Tag: Feyerabend Against Method

Against Method – And Reading

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3–5 minutes

I just finished reading Feyerabend’s Against Method – rather, I just finished the back matter, as I finished the core of the book some time ago. I debated reading this part of the book, and sorry, but I often don’t – despite writing back matter for some of my own academic publications. I treat them as asides.

I’m glad I read this material because, aside from the endnotes, it was meta and biographical, so the perspective was nice. In fact, it got me thinking. He talks about his struggle with Relativism™. I used to struggle with the same thing; there seemed to be a false battle between objectivists and relativists or subjectivists, but in my mind these were always straw-man caricatures nobody seriously defended, yet somehow people were vocal about avoiding. I’ve written extensively about my own position on mediation, so I won’t info dump here.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

As people familiar with my habits, I tend to read several books in parallel. In fact, you can review what I am reading on Goodreads.

Besides a new translation of Heidegger’s Being and Time, I just started a close read of Leurs enfants après eux.

To be fair, I don’t tend to close-read fiction books very often. I find it to be slow and cumbersome. For non-fiction, this is the default, but not generally for fiction. But, since French is a second language, my attention needs to be focused. I don’t feel that I can read casually and catch the sort of embedded grammatologie that I can absorb through osmosis in English-language books.

Why slow read then? I have a desire to maintain and advance my French, so I think that reading contemporary books connects me to current language trends, terms, phraseology, and metaphor. I am using Claude and ChatGPT to assist with the close reading. They’ve already helped me to better understand the opening paragraphs. It opens like this:

Let’s discuss this, word choices, and any implications. This is the first paragraph of the first chapter:

Debout sur la berge, Anthony regardait droit devant lui. À l’aplomb du soleil, les eaux du lac avaient des lourdeurs de pétrole. Par instants, ce velours se froissait au passage d’une carpe ou d’un brochet. Le garçon renifla. L’air était chargé de cette même odeur de vase, de terre plombée de chaleur. Dans son dos déjà large, juillet avait semé des taches de rousseur. Il ne portait rien à part un vieux short de foot et une paire de fausses Ray-Ban. Il faisait une chaleur à crever, mais ça n’expliquait pas tout.

This scene starts to set the tone of the narrative from the onset – lentement, insouciant. It’s midsummer. The heat is overbearing – stifling. It tracks the life of our antagonist, Anthony, a 14-year-old in between grades, in fact, getting ready to enter Year 10 or high school, ninth grade. But not yet. We haven’t reached this paragraph quite yet.

Besides the heat references, we see emergences of weight, falling. Again, loading up on metaphors. Anthony doesn’t have an easy life. Many don’t at these junctures.

He, himself, is at that awkward adolescent stage, where his body is outgrowing his childhood, whilst his mind is trying desperately to keep up.

A challenge I have with French is that I know dogs, cats, trees, and fish, but I don’t know the types of these. Here, we see the word « un brochet ». It’s a pike fish. Honestly, I don’t even know what a pike looks like, though I am familiar with the English term.

Image: Pike. (Not to be confused with a pickerel, which is evidently a related but smaller fish I had also never seen.) Credit

Another language challenge is polysemous terms – in this case, « vase ». As I am reading, I am trying to imagine the smell of a vase, all the while recalling that vases don’t exactly have a distinct scent. It turns out that vase also translates to mud or silt. quite the difference.

Since I started, I might as well continue exploring this paragraph: Anthony is wearing fake Ray-Bans. This is an insight into class and station.

As for register, Mathieu mentions these things matter-of-factly without judgement. Later on, we’ll notice differences, but these are narrational and through the eyes of Anthony, as he compares himself with his environment. Class projections might be imported by the reader. I won’t invoke Barthes here.

The final sentence leaves us hanging. It reminds us again that this July is hot, but somehow it doesn’t explain everything, likely, about Anthony.

Scientific Authority in an Age of Uncertainty

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At a time when scientific authority faces unprecedented challenges—from climate denial to vaccine hesitancy—the radical critiques of Paul Feyerabend and Bruno Latour offer surprising insight. Their work, far from undermining scientific credibility, provides a more nuanced and ultimately more robust understanding of how scientific knowledge actually progresses. In an era grappling with complex challenges like artificial intelligence governance and climate change, their perspectives on the nature of scientific knowledge seem remarkably prescient.

The Anarchist and the Anthropologist: Challenging Scientific Orthodoxy

When Paul Feyerabend declared “anything goes” in his critique of scientific method, he launched more than a philosophical provocation—he opened a fundamental questioning of how we create and validate knowledge. Bruno Latour would later expand this critique through meticulous observation of how science operates in practice. Together, these thinkers reveal science not as an objective pursuit of truth, but as a deeply human enterprise shaped by social forces, rhetoric, and often, productive chaos.

