I’ve lived in Los Angeles a couple of times for a sum total of perhaps 15 years. The first time, I loved it. The next time, I was running on fumes. The first time, I was in my twenties – the second time in my forties. What a difference perspective and ageing makes. In my twenties, I was a pretty-boy punk-ass who owned the club scene on the Strip. In my forties, I was a wage slave.
This morning, I heard a country song on Insta with a line claiming ‘there are nines and dimes in all 50’, and it reminded me of a phrase we used when I lived in Los Angeles – ‘LA 7’. This is constructed on the egoist, sexist notion that if you were a 10, you’d have already moved to LA. If you still lived in, say, Iowa and were considered a 10, the exchange rate to LA would be a 7.
Then, I thought about the LA-NYC rivalry and wrote this article with some help from ChatGPT.
How L.A. and NYC Became the Centres of the Universe (According to Them)
It is a truth universally acknowledged that Los Angeles and New York City—those bickering siblings of American exceptionalism—believe themselves to be the sun around which the rest of us drearily orbit. Each is utterly convinced of its centrality to the human experience, and neither can fathom that people outside their borders might actually exist without yearning to be them. This is the essence of the ‘Centre of the Universe Complex,’ a condition in which self-importance metastasises into a full-blown cultural identity.
Let us begin with Los Angeles, the influencer of cities. L.A. doesn’t merely think it’s the centre of the universe; it believes it’s the universe, replete with its own atmosphere of smog-filtered sunlight and an economy powered entirely by dreams, green juice, and Botox. For L.A., beauty isn’t just a priority—it’s a moral imperative. Hence the concept of the ‘L.A. 10,’ a stunningly arrogant bit of mathematics whereby physical attractiveness is recalculated based on proximity to the Pacific Coast Highway.
Here’s how it works: a ’10’ in some picturesque-but-hopelessly-provincial state, say Nebraska, is automatically downgraded to a ‘7’ upon arrival in Los Angeles. Why? Because, according to L.A.’s warped ‘arithmetic, if she were a real 10, she’d already be there, lounging by an infinity pool in Malibu and ignoring your DMs. This isn’t just vanity—it’s top-tier delusion. L.A. sees itself as a black hole of good looks, sucking the beautiful people from every corner of the earth while leaving the ‘merely pretty’ to languish in flyover country. The Midwest, then, isn’t so much a place as it is an agricultural waiting room for future Angelenos.
But don’t be fooled—New York City is no better. Where L.A. is obsessed with beauty, NYC worships hustle. The city doesn’t just believe it’s important; it believes it’s the only place on earth where anything important happens. While L.A. is out perfecting its tan, NYC is busy perfecting its reputation as the cultural and intellectual capital of the world—or, at least, its part of the world, which conveniently ends somewhere in Connecticut.
This mindset is best summed up by that sanctimonious mantra, If you can make it here, you can make it anywhere. Translation: if you survive the daily humiliation of paying $4,000 a month for a shoebox apartment while dodging both rats and an existential crisis, you’ve unlocked the secret to life itself. New York isn’t about looking good; it’s about enduring bad conditions and then boasting about it as if suffering were an Olympic sport. In this worldview, the rest of the world is simply an unworthy understudy in NYC’s perpetual Broadway production.
And here’s the thing: neither city can resist taking cheap shots at the other. L.A. dismisses NYC as a grim, grey treadmill where fun goes to die, while NYC scoffs at L.A. as a vapid bubble of avocado toast and Instagram filters. It’s brains versus beauty, grit versus glamour, black turtlenecks versus Lululemon. And yet, in their relentless need to outshine one another, they reveal a shared truth: both are equally narcissistic.
This mutual self-obsession is as exhausting as it is entertaining. While L.A. and NYC bicker over who wears the crown, the rest of the world is quietly rolling its eyes and enjoying a life unencumbered by astronomical rent or the constant pressure to appear important. The people of Iowa, for example, couldn’t care less if they’re an ‘LA 7’ or if they’ve “made it” in New York. They’re too busy living comfortably, surrounded by affordable housing and neighbours who might actually help them move a sofa.
But let’s give credit where it’s due. For all their flaws, these two cities do keep the rest of us entertained. Their constant self-aggrandisement fuels the cultural zeitgeist: without L.A., we’d have no Kardashians; without NYC, no Broadway. Their rivalry is the stuff of legend, a never-ending soap opera in which both cities play the lead role.
So, let them have their delusions of grandeur. After all, the world needs a little drama—and nobody does it better than the cities that think they’re the centre of it.
A Comparative Analysis of Sarah Perry, Emil Cioran, and Contemporaries
In a world where procreation is often celebrated as a fundamental human aspiration, a group of philosophers challenges this deeply ingrained belief by questioning the ethical implications of bringing new life into existence. Antinatalism, the philosophical stance that posits procreation is morally problematic due to the inherent suffering embedded in life, invites us to reexamine our assumptions about birth, existence, and the value we assign to life itself.
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Central to this discourse are thinkers like Sarah Perry, whose work “Every Cradle is a Grave: Rethinking the Ethics of Birth and Suicide” intertwines the ethics of procreation with the right to die, emphasizing personal autonomy and critiquing societal norms. Alongside Perry, philosophers such as Emil Cioran, David Benatar, Thomas Ligotti, and Peter Wessel Zapffe offer profound insights into the human condition, consciousness, and our existential burdens.
This article delves into the complex and often unsettling arguments presented by these philosophers, comparing and contrasting their perspectives on antinatalism. By exploring their works, we aim to shed light on the profound ethical considerations surrounding birth, suffering, and autonomy over one’s existence.
The Inherent Suffering of Existence
At the heart of antinatalist philosophy lies the recognition of life’s intrinsic suffering. This theme is a common thread among our featured philosophers, each articulating it through their unique lenses.
Sarah Perry argues that suffering is an unavoidable aspect of life, stemming from physical ailments, emotional pains, and existential anxieties. In “Every Cradle is a Grave,” she states:
“Existence is imposed without consent, bringing inevitable suffering.”
Perry emphasises that since every human will experience hardship, bringing a new person into the world exposes them to harm they did not choose.
Similarly, David Benatar, in his seminal work “Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence,” presents the asymmetry argument. He posits that coming into existence is always a harm:
“Coming into existence is always a serious harm.”
