Solidarity as a Local Moral Grammar

24–37 minutes

Although I didn’t want to publish a formal essay, I wanted to produce something otherwise rigorous. The references I make are of the authored piece I am critiquing – MacIntyre, Žižek, Lacan – I’ve discussed these figures and their works, sometimes at length.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast discussion of this content.

Preamble: Setting the Encounter

Over the past several weeks, Otti Vogt and I have been circling one another in public threads on leadership, solidarity, ethics, and what might loosely be called the moral architecture of social life. At moments, we converge; more often, we don’t. The exchanges have been serious, occasionally sharp, and – credit where it’s due – largely conducted in good faith.

Recently, Otti published a more explicit articulation of the ontological commitments underlying his work – The Future of Flourishing: Toward a Dialectical Spiritual Realist Social Ontology (DRS) – a framework grounded in participatory metaphysics, virtue ethics, and an objective conception of the Good, oriented toward human flourishing. In doing so, he has done something both generous and rare in contemporary discourse: he has made his meta-assumptions visible. That gesture deserves to be taken seriously. This response is written in that spirit.

For my part, I have already shared a different set of commitments, most notably what I call the Mediated Encounter Ontology (MEOW) and the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (LIH). These are not counter-ontologies in the conventional sense, nor are they offered as replacements for the metaphysical structures Otti defends. They are diagnostic lenses. Their purpose is to foreground mediation, semantic drift, power asymmetries, and the limits of moral language – especially where that language is asked to perform stabilising or universalising work it cannot reliably sustain.

What follows, then, is not a refutation from within Otti’s framework, nor an attempt to ‘correct’ his ontology by substituting another in its place. It is an analysis conducted from a philosophy of language that explicitly rejects the need for the kind of metaphysical grounding his project presupposes.

That distinction matters. Much philosophical disagreement fails not because arguments are weak, but because interlocutors believe they are disputing conclusions when they are, in fact, operating with incompatible assumptions about what language can do, how meaning holds, and where normativity comes from.

Accordingly, I will first restate Otti’s position as charitably and accurately as possible, including the conditions under which it appears to work well. I will then apply MEOW and LIH as analytic lenses – not to score points, but to observe how this framework behaves under pressure: across time, across groups, and across material and organisational realities. Finally, I will explain why, despite its internal coherence and aspirational appeal, I regard the project as structurally unsustainable beyond tightly aligned in-groups.

This is a polemic, but not a casual one. It is written in respect of the seriousness of the work, and in full awareness that the disagreement it traces is unlikely to be resolved. I do not expect to publish this as a formal preprint, but I have structured it much as I otherwise would. The latitude afforded by a blog is used here not to loosen standards, but to speak more plainly about where the fault-lines actually lie.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of the original DSR essay.

1. Restating the Ontology (On Its Own Terms)

At its strongest, Otti Vogt’s framework is an attempt to rescue ethics, leadership, and social solidarity from what he takes to be the exhaustion of proceduralism, relativism, and technocratic management. The diagnosis is familiar but not trivial: without a shared moral horizon, collective action collapses into preference aggregation, power struggles, or managerial optimisation masquerading as value-neutral necessity. Against this, Otti proposes a participatory social ontology grounded in three interlocking commitments.

Moral claims are not merely expressions of preference, strategic coordination devices, or retrospective rationalisations of power. They track something objective, even if imperfectly. The Good is not constructed ex nihilo by consensus, nor generated procedurally through participation; rather, participation presupposes it. Solidarity, dignity, and justice do not emerge bottom-up from agreement alone, but from orientation toward a moral reality that precedes and exceeds any given social formation.

Individuals are not pre-social atoms who later enter into moral contracts, but beings-in-relation whose identities are shaped through participation in shared practices, institutions, and meanings. Drawing on Aristotelian virtue ethics, Christian theology, and strands of critical realism, Otti treats ethical formation not as rule-following but as the cultivation of practical wisdom within an ordered moral ecology. Virtue, here, is not compliance but excellence-in-relation.

Change does not occur through rule revision alone, nor through technocratic optimisation, but through what might be called moral morphogenesis: the transformation of agents and structures together as they orient themselves toward better forms of collective life. Leadership, on this view, is not managerial control but ethical mediation – holding open a space in which shared participation in the Good can occur.

Importantly, this is not presented as naïve moralism. Otti is explicit that causality and ethics must be distinguished, that material conditions matter, and that social systems operate across stratified domains. His engagement with Bhaskar, Archer, and Duindam is meant to secure this distinction without collapsing ethics into natural determinism. Likewise, his invocation of Lacan and Žižek is intended to show that absence, lack, and non-identity are not defects to be eliminated, but productive tensions that drive ethical becoming rather than undermining it. On the happy path, this framework is compelling.

In small, relatively homogeneous groups – especially those already sharing a thick moral vocabulary – it offers a powerful grammar for meaning-making. It legitimises ethical judgment without reducing it to preference. It resists the flattening tendencies of procedural liberalism. It offers leaders a language richer than metrics and incentives, while avoiding crude authoritarianism. And it gives participants a sense that their actions matter not merely instrumentally, but as contributions to something genuinely worthwhile.

If one already accepts its metaphysical premises, the system is internally coherent. More than that, it is motivational, aspirational, and – within its own frame – normatively robust. That coherence is not in dispute.

What is in dispute is what happens when this framework leaves the happy path: when participants do not already share the ontology, when meanings drift over time, when organisational power intervenes, and when the language of participation is asked to scale beyond aligned in-groups into contested social reality. That is where the analysis begins.

2. Where the Framework Breaks: Boundary Conditions, Not Bad Faith

The first pressure point appears the moment participation is treated as if it occurs within an open, neutral moral field.

It doesn’t.

Participation always takes place inside an already-structured semantic environment. Values, goods, virtues, and ends are never encountered as raw givens, but as pre-formatted invitations. One does not simply ‘enter’ participation; one enters a space whose grammar has been written in advance, whose concepts already carry weight, direction, and implied hierarchies of legitimacy. This is not an accidental feature of social life. It is constitutive of it.

To participate is to move within a field of meanings that already distinguishes sense from nonsense, virtue from vice, maturity from immaturity, insight from confusion. Even when those distinctions are contested, the contest itself presupposes a shared language in which disagreement can appear as intelligible disagreement rather than noise.

This matters because Otti’s framework consistently treats participation as if it were epistemically generous and normatively hospitable by default. Yet participation is never merely an invitation; it is also a constraint. It shapes what can be said without sanction, which forms of dissent register as good-faith critique, and which appear as moral immaturity, resistance, or failure to ‘grasp the horizon’.

The moment a moral centre is posited – however dialectical, however participatory – it generates a gradient of alignment. Some positions sit closer to the centre and therefore appear clearer, wiser, more attuned. Others sit further out and must explain themselves, translate themselves, or justify their deviance from what is increasingly experienced as common sense. This is not a corruption of participatory ethics. It is its inevitable consequence.

Even if the Good is not imposed but ‘participated in,’ participation itself is never symmetrical. Someone always articulates the terms. Someone always curates the language. Someone always has greater fluency in the idiom of the Good and thus greater interpretive authority over what participation currently requires.

In practice, this produces a familiar asymmetry: those already aligned with the metaphysical grammar experience the framework as expansive and liberating, while those outside it experience it as invisible pressure. They are not coerced in any crude sense, but they are nonetheless nudged, corrected, reoriented, or quietly marginalised. The boundary condition, then, is simple but decisive: Participation does not erase power. It reconfigures it.

The claim that solidarity arises from participation in the Good rather than from procedure does not eliminate enforcement; it relocates it upstream, into ontology. What had previously been contested politically now appears as a matter of moral attunement or ontological adequacy. This is especially significant when the framework encounters out-groups.

For those who do not already share the metaphysical commitments – who do not recognise the same Good, or who reject the idea that such a Good exists independently of social negotiation – participation becomes conditional. Entry requires translation into a language they did not choose. Dissent must be framed in terms that already concede too much.

At that point, participation ceases to be an open moral practice and becomes something closer to initiatory alignment. This does not make the framework incoherent. It makes it local.

The problem arises only when a local moral grammar presents itself as foundational, scalable, or universally binding – when its boundary conditions are treated as philosophical necessities rather than contingent achievements. That transition is where the trouble begins.

