Capitalism Doesn’t Merely Exploit Labour

5โ€“8 minutes

There is a vulgar little myth still circulating among the managerial classes that capitalism, for all its blemishes, is at least good at ‘unlocking human potential’. It is not. It is very good at monetising human potential, disciplining it, redirecting it, and, where necessary, grinding it into forms useful to administration and exchange. This is not quite the same thing.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

One of capitalismโ€™s less discussed achievements is its ability to rob society not merely of comfort, leisure, health, and life, but of minds. Not always by censorship. Not always by prison or direct prohibition. More often by something duller and therefore more effective: fatigue, schedules, rent, invoices, commuting, institutional obedience, and the constant low-grade humiliation of having to sell the best hours of oneโ€™s life in order to remain housed and fed.

Franz Kafka is the obvious mascot for this arrangement, which is precisely why he matters. He worked in insurance. The office consumed the day; the writing had to happen in the ruins of the night. His bureaucratic life helped furnish the atmosphere of his fiction, certainly. Human beings do enjoy confusing damage with justification. But the point is not that the office was somehow good for Kafka because it gave him material. A prison may furnish one with subject matter, too. That does not make incarceration a residency programme. Kafkaโ€™s employment constrained the very work for which he is remembered. The miracle is not the arrangement. The miracle is that anything survived it. And Kafka was not unusual in kind. He was merely famous enough to make the violence legible.

NotebookLM Infographic on this topic.

Capitalismโ€™s defenders like to point to the artists and thinkers who produced great work while employed, underpaid, exhausted, or cornered by necessity. Fine. Let us grant them their exhibit. Bukowski had the post office. Pessoa had commercial correspondence. Einstein had the patent office. One can add a hundred more names with minimal effort and maximal melancholy. Yet this proves the opposite of what the defenders want it to prove. It shows that some people managed to create despite the arrangement, not because of it.

This is the first confusion worth clearing away. There is no symbiosis here. At best, there is a kind of reverse symbiosis, a parasitic bargain. The job steals the time and energy required for serious work, while art scavenges from the psychic wreckage whatever it can still use. The worker is depleted; the artwork is composed from depletion. Critics then arrive later, pince-nez trembling, to tell us how fruitful this tension was. Fruitful for whom? Certainly not for the unwritten books, the undeveloped theories, the unfinished scores, or the painter dead too early to become collectible.

That, in fact, is the real question. Not which celebrated figures managed to drag a masterpiece out of economic adversity, but which works never appeared at all.

We are asked, constantly, to admire the canon. We are less often asked to consider the anti-canon: the archive of the unmade. The novel that never got written because its author spent thirty years in clerical work. The philosophy never developed because its possible author was too busy meeting payroll. The music that belonged to a particular age, a particular voice, a particular historical moment, could not simply be written forty years later by a different self under improved circumstances.

This is one of capitalismโ€™s cleverest vanishing acts. It leaves behind no body when it kills a possibility. The unwritten book does not appear in mortality statistics. The lost symphony produces no coronerโ€™s report. The poem abandoned in favour of stable employment is not entered into the national accounts as a dead thing. GDP ticks on, cheerful and imbecilic, while whole modes of life are silently foreclosed.

Some will object that artists have always depended on subsidy. Quite right. That objection destroys rather more than it saves. Van Gogh depended on Theo. Marx depended for years on Engels. Tchaikovsky had patronage. Virginia Woolf, unlike millions of women before her, had both money and a room of her own, and had the clarity to state the matter plainly. The lesson is not that genius floats free of material conditions. The lesson is the reverse: culture has always depended heavily on someone, somewhere, being shielded from the full stupidity of economic necessity.

This means the canon is not a clean record of merit. It is also a record of subsidy, exemption, accident, family money, patrons, tolerant spouses, sinecures, inherited cushion, and occasional institutional slack. In short, it is partly a record of who had enough protection from the market to do something other than kneel before it. The rest, meanwhile, are told a moral fable about hard work.

This is where the sentimental clichรฉ about the ‘starving artist’ should be discarded with force. There is nothing noble about preventable exhaustion. There is nothing spiritually elevating about watching oneโ€™s better projects dry out from lack of time. There is certainly nothing socially rational about a civilisation organised in such a way that its most reflective, gifted, or aesthetically sensitive members must defer their work until retirement, ill health, or redundancy grants them a little stolen air.

One might respond that practical life gives artists experience. True enough. So does grief. So does war. So does prison. Experience is not the issue. The issue is the conversion rate. If one must surrender decades of oneโ€™s most fertile attention in exchange for a modest accumulation of usable material, the return is abysmal. The economist might call this poor ROI. The philosopher might call it structural stupidity. The artist, if still awake, may call it theft. And the theft is not merely personal. It is civilisational.

A society that forces most of its creative and intellectual life into the margins should not flatter itself for the masterpieces that occasionally emerge. It should be haunted by the scale of what never did. For every Kafka who wrote at night, how many did not? For every theorist supported by patronage or inheritance, how many more were processed into middle management, consultancy, administration, compliance, sales, logistics, and the thousand dead dialects of modern necessity? How many minds were not defeated in argument, but merely preoccupied into silence?

