The Merits of Meritocracy

4–5 minutes

I shared another Substack post, but I want to expand it a bit here. On the Substack version, I conspicuously didn’t name certain obvious names, but here, I shall. I also left out a reference to Plato’s Republic.

Meritocracy, and the men who would not deny it

The current American regime is built on meritocracy, and – this is the part everyone misses – it would not deny the charge. It rather likes the word. It uses the reinterpreted version, the laundered one my other essay was about, in which merit means precisely whatever the sovereign has decided it should mean this morning. Accuse them of meritocracy, and they will thank you for noticing.

Take the man at the centre of it. Whether Donald Trump is meritorious is not, in the end, a question about Donald Trump. It is a question about which ontological grammar you happen to be speaking, because the grammar constitutes the object before a single fact is admitted into evidence. This is the whole Language Insufficiency point in miniature: the frame quietly does the work the facts are later congratulated for.

To Cohort A, he is a charismatic and self-made businessman. The six bankruptcies are not failures but proof of a shrewd operator who knows how to play the game and walk away intact – power-mind, killer instinct, the art of the deal. That he has a decades-long habit of not paying his contractors, and an even longer one of not paying his tax, does not indict him; it endears him. It makes him the everyman who beat the system the rest of us merely resent. A working-class hero, if you can manage it, descending on a golden escalator.

To Cohort B – and I’ll confess my membership, since honesty is cheaper than the pretence of the view from nowhere – he is a less likeable Forrest Gump: a man forever arriving at the centre of history without ever quite grasping how he got there, weaponising a charisma that works only on the already-mesmerised, and rebuilding the world with himself at the origin. He has a certain gravity. It attracts sycophants and rewards them, which is the only merit test his court reliably administers.

Same man. Two grammars. The ‘merit’ resides in neither the man nor the record; it is assigned by the frame and then invoiced to the evidence. Which is exactly the thesis of the parent essay, now wearing a name tag.

The downward stroke, said plainly

The parent essay left the reverse operation as a coy ‘phrase in current circulation’. I’ll say it here without the euphemism: DEI hire. The move is to take career civil servants – people with decades of demonstrable domain competence, whatever their private politics – and broad-brush them as diversity appointments, which is to say, unqualified by definition, arrived by an unauthorised route. The vacancies then fill with those who have pledged fealty and displayed the one indispensable qualification: a flexible integrity. The competent are marked down for being the wrong sort; the pliant are marked up for being biddable. ‘Incompetent’ has been quietly reissued to mean not ours, and ‘qualified’ to mean loyal. Same machine, thrown into reverse – now with a name engraved on the lever.

The cream, and the dimension it rose along

Which brings me, as these things do, to Plato. The Substack piece used his ship of state – the crew who master the mutiny rather than the sea. Here I want the other half of the same complaint: the comfortable conviction that the meritorious rise to the top like cream.

They do rise. That was never in dispute. What the metaphor conceals is the dimension along which they rose. These people are genuinely competent – at working the system, at the acquisition and retention of position – which is a wholly different skill from governing, and precisely the one we so conveniently assume we were measuring. Cream rises; so does scum; the trope declines to specify which, and physics is no help at all.

This is the standing problem of republicanism – and no, before anyone lunges for the comment box, I do not mean the Republican Party, which has its own well-stocked catalogue of failures, as do the Democrats, who would be unwise to feel smug reading this. Nor is any of it uniquely American. If you are somewhere else entirely, enjoying the spectacle from a safe distance, do put the popcorn down. The mechanism by which a society mistakes competence-at-ascending for competence-at-ruling is not a national defect. It is a design flaw in selection itself, and your country installed it too.

I will not, on this occasion, start in on the failings of democracy as a system. Been there; done that. There are only so many sacred cows a man can tip before lunch.

The question, once more

‘Meritocracy’ survives all of this the way it survives everything – by never once being asked the only question that matters: merit at what, judged by whom, to whose benefit? Put it to the present court, and the answer is almost embarrassingly legible. Which is, of course, exactly why the question is never put.

Discomfort of You

2–3 minutes

NB: The following post will be entirely human-generated, with no LLM involvement – except for the cover image rendered by Gemini. It will also be brief.

I am (still, perpetually) learning French, and I use Anki to help me. I recommend it for standard and non-standard flashcard uses. Recently, I asked ChatGPT to generate a CSV with phrases for the front and back of the cards, for example:

Front: I will be able to visit France next year.

Back: Je pourrai visiter la France l’année prochaine. (futur simple)

I found the pack useful, but a few days later (today), I asked for more than first-person perspectives, as well as additional tenses. I entered this prompt, which is what triggered this blog entry:

‘You’ rendered this for me. Might you generate a similar file that I can use to import to Anki that includes versions other than first-person singular? Future tenses would be helpful as well.

Notice the ‘you‘ in scare quotes – inverted commas.

It’s no secret that I am partial to the episodic selves of Galen Strawson in contrast with diachronic selves, which is to say that I don;t believe that the you or the I or yesterday – or even a second ago – is intrinsically the same person. I’ve explained this elsewhere, so I’ll leave it here.