3. Virtue as a Fluid: The Instability at the Centre

The next fault line emerges around virtue itself. Within Otti’s framework, virtue is no longer merely a description of excellence-in-practice, nor even a tradition-bound cultivation of character in recognisable forms of life. It becomes something more elusive: a dynamic orientation toward the Good, realised through participatory attunement rather than rule-following or procedural compliance.

On the surface, this looks like a strength. It avoids legalism. It avoids rigid codification. It allows for context, judgment, and development over time. But this move has a cost.

Once virtue is abstracted from stable practices and anchored instead to a transcendent moral horizon, it becomes semantically fluid. Its content is no longer secured by what people reliably do well together, but by how well their dispositions appear aligned with an ideal that itself resists definitive articulation.

At this point, virtue quietly changes function. It ceases to operate primarily as a descriptive account of excellence within a practice and becomes prescriptive as a mode of conformity to an interpretive centre. The question shifts from ‘What does excellence look like here?’ to ‘How well does this agent instantiate the orientation we recognise as virtuous?’

MacIntyre already gestures toward this danger, though he does not fully escape it. His attempt to recover virtue through traditions of practice depends on the relative stability of those traditions. Once the tradition fragments or pluralises, virtue must either harden into orthodoxy or soften into abstraction. Otti’s framework opts for the latter, but abstraction does not dissolve authority; it redistributes it.

When virtue becomes fluid, it also becomes indexical. Its meaning is determined less by shared activity than by ongoing interpretation. And interpretation, inevitably, has interpreters.

Those most fluent in the language of the Good become de facto arbiters of what virtue currently requires. Those less fluent must demonstrate sincerity, openness, or willingness to be formed. Virtue, in other words, becomes something one is recognised as having rather than something one demonstrably does. This produces a subtle but powerful inversion.

Instead of virtue disciplining ideals through lived practice, ideals discipline agents through moral evaluation. What begins as openness hardens into expectation. What begins as formation shades into assessment. What begins as aspiration becomes normativity with softer edges but firmer reach.

The fluidity of virtue does not eliminate moral pressure. It intensifies it, precisely because it lacks clear boundaries. And this is where temporal drift compounds the problem.

If virtue is continuously rearticulated in light of a transcendent Good, then yesterday’s excellence may become today’s deficiency – not because practices failed, but because the interpretive centre shifted. The agent who was once exemplary now appears insufficiently attuned. Correction follows. Alignment is requested. Resistance is reclassified as misunderstanding. None of this requires bad faith. None of it requires domination. It emerges naturally from the structure.

A virtue ethics that cannot tolerate virtue disagreement without moralising it is no longer describing excellence. It is managing deviation. This is not an argument against virtue per se. It is an argument against virtue untethered from stable practices and reattached to metaphysical ideals whose interpretation remains necessarily contested. Once virtue becomes a fluid, it stops being a guide to excellence and starts functioning as a solvent – dissolving difference while claiming to honour it.

Interlude: Interpretation, Gravity, and the Problem of Innocent Power

At this point, it is tempting to reassure ourselves that none of the above entails domination, coercion, or even hierarchy in any crude sense. After all, the framework under discussion explicitly rejects authoritarianism, emphasises participation, and repeatedly insists that the Good is not imposed but disclosed through relational engagement. This reassurance is sincere. It is also insufficient.

The problem is not that leaders within such a framework intend to exert power. The problem is that interpretation exerts power regardless of intention.

Any system oriented toward a transcendent Good requires interpretation. Someone must articulate what participation looks like here, now, under these conditions. Someone must distinguish fidelity from distortion, growth from regression, openness from refusal. These judgments cannot be automated, proceduralised, or dissolved into pure dialogue. They must be made.

Where judgments are made, gravity forms. This is not a psychological claim about ego, nor a moral accusation about bad faith. It is a structural observation. Interpretive authority emerges wherever meaning is stabilised long enough to guide action. The more abstract and elevated the referent, the greater the interpretive leverage required to render it actionable. The paradox is this: the more a leader insists they are not exercising authority, the harder their authority becomes to contest.

When normativity is framed as participation in the Good rather than compliance with rules, disagreement does not present itself as disagreement. It presents itself as misalignment, immaturity, or insufficient formation. Resistance is redescribed not as an alternative judgment but as a failure of attunement.

At this point, critique becomes difficult without appearing morally suspect. This is what gives participatory metaphysics its peculiar force. It does not silence opposition; it spiritualises it. Dissenters are not wrong so much as ‘not yet there’. Their objections are not refuted; they are absorbed into a narrative of ongoing formation.

This is not coercion. It is more effective than coercion. Even if a leader sincerely wishes not to exert gravity, the structure ensures that gravity accumulates around them. Those closest to the interpretive centre appear most aligned with the Good. Their judgments carry more weight. Their language becomes the idiom through which virtue is recognised.

If a leader truly did not wish to exert gravity, the most consistent action would be not to lead. But leadership, by definition, involves orientation. Orientation requires reference points. Reference points generate asymmetry. Asymmetry generates power.

The framework attempts to resolve this by redescribing hierarchy as ‘participatory’ rather than directive, and authority as ‘mediating’ rather than commanding. Yet this is a semantic reconfiguration, not a structural one. The same dynamics persist under gentler names. What disappears is not power, but its visibility. And power that cannot be named cannot be resisted. It can only be internalised.

This is the point at which metaphysics becomes political, whether it intends to or not. The claim that the Good is objective does not neutralise power. It sanctifies it.

4. Temporal Semantic Drift: Why Moral Centres Do Not Hold

Even if one grants – charitably – that participatory metaphysics can function without collapsing into interpretive domination in the short term, it remains vulnerable to a more corrosive force: time.

Moral centres do not fail all at once. They drift. The framework under discussion acknowledges this in principle. It speaks of dialectical movement, of gaps between actuality and the Good, of ongoing formation rather than static completion. On paper, this appears to inoculate it against rigidity.

In practice, it does the opposite. A moral centre that must continuously reinterpret itself in light of a transcendent horizon is never neutral. Each iteration reorders what counts as fidelity, maturity, and alignment. What was virtuous yesterday may become insufficient today – not because practices degraded, but because the interpretive frame shifted.

This is not accidental. It is intrinsic. Because the Good is not fully specifiable, its articulation is always provisional. But provisional articulations still carry normative force. People organise their lives around them. Careers, identities, reputations, and exclusions follow.

Then the centre moves. Those who move with it appear wise, flexible, and developmentally advanced. Those who hesitate appear resistant. Those who remain where they are appear obstructive. Drift is redescribed as growth, and displacement as failure to keep up.

This is how moral projects shed members without ever formally excluding them. At Time-nought, alignment feels communal. At Time-one, it becomes selective. At Time-two, it becomes justificatory. By the time the pattern is visible, the language of solidarity has already done its work.

Transductive subjectivity intensifies this effect. Because subjects and structures co-constitute one another, each moment of participation subtly reshapes the field itself. The centre is never merely followed; it is reproduced through enactment. Drift compounds. What results is not pluralism, but path dependency.

Early interpretations disproportionately shape later possibilities. Foundational voices become canonical. Corrective gestures are framed as recoveries rather than revisions. The centre insists it is merely unfolding what was always implicit. At this point, appeals to the Good no longer function as orientation. They function as retrospective validation. This is where temporal semantic drift becomes decisive.

Key terms – virtue, flourishing, participation, solidarity – do not remain semantically stable across contexts or generations. They accrete meaning through use, conflict, and institutionalisation. To claim continuity is to perform continuity, not to demonstrate it.

The framework attempts to resolve this by appealing to a stable moral horizon beyond language. But this simply relocates the problem. The horizon does not speak. People do.

Every attempt to stabilise meaning across time requires custodians. Custodianship introduces authority. Authority introduces exclusion. Exclusion introduces rationalisation. None of this implies malice. It implies entropy.

What works in a tightly aligned founding cohort does not survive scale, succession, or stress. History is littered with ethical systems that were internally coherent, sincerely motivated, and initially generative – until drift revealed the cost of maintaining coherence.

The claim is not that moral projects inevitably fail. It is that they cannot guarantee their own continuity without paying a price.