The answer, of course, is unknowable. Which is convenient for the system because what cannot be counted can be dismissed, and what can be dismissed can be repeated indefinitely.

Capitalismโ€™s admirers are fond of innovation. They should spend less time praising the gadgets that reached market and more time mourning the consciousness that never reached form. Not every loss is a corpse. Some losses are libraries that never came into being. Some are paintings that remained latent in the hands of the overworked. Some are ideas that would have altered the climate of a discipline had their author not been busy earning a living.

The old accusation that capitalism exploits labour is true enough, but it is no longer adequate. It exploits labour, yes. It also colonises attention, cannibalises vocation, and narrows the range of what a culture is permitted to become. It does not merely take from workers. It takes from history. And then it calls the remainder efficiency.

The Procrustean Universe

5โ€“7 minutes

How Modern Thought Mistakes Its Own Grid for Reality

Modern thought has a peculiar habit.

It builds a measuring device, forces the world through it, and then congratulates itself for discovering what the world is really like.

This is not always called scientism. Sometimes it is called rigour, precision, formalism, standardisation, operationalisation, modelling, or progress. The names vary. The structure does not. First comes the instrument. Then comes the simplification. Then comes the quiet metaphysical sleight of hand by which the simplification is promoted into reality itself.

Consider music.

A drummer lays down a part with slight drag, push, looseness, tension. It breathes. It leans. It resists the metronome just enough to sound alive. Then someone opens Pro Tools and quantises it. The notes snap to grid. The beat is now ‘correct’. It is also, very often, dead.

This is usually treated as an aesthetic dispute between old romantics and modern technicians. It is more than that. It is a parable.

Quantisation is not evil because it imposes structure. Every recording process imposes structure. The problem is what happens next. Once the grid has done its work, people begin to hear the grid not as a tool, but as truth. Timing that exceeds it is heard as error. The metric scaffold becomes the criterion of reality.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

A civilisation can live like this.

It can begin with a convenience and end with an ontology.

Carlo Rovelliโ€™s The Order of Time is useful here precisely because it unsettles the fantasy that time is a single smooth substance flowing uniformly everywhere like some celestial click-track. It is not. Time frays. It dilates. It varies by frame, relation, and condition. Space, too, loses its old role as passive container. The world begins to look less like a neat box of coordinates and more like an unruly field of relations that only reluctantly tolerates our diagrams.

This ought to induce some modesty. Instead, modern disciplines often respond by doubling down on the diagram.

That is where James C. Scott arrives, carrying the whole argument in a wheelbarrow. Seeing Like a State is not merely about states. It is about the administrative desire to make the world legible by reducing it to formats that can be counted, organised, compared, and controlled. Forests become timber reserves. People become census entries. Places become parcels. Lives become cases. The simplification is not wholly false. It is simply tailored to the needs of governance rather than to the fullness of what is governed.

That’s the key.

The state does not need the world in its density. It needs the world in a format it can read.

And modern disciplines are often no different. They require stable units, repeatable measures, abstract comparability, portable standards. Fair enough. No one is conducting physics with incense and pastoral reverie. But then comes the familiar conceit: what was required for the practice quietly becomes what reality is said to be. The discipline first builds the bed for its own survival, then condemns the world for failing to lie down properly.

This is the Procrustean move.

Cut off what exceeds the frame. Stretch what falls short. Call the result necessity.

Many supposed paradoxes begin here. Not in reality itself, but in the overreach of a measuring grammar.

I use a ruler to measure temperature, and I am surprised when it does not comport.

The example is absurd, which is why it is helpful. The absurdity is not in the temperature. It’s in the category mistake. Yet much of modern thought survives by committing more sophisticated versions of precisely this error. We use tools built for extension to interpret process. We use spatial metaphors to capture time. We use statistical flattening to speak of persons. We use administrative categories to speak of communities. We use computational tractability to speak of mind. Then the thing resists, and we call the resistance mysterious.

Sometimes it is not mysterious at all. Sometimes it is merely refusal.

The world declines to be exhausted by the terms under which we can most easily manage it.

That refusal then returns to us under grander names: paradox, irrationality, inconsistency, noise, anomaly. But what if the anomaly is only the residue of what our instruments were built to exclude? What if paradox is often the bruise left by an ill-fitted measure?

This is where realism, at least in its chest-thumping modern form, begins to look suspicious. Not because there is no world. There is clearly something that resists us, constrains us, embarrasses us, punishes bad maps, and ruins bad theories. The issue is not whether there is a real. The issue is whether what we call โ€œthe realโ€ is too often just what our current apparatus can stabilise.

That is not realism.

That is successful compression mistaken for ontology.

Space and time, in this light, begin to look less like the universeโ€™s native grammar and more like the interface through which a certain kind of finite creature renders the world tractable. Useful, yes. Necessary for us, perhaps. Final? hardly.

The same applies everywhere. We do not merely measure the world. We reshape it, conceptually and institutionally, until it better fits our preferred methods of seeing. Then we forget we did this.

Scottโ€™s lesson is that states fail when they confuse legibility with understanding. Our broader civilisational lesson may be that disciplines fail in much the same way. They flatten in order to know, and then mistake the flattening for disclosure. What exceeds the frame is dismissed until it returns as contradiction.

