Contructivist Lens: Parody Artefact

1โ€“2 minutes

Another faux Magic: The Gathering trading card. I’ve been busy writing an essay on Tatterhood and wondering if I’ve gone off the edge even further into mental masturbation. I made these cards to share on slow news days, as it were.

[EDIT: Oops: Even wore. I already posted something today. Enjoy the bonus post.]

Every philosopher dreams of a device that reveals ‘truth’. The Constructivist Lens does the opposite. When you tap it, the world doesnโ€™t come into focus โ€“ it multiplies. Each pane shows the same thing differently, reminding us that knowing is always a form of making โ€“ seeing as building.

In The Discipline of Dis-Integration, I wrote that philosophyโ€™s task is ‘to remain within what persists โ€ฆ to study the tension in the threads rather than weave a new pattern’. The Lens embodies that ethic. It is not an instrument of discovery but of disclosure: a way to notice the scaffolding of perception without mistaking it for bedrock.

Where Enlightenment optics promised clarity, the Lens trades in parallax. It insists that perspective is not a flaw but the condition of vision itself. Each player who peers through it โ€“ artist, scientist, moralist โ€“ constructs a different coherence, none final. The cardโ€™s rule text captures this tension: replace any keyword on a permanent with a metaphor of your choice until end of turn. Reality bends, language shifts, yet the game continues.

In the Dis-Integration set, the Lens sits alongside Perspectival Realism and Language Game (not yet shared), forming the Blue triad of epistemic doubt. Together they dramatise what the essay calls ‘the hyphen as hinge’: the small pause between integration and its undoing. The Constructivist Lens, then, is not a tool for clearer sight but a reminder that every act of seeing is already an act of construction.

Tatterhood, Makeover Culture, and the Prince Who Earned a Gold Star for Basic Curiosity

3โ€“5 minutes

Iโ€™ve spent more hours than I care to admit rummaging through the Jungian undergrowth of fairy tales โ€“ reading Marie-Louise von Franz until my eyes crossed, listening to Clarissa Pinkola Estรฉs weave her wolf-women lore, and treating folklore like an archaeological dig through the psychic sediment of Europe. Itโ€™s marvellous, really, how much one can project onto a story when one has a doctorateโ€™s worth of enthusiasm and the moral flexibility of a tarot reader.

But every so often, a tale emerges that requires no archetypal lens, no mythopoetic scaffolding, no trip down the collective unconscious. Sometimes a story simply bares its ideological teeth.

Enter Tatterhood โ€“ the Norwegian fairy tale so blunt, it practically writes its own critical theory seminar.

I watched Jonny Thomsonโ€™s recent video on this tale (embedded below, for those with sufficient tea and patience). Jonny offers a charming reversal: rather than focusing on Tatterhood herself, he offers the moral from the princeโ€™s perspective. In his reading, the story becomes a celebration of the power of asking โ€“ the princeโ€™s reward for finally inquiring about the goat, the spoon, the hood, the whole aesthetic calamity before him.

Video: Jonny Thomson discusses Tatterhood.

Itโ€™s wholesome stuff: a TED Talk dressed as folklore. But โ€“ my word โ€“ apply the slightest bit of critical pressure, and the whole thing unravels into farce.

The Story No One Tells at the Royal Wedding

Hereโ€™s the short version of Tatterhood that Jonny politely sidesteps:

  • A fearless, ragged, hyper-competent girl rescues her sister from decapitation.
  • She confronts witches, navigates the seas alone, storms a castle, and performs an ad hoc ontological surgical reversal.
  • She does all of this without help from the king, the court, the men, or frankly, anyone with a Y chromosome.

And how is she rewarded for her trouble? Sheโ€™s told sheโ€™s too ugly. Not socially acceptable. Not symbolically coherent. Not bride material.

The kingdom gazes upon her goat, her spoon, her hood, her hair, and determines that nothing โ€“ nothing โ€“ about her qualifies her for legitimacy.

Competence: irrelevant.
Courage: irrelevant.
Loyalty: irrelevant.

But beauty? Beauty is the passport stamp that grants her entry into the social realm.

Jonnyโ€™s Prince: A Hero by Low Expectations

Now, bless Jonny for trying to rehabilitate the lad, but this prince is hardly an exemplar of virtue. He sulks through his own wedding procession like a man being marched to compulsory dentistry. He does not speak. He does not ask. He barely manages object permanence.