Participatory metaphysics offers no mechanism for escaping this. It offers only better reasons for why the price was necessary.

Interlude II: On Borrowing Žižek to Refute Žižek

At this point, a further tension must be addressed directly, because it is not incidental. It sits at the conceptual core of the framework itself.

Otti explicitly invokes Žižek and Lacan to demonstrate that absence, lack, and non-identity are not pathological failures to be overcome, but productive features of subjectivity and social life. This move is intended to show that participatory metaphysics can accommodate negativity, incompleteness, and instability without collapsing into relativism or nihilism. The intention is understandable. The result is incoherent.

Žižek’s central claim is not merely that the Big Other is fractured, incomplete, or imperfectly realised. It is that the Big Other does not exist. There is no transcendent guarantor of meaning, no symbolic authority that secures coherence from beyond the field of human practices. To ‘traverse the fantasy’ is precisely to accept this absence, not to redescribe it in more sophisticated terms.

Lacan’s notion of constitutive lack is not a privation awaiting fulfilment. It is not a gap that participation can close. It is an ontological condition: the impossibility of any final anchoring of meaning, identity, or desire. Lack is not productive because it gestures toward plenitude; it is productive because plenitude is structurally impossible. This is where the framework under review performs a decisive sleight of hand.

By mapping Lacanian lack onto Bhaskar’s concept of real absence, the argument treats both as ‘modes of non-being that nonetheless exercise causal force’. But this collapses a distinction that Žižek and Lacan insist upon. Bhaskar’s absences are, in principle, fillable: the missing resource, the unjust structure, the preventable harm. Lacan’s lack is not. Attempts to fill it do not resolve the problem; they generate new symptoms, new fantasies, new forms of misrecognition. To invoke Lacan in support of a transcendent Good is therefore not a creative synthesis. It is a misappropriation.

What results is the reinstallation of precisely what psychoanalysis dismantles: a symbolic guarantor that promises coherence, orientation, and resolution. The Good becomes the ultimate Big Other – disavowed, abstracted, and rendered untouchable by those who claim merely to participate in it. This is not a minor theoretical inconsistency. It reveals the deeper strategy at work.

The framework borrows the critical sophistication of post-structural thought to inoculate itself against charges of naivety, while quietly reinstalling a classical metaphysics that those same thinkers spent their careers undoing. Absence is affirmed rhetorically, only to be neutralised ontologically. Negativity is welcomed, but only insofar as it can be oriented toward a pre-existing moral horizon. In effect, the language of lack is used to smuggle in fullness.

Once this move is made, the rest follows predictably. Interpretation acquires authority. Participation acquires normativity. Dissent becomes misrecognition. And the Good, now safely beyond contestation, does exactly the work the Big Other has always done – only with better philosophical cover.

5. Transductive Subjectivity: Participation Rewrites the Good

The final pressure point is not historical but immediate. Even if one brackets time, tradition, and institutional inertia, the framework still assumes something that does not hold: that subjects can participate in the Good without becoming co-authors of it. This is where transductive subjectivity becomes decisive.

Subjects are not vessels into which ethical form is poured. They are mediating agents. Every act of participation feeds back into the system that solicited it. Meaning is not transmitted intact; it is refracted through position, interest, fear, aspiration, and interpretation. Participation does not preserve coherence. It produces variance.

This is not a flaw in human beings. It is how social systems function. Each interaction slightly reshapes the normative field, altering expectations, redefining what counts as success, recalibrating what virtue now looks like in practice. Multiply this across hundreds or thousands of agents, and the idea of a stable moral centre becomes untenable without aggressive correction.

Here, Archer’s morphogenetic insight quietly undermines the aspiration of ethical constancy. Structures condition action, action transforms structure, and the cycle repeats. There is no equilibrium point. The system is always becoming something slightly different from what it was meant to be.

From within the framework, this is often redescribed as growth, maturation, or deepening participation. From a systems perspective, it is drift under another name. Either participation rewrites the Good, or the Good rewrites participants. There is no third option.

What holds such systems together is not metaphysical participation, but selective reinforcement. Certain interpretations of virtue are amplified; others fade. Some agents are rewarded as exemplars; others are marked as misaligned. Over time, the system converges not on the Good, but on what is most compatible with its own survival. At this point, solidarity no longer links virtue to the common good. It links conformity to belonging.

This is why ‘participative flourishing’ is not a distinct category so much as a rhetorical intensifier. Flourishing is always participative in the tautological sense that humans act together. The adjective matters only when it is doing boundary work: distinguishing authentic participation from deviant engagement. And that distinction is never neutral.

Once transductive feedback is acknowledged, the best-case scenario becomes clear. The framework can temporarily stabilise a coherent moral culture for a relatively homogeneous group. It may feel meaningful, even liberating, from within.

But it will not scale without exclusion. It will not persist without maintenance. And it will not survive contact with materially divergent lives without becoming prescriptive. This is not cynicism. It is mechanics.

6. Leadership, Power, and the Reality of Organisational Life

All of the above tensions sharpen dramatically once we leave ‘society’ in the abstract and enter organisations. Organisations are not voluntary moral laboratories. They are asymmetric structures with built-in coercion, however politely framed. Participation is rarely free when the alternative is unemployment, precarity, or social marginalisation. Exit costs matter. Silence matters. Compliance matters. This is where appeals to solidarity, virtue, and shared flourishing acquire a different texture.

In organisational settings, leadership does not operate via participative democracy. Its function is not collective deliberation, but directional coordination. Leaders set priorities, allocate resources, and define success metrics. Even the most ‘inclusive’ leadership models ultimately require alignment, not pluralism. Consultation can be widened; directionality cannot be abolished without abolishing the role itself. This produces a structural contradiction.

On the one hand, the rhetoric insists that ethics flows from participation in a shared Good. On the other, participation itself is conditioned by hierarchy. A leader may deny being a centre of gravity, but gravity does not ask permission. The mere ability to define vision, values, or culture already exerts force.

Under these conditions, solidarity does not simply emerge. It is staged. Employees learn quickly which interpretations of virtue are rewarded, which forms of dissent are tolerated, and which are quietly penalised. Moral language becomes a signalling system long before it becomes a compass.

The danger here is not cartoon authoritarianism. It is something subtler and more durable: moral capture. By this I mean the process through which ethical vocabulary is absorbed into institutional incentives, such that ‘goodness’ becomes legible primarily as compliance with the organisation’s preferred self-description. Ethics becomes a loyalty test. Solidarity becomes alignment. Flourishing becomes a synonym for fit.

This is why organisational utopias tend to function best in small, ideologically homogeneous groups and become brittle as complexity increases. Add more agents, more roles, more external pressures, and more disagreement about what ‘good work’ even is, and the system faces a choice between diversity of perspective and coherence of direction. History suggests it usually chooses the latter.

Religious movements, political vanguards, start-ups, consultancies, and ‘values-led’ enterprises all confront the same dilemma. Harmony is easy when dissenters are excluded early. It becomes harder once heterogeneity enters the system. At that point, solidarity either thins into vacuous slogans or hardens into enforcement.

Girard would recognise the pattern immediately: cohesion is often purchased by identifying the misfit, the blocker, the ‘toxic’ element – the one who must be managed out so that the group can experience itself as good.

The claim that better formation, transparency, or distributed leadership can resolve this misunderstands the problem. These tools can redistribute labour and reduce certain abuses. They do not eliminate asymmetry. Someone still defines the centre, even when it is dressed up as ‘process’, ‘culture’, or ‘shared ownership’. A moral horizon interpreted by a few will, reliably, become a moral demand placed upon the many. Which brings us to the unavoidable conclusion.

7. What This Critique Is (and Is Not)

This critique is not a defence of relativism-for-fun, nor of nihilism-as-apathy. I am a nihilist in a narrow, technical sense: I deny the existence of inherent meanings that are not invented, stabilised, and transmitted through language and practice. Meaning is not discovered intact in the world; it is negotiated, maintained, and contested. That position does not entail indifference. It entails vigilance.

If meanings are made rather than given, then they require care. They require scrutiny. They require attention to who is doing the naming, who benefits from the stabilisation, and who is being asked to align. Nihilism, in this sense, is not a shrug. It is a refusal to outsource responsibility to metaphysics.