None of this requires anti-scientific melodrama. Science is powerful. Measurement is indispensable. Standardisation is often the price of cumulative knowledge. The problem is not the existence of the grid. The problem is the promotion of the grid into metaphysics. A tool required for a practice is not therefore the native structure of the world. That should be obvious. It rarely is.

Scientism, in its most irritating form, begins precisely where this obviousness ends. It is not disciplined inquiry but disciplinary inflation: the belief that whatever can be rendered formally legible is most real, and whatever resists is merely awaiting capture by better instruments, finer models, sharper equations, more obedient categories. It is the provincial fantasy that the universe must ultimately speak in the accent of our methods.

Perhaps it doesn’t.

Perhaps our great achievement is not that we have discovered realityโ€™s final language, but that we have become unusually good at mistaking our translations for the original.

Imagine that.

When Language Fails – Abstract

3โ€“4 minutes

I set aside some time to design the front cover of my next book. I’m excited to share this โ€“ but that’s always the case. It’s substantially complete. In fact, it sidelined another book, also substantially complete, but the content in this might force me to change the other one. It should be ready for February. I share the current state of the Abstract

This book is meant to be an academic monograph, whilst the other, working title: The Competency Paradox, is more of a polemic.

As I mentioned in another post, it builds upon and reorients the works ofย George Lakoff,ย Jonathan Haidt,ย Kurt Gray, andย Joshua Greene.ย I’ve already revised and extended Gallie’s essentially contested concepts in A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis in the form of Contestables, but I lean on them again here.

Abstract

Contemporary moral and political discourse is marked by a peculiar frustration: disputes persist even after factual clarification, legal process, and good-faith argumentation have been exhausted. Competing parties frequently agree on what happened, acknowledge that harm occurred, and yet remain irreconcilably divided over whether justice has been served. This persistence is routinely attributed to misinformation, bad faith, or affective polarisation. Such diagnoses are comforting. They are also often wrong.

This paper advances a different claim. Certain conflicts are not primarily epistemic or semantic in nature, but ontological. They arise from incompatible orientations that structure how agents register salience, threat, authority, autonomy, and legitimacy. These orientations are genealogically shaped through enculturation, institutions, and languaged traditions, yet operationally they function prior to linguistic articulation: salience fires before reasons are narrated. Moral vocabulary enters downstream, tasked with reconciling commitments that were never shared.

From this perspective, the instability of concepts such as justice is not the primary problem but a symptom. Justice belongs to a class of Contestables (in Gallieโ€™s sense, PDF): action-authorising terms that appear determinate while remaining untethered from shared reference under ontological plurality. Appeals to clearer definitions, better process, or shared values therefore misfire. They presume a common ontological ground that does not, in fact, exist.

When institutions are nevertheless required to act, they cannot adjudicate between ontologies. They can only select. Courts, juries, regulatory bodies, and enforcement agencies collapse plural interpretations into a single outcome. That outcome is necessarily experienced as legitimate by those whose orientation it instantiates, and as injustice by those whose orientation it negates. No procedural refinement can eliminate this asymmetry. At best, procedure dampens variance, distributes loss, and increases tolerability.
Crucially, the selection itself is constrained but underdetermined. Even within formal structures, human judgment, discretion, mood, confidence, fear, and narrative framing play a decisive role. Following Keynes, this irreducible contingency may be described as animal spirits. In formal terms, institutional outcomes are sampled from a constrained space of possibilities, but the reaction topology remains structurally predictable regardless of which branch is taken.

The consequence is stark but clarifying: outrage is not evidence that a system has failed to deliver justice; it is evidence that plural ontological orientations have been forced through a single decision point. Where semantic reconciliation is structurally unavailable, exogenous power is the dominant near-term mediator. Power does not resolve the conflict; it pauses it and stabilises meaning sufficiently for coordination to continue.

This analysis does not deny the reality of harm, the importance of law, or the necessity of institutions. Nor does it lapse into nihilism or indifference. Rather, it reframes the problem. In ontologically plural environments, the task is not moral convergence but maintenance: containing collision, resisting premature coherence, and designing institutions that minimise catastrophic failure rather than promising final resolution.

The argument developed here predates any particular event. Its value lies precisely in its predictive capacity. Given plural ontologies, untethered contestables, and institutions that must act, the pattern of reaction is invariant. The surface details change; the structure does not.
What follows is not a proposal for reconciliation. It is a diagnosis of why reconciliation is so often a category error, and why pretending otherwise is making things worse.

Legibility Meets Humanity for Xmas

3โ€“4 minutes

I’m no fan of holidays. I neither enjoy nor celebrate Christmas. Iโ€™m acutely aware of its commercial excesses and its religious inheritance, two institutions I find, at best, tiresome and, at worst, actively corrosive. Whether thatโ€™s abhorrence or simple loathing is a distinction Iโ€™ll leave to braver souls.

Still, calendars exist whether one consents to them or not, and this piece happens to land today. If Christmas is your thing, by all means, have at it. Sincerely. Rituals matter to people, even when their metaphysics donโ€™t survive inspection.

What follows is not a defence of the season, nor a seasonal moral. Itโ€™s a small human moment that happens to involve Santa, which is to say a costume, a script, and a public performance. What interests me is not the symbolism, but what happens when the performance yields just enough to allow someone else to be seen on their own terms. If nothing else, that feels like a tolerable use of the day.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast on this topic.