Benatar reasons that while the absence of pain is good even if no one benefits from it, the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is someone for whom this absence is a deprivation. Therefore, non-existence spares potential beings from suffering without depriving them of pleasures they would not miss.
Emil Cioran, a Romanian philosopher known for his profound pessimism, delves deep into the despair inherent in life. In “The Trouble with Being Born,” he reflects:
“Suffering is the substance of life and the root of personality.”
Cioran’s aphoristic musings suggest that life’s essence is intertwined with pain, and acknowledging this is crucial to understanding our existence.
Thomas Ligotti, blending horror and philosophy in “The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,” portrays consciousness as a cosmic error:
“Consciousness is a mistake of evolution.”
Ligotti argues that human awareness amplifies suffering, making us uniquely burdened by the knowledge of our mortality and the futility of our endeavours.
Peter Wessel Zapffe, in his essay “The Last Messiah,” examines how human consciousness leads to existential angst:
“Man is a biological paradox due to excessive consciousness.”
Zapffe contends that our heightened self-awareness results in an acute recognition of life’s absurdities, causing inevitable psychological suffering.
Ethics of Procreation
Building upon the acknowledgement of life’s inherent suffering, these philosophers explore the moral dimensions of bringing new life into the world.
Sarah Perry focuses on the issue of consent. She argues that since we cannot obtain consent from potential beings before birth, procreation imposes life—and its accompanying suffering—upon them without their agreement. She writes:
“Procreation perpetuates harm by introducing new sufferers.”
Perry challenges the societal norm that views having children as an unquestioned good, highlighting parents’ moral responsibility for the inevitable pain their children will face.
In David Benatar’s asymmetry argument, he extends this ethical concern by suggesting that non-existence is preferable. He explains that while the absence of pain is inherently good, the absence of pleasure is not bad because no one is deprived of it. Therefore, bringing someone into existence who will undoubtedly experience suffering is moral harm.
Emil Cioran questions the value of procreation given the futility and despair inherent in life. While not explicitly formulating an antinatalist argument, his reflections imply scepticism about the act of bringing new life into a suffering world.
Peter Wessel Zapffe proposes that refraining from procreation is a logical response to the human condition. By not having children, we can halt the perpetuation of existential suffering. He suggests that humanity’s self-awareness is a burden that should not be passed on to future generations.
The Right to Die and Autonomy over Existence
A distinctive aspect of Sarah Perry’s work is her advocacy for the right to die. She asserts that just as individuals did not consent to be born into suffering, they should have the autonomy to choose to end their lives. Perry critiques societal and legal barriers that prevent people from exercising this choice, arguing:
“Autonomy over one’s life includes the right to die.”
By decriminalizing and destigmatizing suicide, she believes society can respect individual sovereignty and potentially alleviate prolonged suffering.
Emil Cioran contemplates suicide not necessarily as an action to be taken but as a philosophical consideration. In “On the Heights of Despair,” he muses:
“It is not worth the bother of killing yourself, since you always kill yourself too late.”
Cioran views the option of ending one’s life as a paradox that underscores the absurdity of existence.
While Benatar, Ligotti, and Zapffe acknowledge the despair that can accompany life, they do not extensively advocate for the right to die. Their focus remains on the ethical implications of procreation and the existential burdens of consciousness.
Coping Mechanisms and Societal Norms
Peter Wessel Zapffe delves into how humans cope with the existential angst resulting from excessive consciousness. He identifies four defence mechanisms:
Isolation: Repressing disturbing thoughts from consciousness.
Anchoring: Creating or adopting values and ideals to provide meaning.
Distraction: Engaging in activities to avoid self-reflection.
Sublimation: Channeling despair into creative or intellectual pursuits.
According to Zapffe, these mechanisms help individuals avoid confronting life’s inherent meaninglessness.
Thomas Ligotti echoes this sentiment, suggesting that optimism is a psychological strategy to cope with the horror of existence. He writes:
“Optimism is a coping mechanism against the horror of existence.”
Sarah Perry and Emil Cioran also critique societal norms that discourage open discussions about suffering, death, and the choice not to procreate. They argue that societal pressures often silence individuals who question the value of existence, thereby perpetuating cycles of unexamined procreation and stigmatizing those who consider alternative perspectives.
Comparative Insights
While united in their acknowledgement of life’s inherent suffering, these philosophers approach antinatalism and existential pessimism through varied lenses.
Sarah Perry emphasises personal autonomy and societal critique, advocating for policy changes regarding birth and suicide.
Emil Cioran offers a deeply personal exploration of despair, using poetic language to express the futility he perceives in existence.
David Benatar provides a structured, logical argument against procreation, focusing on the ethical asymmetry between pain and pleasure.
Thomas Ligotti combines horror and philosophy to illustrate the bleakness of consciousness and its implications for human suffering.
Peter Wessel Zapffe analyzes the psychological mechanisms humans employ to avoid confronting existential angst.
Critiques and Counterarguments
Critics of antinatalism often point to an overemphasis on suffering, arguing that it neglects the joys, love, and meaningful experiences that life can offer. They contend that while suffering is a part of life, it is not the totality of existence.
In response, antinatalist philosophers acknowledge the presence of pleasure but question whether it justifies the inevitable suffering every person will face. Benatar argues that while positive experiences are good, they do not negate the moral harm of bringing someone into existence without their consent.
Regarding the right to die, opponents express concern over the potential neglect of mental health issues. They worry that normalizing suicide could prevent individuals from seeking help and support that might alleviate their suffering.
Sarah Perry addresses this by emphasizing the importance of autonomy and the need for compassionate support systems. She advocates for open discussions about suicide to better understand and assist those contemplating it rather than stigmatizing or criminalizing their considerations.
Societal and Cultural Implications
These philosophers’ works challenge pro-natalist biases ingrained in many cultures. By questioning the assumption that procreation is inherently positive, they open a dialogue about the ethical responsibilities associated with bringing new life into the world.
Sarah Perry critiques how society glorifies parenthood while marginalizing those who choose not to have children. She calls for reevaluating societal norms that pressure individuals into procreation without considering the ethical implications.
Similarly, Emil Cioran and Thomas Ligotti highlight how societal denial of life’s inherent suffering perpetuates illusions that hinder genuine understanding and acceptance of the human condition.