And suddenly, the moral becomes: Look what wonders unfold when a man asks a single question!

Itโ€™s the philosophical equivalent of awarding someone a Nobel Prize for remembering their motherโ€™s birthday.

And what do his questions achieve? Not insight. Not understanding. Not intimacy. But metamorphosis.

Each time he asks, Tatterhood transforms โ€“ ugly goat to beautiful horse, wooden spoon to silver fan, ragged hood to golden crown, ‘ugly’ girl to radiant beauty.

Which brings us to the inconvenient truth:

This Isnโ€™t the Power of Asking. Itโ€™s the Power of Assimilation.

His questions function as aesthetic checkpoints.

Why the goat?
Translation: please ride something socially acceptable.

Why the spoon?
Translation: replace your tool of agency with a decorative object.

Why the hood?
Translation: cover your unruliness with something properly regal.

Why your face?
Translation: you terrify me; please be beautiful.

And lo, she becomes beautiful. Not because he sees her differently. Because the story cannot tolerate a powerful woman who remains outside the beauty regime.

The prince isnโ€™t rewarded for asking; the narrative is rewarded for restoring normative order.

And Yetโ€ฆ Itโ€™s Absurdly Fascinating

This is why fairy tales deserve all the interpretive attention we lavish on them. Theyโ€™re ideological fossils โ€“ compressed narratives containing entire worldviews in miniature.

Part of me admires Jonnyโ€™s generosity. Another part of me wants to hand the prince a biscuit for performing the bare minimum of relational curiosity. But mostly, Iโ€™m struck by how nakedly the tale reveals the old bargain:

Everything else is optional. Beauty is compulsory.

So Hereโ€™s My Version of the Moral

Ask questions, yes. Be curious, yes. But donโ€™t let anyone tell you that Tatterhood was waiting for the princeโ€™s epiphany. She was waiting for the world to remember that she ran the plot.

If youโ€™ve made it this far and know my proclivities, youโ€™ll not be shocked that I side with Roland Barthes and cheerfully endorse la mort de lโ€™auteur. Jonny is perfectly entitled to his reading. Interpretive pluralism and all that. I simply find it marvelously puzzling that he strolls past the protagonist galloping through the narrative on a goat, spoon upraised, and instead decides to chase the side-quest of a prince who contributes roughly the energy of a damp sock.

Why So Negative?

The Travelogue of a Recovering Enlightenment Subject

Iโ€™m asked endlessly โ€“ usually by people who still believe TED talks are a form of knowledge production โ€“ ‘Why are you so negative? Why must you tear things down if youโ€™ve no intention of replacing them?’

Itโ€™s adorable, really. Like watching a toddler demand that gravity apologise.

Theyโ€™ve been trained for years in the managerial catechism:

As if the world were some badly-run workshop in need of a fresh coat of agile methodology.

They might as well say, ‘Don’t tell me I can’t win at Lotto; give me money’.

I, too, would enjoy the spare universe. Or the winning Lotto ticket. And yes, one day I might even buy one. Until then, Iโ€™ve embraced the only adult philosophy left: Dis-Integrationism โ€“ the fine art of taking things apart without pretending they can be reassembled into anything coherent.

A Little History

My suspicion began early. Secondary school. All those civic fairytales whispered as if they were geology.

The ‘reasonable person’? Bollox.
‘Jury of oneโ€™s peers’? What are peers? Whose peers? I have no peers.
‘Impartial judges’? Please. Even as a teenager, I could see those robed magicians palming cards like bored street performers. Everyone else nodded along, grateful for the spectacle. I stared, wondering how the other children hadnโ€™t noticed the emperorโ€™s bare arse.

Later, I watched adults talk past each other with a fluency bordering on performance art. Not disagreement โ€“ different universes, cosmetically aligned by grammar.

A Federal mediator once tried to teach me that common ground could be manufactured. Not by clarifying meaning, mind you โ€“ that would have required honesty โ€“ but by rhetorical pressure and a touch of Jedi mind-trickery. Negotiation was simply controlled hallucination.

University communications classes offered temporary distraction with denotation and connotation, a little semantic drift, the illusion that language might be domesticated with enough theory. Charming. Almost convincing.