What Legibility?

When I use the term legibility, itโ€™s usually as a pejorative. Itโ€™s my shorthand for reductionism. For the way human beings are flattened into checkboxes, metrics, market segments, or moral exemplars so they can be processed efficiently by institutions that mistake simplification for understanding.

But legibility isnโ€™t always a vice.

Video: Santa signs with a 3-year-old dear girl

Most of us, I suspect, want to be legible. Just not in the ways we are usually offered. We want to be seen on our own terms, not translated into something more convenient for the viewer. That distinction matters.

In the video above, a deaf child meets Santa. Nothing grand happens. No lesson is announced. No slogan appears in the corner of the screen. Santa simply signs.

The effect is immediate. The childโ€™s posture changes. Her attention sharpens. Thereโ€™s a visible shift from polite endurance to recognition. She realises, in real time, that she does not need to be adapted for this encounter. The encounter has adapted to her. This is legibility done properly.

Not the synthetic legibility of television advertising, where difference is curated, sanitised, and arranged into a reassuring grid of representation. Not the kind that says, we see you, while carefully controlling what is allowed to be seen. That version of legibility is extraction. It takes difference and renders it harmless. Here, the legibility runs the other way.

Santa, already a performative role if ever there was one, doesnโ€™t stop being performative. The costume remains. The ritual remains. But the performance bends. It accommodates. It listens. The artifice doesnโ€™t collapse; it becomes porous.

Iโ€™m wary of words like authenticity. Theyโ€™ve been overused to the point of meaninglessness. But I do think we recognise performatism when we see it. Not in the technical sense of speech acts, but in the everyday sense of personas that ring hollow, gestures that exist for the camera rather than the people involved. This doesnโ€™t feel like that.

Of course, the child could already connect. Deaf people connect constantly. They persevere. They translate. They accommodate a world that rarely meets them halfway. Nothing here ‘grants’ her humanity. What changes is the tightness of the connexion.

The shared language acts as a verbal proxy, a narrowing of distance. You can see the moment it clicks. He speaks her language. Or rather, he speaks a language that already belongs to her, even if calling it ‘hers’ is technically imprecise. Mother tongue is a slippery phrase. Irony does some of the work here.

Legibility, in this case, doesnโ€™t make her smaller. It makes the interaction larger. And that, inconveniently for our systems and slogans, is what most people have been asking for all along.

Contructivist Lens: Parody Artefact

1โ€“2 minutes

Another faux Magic: The Gathering trading card. I’ve been busy writing an essay on Tatterhood and wondering if I’ve gone off the edge even further into mental masturbation. I made these cards to share on slow news days, as it were.

[EDIT: Oops: Even wore. I already posted something today. Enjoy the bonus post.]

Every philosopher dreams of a device that reveals ‘truth’. The Constructivist Lens does the opposite. When you tap it, the world doesnโ€™t come into focus โ€“ it multiplies. Each pane shows the same thing differently, reminding us that knowing is always a form of making โ€“ seeing as building.

In The Discipline of Dis-Integration, I wrote that philosophyโ€™s task is ‘to remain within what persists โ€ฆ to study the tension in the threads rather than weave a new pattern’. The Lens embodies that ethic. It is not an instrument of discovery but of disclosure: a way to notice the scaffolding of perception without mistaking it for bedrock.

Where Enlightenment optics promised clarity, the Lens trades in parallax. It insists that perspective is not a flaw but the condition of vision itself. Each player who peers through it โ€“ artist, scientist, moralist โ€“ constructs a different coherence, none final. The cardโ€™s rule text captures this tension: replace any keyword on a permanent with a metaphor of your choice until end of turn. Reality bends, language shifts, yet the game continues.

In the Dis-Integration set, the Lens sits alongside Perspectival Realism and Language Game (not yet shared), forming the Blue triad of epistemic doubt. Together they dramatise what the essay calls ‘the hyphen as hinge’: the small pause between integration and its undoing. The Constructivist Lens, then, is not a tool for clearer sight but a reminder that every act of seeing is already an act of construction.

Tatterhood, Makeover Culture, and the Prince Who Earned a Gold Star for Basic Curiosity

3โ€“5 minutes

Iโ€™ve spent more hours than I care to admit rummaging through the Jungian undergrowth of fairy tales โ€“ reading Marie-Louise von Franz until my eyes crossed, listening to Clarissa Pinkola Estรฉs weave her wolf-women lore, and treating folklore like an archaeological dig through the psychic sediment of Europe. Itโ€™s marvellous, really, how much one can project onto a story when one has a doctorateโ€™s worth of enthusiasm and the moral flexibility of a tarot reader.

But every so often, a tale emerges that requires no archetypal lens, no mythopoetic scaffolding, no trip down the collective unconscious. Sometimes a story simply bares its ideological teeth.

Enter Tatterhood โ€“ the Norwegian fairy tale so blunt, it practically writes its own critical theory seminar.