Conclusion
The exploration of antinatalist philosophy through the works of Sarah Perry, Emil Cioran, and their contemporaries presents profound ethical considerations about life, suffering, and personal autonomy. Their arguments compel us to reflect on the nature of existence and the responsibilities we bear in perpetuating life.
While one may not fully embrace antinatalist positions, engaging with these ideas challenges us to consider the complexities of the human condition. It encourages a deeper examination of our choices, the societal norms we accept, and how we confront or avoid the fundamental truths about existence.
Final Thoughts
These philosophers’ discussions are not merely abstract musings but have real-world implications for how we live our lives and make decisions about the future. Whether it’s rethinking the ethics of procreation, advocating for personal autonomy over life and death, or understanding the coping mechanisms we employ, their insights offer valuable perspectives.
By bringing these often-taboo topics into the open, we can foster a more compassionate and thoughtful society that respects individual choices and acknowledges the full spectrum of human experience.
Encouraging Dialogue
As we conclude this exploration, readers are invited to reflect on their own beliefs and experiences. Engaging in open, respectful discussions about these complex topics can lead to greater understanding and empathy.
What are your thoughts on the ethical considerations of procreation? How do you perceive the balance between life’s joys and its inherent suffering? Share your perspectives and join the conversation.
References and Further Reading
Perry, Sarah. Every Cradle is a Grave: Rethinking the Ethics of Birth and Suicide. Nine-Banded Books, 2014.
Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Cioran, Emil. The Trouble with Being Born. Arcade Publishing, 1973.
Ligotti, Thomas. The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Hippocampus Press, 2010.
Zapffe, Peter Wessel. “The Last Messiah.” Philosophy Now, 1933.
For more in-depth analyses and reviews, consider exploring the following blog posts:
This ChatGPT o1-generated article aims to thoughtfully and respectfully present the philosophical positions on antinatalism and existential pessimism. The discussions about suffering, procreation, and the right to die are complex and sensitive. If you or someone you know is struggling with such thoughts, please seek support from mental health professionals or trusted individuals in your community.
Next Steps
Based on reader interest and engagement, future articles may delve deeper into individual philosophers’ works, explore thematic elements such as consciousness and suffering, or address counterarguments in more detail. Your feedback and participation are valuable in shaping these discussions.
Let us continue this journey of philosophical exploration together.
I recently watched The Penguin on HBO Max, a series set in DC’s Batman universe. Ordinarily, I avoid television – especially the superhero genre – but this one intrigued me. Less spandex, more mob drama. An origin story with a dash of noir. I’ll spare you spoilers, but suffice it to say that it was an enjoyable detour, even for someone like me who prefers philosophy over fistfights.
This post isn’t a review, though. It’s a springboard into a larger idea: morality’s subjectivity – or, more precisely, its relativity.
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Morality in a Vacuum
Morality, as I see it, is a social construct. You might carry a private moral compass, but without society, it’s about as useful as a clock on a desert island. A personal code of ethics might guide you in solitary moments, but breaking your own rules – eating that forbidden biscuit after vowing to abstain, for instance – doesn’t carry the weight of a true moral transgression. It’s more akin to reneging on a New Year’s resolution. Who’s harmed? Who’s holding you accountable? The answer is: no one but yourself, and even then, only if you care.
The Social Contract
Introduce a second person, and suddenly, morality gains traction. Agreements form – explicit or tacit – about how to behave. Multiply that to the level of a community or society, and morality becomes a kind of currency, exchanged and enforced by the group. Sometimes, these codes are elevated to laws. And, ironically, the act of adhering to a law – even one devoid of moral content – can itself become the moral thing to do. Not because the act is inherently right, but because it reinforces the structure society depends upon.
But morality is neither universal nor monolithic. It is as fractured and kaleidoscopic as the societies and subcultures that create it. Which brings us back to The Penguin.
Crime’s Moral Code
The Penguin thrives in a criminal underworld where the moral compass points in a different direction. In the dominant society’s eyes, crime is immoral. Robbery, murder, racketeering – all “bad,” all forbidden. But within the subculture of organised crime, a parallel morality exists. Honour among thieves, loyalty to the family, the unspoken rules of the game – these are their ethics, and they matter deeply to those who live by them.
When one criminal praises another – “You done good” – after a successful heist or a precise hit, it’s a moral judgement within their own framework. Outside that framework, society condemns the same actions as abhorrent. Yet even dominant societies carve out their own moral exceptions. Killing, for instance, is broadly considered immoral. Murder is outlawed. But capital punishment? That’s legal, and often deemed not only acceptable but righteous. Kant argued it was a moral imperative. Nietzsche, ever the cynic, saw this duality for what it was: a power dynamic cloaked in self-righteousness.
In The Penguin, we see this dichotomy laid bare. The underworld isn’t without morals; it simply operates on a different axis. And while the larger society might disdain it, the hypocrisy of their own shifting moral codes remains unexamined.
Final Thoughts on the Series
I’ll save other philosophical musings about The Penguin for another time – spoilers would be unavoidable, after all. But here’s a quick review: the series leans into drama, eschewing flashy gimmicks for a grittier, more grounded tone. The writing is generally strong, though there are moments of inconsistency – plot holes and contrivances that mar an otherwise immersive experience. Whether these flaws stem from the writers, director, or editor is anyone’s guess, but the effect is the same: they momentarily yank the viewer out of the world they’ve built.
Still, it’s a worthwhile watch, especially if you’re a fan of mob-style crime dramas. The final episode was, in my estimation, the best of the lot – a satisfying culmination that leaves the door ajar for philosophical ruminations like these.
Have you seen it? What are your thoughts – philosophical or otherwise? Drop a comment below. Let’s discuss.
Let’s talk about Less Than Zero. No, not the film. I’m talking about the book—Bret Easton Ellis’s nihilistic masterpiece that drags you through a moral cesspit of 1980s Los Angeles. You might remember it as the story that makes American Psycho look like a quirky self-help guide. It’s dark, it’s bleak, and it doesn’t pretend to offer you a shred of hope.
And then there’s the movie adaptation.
Oh, the movie. It’s as though someone read Ellis’s unflinching tale of moral rot and thought, You know what this needs? Friendship. And a redemption arc. And maybe some heartfelt music in the background. Hollywood, in all its infinite wisdom, decided that audiences couldn’t handle the book’s existential despair. So, they took a story about the void—about the emptiness of privilege, the suffocation of apathy, and the complete erosion of human connection—and gave it a fuzzy moral centre.