In practical terms, this means treating ethical claims as proposals rather than discoveries, responsibilities rather than revelations, and commitments that must be defended in public rather than secured by ontological guarantee. It means accepting that moral authority is something we negotiate and sustain together, not something we uncover already intact and binding.

Nor is this an argument against local moral projects. Communities can and do organise themselves around shared goods, shared narratives, and shared aspirations. Such projects can be meaningful, motivating, and even life-sustaining. But they are also contingent, temporary, and sustained only through ongoing renegotiation.

What works for a particular group, at a particular moment, under particular conditions, does not thereby acquire universal authority. Moral coherence achieved locally does not scale automatically, and it does not endure without friction. That is not a failure of ethics. It is the cost of plurality and time.

The problem arises only when local moral projects mistake their internal coherence for external legitimacy. When they present themselves not as one way of organising meaning, but as a foundational ontology, a scalable ethical architecture, or a universally binding account of the Good.

At that point, disagreement ceases to register as intelligible difference and becomes moral deficiency. Dissent is redescribed as immaturity. Refusal is framed as lack of formation. And ethics quietly crosses the line from orientation into governance. This critique is aimed precisely at that crossing.

8. Conclusion: A Local Moral Project, Not a Universal Architecture

Taken on its own terms, this ontology is serious, internally coherent, and animated by a genuine concern for moral decay, procedural emptiness, and the hollowness of technocratic governance. It is not frivolous work. It is not cynical work. It is work born of dissatisfaction with thin ethics and a desire to recover meaning, orientation, and responsibility. But that does not make it universal.

What this framework offers is best understood not as a foundational solution to ethics, leadership, or societal becoming, but as a local moral project: a thick, tradition-inflected grammar capable of organising commitment among those already disposed to its metaphysical and ethical premises.

Within such in-groups, it may function well. It can generate shared language, reinforce norms, motivate sacrifice, and provide a sense of direction. It may even feel emancipatory, precisely because it relieves participants of the burden of perpetual moral indeterminacy. That relief is not incidental. It is the primary psychological reward such frameworks offer.

What it cannot do, without remainder, is scale across plural moral landscapes without reintroducing coercion under another name.

The moment the framework encounters agents who do not recognise its metaphysical centre, virtue ceases to orient and begins to adjudicate. Solidarity becomes conditional. Participation becomes aspirational compliance. Flourishing becomes legible only to those who already speak the language.

This is not a failure of goodwill. It is the inevitable consequence of grounding ethics in a substantive vision of the Good rather than in negotiated coexistence under conditions of deep disagreement.

Attempts to resolve this by appeal to deeper formation, better leadership, or more refined ontological articulation misunderstand the problem. The obstacle is not insufficient sophistication. It is the impossibility of securing universal normative authority without either emptying ethics of content or enforcing it through power. History does not suggest a third option.

To acknowledge this is not to abandon ethics, nor to retreat into relativism or nihilism-as-apathy. It is to recognise that moral systems are provisional, situated, and sustained through ongoing negotiation rather than metaphysical guarantees. Meaning is made, not discovered intact. And whatever coherence we achieve is fragile, temporary, and bought at the cost of exclusion.

If this ontology were presented as one compelling way of organising moral life among those who freely choose it, there would be little to object to. The trouble begins only when it is asked to do more than it can bear: to ground, to bind, to scale, and to endure without remainder. That expectation is not just ambitious. It is precisely the illusion that has undone every such project before.

9. Closing: Admirable Aspirations, Ancient Failure Modes

The desire animating this ontology is admirable. So were many before it. Projects of moral renewal rarely fail because their intentions are corrupt. They fail because they underestimate three forces that never go away: semantic drift, human difference, and the stubborn refusal of people to remain aligned over time without someone being marginalised, disciplined, or expelled. What works at Time-nought rarely survives Time-one.

At the outset, shared language feels like shared purpose. Participation feels voluntary. Solidarity feels mutual. But as contexts shift, meanings stretch, and pressures accumulate, the system must either loosen its grip or tighten it. History suggests it almost always chooses the latter, while continuing to speak the language of the former.

This framework may function well as an in-group grammar. It may even be nourishing there. Within aligned communities, it can generate coherence, motivation, and a genuine sense of ethical direction. That should not be dismissed.

But once pressed beyond its boundaries, it exhibits the same failure modes we have seen for centuries: moral centres that require constant maintenance, virtues that drift and must be reinterpreted, participation that quietly becomes compliance, and solidarity that depends on exclusion to remain intact. The difference here is not structure, but style.

What we are offered is not a new solution to ethics, leadership, or social order, but a familiar answer articulated with contemporary sophistication and excellent footnotes. That does not make it unserious. It makes it recognisable.

And recognition, in this case, means seeing an old pattern dressed in new language: a moral centre that promises orientation while quietly reintroducing authority, a vision that speaks the grammar of participation while relying on alignment to survive.

The aspiration is admirable. The failure modes are ancient. And no amount of metaphysical refinement has ever abolished them.

Freedom: The Chains That Bind Us Together

Black-and-white illustration of robed figures standing in a forest clearing, forming a circle by linking chains between their hands. The figures appear both united and restrained, illuminated by a pale, radiant light that suggests dawn or revelation. The mood is solemn yet transcendent, symbolising Rousseau’s paradox that freedom and constraint are inseparable. The image appears as a parody Magic: The Gathering card titled “Freedom,” subtitled “Enchantment — Social Contract,” with a quote from Jean-Jacques Rousseau: “To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man.” The art captures the tension between community, bondage, and liberation.

Freedom is a word so overused it’s practically anaemic. Everyone wants it; no one agrees on what it means. It’s been weaponised by tyrants and revolutionaries alike, invoked to justify both the breaking of chains and their reforging in a different metal.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast on this topic.

As I write this, I have just finished Erich Fromm’s A Sane Society. Without derailing this post, he cited a scenario – a description of work communities given in All Things Common, by Claire Huchet Bishop – where in post-WW2 France, a group formed a sort of workers’ coöperative – but it was more than that; it was an anarchosyndicalist experiment. As I read it, I had to cringe at the power ‘voluntary’ transfers that immediately got me thinking of Foucault’s biopower – as I often do. Saving this for a separate post.

Black-and-white illustration of robed figures standing in a forest clearing, forming a circle by linking chains between their hands. The figures appear both united and restrained, illuminated by a pale, radiant light that suggests dawn or revelation. The mood is solemn yet transcendent, symbolising Rousseau’s paradox that freedom and constraint are inseparable. The image appears as a parody Magic: The Gathering card titled “Freedom,” subtitled “Enchantment — Social Contract,” with a quote from Jean-Jacques Rousseau: “To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man.” The art captures the tension between community, bondage, and liberation.
Image: Freedom: The Chains That Bind Us Together
Card 006 from the Postmodern Set – Philosophics.blog

This Critical Theory parody card, Freedom, draws its lineage from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose paradox still haunts the modern condition: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” The card re-enchants that contradiction – an Enchantment – Social Contract that reminds us liberty isn’t a state but a negotiation.

The card reads:

At the beginning of each player’s upkeep, that player may remove a Binding counter from a permanent they control.
Creatures you control can’t be tapped or sacrificed by spells or abilities your opponent controls.

This is Rousseau’s dilemma made mechanical. Freedom is not absolute; it’s procedural. The upkeep represents the maintenance of the social contract—an ongoing renewal, not a one-time event. Every player begins their turn by negotiating what freedom costs. You may remove one Binding counter, but only if you recognise that binding exists.

The flavour text underlines Rousseau’s plea:

“To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man.”

Freedom, for Rousseau, wasn’t about doing whatever one pleased. It was about participating in the moral and civic order that gives action meaning. To exist outside that order is not liberty; it’s anarchy, the tyranny of impulse.

The card, therefore, resists the naïve libertarian reading of freedom as the absence of restraint. It instead depicts freedom as the capacity to act within and through shared constraints.

The art shows a ring of robed figures, hand in hand, their chains forming a circle beneath a clearing sky. It’s a haunting image: freedom through fellowship, bondage through unity. The circle symbolises Rousseau’s idea that true liberty emerges only when individuals subordinate selfish will to the general will – the common interest formed through collective agreement.