I watched Jonny Thomsonโ€™s recent video on this tale (embedded below, for those with sufficient tea and patience). Jonny offers a charming reversal: rather than focusing on Tatterhood herself, he offers the moral from the princeโ€™s perspective. In his reading, the story becomes a celebration of the power of asking โ€“ the princeโ€™s reward for finally inquiring about the goat, the spoon, the hood, the whole aesthetic calamity before him.

Video: Jonny Thomson discusses Tatterhood.

Itโ€™s wholesome stuff: a TED Talk dressed as folklore. But โ€“ my word โ€“ apply the slightest bit of critical pressure, and the whole thing unravels into farce.

The Story No One Tells at the Royal Wedding

Hereโ€™s the short version of Tatterhood that Jonny politely sidesteps:

  • A fearless, ragged, hyper-competent girl rescues her sister from decapitation.
  • She confronts witches, navigates the seas alone, storms a castle, and performs an ad hoc ontological surgical reversal.
  • She does all of this without help from the king, the court, the men, or frankly, anyone with a Y chromosome.

And how is she rewarded for her trouble? Sheโ€™s told sheโ€™s too ugly. Not socially acceptable. Not symbolically coherent. Not bride material.

The kingdom gazes upon her goat, her spoon, her hood, her hair, and determines that nothing โ€“ nothing โ€“ about her qualifies her for legitimacy.

Competence: irrelevant.
Courage: irrelevant.
Loyalty: irrelevant.

But beauty? Beauty is the passport stamp that grants her entry into the social realm.

Jonnyโ€™s Prince: A Hero by Low Expectations

Now, bless Jonny for trying to rehabilitate the lad, but this prince is hardly an exemplar of virtue. He sulks through his own wedding procession like a man being marched to compulsory dentistry. He does not speak. He does not ask. He barely manages object permanence.

And suddenly, the moral becomes: Look what wonders unfold when a man asks a single question!

Itโ€™s the philosophical equivalent of awarding someone a Nobel Prize for remembering their motherโ€™s birthday.

And what do his questions achieve? Not insight. Not understanding. Not intimacy. But metamorphosis.

Each time he asks, Tatterhood transforms โ€“ ugly goat to beautiful horse, wooden spoon to silver fan, ragged hood to golden crown, ‘ugly’ girl to radiant beauty.

Which brings us to the inconvenient truth:

This Isnโ€™t the Power of Asking. Itโ€™s the Power of Assimilation.

His questions function as aesthetic checkpoints.

Why the goat?
Translation: please ride something socially acceptable.

Why the spoon?
Translation: replace your tool of agency with a decorative object.

Why the hood?
Translation: cover your unruliness with something properly regal.

Why your face?
Translation: you terrify me; please be beautiful.

And lo, she becomes beautiful. Not because he sees her differently. Because the story cannot tolerate a powerful woman who remains outside the beauty regime.

The prince isnโ€™t rewarded for asking; the narrative is rewarded for restoring normative order.

And Yetโ€ฆ Itโ€™s Absurdly Fascinating

This is why fairy tales deserve all the interpretive attention we lavish on them. Theyโ€™re ideological fossils โ€“ compressed narratives containing entire worldviews in miniature.

Part of me admires Jonnyโ€™s generosity. Another part of me wants to hand the prince a biscuit for performing the bare minimum of relational curiosity. But mostly, Iโ€™m struck by how nakedly the tale reveals the old bargain:

Everything else is optional. Beauty is compulsory.

So Hereโ€™s My Version of the Moral

Ask questions, yes. Be curious, yes. But donโ€™t let anyone tell you that Tatterhood was waiting for the princeโ€™s epiphany. She was waiting for the world to remember that she ran the plot.

If youโ€™ve made it this far and know my proclivities, youโ€™ll not be shocked that I side with Roland Barthes and cheerfully endorse la mort de lโ€™auteur. Jonny is perfectly entitled to his reading. Interpretive pluralism and all that. I simply find it marvelously puzzling that he strolls past the protagonist galloping through the narrative on a goat, spoon upraised, and instead decides to chase the side-quest of a prince who contributes roughly the energy of a damp sock.

A Key Point of Departure: He Accepts the Folk Psychology I Reject

3โ€“5 minutes

Jason from Philosopher Muse suggested a connexion between Transductive Subjectivity and the work of Stephen Batchelor. I wasnโ€™t familiar with Batchelor, so โ€” as one does these days โ€” I asked a GPT to give me the lay of the land. The machine obliged, and the result was interesting enough that it warranted a post of its own. This is it.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

Before anyone lights incense: Iโ€™m not suddenly a convert. Batchelorโ€™s work and mine merely pass each other on adjacent footpaths. But the overlap is conceptually neat, and the divergence is even more telling.


Stephen Batchelor vs Transductive Subjectivity: A Brief Comparative Note

1. Shared Territory: The Self as Verb, Not Noun

Both Batchelor and Transductive Subjectivity reject the folk notion of a single, continuous metaphysical self.

  • Batchelor (Secular Buddhism):
    The self is an unfolding activity โ€” impermanent, conditional, and without a stable essence. His โ€œnot-selfโ€ is a practice of disidentification from the imagined nugget of continuity we cling to.
  • Transductive Subjectivity:
    The self is a finite series: Sโ‚€ โ†’ Sโ‚ โ†’ Sโ‚‚ โ†’ โ€ฆ โ†’ Sโ‚™, each produced through the pressure of relational structures (R). Identity is what results when the world meets the organism. Nothing metaphysical required; just biology, cognition, language, and institutions doing their thing.