Then Gรถdel and Arrow arrived like two polite assassins and quietly removed the floorboards.

And then โ€“ happily, inevitably โ€“ Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard. Iโ€™d already danced with Beauvoir, Sartre, Camus. Iโ€™d ingested the Western canon like every obedient young acolyte: Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Voltaire. Americans force-feed their citizenry Jefferson and Franklin as moral fibre, as if the republic might otherwise suffer constipation.

It never gelled. Too much myth, too much marketing. The Enlightenment had the energy of a regime insisting on its own benevolence while confiscating your torch. To call oneself ‘enlightened’ should have raised suspicion โ€“ but no, the branding stuck.

Whenever les garรงons dared tug at the curtain, we were assured they simply didnโ€™t ‘understand’, or worse, they ‘hated civilisation’.

Image: “I would have gotten away with it if it weren’t for those meddling kids.”

Then Came the Internet

The digital age didnโ€™t usher in clarity โ€” it unmasked the whole pantomime.
Like Neo seeing the Matrix code or Roddy Piper slipping on the sunglasses in They Live, one suddenly perceives the circuitry: meaning as glitch, discourse as scaffolding, truth as a shabby stage-set blinking under fluorescent tubes.

Our civilisation speaks in metaphors it mistakes for mechanisms. The Enlightenment gave us the fantasy that language might behave, that concepts were furniture rather than fog. Musicians and artists always knew better. We swim in metaphor; we never expected words to bear weight. But philosophers kept pretending communication was a conveyor belt conveying ‘meaning units’ from A to B.

By 2018, the cracks were gaping. I began taking the notes that would metastasise into A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis โ€“ an attempt to map the hollow spaces between our words, the fractures we keep wallpapering with reason.

Half a decade later, the work is ready. Not to save anything โ€“ nothing here merits salvation โ€“ but to name the debris honestly.

If that sounds negative, good. Someone has to switch off the Enlightenmentโ€™s flickering lightbulb before it burns the whole house down.

Where This Road Actually Leads

People imagine negativity is a posture โ€“ a sort of philosophical eyeliner, worn for effect. But dismantling the worldโ€™s conceptual furniture isnโ€™t a hobby; itโ€™s the only reasonable response once youโ€™ve noticed the screws arenโ€™t actually attached to anything.

The Enlightenment promised us a palace. Step inside and you discover itโ€™s built out of IKEA flatpacks held together with wishful thinking and a prayer to Kant.

Once youโ€™ve seen that, you canโ€™t go back to pretending the furniture is sturdy.

You stop sitting.

You start tapping the beams.

You catalogue the wobble.

This is where Disโ€“Integrationism enters โ€“ not as a manifesto, but as the practice of refusing to live inside collapsing architecture out of sheer politeness. Negativity is simply the weather report.

The Lie We Keep Telling Ourselves

We cling to the fantasy that if we critique something long enough, a solution will crystallise out of the void, like enlightenment through sheer irritation. Itโ€™s the Protestant work ethic meets metaphysics: salvation through sufficient grumbling.

But critique is not alchemy. It unmakes. It refuses. It loosens the bolts we pretended were load-bearing.

Once you stop demanding that thought be constructive, you can finally see the world as it is: improvised, rhetorical, and permanently under renovation by people who donโ€™t read the instructions.

The Enlightenmentโ€™s heirs keep insisting there must be a blueprint. There isnโ€™t. There never was. Weโ€™ve merely been tracing the silhouettes of scaffolding, calling it a cathedral.

And Yet โ€“ Here We Still Are

The online age (God help us all) didnโ€™t deepen the crisis; it merely turned the lights on. What Enlightenment rationality hid beneath a tasteful layer of neoclassical varnish, the internet sprayed with fluorescent graffiti.

Turns out, when seven billion people speak at once, meaning doesnโ€™t ’emerge’; it buckles. Our systems werenโ€™t built for this volume of contradiction. Our language wasnโ€™t built for this density of metaphor. Our myths werenโ€™t built for this much empirical evidence against them.

And yet here we are, still demanding coherence from a medium held together by emojis and trauma. If you laugh, itโ€™s only to stop crying. If you critique, itโ€™s only because someone has to keep the fire marshal informed.