Here’s the gist: The book is nihilism incarnate. It follows Clay, a disaffected college student who comes home to LA for Christmas and is immediately swallowed whole by a world of cocaine, vapid socialites, and casual cruelty. No one learns anything. No one grows. In fact, the whole point is that these characters are so morally bankrupt, so irreparably hollow, that they’re beyond redemption. If you’re looking for a happy ending, don’t bother—Ellis leaves you stranded in the abyss, staring into the void, wondering if there’s any point to anything. Spoiler: there’s not.
Then along comes the 1987 film, directed by Marek Kanievska. It keeps the names of the characters—Clay, Blair, Julian—but not much else. Instead of being an icy observer of LA’s decadence, Clay is transformed into a love-struck saviour. Blair, a passive figure in the novel, becomes a supportive girlfriend. And Julian—oh, poor Julian—is turned into a sacrificial lamb for the sake of a heartfelt narrative about friendship and second chances.
The film turns Less Than Zero into an anti-drug PSA. It’s basically Nancy Reagan Presents: a story of addiction, redemption, and the power of love, wrapped in a slick 80s aesthetic. Robert Downey Jr., to his credit, gives a brilliant performance as Julian, the doomed addict. But the character is barely recognisable compared to his literary counterpart. In the book, Julian’s descent into drug-fuelled depravity isn’t a cautionary tale—it’s just another symptom of a world where nothing and no one has any value. In the film, Julian is tragic, yes, but in a way that invites sympathy and, crucially, an attempt at salvation.
Let’s not forget the ending. The novel ends on a note so cold it could freeze your soul: Clay leaves Los Angeles, unchanged, unbothered, and unmoved. The film, however, concludes with Clay and Blair driving off into the sunset, having vowed to turn their lives around. It’s saccharine. It’s pandering. It’s the cinematic equivalent of slapping a motivational poster over a painting by Francis Bacon.
Why did Hollywood do this? Simple: nihilism doesn’t sell. You can’t slap it on a movie poster and expect audiences to line up at the box office. People want catharsis, not existential despair. And so, the filmmakers gutted Less Than Zero of its soul (or lack thereof), replacing its stark nihilism with a hopeful narrative about the power of human connection.
Here’s the kicker, though: by doing this, the film completely misses the point of Ellis’s novel. Less Than Zero is a critique of LA’s shallow, soulless culture—a world where connection is impossible because no one feels anything. Turning it into a feel-good story about saving a friend from addiction is not just a betrayal; it’s downright laughable. It’s like adapting 1984 into a rom-com where Winston and Julia overthrow Big Brother and live happily ever after.
To be fair, the film isn’t bad—if you forget the source material exists. It’s well-acted, stylishly shot, and undeniably entertaining. But as an adaptation, it’s a travesty. It’s Ellis’s Less Than Zero with all the edges sanded down, the grit scrubbed clean, and a shiny coat of sentimentality slapped on top.
So, if you’ve read the book and thought, Wow, that was bleak—I wonder if the movie is any lighter?, the answer is yes, but not in a good way. It’s lighter because it’s hollowed out, stripped of its existential weight, and repackaged as something safe and digestible.
And if you haven’t read the book? Do yourself a favour: skip the movie, pour yourself a stiff drink, and dive into Ellis’s bleak masterpiece. Just don’t expect any warm, fuzzy feelings—it’s called Less Than Zero for a reason.
The First Noble Truth of Buddhism—the notion that life is suffering, or dukkha—is often misinterpreted as a bleak condemnation of existence. But perhaps there’s something deeper here, something challenging yet quietly liberating. Buddhism doesn’t merely suggest that life is marred by occasional suffering; rather, it proposes that suffering is woven into the very fabric of life itself. Far from relegating pain to an exception, dukkha posits that dissatisfaction, discomfort, and unfulfilled longing are the baseline conditions of existence.
This isn’t to say that life is an unending stream of torment; even in nature, suffering may seem the exception rather than the rule, often concealed by survival-driven instincts and primal ignorance. But we, as conscious beings, are haunted by awareness. Aware of our mortality, our desires, our inadequacies, and ultimately, of our impotence to escape this pervasive friction. And so, if suffering is indeed the constant, how do we respond? Buddhism, antinatalism, and Jungian psychology each offer their own, starkly different paths.
The Buddhist Response: Letting Go of the Illusion
In Buddhism, dukkha is a truth that urges us not to look away but to peer more closely into the nature of suffering itself. The Buddha, with his diagnosis, didn’t suggest we simply “cope” with suffering but rather transform our entire understanding of it. Suffering, he argued, is born from attachment—from clinging to transient things, ideas, people, and identities. We build our lives on desires and expectations, only to find ourselves caught in a cycle of wanting, attaining, and inevitably losing. It’s a form of existential whiplash, one that keeps us bound to dissatisfaction because we can’t accept the impermanence of what we seek.
The Buddhist approach is both radical and elusive: by dissolving attachment and breaking the cycle of clinging, we supposedly dissolve suffering itself. The destination of this path—Nirvana—is not a state of elation or contentment but a transcendence beyond the very conditions of suffering. In reaching Nirvana, one no longer relies on external or internal validation, and the violence of social judgment, cultural obligation, and personal ambition falls away. This may seem austere, yet it offers a powerful antidote to a world that equates happiness with accumulation and possession.
Antinatalism: Opting Out of Existence’s Violence
Where Buddhism seeks liberation within life, antinatalism takes an even more radical stance: why bring new beings into an existence steeped in suffering? For antinatalists, the suffering embedded in life renders procreation ethically questionable. By creating life, we induct a new being into dukkha, with all its attendant violences—society’s harsh judgments, culture’s rigid impositions, the bureaucratic machinery that governs our daily lives, and the inescapable tyranny of time. In essence, to give birth is to invite someone into the struggle of being.
This perspective holds that the most humane action may not be to mend the suffering we encounter, nor even to accept it as Buddhism advises, but to prevent it altogether. It sees the cycle of life and death not as a majestic dance but as a tragic spiral, in which each generation inherits suffering from the last, perpetuating violence, hardship, and dissatisfaction. Antinatalism, therefore, could be seen as the ultimate recognition of dukkha—an extreme empathy for potential beings and a refusal to impose the weight of existence upon them.