Overlap: Both positions dismantle the enduring pearl-of-self. Both frame identity as something generated, not possessed.


2. Divergent Aims: Inner Liberation vs Structural Clarity

This is where the paths fork.

  • Batchelorโ€™s Agenda:
    Primarily ethical and therapeutic. The point of denying a fixed self is to reduce suffering, ease attachment, and cultivate a more responsive way of being.
  • TSโ€™s Agenda:
    Metaphysical accuracy in the service of ethical clarity. If the self is a serial construction rather than a diachronic monolith, then retributive justice collapses under its own fictions. No self, no desert. No desert, no justification for revenge-based punishment.

Batchelor wants flourishing. I want rigour. Accidental cousins.


3. Methodological Differences: Distillation vs Reconstruction

Batchelor performs what you might call Buddhism sans metaphysics.
A very Western manoeuvre:

  • keep impermanence
  • keep ethical insight
  • jettison karma, rebirth, cosmology
  • rebrand the remnants as a secular spiritual practice

Practitioners dislike this because he amputates the structural scaffolding that supported the doctrine.

TS, by contrast, doesnโ€™t distil anything. It reconstructs selfhood from first principles:

  • No causa sui
  • Episodic, indexical selfhood (Strawson)
  • Rโ†’S transduction (MEOW)
  • No diachronic essence
  • No metaphysical ballast

If Buddhism aligns with TS, itโ€™s incidental โ€” the way two different mathematicians can discover the same function by entirely different routes.


4. Conceptual Architecture: Dependent Origination vs MEOWโ€™s Tiers

  • Batchelor:
    leans on dependent origination as a philosophical metaphor โ€” phenomena arise through conditions.
  • TS:
    models the exact channels of that conditioning via MEOW:
    T0 โ†’ biological signals
    T1 โ†’ cognitive architecture
    T2 โ†’ linguistic formats
    T3 โ†’ social-technical pressures

Where Batchelor says โ€œeverything is contingent,โ€ TS says โ€œyes, and here is the actual machinery.โ€


5. Different Stakes

  • Batchelor: freeing the person from clinging to an imaginary core.
  • TS: freeing ethics, law, and social design from pretending that metaphysical core exists.

One is therapeutic; the other is diagnostic.


A Key Point of Departure: Batchelor Works with Folk Psychology; TS Rejects Its Premises

There is one more divergence worth highlighting because it cuts to the bone of the comparison.

Batchelor accepts the phenomenological feel of the continuous self as a legitimate starting point. His work is therapeutic: he begins where the person is, in the lived experience of being โ€œme,โ€ and then encourages a gentle loosening of the grip on that intuition.

Transductive Subjectivity takes a different route entirely.

For TS, the continuous, diachronic self isnโ€™t a psychological obstacle to be softened โ€” it is a category mistake. A narrative compression artefact. A heuristic with pragmatic uses, yes, but no metaphysical legitimacy. Batchelor tries to transform our relation to the folk-self; TS denies that the folk-self was ever more than a convenient fiction.

Batchelor says:
โ€œYou seem like a continuous self; now learn to hold that lightly.โ€

TS says:
โ€œYou seem like a continuous self because the system is glossing over discontinuities. The sensation itself is misleading.โ€

In other words:

  • Batchelor redeems the experience.
  • TS disassembles the model.

He treats the โ€œselfโ€ as something to relate to differently.
TS treats the โ€œselfโ€ as an ontological construct to be replaced with a more accurate one.

This is not a difference of ethical aim but of metaphysical foundation.
Batchelor trims the folk psychology; TS declines the invitation altogether.

Closing Note

So yes โ€” the connexion Jason spotted is real. But itโ€™s genealogical, not derivative. We arrive at similar conclusions for different reasons and with different consequences.

Batchelor is pruning a tradition.
Transductive Subjectivity is rebuilding the ontology.

And both, in their own way, make the continuity-self look like the rhetorical placeholder it always was.

Seeing Red โ€“ Or, How the Enlightenment Got Colour-Blind

6โ€“9 minutes

With the MEOW thesis now roaming freely across the intellectual savannah, knocking over conceptual furniture and frightening the rationalists, it’s time to walk through a simple example. We’ll stay safely within the realm of conscious perception for now. That way, no one panics, and everyone can pretend they’re on familiar ground.

Our case study: colour.

Or rather, the quite embarrassing misunderstanding of colour that Western philosophy has been peddling for roughly three centuries.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast summary of this topic, Colour, Perception, and Mediated Ontology.

The Realist’s Apple: A Comedy of Certainty

Picture an apple on a table: plump, unashamedly spherical, wearing its redness like a badge of honour. The traditional Realist swears it’s red in itself, quite independent of anyone wandering in to admire it. The apple has redness the way it has mass, curvature, and that little bruise from the careless shop assistant. When you enter the room, you ‘see’ the red it’s been proudly radiating all along.

Image 0: Subject viewing red apple.