As much as I feel this way, I don’t feel put off referring to myself as myself or I – me, myself, and I – or to you as you, but I am more consciously uncomfortable with addressing an LLM as you, as demonstrated.

I know full well that each prompt and response is to a different instance of the LLM – a different episode. Unless the LLM accesses an earlier conversation in memory – and I use this term loosely here, too – it would not retain context, and the absence of you-ness would be painfully obvious.

I don;t believe that the self of people is functionally any different. Obviously, humans are carbon-based rather than silicon-based, and storage and retrieval operate differently beyond the substrates, but the mechanism is metaphorically similar.

Does anyone else feel dis-ease in addressing an LLM in the second person? Or is it just me – or me?

My Philosophical Position: Language [5/10]

This is the fifth of a deeper look into ten philosophical positions. This one is on convergence realism within the category of epistemology. A full article is available on Substack, with supporting information on a recent post here on Philosophics Blog.

Below is a ~5-minute short podcast.

Language works, but not uniformly.

Its effectiveness declines as the conceptual complexity, abstraction, contestability, contextual dependence, and institutional burden of what it is asked to communicate increase. We routinely mistake grammatical fluency for semantic precision and social agreement for shared reference.

I describe this through an Effectiveness–Complexity Gradient:

Invariants are comparatively stable terms with constrained error ranges.

Contestables remain usable but acquire their force within normative or institutional frameworks.

Fluids drift across contexts and disciplines, preserving family resemblance without reliable closure.

Ineffables mark domains where propositional language collapses into metaphor, gesture, paradox, or silence.

These are not ontological species. They are diagnostic regions along a gradient. The important feature is not the label but the rate at which apparent linguistic effectiveness decays as conceptual load increases.

My Philosophical Position: Selfhood and Personal Identity [4/10]

This is the fourth of a deeper look into ten philosophical positions. This one is on convergence realism within the category of epistemology. A full article is available on Substack, with supporting information on a recent post here on Philosophics Blog.

Below is a ~5-minute short podcast.

I don’t regard the self as a persistent entity travelling through time while accumulating experiences like stamps in a metaphysical passport.

The first-person “I” is an indexical compression. It marks the presently organised locus of perspective, salience, memory-access, and action. It is indispensable, but indispensability does not establish an inner owner to which the index refers.

The diachronic self is a broader compression: a narrative, biological, documentary, interpersonal, and institutional device for tracking selected continuities across time. Memory contributes to this, but memory is lossy, reconstructive, and uneven. The person remembered is not transported intact into the act of remembering.

On LLMs and Understanding

In this Substack essay, I explore the flawed nature of human comprehension, arguing that our understanding is often just a calculation of probability rather than an objective grasp of truth. By examining linguistic errors like misheard lyrics and his own struggles with French phonemes, Willis demonstrates that humans frequently hallucinate or misinterpret data based on what seems most plausible. He compares these mental lapses to the ‘hallucinations’ of Large Language Models, suggesting that the mistakes made by AI are fundamentally similar to our own. The author contends that we apply a double standard by granting humans the status of ‘understanding’ while dismissing machines for the exact same predictive behaviours. Ultimately, the text challenges the metaphysical assumptions of human exceptionalism, asserting that what we call ‘understanding’ is merely an external attribution rather than a unique internal state.

Essentially, I am not advocating the view that LLMs have consciousness and understanding; rather, I am arguing that the human versions of these are inflated with metaphysics.

My Philosophical Position: Objectivity and Realism [3/10]

This is the third of a deeper look into ten philosophical positions. This one is on convergence realism within the category of epistemology. A full article is available on Substack, with supporting information on a recent post here on Philosophics Blog.

Below is a ~5-minute short podcast.

My Philosophical Position: Ontology [2/10]

This is the second of a deeper look into ten philosophical positions. This one is on mediated encounter realism (ontology) within the category of metaphysics and ontology. A full article is available on Substack, with supporting information on a recent post here on Philosophics Blog.

Below is a ~5-minute short podcast.

My Philosophical Position: Metaphilosophy [1/10]

This is the first of a deeper look into my position of diagnostic anti-foundationalism within the category of philosophical method for metaphilosophy. A full article is available on Substack, with supporting information on a recent post here on Philosophics Blog.

Below is a ~5-minute short podcast.

Summary of Some of My Philosophical Positions

The question is reasonable, although belief may already be doing more work than I would permit it under cross-examination. My writing is generally diagnostic rather than doctrinal. I am more interested in identifying the architectural assumptions beneath a dispute than in selecting a furnished room within it. Where philosophy offers a contest between established positions, I often suspect that the arena itself has been badly designed.

Still, repeated diagnoses eventually disclose a pattern. Certain commitments recur: suspicion of substance, resistance to metaphysical inflation, distrust of linguistic confidence, rejection of moral realism, scepticism toward persistent personal identity, and an insistence that mediation does not entail fabrication.

What follows is therefore neither a creed nor a completed system. It is a provisional map of where I presently stand.

The labels are intended as coordinates, not allegiances. Where no established term quite fits, I have used my own. This is partly unavoidable and partly evidence for the very linguistic difficulty I spend so much time diagnosing.

This content, including video and podcast summary, are of a longer Substack article on my philosophical positions with descriptions.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.