Yet there’s also a postmodern irony here: circles can be prisons too. The social contract can emancipate or suffocate, depending on who wrote its terms. The same chains that protect can also bind.

The monochrome aesthetic amplifies the ambiguity – freedom rendered in greyscale, neither utopia nor despair, but the space in between.

Rousseau’s notion of the social contract was revolutionary, but its dissonance still resonates: how can one be free and bound at the same time? He answered that only through the voluntary participation in a collective moral order can humans transcend mere instinct.

We might say that today’s democracies still operate under Freedom (Enchantment – Social Contract). We maintain our rights at the cost of constant negotiation: legal, social, linguistic. Every “Binding counter” removed is the product of civic upkeep. Stop maintaining it, and the enchantment fades.

The card hints at the price of this enchantment: creatures (citizens) can’t be tapped or sacrificed by opponents’ control. In other words, autonomy is secured only when the system prevents external domination. But systems fail, and when they do, the illusion of freedom collapses into coercion.

Rousseau earns a complicated respect in my philosophical canon. He’s not in my top five, but he’s unavoidable. His concept of freedom through the social contract anticipates both modern liberalism and its critique. He believed that genuine liberty required moral community – a notion now eroded by hyper-individualism.

Freedom, as I’ve rendered it here, isn’t celebration. It’s lamentation. The card is about the fragility of the social spell that keeps chaos at bay. We remove one binding at a time, hoping not to unbind ourselves entirely.

Psychology of Totalitarianism

I finished Mattias Desmet’s The Psychology of Totalitarianism, which I mentioned the other day. Unfortunately, my initial optimism was premature. Everything I enjoyed was front-loaded: the first four chapters set up a promising critique of mechanistic rationality and the collapse of shared meaning. Then the book turned into a long, therapeutic sermon. I should have stopped at Chapter 4 and saved myself the sunk-cost regret.

It isn’t that nothing follows; it’s just that what follows is so thin that the cost-benefit ratio goes negative. Once Desmet moves from diagnosis to prescription, the argument collapses into a psychologist’s worldview: an entire civilisation explained through mass neurosis and healed through better intuition. He builds his case on straw versions of reason, science, and modernity, so his ‘cure’ can look revelatory.

The trouble is familiar. Having dismantled rationalism, Desmet then installs intuition as its replacement – an epistemic monarchy by another name. His appeal to empathy and connection reads less like philosophy and more like professional self-promotion. The therapist can’t stop therapising; he privileges the psychological lens over every other possibility.

The result is a reductionist parascience dressed as social theory. The totalitarian mind, in Desmet’s telling, isn’t political or structural but psychological – a patient waiting for insight. I don’t doubt his sincerity, only his scope. It’s what happens when a discipline mistakes its vocabulary for the world.

Desmet’s project ultimately re-enchants what it claims to critique. He wants rationalism redeemed through feeling, order reborn through connection. Dis-Integrationism stops short of that impulse. It accepts fracture as the permanent condition – no higher synthesis, no therapeutic finale. Where Desmet sees totalitarianism as a collective pathology awaiting treatment, I see it as reason’s own reflection in the mirror: a system trying to cure itself of the only disease it knows, the need to be whole.

Missing Pieces of the Anti-Enlightenment Project

5–8 minutes

I’ve just added a new entry to my Anti-Enlightenment corpus, bringing the total to seven – not counting my latest book, The Illusion of Light, that summarises the first six essays and places them in context. This got me thinking about what aspects of critique I might be missing. Given this, what else might I be missing?

Audio: NotebookLM podcast discussion of this topic.

So far, I’ve touched on the areas in the top green table and am considering topics in the bottom red/pink table:

Summary Schema – The Anti-Enlightenment Project – Published Essays

AxisCore QuestionRepresentative Essay(s)
EpistemicWhat counts as “truth”?Objectivity Is Illusion: An Operating Model of Social and Moral Reasoning
PoliticalWhat holds power together?Rational Ghosts: Why Enlightenment Democracy Was Built to Fail; Temporal Ghosts: Tyranny of the Present
PsychologicalWhy do subjects crave rule?Against Agency: The Fiction of the Autonomous Self; The Will to Be Ruled: Totalitarianism and the Fantasy of Freedom
AnthropologicalWhat makes a “normal” human?The Myth of Homo Normalis: Archaeology of the Legible Human
EthicalHow to live after disillusionment?The Discipline of Dis-Integration: Philosophy Without Redemption

Summary Schema – The Anti-Enlightenment Project – Unpublished Essays

AxisCore QuestionRepresentative Essay
Theological (Metaphysical)What remains sacred once transcendence is dismantled?The Absent God: Metaphysics After Meaning
Aesthetic (Affective)How did beauty become moral instruction?The Aesthetic Contract: Beauty as Compliance
Ecological (Post-Human)What happens when the world refuses to remain in the background?The Uncounted World: Ecology and the Non-Human
Linguistic (Semiotic)How does language betray the clarity it promises?The Fractured Tongue: Language Against Itself
Communal (Social Ontology)Can there be community without conformity?The Vanished Commons: Between Isolation and Herd

Below is a summary of the essays already published. These are drawn verbatim from the Anti-Enlightenment Project page.

1. Objectivity Is Illusion: An Operating Model of Social and Moral Reasoning

Published September 2025

Objectivity, in the social and moral sense, is a performance – a consensus mechanism mistaken for truth. This essay maps how “objectivity” operates as a scaffold for Enlightenment rationality, masking moral preference as neutral judgment. It introduces a five-premise model showing that what we call objectivity is merely sustained agreement under shared illusions of coherence. The argument reframes moral reasoning as provisional and participatory rather than universal or fixed.

Read on Zenodo

2. Rational Ghosts: Why Enlightenment Democracy Was Built to Fail

Published October 2025
The Enlightenment built democracy for rational ghosts – imagined citizens who never existed. This essay dissects six contradictions at the foundation of “rational” governance and shows why democracy’s collapse was prewritten in its metaphysics. From mathematical impossibility to sociological blindness, it charts the crisis of coherence that modern politics still calls freedom.
Read on Zenodo

3. Temporal Ghosts: Tyranny of the Present

Published October 2025
Modern democracies worship the now. This essay examines presentism – the systemic bias toward immediacy – as a structural flaw of Enlightenment thinking. By enthroning rational individuals in perpetual “decision time,” modernity erased the unborn from politics. What remains is a political theology of the short term, collapsing both memory and imagination.
Read on Zenodo

4. Against Agency: The Fiction of the Autonomous Self

Published October 2025
“Agency” is not a metaphysical faculty – it’s an alibi. This essay dismantles the myth of the autonomous self and reframes freedom as differential responsiveness: a gradient of conditions rather than a binary of will. Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and decolonial thought, it argues for ethics as maintenance, not judgment, and politics as condition-stewardship.
Read on Zenodo

5. The Discipline of Dis-Integration: Philosophy Without Redemption

Published October 2025

This essay formalises Dis-Integrationism – a philosophical method that refuses synthesis, closure, and the compulsive need to “make whole.” It traces how Enlightenment reason, deconstruction, and therapy culture all share a faith in reintegration: the promise that what’s fractured can be restored. Against this, Dis-Integrationism proposes care without cure, attention without resolution – a discipline of maintaining the broken as broken. It closes the Anti-Enlightenment loop by turning critique into a sustained practice rather than a path to redemption.

Read on Zenodo

6. The Myth of Homo Normalis: Archaeology of the Legible Human

Published October 2025

Modernity’s most persistent myth is the “normal” human. This essay excavates how legibility – the drive to measure, categorise, and care – became a form of control. From Quetelet’s statistical man to Foucault’s biopower and today’s quantified emotion, Homo Normalis reveals the moral machinery behind normalisation. It ends with an ethics of variance: lucidity without repair, refusal without despair.

Read on Zenodo

7. The Will to Be Ruled: Totalitarianism and the Fantasy of Freedom

Published October 2025

This essay examines how the Enlightenment’s ideal of autonomy contains the seed of its undoing. The rational, self-governing subject – celebrated as the triumph of modernity – proves unable to bear the solitude it creates. As freedom collapses into exhaustion, the desire for direction re-emerges as devotion. Drawing on Fromm, Arendt, Adorno, Reich, Han, and Desmet, The Will to Be Ruled traces the psychological gradient from fear to obedience, showing how submission is moralised as virtue and even experienced as pleasure. It concludes that totalitarianism is not a deviation from reason but its consummation, and that only through Dis-Integrationism – an ethic of maintenance rather than mastery – can thought remain responsive as the light fades.