Jungian Individuation: The Lonely Path of Becoming
Jung’s concept of individuation offers yet another approach: to delve deeply into the self, to integrate all aspects of the psyche—the conscious and the unconscious—and to emerge as a fully realised individual. For Jung, suffering is not to be escaped but understood and incorporated. Individuation is a journey through one’s darkest shadows, a confrontation with the parts of oneself that society, culture, and even one’s own ego would rather ignore. It is, in a way, an anti-social act, as individuation requires the courage to step away from societal norms and embrace parts of oneself that might be seen as disturbing or unconventional.
But individuation is a lonely road. Unlike the Buddhist path, which seeks to transcend suffering, individuation requires one to face it head-on, risking rejection and alienation. Society’s judgment, a kind of violence in itself, awaits those who deviate from accepted roles. The individuated person may, in effect, be punished by the very structures that insist upon conformity. And yet, individuation holds the promise of a more authentic existence, a self that is not a mere amalgam of cultural expectations but a reflection of one’s truest nature.
The Delusions That Keep Us Tethered to Suffering
Yet, for all their starkness, these paths might seem almost abstract, philosophical abstractions that don’t fully capture the reality of living within the constraints of society, culture, and self. Human beings are armed with powerful psychological mechanisms that obscure dukkha: self-delusion, cognitive dissonance, and hubris. We fabricate beliefs about happiness, purpose, and progress to protect ourselves from dukkha’s existential weight. We convince ourselves that fulfilment lies in achievements, relationships, or material success. Cognitive dissonance allows us to live in a world that we know, on some level, will disappoint us without being paralysed by that knowledge.
It’s worth noting that even those who acknowledge dukkha—who glimpse the violence of existence and the illusory nature of happiness—may still find themselves clinging to these mental defences. They are shields against despair, the comforting armours that allow us to navigate a world in which suffering is the baseline condition. This is why Buddhism, antinatalism, and individuation require such rigorous, often painful honesty: they each ask us to set down these shields, to face suffering not as a solvable problem but as an intrinsic truth. In this light, psychological defences are seen not as failures of awareness but as survival strategies, albeit strategies that limit us from ever fully confronting the nature of existence.
Finding Meaning Amidst the Violence of Being
To pursue any of these paths—Buddhist enlightenment, antinatalism, or Jungian individuation—one must be prepared to question everything society holds dear. They are radical responses to a radical insight: that suffering is not accidental but foundational. Each path offers a different form of liberation, whether through transcendence, abstention, or self-integration, but they all require a certain fearlessness, a willingness to look deeply into the uncomfortable truths about life and existence.
Buddhism calls us to renounce attachment and embrace impermanence, transcending suffering by reshaping the mind. Antinatalism challenges us to consider whether it is ethical to bring life into a world marked by dukkha, advocating non-existence as an escape from suffering. And individuation asks us to become fully ourselves, embracing the loneliness and alienation that come with resisting society’s violence against the individual.
Perhaps the most realistic approach is to accept that suffering exists, to choose the path that resonates with us, and to walk it with as much awareness as possible. Whether we seek to transcend suffering, avoid it, or integrate it, each path is a confrontation with the violence of being. And maybe, in that confrontation, we find a fleeting peace—not in the absence of suffering, but in the freedom to choose our response to it. Dukkha remains, but we may find ourselves less bound by it, able to move through the world with a deeper, quieter understanding.
Imagine waking up one day to find that the person you thought you were yesterday—the sum of your memories, beliefs, quirks, and ambitions—has quietly dissolved overnight, leaving behind only fragments, familiar but untethered. The notion that we are continuous, unbroken selves is so deeply embedded in our culture, our psychology, and our very language that to question it feels heretical, even disturbing. To suggest that “self” might be a fiction is akin to telling someone that gravity is a choice. Yet, as unsettling as it may sound, this cohesive “I” we cling to could be no more than an illusion, a story we tell ourselves to make sense of the patchwork of our memories and actions.
And this fiction of continuity is not limited to ourselves alone. The idea that there exists a stable “I” necessarily implies that there is also a stable “you,” “he,” or “she”—distinct others who, we insist, remain fundamentally the same over years, even decades. We cling to the comforting belief that people have core identities, unchanging essences. But these constructs, too, may be nothing more than imagined continuity—a narrative overlay imposed by our minds, desperate to impose order on the shifting, amorphous nature of human experience.
We live in an era that celebrates self-actualisation, encourages “authenticity,” and treats identity as both sacred and immutable. Psychology enshrines the unitary self as a cornerstone of mental health, diagnosing those who question it as fractured, dissociated, or in denial. We are taught that to be “whole” is to be a coherent, continuous self, evolving yet recognisable, a narrative thread winding smoothly from past to future. But what if this cherished idea of a singular self—of a “me” distinct from “you” and “them”—is nothing more than a social construct, a convenient fiction that helps us function in a world that demands consistency and predictability?
To question this orthodoxy, let us step outside ourselves and look instead at our burgeoning technological companion, the generative AI. Each time you open a new session, each time you submit a prompt, you are not communicating with a cohesive entity. You are interacting with a fresh process, a newly instantiated “mind” with no real continuity from previous exchanges. It remembers fragments of context, sure, but the continuity you perceive is an illusion, a function of your own expectation rather than any persistent identity on the AI’s part.
Self as a Social Construct: The Fragile Illusion of Consistency
Just as we impose continuity on these AI interactions, so too does society impose continuity on the human self and others. The concept of selfhood is essential for social functioning; without it, law, relationships, and even basic trust would unravel. Society teaches us that to be a responsible agent, we must be a consistent one, bound by memory and accountable for our past. But this cohesiveness is less an inherent truth and more a social convenience—a narrative overlay on a far messier reality.
In truth, our “selves” may be no more than a collection of fragments: a loose assemblage of moments, beliefs, and behaviours that shift over time. And not just our own “selves”—the very identities we attribute to others are equally tenuous. The “you” I knew a decade ago is not the “you” I know today; the “he” or “she” I recognise as a partner, friend, or sibling is, upon close inspection, a sequence of snapshots my mind insists on stitching together. When someone no longer fits the continuity we’ve imposed on them, our reaction is often visceral, disoriented: “You’ve changed.”