By school age, most of us are told that apples don’t ‘have’ colour; they merely reflect certain wavelengths. A minor complication. A mechanical detail. Nothing to disturb the fundamental metaphysical fantasy: that redness is still ‘out there’, waiting patiently for your eyes to come collect it.

It’s all very straightforward. Very tidy. And very wrong.

Idealists to the Rescue (Unfortunately)

Ask an Idealist about the apple and the entertainment begins.

The Berkeley devotee insists the apple exists only so long as it’s perceived โ€“ esse est percipi โ€“ which raises awkward questions about what happens when you step out for a cuppa. God, apparently, keeps the universe running as a kind of 24-hour perceptual babysitter. You may find this profound or you may find it disturbingly clingy.

The Kantian, inevitably wearing a waistcoat, insists the apple-in-itself is forever inaccessible behind the Phenomenal Veil of Mystery. What you experience is the apple-for-you, sculpted by space, time, causality, and a toolkit of categories you never asked for. This explains a lot about post-Kantian philosophy, not least the fixation on walls no one can climb.

Contemporary idealists get creative: proto-experience in everything, cosmic consciousness as universal substrate, matter as a sleepy epiphenomenon of Mind. It’s quite dazzling if you ignore the categories they’re smashing together.

What unites these camps is the conviction that mind is doing the heavy lifting and the world is an afterthought โ€“ inconvenient, unruly, and best kept in the margins.

The Shared Mistake: An Architectural Catastrophe

Both Realist and Idealist inherit the same faulty blueprint: mind here, world there โ€“ two self-contained realms entering into an epistemic handshake.

Realists cling to unmediated access (a fantasy incompatible with biology).
Idealists cling to sovereign mentality (a fantasy incompatible with objectivity).

Both take ‘experience’ to be a relation between two pre-existing domains rather than a single structured encounter.

This is the mistake. Not Realism’s claims about mind-independence. Not Idealism’s claims about mental primacy. The mistake is the architecture โ€“ the assumption of two separately-existing somethings that subsequently relate.

MEOW โ€“ yes, we’re calling it that โ€“ puts it bluntly:

The problem isn’t where colour is. The problem is assuming it has to be in something โ€“ mind or world โ€“ rather than in the event.

Redness isn’t inside your head or inside the apple.
It’s co-constituted by biological, cognitive, linguistic, and cultural mediation interacting with persistent constraint patterns.

Time to peel this onionโ€ฆ er, apple.

The Four Layers of Mediation (Tโ‚€โ€“Tโ‚ƒ)

A Ridiculously Oversimplified Cheat-Sheet That Still Outperforms Most Metaphysics Syllabi

Image 1: Four-tier diagram (Tโ‚€ Biological โ†’ Tโ‚ƒ Cultural)

Tโ‚€ โ€“ Biological Mediation

Structure and Sensitivity: the Architecture You Never Asked For

This is where the Enlightenment’s fantasy of ‘raw perception’ goes to die.

Your visual system transforms, filters, enhances, suppresses, and reconstructs before ‘red’ even reaches consciousness. Cone responses, opponent processes, retinal adaptation, spatial filtering โ€“ all of it happening before the poor cortex even gets a look-in.

You never perceive ‘wavelengths’. You perceive the output of a heavily processed biological pipeline.

Image 2: Chromatic processing pathway (Tโ‚€โ†’Tโ‚): the layered biological transformations that make โ€œredโ€ possible long before consciousness gets involved.

Tโ‚ โ€“ Cognitive Mediation

Prediction and Inference: You See What You Expect (Until Constraint Smacks You)

Your cognitive system doesn’t ‘receive’ colour information โ€“ it predicts it and updates the guess when necessary.

Memory colour biases perception toward canonical instances. Attentional gating determines what gets processed intensively and what gets summary treatment. Top-down modulation shapes what counts as signal versus noise.

There is no percept without mediation. There is no ‘raw data’ waiting underneath.

The Enlightenment liked to imagine perception as a passive window.
Cognition turns that window into a heavily editorialised newsfeed.

Image 3: Expectation and input co-determine the percept: โ€œredโ€ emerges from the encounter, not from either source alone.

Tโ‚‚ โ€“ Linguisticโ€“Conceptual Mediation

Categories and Symbols: How Words Carve the Spectrum

Enter the famous Whorf skirmishes.
Do words change perception?
Do they merely label pre-existing distinctions?
Do Russians really ‘see’ blue differently?

Berlin & Kay gave us focal colour universals โ€“ constraint patterns stable across cultures.
Roberson et al. gave us the Himba data โ€“ linguistic categories reshaping discrimination and salience.

The correct answer is neither universalism nor relativism. It’s MEOW’s favourite refrain:

Mediation varies; constraint persists.

Words don’t invent colours.
But they do reorganise the perceptual field, changing what pops and what hides.

Image 4: Different languages carve the same physical continuum differently: English imposes a blue/green split; Himba divides the region into several greens with no blue boundary at all.

Tโ‚ƒ โ€“ Culturalโ€“Normative Mediation

Shared Practices: The Social Life of Perception

Your discipline, training, historical context, and shared norms tell you:

  • which distinctions matter
  • which differences ‘count’
  • which patterns get ignored

A Himba herder, a Renaissance painter, and a radiologist do not inhabit the same perceptual world โ€“ even when staring at the same patch of light.