Read on Zenodo

Below are possible future topics for this series*

8. The Absent God: Metaphysics After Meaning

Axis: Theological / Metaphysical
Core Question: What remains sacred once transcendence is dismantled?

Concept:
This essay would trace how Enlightenment humanism replaced God with reason, only to inherit theology’s structure without its grace. It might read Spinoza, Kant’s moral law, and modern technocracy as secularised metaphysics – systems that still crave universal order.
Goal: To show that disenchantment never erased faith; it simply redirected worship toward cognition and control.
Possible subtitle: The Enlightenment’s Unconfessed Religion.

9. The Aesthetic Contract: Beauty as Compliance

Axis: Aesthetic / Affective
Core Question: How did beauty become moral instruction?

Concept:
From Kant’s Critique of Judgment to algorithmic taste cultures, aesthetic judgment serves social order by rewarding harmony and punishing dissonance. This essay would expose the politics of form – how beauty trains attention and regulates emotion.
Goal: To reclaim aesthetics as resistance, not refinement.
Possible subtitle: Why Modernity Needed the Beautiful to Behave.

10. The Uncounted World: Ecology and the Non-Human

Axis: Ecological / Post-Human
Core Question: What happens when the world refuses to remain background?

Concept:
Here you dismantle the Enlightenment split between subject and nature. From Cartesian mechanism to industrial rationalism, the natural world was cast as resource. This essay would align Dis-Integrationism with ecological thinking – care without mastery extended beyond the human.
Goal: To reframe ethics as co-maintenance within an unstable biosphere.
Possible subtitle: Beyond Stewardship: Ethics Without Anthropos.

11. The Fractured Tongue: Language Against Itself

Axis: Linguistic / Semiotic
Core Question: How does language betray the clarity it promises?

Concept:
Every Anti-Enlightenment text already hints at this: language as both the instrument and failure of reason. Drawing on Nietzsche, Derrida, Wittgenstein, and modern semiotics, this essay could chart the entropy of meaning – the collapse of reference that makes ideology possible.
Goal: To formalise the linguistic fragility underlying every rational system.
Possible subtitle: The Grammar of Collapse.

12. The Vanished Commons: Between Isolation and Herd

Axis: Communal / Social Ontology
Core Question: Can there be community without conformity?

Concept:
This would return to the psychological and political threads of The Will to Be Ruled, seeking a space between atomised autonomy and synchronized obedience. It might turn to Arendt’s notion of the world between us or to indigenous and feminist relational models.
Goal: To imagine a non-totalitarian togetherness – a responsive collective rather than a collective response.
Possible subtitle: The Ethics of the Incomplete We.

* These essays may never be published, but I share this here as a template to further advance the Anti-Enlightenment project and fill out the corpus.

The Will to Be Ruled: Totalitarianism and the Fantasy of Freedom

1–2 minutes

The latest addition to the Anti-Enlightenment Project is now live on Zenodo:
The Will to Be Ruled: Totalitarianism and the Fantasy of Freedom

Modern liberal democracies still chant the Enlightenment’s refrain: the rational, self-governing individual acting freely within a moral order of their own design. It’s an elegant myth – until the self begins to wobble. Under economic, cultural, and epistemic strain, autonomy curdles into exhaustion, and exhaustion seeks relief in obedience.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast of this essay. Please note that this audio summarises the entire essay. As such, it’s also longer than most, coming in at just under 40 minutes. I listened to it, and I feel it does a good job of capturing the essences of the essay. Of course, you could read the essay more quickly, but the perspective may still be helpful.

This essay traces that drift – from the Enlightenment’s causa sui complex to the ecstatic submission that defines modern authoritarianism. Drawing on Fromm, Arendt, Adorno, Reich, Han, and Desmet, it explores how freedom’s rhetoric becomes its opposite: obedience moralised as virtue, conformity sold as courage, submission experienced as pleasure.

At its core, The Will to Be Ruled argues that totalitarianism is not the antithesis of Enlightenment reason but its fulfilment. Once the world is rendered intelligible only through rational mastery, the subject inevitably longs to be mastered in return.

The closing section introduces Dis-Integrationism – a philosophical stance that declines redemption, preferring maintenance over mastery. It offers no cure, only the small ethic of attentiveness: keeping the field responsive while the light fades.

Filed under the Anti-Enlightenment Project, this essay completes the current thematic triad alongside Objectivity Is Illusion and Against Agency.

NB: This essay was inspired in part by Desmet’s The Psychology of Totalitarianism and this video:

Video: The Modern World, Totalitarianism and the Brain with Iain McGilchrist & Mattias Desmet

Democracy and the Millions-Body Problem

2–3 minutes

In celestial mechanics, the three-body problem is notorious. Give Newton two bodies – a planet and a sun – and the equations sing. Add a third, and the song collapses into noise. No general solution exists. Even the smallest nudge in one orbit cascades unpredictably through the system.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast on this topic.

Now swap out planets for people. Not three, but millions. Each voter tugging with their own gravity – preferences, fears, biases, identities, the entire mess of human subjectivity. Democracy insists that by tallying these forces, we’ll arrive at something stable: the will of the people. But what we actually get is the millions-body problem: unstable coalitions, contradictory mandates, endlessly shifting orbits.

Condorcet’s Dilemma

The French mathematician Marquis de Condorcet spotted this flaw in the 18th century. His paradox showed that even if every individual voter ranks choices rationally, the group as a whole may not. Collective preferences can loop in circles: A beats B, B beats C, C beats A. It’s not dysfunction; it’s baked into the math.

Later, political scientists proved the paradox was only the beginning. McKelvey’s “chaos theorem” demonstrated that in a system with three or more options, almost any outcome can be engineered by manipulating the order of votes. In other words, democratic choice is not stable; it’s sensitive to framing, sequence, and agenda control.

Condorcet was brilliant enough to see the cracks, but like his Enlightenment peers, he decided that the fiction of order was preferable to the reality of chaos. Better to promise tidy majorities than to admit that majority rule is structurally incoherent.

The Tidy Lie

Why did majority rule catch on? Because it looked fair, even if speciously so. It gave the appearance of impartiality: count, declare, move on. It was simple enough to administer, and more palatable than monarchy or deadlock.

But neatness is not truth. If 51% of people vote for one candidate, 49% are compelled to live under a government they explicitly rejected. If a third of the population abstains altogether, the “winner” might rule with the backing of barely one-third of the country – yet claim a mandate.

This is what makes majority rule a ritual of laundered coercion. The losers are told, “next time you might win,” even though whole minorities may never win. Abstainers are scapegoated for outcomes they opposed. And everyone is asked to keep pretending that arithmetic equals legitimacy.

The Millions-Body Orbit

Elections give us final numbers – 34% here, 33% there – and we mistake them for laws of motion, as if the cosmos has spoken. But what we’re really seeing is a freeze-frame of chaos. The actual trajectories – coalitions, grievances, shifting identities – continue to wobble beneath the surface.

Like the three-body problem, democracy has no general solution. It isn’t clockwork; it’s turbulence. The miracle is not that it works, but that we pretend it does. Every “mandate” is a temporary illusion, a centre of gravity that exists only until the next disturbance knocks it off course.

And yet, the illusion persists. Because without it, the truth is unbearable: that there is no singular “will of the people,” only the millions-body problem, endlessly unstable, masked by the ritual of counting hands.

Rational Ghosts: Why Enlightenment Democracy Was Built to Fail

3–4 minutes

We are governed by phantoms. Not the fun kind that rattle chains in castles, but Enlightenment rational ghosts – imaginary citizens who were supposed to be dispassionate, consistent, and perfectly informed. They never lived, but they still haunt our constitutions and television pundits. Every time some talking head declares “the people have spoken”, what they really mean is that the ghosts are back on stage.