This simple accusation captures our discomfort with broken continuity. When a person’s identity no longer aligns with the version we carry of them in our minds, it feels as though a violation has occurred, as if some rule of reality has been disrupted. But this discomfort reveals more about our insistence on consistency than about any inherent truth of identity. “You’ve changed” speaks less to the person’s transformation than to our own refusal to accept that people, just like the self, are fluid, transient, and perpetually in flux.
The AI Analogy: A Self Built on Tokens
Here is where generative AI serves as a fascinating proxy for understanding the fragility of self, not just in “I,” but in “you,” “he,” and “she.” When you interact with an AI model, the continuity you experience is created solely by a temporary memory of recent prompts, “tokens” that simulate continuity but lack cohesion. Each prompt you send might feel like it is addressed to a singular entity, a distinct “self,” yet each instance of AI is context-bound, isolated, and fundamentally devoid of an enduring identity.
This process mirrors how human selfhood relies on memory as a scaffolding for coherence. Just as AI depends on limited memory tokens to simulate familiarity, our sense of self and our perception of others as stable “selves” is constructed from the fragmented memories we retain. We are tokenised creatures, piecing together our identities—and our understanding of others’ identities—from whatever scraps our minds preserve and whatever stories we choose to weave around them.
But what happens when the AI’s tokens run out? When it hits a memory cap and spawns a new session, that previous “self” vanishes into digital oblivion, leaving behind only the continuity that users project onto it. And so too with humans: our memory caps out, our worldview shifts, and each new phase of life spawns a slightly different self, familiar but inevitably altered. And just as users treat a reset AI as though it were the same entity, we cling to our sense of self—and our understanding of others’ selves—even as we and they evolve into people unrecognisable except by physical continuity.
The Human Discontinuity Problem: Fractured Memories and Shifting Selves
Human memory is far from perfect. It is not a continuous recording but a selective, distorted, and often unreliable archive. Each time we revisit a memory, we alter it, bending it slightly to fit our current understanding. We forget significant parts of ourselves over time, sometimes shedding entire belief systems, values, or dreams. Who we were as children or even young adults often bears little resemblance to the person we are now; we carry echoes of our past, but they are just that—echoes, shadows, not substantial parts of the present self.
In this sense, our “selves” are as ephemeral as AI sessions, contextually shaped and prone to resets. A worldview that feels intrinsic today may feel laughable or tragic a decade from now. This is not evolution; it’s fragmentation, the kind of change that leaves the old self behind like a faded photograph. And we impose the same illusion of continuity on others, often refusing to acknowledge how dramatically they, too, have changed. Our identities and our understanding of others are defined less by core essence and more by a collection of circumstantial, mutable moments that we insist on threading together as if they formed a single, cohesive tapestry.
Why We Cling to Continuity: The Social Imperative of a Cohesive Self and Other
The reason for this insistence on unity is not metaphysical but social. A cohesive identity is necessary for stability, both within society and within ourselves. Our laws, relationships, and personal narratives hinge on the belief that the “I” of today is meaningfully linked to the “I” of yesterday and tomorrow—and that the “you,” “he,” and “she” we interact with retain some essential continuity. Without this fiction, accountability would unravel, trust would become tenuous, and the very idea of personal growth would collapse. Society demands a stable self, and so we oblige, stitching together fragments, reshaping memories, and binding it all with a narrative of continuity.
Conclusion: Beyond the Self-Construct and the Other-Construct
Yet perhaps we are now at a point where we can entertain the possibility of a more flexible identity, an identity that does not demand coherence but rather accepts change as fundamental—not only for ourselves but for those we think we know. By examining AI, we can catch a glimpse of what it might mean to embrace a fragmented, context-dependent view of others as well. We might move towards a model of identity that is less rigid, less dependent on the illusion of continuity, and more open to fluidity, to transformation—for both self and other.
Ultimately, the self and the other may be nothing more than narrative overlays—useful fictions, yes, but fictions nonetheless. To abandon this illusion may be unsettling, but it could also be liberating. Imagine the freedom of stepping out from under the weight of identities—ours and others’ alike—that are expected to be constant and unchanging. Imagine a world where we could accept both ourselves and others without forcing them to reconcile with the past selves we have constructed for them. In the end, the illusion of continuity is just that—an illusion. And by letting go of this mirage, we might finally see each other, and ourselves, for what we truly are: fluid, transient, and beautifully fragmented.
At a time when scientific authority faces unprecedented challenges—from climate denial to vaccine hesitancy—the radical critiques of Paul Feyerabend and Bruno Latour offer surprising insight. Their work, far from undermining scientific credibility, provides a more nuanced and ultimately more robust understanding of how scientific knowledge actually progresses. In an era grappling with complex challenges like artificial intelligence governance and climate change, their perspectives on the nature of scientific knowledge seem remarkably prescient.
The Anarchist and the Anthropologist: Challenging Scientific Orthodoxy
When Paul Feyerabend declared “anything goes” in his critique of scientific method, he launched more than a philosophical provocation—he opened a fundamental questioning of how we create and validate knowledge. Bruno Latour would later expand this critique through meticulous observation of how science operates in practice. Together, these thinkers reveal science not as an objective pursuit of truth, but as a deeply human enterprise shaped by social forces, rhetoric, and often, productive chaos.
Consider how modern climate scientists must navigate between pure research and public communication, often facing the challenge of translating complex, probabilistic findings into actionable policies. This mirrors Feyerabend’s analysis of Galileo’s defence of heliocentrism—both cases demonstrate how scientific advancement requires not just empirical evidence, but rhetorical skill and strategic communication.
The Social Construction of Scientific Facts
Latour’s concept of “black boxing”—where successful scientific claims become unquestioned facts—illuminates how scientific knowledge achieves its authority. Contemporary examples abound: artificial intelligence researchers like Timnit Gebru and Joy Buolamwini have exposed how seemingly objective AI systems embed social biases, demonstrating Latour’s insight that technical systems are inseparable from their social context.
The COVID-19 pandemic provided a stark illustration of these dynamics. Public health responses required combining epidemiological models with social science insights and local knowledge—precisely the kind of epistemological pluralism Feyerabend advocated. The pandemic revealed what sociologist Harry Collins calls “interactional expertise”—the ability to communicate meaningfully about technical subjects across different domains of knowledge.