Consider how modern climate scientists must navigate between pure research and public communication, often facing the challenge of translating complex, probabilistic findings into actionable policies. This mirrors Feyerabend’s analysis of Galileo’s defence of heliocentrism—both cases demonstrate how scientific advancement requires not just empirical evidence, but rhetorical skill and strategic communication.

The Social Construction of Scientific Facts

Latour’s concept of “black boxing”—where successful scientific claims become unquestioned facts—illuminates how scientific knowledge achieves its authority. Contemporary examples abound: artificial intelligence researchers like Timnit Gebru and Joy Buolamwini have exposed how seemingly objective AI systems embed social biases, demonstrating Latour’s insight that technical systems are inseparable from their social context.

The COVID-19 pandemic provided a stark illustration of these dynamics. Public health responses required combining epidemiological models with social science insights and local knowledge—precisely the kind of epistemological pluralism Feyerabend advocated. The pandemic revealed what sociologist Harry Collins calls “interactional expertise”—the ability to communicate meaningfully about technical subjects across different domains of knowledge.

Beyond Method: The Reality of Scientific Practice

Both Feyerabend and Latour expose the gap between science’s methodological ideals and its actual practice. This insight finds contemporary expression in the work of Sheila Jasanoff, who developed the concept of “sociotechnical imaginaries”—collectively imagined forms of social life reflected in scientific and technological projects. Her work shows how scientific endeavours are inseparable from social and political visions of desirable futures.

The climate crisis perfectly exemplifies this interweaving of scientific practice and social context. Scholars like Kyle Whyte and Robin Wall Kimmerer demonstrate how indigenous environmental knowledge often provides insights that Western scientific methods miss. This validates Feyerabend’s assertion that progress often requires breaking free from established methodological constraints.

The Pluralistic Vision in Practice

Neither Feyerabend nor Latour advocates abandoning science. Instead, they argue for recognising science as one way of knowing among many—powerful but not exclusive. This vision finds practical expression in contemporary movements like citizen science, where projects like Galaxy Zoo or FoldIt demonstrate how non-experts can contribute meaningfully to scientific research.

The “slow science” movement, championed by Isabelle Stengers, similarly echoes Feyerabend’s critique of methodological orthodoxy. It advocates for more thoughtful, inclusive approaches to research that acknowledge the complexity and uncertainty inherent in scientific inquiry.

Knowledge in the Age of Complexity

Today’s challenges—from climate change to artificial intelligence governance—demand precisely the kind of epistemological pluralism Feyerabend and Latour advocated. Kate Crawford’s research on the politics of AI parallels Latour’s network analysis, showing how technical systems are shaped by complex webs of human decisions and institutional priorities.

Feminist scholars like Karen Barad propose “agential realism,” suggesting that scientific knowledge emerges from specific material-discursive practices rather than revealing pre-existing truths. This builds on Feyerabend’s insight that knowledge advances not through rigid methodology but through dynamic interaction with multiple ways of knowing.

Towards a New Understanding of Scientific Authority

The critiques of Feyerabend and Latour, amplified by contemporary scholars, suggest that scientific authority rests not on infallible methods but on science’s capacity to engage with other forms of knowledge while remaining open to revision and challenge. This understanding might help address contemporary challenges to scientific authority without falling into either naive scientism or radical relativism.

The rise of participatory research methods and citizen science projects demonstrates how this more nuanced understanding of scientific authority can enhance rather than diminish scientific practice. Projects that combine traditional scientific methods with local knowledge and citizen participation often produce more robust and socially relevant results.

Conclusion: Embracing Complexity

Feyerabend and Latour’s critiques, far from being merely historical curiosities, offer vital insights for navigating contemporary challenges. Their work, extended by current scholars, suggests that the future of knowledge lies not in establishing new orthodoxies but in maintaining openness to multiple approaches and perspectives.

In an age of increasing complexity, this pluralistic vision offers our best path forward—one that recognises science’s value while acknowledging the essential contribution of other ways of knowing to human understanding. As we face unprecedented global challenges, this more nuanced and inclusive approach to knowledge creation becomes not just philosophically interesting but practically essential.

The lesson for contemporary science is clear: progress depends not on rigid adherence to method but on maintaining open dialogue between different ways of understanding the world. In this light, the apparent chaos Feyerabend celebrated appears not as a threat to scientific authority but as a necessary condition for genuine advancement in human knowledge.