👉 Full essay: Rational Ghosts: Why Enlightenment Democracy Was Built to Fail

The conceit was simple: build politics as if it were an engineering problem. Set the rules right, and stability follows. The trouble is that the material – actual people – wasn’t blueprint-friendly. Madison admitted faction was “sown in the nature of man”, Rousseau agonised over the “general will”, and Condorcet managed to trip over his own math. They saw the cracks even while laying the foundation. Then they shrugged and built anyway.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast on this topic.

The rational ghosts were tidy. Real humans are not. Our brains run on shortcuts: motivated reasoning, availability cascades, confirmation bias, Dunning–Kruger. We don’t deliberate; we improvise excuses. Education doesn’t fix it – it just arms us with better rationalisations. Media doesn’t fix it either – it corrals our biases into profitable outrage. The Enlightenment drafted for angels; what it got was apes with smartphones.

Even if the ghosts had shown up, the math betrayed them. Arrow proved that no voting system can translate preferences without distortion. McKelvey showed that whoever controls the sequence of votes controls the outcome. The “will of the people” is less an oracle than a Ouija board, and you can always see whose hand is pushing the planchette.

Scale finishes the job. Dunbar gave us 150 people as the human limit of meaningful community. Beyond that, trust decays into myth. Benedict Anderson called nations “imagined communities”, but social media has shattered the illusion. The national conversation is now a million algorithmic Dunbars, each convinced they alone are the real people.

Audio: This is a longer (40-minute) NotebookLM podcast on the essay itself.

Why did democracy limp along for two centuries if it was this haunted? Because it was on life-support. Growth, war, and civic myth covered the cracks. External enemies, national rituals, and propaganda made dysfunction look like consensus. It wasn’t design; it was borrowed capital. That capital has run out.

Cue the panic. The defences roll in: Churchill said democracy was the “least bad” system (he didn’t, but whatever). Voters self-correct. Education will fix it. It’s only an American problem. And if you don’t like it, what – authoritarianism? These are less arguments than incantations, muttered to keep the ghosts from noticing the creaks in the floorboards.

The real task isn’t to chant louder. It’s to stop pretending ghosts exist. Try subsidiarity: smaller-scale politics humans can actually grasp. Try deliberation: citizens’ assemblies show ordinary people can think, when not reduced to a soundbite. Try sortition: if elections are distorted by design, maybe roll the dice instead. Try polycentric governance: let overlapping authorities handle mismatch instead of hammering “one will”. None of these are perfect. They’re just less haunted.

Enlightenment democracy was built to fail because it was built for rational ghosts. The ghosts never lived. The floorboards are creaking. The task is ours: build institutions for the living, before the house collapses under its own myths.

The Argument in Skeleton Form

Beneath the prose, the critique of Enlightenment democracy can be expressed as a syllogism:
a foundation that assumed rational citizens collides with psychological bias, mathematical impossibility, and sociological limits.
The outcome is a double failure – corrupted inputs and incoherent outputs – masked only by temporary props.

Figure: Logical skeleton of “Rational Ghosts: Why Enlightenment Democracy Was Built to Fail.” For the complete essay, with sources and elaboration, see the open-access preprint on Zenodo: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17250225

Modernity: The Phase That Never Was

6–8 minutes

We’re told we live in the Enlightenment, that Reason™ sits on the throne and superstition has been banished to the attic. Yet when I disguised a little survey as “metamodern,” almost none came out as fully Enlightened. Three managed to shed every trace of the premodern ghost, one Dutch wanderer bypassed Modernity entirely, and not a single soul emerged free of postmodern suspicion. So much for humanity’s great rational awakening. Perhaps Modernity wasn’t a phase we passed through at all, but a mirage we still genuflect before, a lifestyle brand draped over a naked emperor.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast on this topic

The Enlightenment as Marketing Campaign

The Enlightenment is sold to us as civilisation’s great coming-of-age: the dawn when the fog of superstition lifted and Reason took the throne. Kant framed it as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity” – an Enlightenment bumper sticker that academics still like to polish and reapply. But Kant wasn’t writing for peasants hauling mud or women without the vote; he was writing for his own coterie of powdered-wig mandarins, men convinced their own habits of rational debate were humanity’s new universal destiny.

Modernity, in this story, isn’t a historical stage we all inhabited. It’s an advertising campaign: Reason™ as lifestyle brand, equality as tagline, “progress” as the logo on the tote bag. Modernity, in the textbooks, is billed as a historical epoch, a kind of secular Pentecost in which the lights came on and we all finally started thinking for ourselves. In practice, it was more of a boutique fantasy, a handful of gentlemen mistaking their own rarefied intellectual posture for humanity’s destiny.

The Archetype That Nobody Lives In

At the core of the Enlightenment lies the archetype of Man™: rational, autonomous, unencumbered by superstition, guided by evidence, weighing pros and cons with the detachment of a celestial accountant. Economics repackaged him as homo economicus, forever optimising his utility function as if he were a spreadsheet in breeches.

But like all archetypes, this figure is a mirage. Our survey data, even when baited as a “metamodern survey”, never produced a “pure” Enlightenment subject.

  • 3 scored 0% Premodern (managing, perhaps, to kick the gods and ghosts to the kerb).
  • 1 scored 0% Modern (the Dutch outlier: 17% Premodern, 0% Modern, 83% Post, skipping the Enlightenment altogether, apparently by bike).
  • 0 scored 0% Postmodern. Every single participant carried at least some residue of suspicion, irony, or relativism.

The averages themselves were telling: roughly 18% Premodern, 45% Modern, 37% Postmodern. That’s not an age of Reason. That’s a muddle, a cocktail of priestly deference, rationalist daydreams, and ironic doubt.

Even the Greats Needed Their Crutches

If the masses never lived as Enlightenment subjects, what about the luminaries? Did they achieve the ideal? Hardly.

  • Descartes, desperate to secure the cogito, called in God as guarantor, dragging medieval metaphysics back on stage.
  • Kant built a cathedral of reason only to leave its foundations propped up by noumena: an unseeable, unknowable beyond.
  • Nietzsche, supposed undertaker of gods, smuggled in his own metaphysics of will to power and eternal recurrence.
  • William James, surveying the wreckage, declared that “truth” is simply “what works”, a sort of intellectual aspirin for the Enlightenment headache.

And economists, in a fit of professional humiliation, pared the rational subject down to a corpse on life support. Homo economicus became a creature who — at the very least, surely — wouldn’t choose to make himself worse off. But behavioural economics proved even that meagre hope to be a fantasy. People burn their wages on scratch tickets, sign up for exploitative loans, and vote themselves into oblivion because a meme told them to.

If even the “best specimens” never fully embodied the rational archetype, expecting Joe Everyman, who statistically struggles to parse a sixth-grade text and hasn’t cracked a book since puberty, to suddenly blossom into a mini-Kant is wishful thinking of the highest order.

The Dual Inertia

The real story isn’t progress through epochs; it’s the simultaneous drag of two kinds of inertia:

  • Premodern inertia: we still cling to sacred myths, national totems, and moral certainties.
  • Modern inertia: we still pretend the rational subject exists, because democracy, capitalism, and bureaucracy require him to.

The result isn’t a new epoch. It’s a cultural chimaera: half-superstitious, half-rationalist, shot through with irony. A mess, not a phase..

Arrow’s Mathematical Guillotine

Even if the Enlightenment dream of a rational demos were real, Kenneth Arrow proved it was doomed. His Impossibility Theorem shows that no voting system can turn individual rational preferences into a coherent “general will.” In other words, even a parliament of perfect Kants would deadlock when voting on dinner. The rational utopia is mathematically impossible.

So when we are told that democracy channels Reason, we should hear it as a polite modern incantation, no sturdier than a priest blessing crops.

Equality and the Emperor’s Wardrobe

The refrain comes like a hymn: “All men are created equal.” But the history is less inspiring. “Men” once meant property-owning Europeans; later it was generously expanded to mean all adult citizens who’d managed to stay alive until eighteen. Pass that biological milestone, and voilà — you are now certified Rational, qualified to determine the fate of nations.

And when you dare to question this threadbare arrangement, the chorus rises: “If you don’t like democracy, capitalism, or private property, just leave.” As if you could step outside the world like a theatre where the play displeases you. Heidegger’s Geworfenheit makes the joke bitter: we are thrown into this world without choice, and then instructed to exit if we find the wallpaper distasteful. Leave? To where, precisely? The void? Mars?