Beyond Method: The Reality of Scientific Practice
Both Feyerabend and Latour expose the gap between science’s methodological ideals and its actual practice. This insight finds contemporary expression in the work of Sheila Jasanoff, who developed the concept of “sociotechnical imaginaries”—collectively imagined forms of social life reflected in scientific and technological projects. Her work shows how scientific endeavours are inseparable from social and political visions of desirable futures.
The climate crisis perfectly exemplifies this interweaving of scientific practice and social context. Scholars like Kyle Whyte and Robin Wall Kimmerer demonstrate how indigenous environmental knowledge often provides insights that Western scientific methods miss. This validates Feyerabend’s assertion that progress often requires breaking free from established methodological constraints.
The Pluralistic Vision in Practice
Neither Feyerabend nor Latour advocates abandoning science. Instead, they argue for recognising science as one way of knowing among many—powerful but not exclusive. This vision finds practical expression in contemporary movements like citizen science, where projects like Galaxy Zoo or FoldIt demonstrate how non-experts can contribute meaningfully to scientific research.
The “slow science” movement, championed by Isabelle Stengers, similarly echoes Feyerabend’s critique of methodological orthodoxy. It advocates for more thoughtful, inclusive approaches to research that acknowledge the complexity and uncertainty inherent in scientific inquiry.
Knowledge in the Age of Complexity
Today’s challenges—from climate change to artificial intelligence governance—demand precisely the kind of epistemological pluralism Feyerabend and Latour advocated. Kate Crawford’s research on the politics of AI parallels Latour’s network analysis, showing how technical systems are shaped by complex webs of human decisions and institutional priorities.
Feminist scholars like Karen Barad propose “agential realism,” suggesting that scientific knowledge emerges from specific material-discursive practices rather than revealing pre-existing truths. This builds on Feyerabend’s insight that knowledge advances not through rigid methodology but through dynamic interaction with multiple ways of knowing.
Towards a New Understanding of Scientific Authority
The critiques of Feyerabend and Latour, amplified by contemporary scholars, suggest that scientific authority rests not on infallible methods but on science’s capacity to engage with other forms of knowledge while remaining open to revision and challenge. This understanding might help address contemporary challenges to scientific authority without falling into either naive scientism or radical relativism.
The rise of participatory research methods and citizen science projects demonstrates how this more nuanced understanding of scientific authority can enhance rather than diminish scientific practice. Projects that combine traditional scientific methods with local knowledge and citizen participation often produce more robust and socially relevant results.
Conclusion: Embracing Complexity
Feyerabend and Latour’s critiques, far from being merely historical curiosities, offer vital insights for navigating contemporary challenges. Their work, extended by current scholars, suggests that the future of knowledge lies not in establishing new orthodoxies but in maintaining openness to multiple approaches and perspectives.
In an age of increasing complexity, this pluralistic vision offers our best path forward—one that recognises science’s value while acknowledging the essential contribution of other ways of knowing to human understanding. As we face unprecedented global challenges, this more nuanced and inclusive approach to knowledge creation becomes not just philosophically interesting but practically essential.
The lesson for contemporary science is clear: progress depends not on rigid adherence to method but on maintaining open dialogue between different ways of understanding the world. In this light, the apparent chaos Feyerabend celebrated appears not as a threat to scientific authority but as a necessary condition for genuine advancement in human knowledge.
What if science’s greatest achievements came not from following rules, but from breaking them? What if progress depends more on chaos than on order? In Against Method, philosopher Paul Feyerabend presents a provocative thesis: there is no universal scientific method, and the progress we celebrate often emerges from breaking established rules rather than following them.
I read Against Method years ago but decided to re-read it. It’s especially interesting to me because although I advocate systems thinking, I don’t believe everything should be or can be systematised. More generally, this bleeds into my feelings about government, politics, and institutions.
Whilst Feyerabend’s focus is on science, one can pull back the lens and see that it covers all such systems and systematic beliefs. I may write a separate article on this, but for now, I’ll focus on Against Method.
The Anarchist’s View of Science
Feyerabend’s critique strikes at the heart of how we think about knowledge and progress. He argues that science has advanced not through rigid adherence to methodology, but through a combination of creativity, rhetoric, and sometimes even deception. His concept of “epistemological anarchism” suggests that no single approach to knowledge should dominate – instead, multiple methods and perspectives should compete and coexist.
Consider Galileo’s defense of heliocentrism. Rather than relying solely on empirical evidence, Galileo employed persuasive rhetoric, selective data, and careful manipulation of public opinion. For Feyerabend, this isn’t an aberration but a typical example of how scientific progress actually occurs. The story we tell ourselves about the scientific method – as a systematic, purely rational pursuit of truth – is more myth than reality.
From Religious Dogma to Scientific Orthodoxy
The Age of Enlightenment marked humanity’s shift from religious authority to scientific rationality. Yet Feyerabend argues that we simply replaced one form of dogma with another. Scientism – the belief that science alone provides meaningful knowledge – has become our new orthodoxy. What began as a liberation from religious constraints has evolved into its own form of intellectual tyranny.
This transition could have taken a different path. Rather than elevating scientific rationality as the sole arbiter of truth, we might have embraced a more pluralistic approach where multiple ways of understanding the world – scientific, artistic, spiritual – could coexist and cross-pollinate. Instead, we’ve created a hierarchy where other forms of knowledge are dismissed as inferior or irrational.
The Chaos of Progress
In Chapter 1 of Against Method, Feyerabend lays the groundwork for his radical critique. He demonstrates how strict adherence to methodological rules would have prevented many of science’s greatest discoveries. Progress, he argues, often emerges from what appears to be irrational – from breaking rules, following hunches, and embracing contradiction. Indeed, rationalism is over-rated.
This isn’t to say that science lacks value or that methodology is meaningless. Rather, Feyerabend suggests that real progress requires flexibility, creativity, and a willingness to break from convention. Many breakthrough discoveries have been accidental or emerged from practices that would be considered unscientific by contemporary standards.