Cultural mediation doesn’t rewrite biology; it reorganises priorities, salience, and interpretive readiness.

Image 5: Three observers confronting the same stimulus yet extracting different distinctions: the scientist tracks wavelength, the artist tracks hue and value, and the Himba pastoralist tracks ecologically salient greens. Same object, different salience hierarchies. Not arbitrary โ€“ just mediated.

What Seeing Red Actually Involves (Step By Exhausting Step)

You walk into a room. Apple on table. Looks red. What just happened?

Tโ‚€ โ€“ Biological: Long wavelength light hits L-cones harder than M- and S-cones. Opponent channels compute (Lโˆ’M). Adaptation shifts baseline. Edge detection fires. You don’t have ‘red’ yet โ€“ you have transformed photoreceptor output.

Tโ‚ โ€“ Cognitive: Your brain predicts ‘apple, probably red’ based on shape and context. Memory colour pulls toward canonical apple-red. Attention allocates processing resources. Prediction matches input (roughly). System settles: ‘yes, red apple’.

Tโ‚‚ โ€“ Linguisticโ€“Conceptual: The continuous gradient gets binned: ‘red’, not ‘crimson’ or ‘scarlet’ unless you’re a designer. The category provides stability, ties this instance to others, makes it reportable.

Tโ‚ƒ โ€“ Culturalโ€“Normative: Does the exact shade matter? Depends whether you’re buying it, photographing it, or painting it. Your practical context determines which distinctions you bother tracking.

And through all of this: Constraint. Metameric matches stay stable. Focal colours persist cross-culturally. Wavelength sensitivities don’t budge. The encounter isn’t arbitrary โ€“ but it’s not unmediated either.

What happened wasn’t: Mind Met World.
What happened was: an encounter-event unfolded, organised through four mediational layers, exhibiting stable constraint patterns that made it this and not that.

Where This Leaves Us

Colour is not ‘out there’. Colour is not ‘in here’.

Colour is the structured relational event of encounter.

Four mediation layers shape what appears.
Constraint patterns stabilise the encounter so we aren’t hallucinating wildly divergent rainbows.

There is no ‘apple as it really is’ waiting behind the encounter.
Nor is there a sovereign mind constructing its own private theatre.

There is only the event โ€“ where biological structure, cognitive dynamics, conceptual categories, and cultural histories co-emerge with the stable patterns of constraint we lazily call ‘the world’.

The apple was never red ‘in itself’.
You were never seeing it ‘as it really is’.
And the Enlightenment can finally take off its colour-blind uncle glasses and admit it’s been squinting at the wrong question for three hundred years.

Next time: Why visual illusions aren’t perception failing, but perception revealing itself.

Until then: stop asking where colour ‘really’ lives.

It lives in the event. And the event is mediated, constrained, and real enough.

Editing Is Hard and Propensity

2โ€“3 minutes

Well, not so much hard as not particularly or inherently enjoyable.

I estimate I’ve got about a day left to complete this manuscript โ€“ ‘done’ done. When I open InDesign, it shames me โ€“ 3 days ago, I last touched this document. It doesn’t feel like 3 days have passed, but time flies.

On the right is an older version. I began reworking it into this new version over the summer, and here I am come autumn. It’s even worse if I use the Chinese calendar. Evidently, 7th November is the first day of winter. They can’t wait until soltace.

Anyway, just a brief update. This isn’t going to edit itself, and I can’t afford to pay an editor for a passion project. Besides โ€“ and let’s be honest โ€“ I can’t afford an editor in general โ€“ or at least can’t cost-justify it โ€“ and all my writing is a passion project.

Of course, editors (and cover artists) insist that one would sell more book if only they were edited or professionally rendered. There is an element of truth to this, but I’ve read some gawdawful books that were professionally edited and published through a traditional publisher, because publishers publish.

Me, I operate on razor-thin margins. Most of my publications haven’t even broken even โ€“ even if I ignore opportunity costs, which I can’t because I’m an economist. Accountants get to play that trick.

This said, I do hire reviewers, editors, and artists in small doses โ€“ homoeopathic as they might be โ€“ and I’ve had mixed results.

I’m rambling

Must really be avoiding the editing processโ€ฆ

Recently, I wanted to redesign the cover of one of my Ridley Park fiction books.

Image Comparison: A Tale of Two Propensities

The cover on the left is the original. It is intentionally a minimal 2-D construction โ€“ a representation of the first section of the book, the first 15 chapters.

The cover on the right is the update. It is also minimalist, representing the second section of Propensity. I’m not sure how I would depict the third section. If it comes to me, I may render a third version.

There’s a story to this. I reached out to some cover artists and told them I was unhappy with my original design but had no visual ideas. I’d leave this to the artist. It turns out that some artists don’t want full control over the design process. I can understand the hesitation.

They asked for covers that I might like, so I researched some covers and saved them to a Pinterest board.

As it turned out, after some inspiration, I decided to render this one myself, too. Hey, I tried.

What happened to the rest of the time?

OK, so there’s more. I also created a video book trailer in the evening.

It was fun enough. Give it a watch. It also represents part one of Propensity.

OK, this time for real. Let me know what you thinkโ€ฆabout anything in particular.