The Pre-Modern lord said: Obey, or be exiled. The Modern democrat says: Vote, or leave. And the Post-Enlightenment sceptic mutters: Leave? To where, exactly? Gravity? History? The species? There is no “outside” to exit into. The system is not a hotel; it’s the weather.

Here the ghost of Baudrillard hovers in the wings, pointing out that we are no longer defending Reason, but the simulacrum of Reason. The Emperor’s New Clothes parable once mocked cowardice: everyone saw the nudity but stayed silent. Our situation is worse. We don’t even see that the Emperor is naked. We genuinely believe in the fineries, the Democracy™, the Rational Man™, the sacred textile of Progress. And those who point out the obvious are ridiculed: How dare you mock such fineries, you cad!

Conclusion: The Comfort of a Ghost

So here we are, defending the ghost of a phase we never truly lived. We cling to Modernity as if it were a sturdy foundation, when in truth it was always an archetype – a phantom rational subject, a Platonic ideal projected onto a species of apes with smartphones. We mistook it for bedrock, built our institutions upon it, and now expend colossal energy propping up the papier-mâché ruins. The unfit defend it out of faith in their own “voice,” the elites defend it to preserve their privilege, and the rest of us muddle along pragmatically, dosing ourselves with Jamesian aspirin and pretending it’s progress.

Metamodernism, with its marketed oscillation between sincerity and irony, is less a “new stage” than a glossy rebranding of the same old admixture: a bit of myth, a bit of reason, a dash of scepticism. And pragmatism –James’s weary “truth is what works” – is the hangover cure that keeps us muddling through.

Modernity promised emancipation from immaturity. What we got was a new set of chains: reason as dogma, democracy as ritual, capitalism as destiny. And when we protest, the system replies with its favourite Enlightenment lullaby: If you don’t like it, just leave.

But you can’t leave. You were thrown here. What we call “Enlightenment” is not a stage in history but a zombie-simulation of an ideal that never drew breath. And yet, like villagers in Andersen’s tale, we not only guard the Emperor’s empty wardrobe – we see the garments as real. The Enlightenment subject is not naked. He is spectral, and we are the ones haunting him.

Democracy: The Worst Form of Government, and Other Bedtime Stories

3–5 minutes

Karl Popper’s Paradox of Intolerance has become a kind of intellectual talisman, clutched like a rosary whenever fascists start goose-stepping into the town square. Its message is simple enough: to preserve tolerance, one must be intolerant of intolerance. Shine enough sunlight on bad ideas, and – so the pious hope – they’ll shrivel into dust like a vampire caught out at dawn.

If only.

The trouble with this Enlightenment fairy tale is that it presumes bad ideas melt under the warm lamp of Reason, as if ignorance were merely a patch of mildew waiting for the bleach of debate. But bad ideas are not bacteria; they are weeds, hydra-headed and delighting in the sun. Put them on television, and they metastasise. Confront them with logic, and they metastasise faster, now with a martyr’s halo.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast on this topic.

And here’s the part no liberal dinner-party theorist likes to face: the people most wedded to these “bad ideas” often don’t play the game of reason at all. Their critical faculties have been packed up, bubble-wrapped, and left in the loft decades ago. They don’t want dialogue. They want to chant. They don’t want evidence. They want affirmation. The Socratic method bounces off them like a ping-pong ball fired at a tank.

But let’s be generous. Suppose, just for a moment, we had Plato’s dream: a citizenry of Philosopher Kings™, all enlightened, all rational. Would democracy then work? Cue Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, that mathematical killjoy which proves that even under perfect conditions – omniscient voters, saintly preferences, universal literacy – you still cannot aggregate those preferences into a system that is both fair and internally consistent. Democracy can’t even get out of its own way on paper.

Now throw in actual humans. Not the Platonic paragons, but Brexit-uncle at the pub, Facebook aunt with her memes, the American cousin in a red cap insisting a convicted felon is the second coming. Suddenly, democracy looks less like a forum of reasoned debate and more like a lottery machine coughing up numbers while we all pretend they mean “the will of the people.”

And this is where the Churchill quip waddles in, cigar smoke curling round its bowler hat: “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.” Ah yes, Winston, do please save us with a quip so well-worn it’s practically elevator music. But the problem is deeper than taste in quotations. If democracy is logically impossible (Arrow) and practically dysfunctional (Trump, Brexit, fill in your own national catastrophe), then congratulating ourselves that it’s “better than the alternatives” is simply an admission that we’ve run out of imagination.

Because there are alternatives. A disinterested AI, for instance, could distribute resources with mathematical fairness, free from lobbyists and grievance-mongers. Nursery schools versus nursing homes? Feed in the data, spit out the optimal allocation. No shouting matches, no demagoguery, no ballots stuffed with slogans. But here the defenders of democracy suddenly become Derrida in disguise: “Ah, but what does fair really mean?” And just like that, we are back in the funhouse of rhetorical mirrors where “fair” is a word everyone loves until it costs them something.

So perhaps democracy doesn’t require an “educated populace” at all; that was always just sugar-paper wrapping. It requires, instead, a population sufficiently docile, sufficiently narcotised by the spectacle, to accept the carnival of elections as a substitute for politics. Which is why calling the devotees of a Trump, or any other demagogue, a gaggle of lemmings is both accurate and impolitic: they know they’re not reasoning; they’re revelling. Your contempt merely confirms the script they’ve already written for you.

Video: Short callout to Karl Popper and Hilary Lawson.

The philosopher, meanwhile, is left polishing his lantern, muttering about reason to an audience who would rather scroll memes about pedophile pizza parlours. Popper warned us that tolerance cannot survive if it tolerates its own annihilation. Arrow proved that even if everyone were perfectly reasonable, the maths would still collapse. And Churchill, bless him, left us a one-liner to make it all seem inevitable.

Perhaps democracy isn’t the worst form of government except for all the others. Perhaps it’s simply the most palatable form of chaos, ballots instead of barricades, polling booths instead of pitchforks. And maybe the real scandal isn’t that people are too stupid for democracy, but that democracy was never designed to be about intelligence in the first place. It was always about managing losers while telling them they’d “had their say.”

The Enlightenment promised us reason; what it delivered was a carnival where the loudest barker gets the booth. The rest of us can either keep muttering about paradoxes in the corner or admit that the show is a farce and start imagining something else.

Democracy: The Idiot’s Opiate, The Sequel Nobody Asked For

Yesterday, I suggested democracy is a mediocre theatre production where the audience gets to choose which mediocre understudy performs. Some readers thought I was being harsh. I wasn’t.

A mate recently argued that humans will always be superior to AI because of emergence, the miraculous process by which complexity gives rise to intelligence, creativity, and emotion. Lovely sentiment. But here’s the rub: emergence is also how we got this political system, the one no one really controls anymore.

Like the human body being mostly non-human microbes, our so-called participatory government is mostly non-participatory components: lobbyists, donors, bureaucrats, corporate media, careerists, opportunists, the ecosystem that is the actual organism. We built it, but it now has its own metabolism. And thanks to the law of large numbers, multiplied by the sheer number of political, economic, and social dimensions in play, even the human element is diluted into statistical irrelevance. At any rate, what remains of it has lost control – like the sorcerer’s apprentice.

People like to imagine they can “tame” this beast, the way a lucid dreamer thinks they can bend the dream to their will. But you’re still dreaming. The narrative still runs on the dream’s logic, not yours. The best you can do is nudge it; a policy tweak here, a symbolic vote there, before the system digests your effort and excretes more of itself.

This is why Deming’s line hits so hard: a bad system beats a good person every time. Even if you could somehow elect the Platonic ideal of leadership, the organism would absorb them, neutralise them, or spit them out. It’s not personal; it’s structural.

And yet we fear AI “taking over,” as if that would be a radical departure from the status quo. Newsflash: you’ve already been living under an autonomous system for generations. AI would just be a remodel of the control room, new paint, same prison.

So yes, emergence makes humans “special.” It also makes them the architects of their own inescapable political microbiome. Congratulations, you’ve evolved the ability to build a machine that can’t be turned off.