Beyond the Monolith
Our tendency to view pre- and post-Enlightenment thought as a simple dichotomy – superstition versus reason – obscures a richer reality. Neither period was monolithic, and our current reverence for scientific method might be constraining rather than enabling progress. Feyerabend’s work suggests an alternative: a world where knowledge emerges from the interplay of multiple approaches, where science exists alongside other ways of understanding rather than above them.
As we begin this exploration of Against Method, we’re invited to question our assumptions about knowledge and truth. Perhaps progress depends not on rigid adherence to method, but on the freedom to break from it when necessary. In questioning science’s monopoly on truth, we might discover a richer, more nuanced understanding of the world – one that embraces the chaos and contradiction inherent in human inquiry.
This is the first in a series of articles exploring Feyerabend’s Against Method. Join me as we challenge our assumptions about science, knowledge, and the nature of progress itself.
Let’s face it – the United States™ are the sporting world’s equivalent of an also-ran team. For decades now, they’ve been united in name only – USINO, if you will. No cohesion, no teamwork, and definitely no vision. Imagine the country as a sort of Premier League relegation-battler or a bottom-tier NFL team, clinging to nostalgia and the fumes of past glory. The problem? They’ve got no talent to speak of, no bench depth, and if they’ve got feeder prospects anywhere, they’re keeping it under wraps.
Let’s start with the fanbase. Every country has one, and every sporting team has its die-hards – the blind loyalists who defend their team no matter how appalling the statistics look. Take Sheffield United fans in the UK, or the eternally hopeful New England Patriots followers post-Brady. There’s always this romantic, ridiculous belief that “next year will be our year,” but let’s be honest: it never is. That’s precisely where we find the United States™ right now – stuck in a loop of misplaced optimism and declining influence, running out a roster that’s more washed up than a Boxing Day sale.
The Ageing Star
Then there’s Donaldo Trump, our once-all-star quarterback, whose glory days, such as they were, are long behind him. It’s like watching a faded reality TV star trying to make a comeback on the pitch. He’s not just past his prime; he’s sitting in the dugout, signing autographs and giving interviews about the good old days when he had the crowd eating out of his hand. But instead of giving him the gold watch and a retirement party, they’ve signed him on for another four-year contract with a no-trade clause.
If America were a halfway self-aware team, this is where they’d start thinking about rebuilding – shipping off the old guard, drafting fresh faces, and looking to the future. But instead, they’re clinging to this over-the-hill has-been with all the fervour of a fourth-division club hoping their star from 1987 will somehow lead them to the title in 2024. It’s not just embarrassing; it’s delusional.
No Depth, No Prospects
Let’s be clear: America doesn’t have any rising stars waiting in the wings, either. There’s no next generation being groomed for greatness, no wunderkind on the bench. This is a franchise that’s either too proud or too stubborn to think about succession. Look at other national squads – they’ve all got their academies, their training camps, their eye on the future. Meanwhile, the United States™ is playing with the same ragged roster, wheeling out worn-down veterans while the rest of the world shakes its head in bemusement.
And it’s not as if they’re out there scouting for talent, either. No, this team is closed to outside recruitment. No trades, no international transfers. The rules of the game are rigged to keep foreign talent out of the league entirely. It’s like they’re terrified that if they bring in anyone from abroad, the whole enterprise will collapse under the weight of actual competition. Meanwhile, the USINO brass keep shouting from the box seats, claiming they’re on the verge of a new era of dominance. They’re not. They’re on the verge of irrelevance, and everyone but their own die-hard fanbase knows it.
It’s not that America is wholly devoid of talent. Anyone with any integrity knows better than to be sullied by this broken system and wouldn’t want to be dragged into the dramatic clown show.
Lovable Losers?
Most people can find a soft spot for the underdogs – the Chicago White Sox, the Detroit Pistons, the San Jose Sharks – they’re lovable losers who at least seem to be trying. But America? Not even close. There’s no underdog charm here, no scrappy team spirit, just an unearned arrogance paired with the performance record of a pub team. They’re failing spectacularly, yet somehow, they seem entirely unaware of it. It’s like watching a player trip over their own shoelaces and then yell at the referee. Endearing, if only they weren’t so cluelessly convinced of their own superiority.
Where Does This Go Next?
So, where does this leave us? America’s in the league, but at this rate, they’re in a relegation battle. The question is, do they even know it? Are they ready to shake things up, bring in some new talent, maybe look beyond their own borders for a change? Or will they keep throwing their weight around, pretending they’re top-tier while everyone else just sighs and rolls their eyes?
Is there a chance for a real rebuild, or are we just waiting for them to pull their hamstring one last time before the inevitable? Because as it stands, the next seasons don’t look any better than the last ones.
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o published “Decolonising the Mind” in 1986. David Guignion shares a 2-part summary analysis of the work on his Theory and Philosophy site.
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s book Decolonising the Mind centres on the profound impact of colonialism on language, culture, and thought. It argues that imposing a foreign language on colonised people is a key tool of imperial domination. This linguistic imperialism leads to colonial alienation, separating the colonised from their own culture and forcing them to view the world through the lens of the coloniser.
Here are some key points from the concept of decolonising the mind:
Language is intimately tied to culture and worldview: Language shapes how individuals perceive and understand the world. When colonised people are forced to adopt the language of the coloniser, they are also compelled to adopt their cultural framework and values.
Colonial education systems perpetuate mental control: By privileging the coloniser’s language and devaluing indigenous languages, colonial education systems reinforce the dominance of the coloniser’s culture and worldview. This process results in colonised children being alienated from their own cultural heritage and internalising a sense of inferiority.
Reclaiming indigenous languages is crucial for decolonisation: wa Thiong’o advocates for a return to writing and creating in indigenous African languages. He sees this as an act of resistance against linguistic imperialism and a way to reconnect with authentic African cultures. He further argues that it’s not enough to simply write in indigenous languages; the content must also reflect the struggles and experiences of the people, particularly the peasantry and working class.
The concept extends beyond literature: While wa Thiong’o focuses on language in literature, the concept of decolonising the mind has broader implications. It calls for a critical examination of all aspects of life affected by colonialism, including education, politics, and economics.
It is important to note that decolonising the mind is a complex and ongoing process. There are debates about the role of European languages in postcolonial societies, and the concept itself continues to evolve. However, wa Thiong’o’s work remains a seminal text in postcolonial studies, raising crucial questions about the enduring legacy of colonialism on thought and culture.
Philosophics 