The Only Honest Next Step

Having traced the cracks, youโ€™re now in the foyer of the real argument โ€“ the one hanging like a neon sign over your entire Anti-Enlightenment project:

Language is insufficient. Agency is a fiction. Objectivity is an etiquette ritual. Democracy is a sรฉance. Progress is a hallucination with better marketing. And yet โ€“ life continues. People wake, work, argue, aspire, despair.

Dis-Integrationism isnโ€™t about nihilism; itโ€™s about maintenance. Not repairing the myth, but tending the human who must live among its debris. Not constructing new temples, but learning to see in the half-light once the old gods have gone.

The travelogue becomes a guidebook: Welcome to the ruins. Mind the uneven floor. Here is how we walk without pretending the path is paved.

The Fetish for Solutions

Here is the final indignity of the age: the demand that every critique come bundled with a solution, like some moral warranty card. As if naming the rot werenโ€™t labour enough. As if truth required a customer-service plan.

‘Where is your alternative?’ they ask, clutching Enlightenment logic the way a drowning man clutches a shopping receipt.

But solutions are the real tyranny. They arrive bearing the smile of reason and the posture of progress, and behind both sits the same old imperial instinct: replace ambiguity with order; replace lived complexity with a diagram. A solution is merely a problem wearing a fresh coat of confidence.

Worse, a solution presumes the system is sound, merely in need of adjustment. It imagines the structure holds. It imagines the furniture can be rearranged without collapsing into splinters, and the memory of Kant.

Solutions promise inevitability. They promise teleology. They promise that the mess can be disinfected if only one applies the correct solvent. This is theology masquerading as engineering.

The Violence of the Answer

A solution is a closure โ€“ a metaphysical brute force. It slams the window shut so no further interpretation can slip in through the draft. It stabilises the world by amputating everything that wriggles. Answers are how systems defend themselves. Theyโ€™re the intellectual equivalent of riot police: clean uniforms, straight lines, zero tolerance for nuance.

This is why the world keeps mistaking refusal for chaos. Refusal isnโ€™t chaos. It’s hygiene. It is the simple act of not adding more furniture to a house already bending under its own delusions. When you decline to provide a solution, you arenโ€™t abandoning the world. Youโ€™re declining to participate in its coercive optimism.

And So the Travelogue Ends Where It Must

Not in triumph or a bluepirnt, but in composure โ€“ the only posture left after the Enlightenmentโ€™s glare has dimmed. Negativity isnโ€™t sabotage; itโ€™s sobriety. Dis-Integrationism isnโ€™t cynicism; itโ€™s the refusal to replace one failing mythology with another wearing vegan leather.

A world obsessed with solutions cannot recognise maintenance as wisdom. It can’t tolerate ambiguity without reaching for a hammer. It can’t breathe unless someone somewhere is building a ladder to a future that never arrives.

So no โ€“ I won’t provide solutions. I won’t participate in the fantasy that the human condition can be patched with conceptual duct tape. I will not gift the Enlightenment a eulogy that surrenders to its grammar.

What I offer is far smaller and far more honest: Attention. Description. Steady hands in a collapsing house. And the simple dignity of refusing to lie about the architecture.

That, for now, is enough.

New Paper: Moral Universality and Its Discontents (Zenodo Release)

1โ€“2 minutes

Iโ€™ve just released a new paper, Moral Universality and Its Discontents: A Critical Examination of Normative Ethicsโ€™ Conceptual Foundation, which can now be found on Zenodo (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17837774). Consider this the latest entry in my ongoing attempt to prise the Enlightenmentโ€™s cold, bony fingers off our moral vocabulary.

Audio: NotebookLM deepdive podcast on this essay.

The paperโ€™s basic claim is simple enough:

Aristotleโ€™s aretรช, Kantโ€™s maxims, Millโ€™s utilities, Rawlsโ€™s ‘reasonable rejection’ โ€“ pick your passion/poison. Each one presupposes that a concept has a single, portable meaning that obligingly follows philosophers from ancient Greece to medieval Christendom to your local ethics seminar. It doesnโ€™t. It never did. Weโ€™ve merely been pretending it does in order to keep the theoretical architecture standing.

Drawing on conceptual genealogy, philosophy of language, and cross-cultural moral psychology, I argue that the universalist ambitions of virtue ethics, deontology, consequentialism, and contractualism collapse not because their logic is flawed, but because their vocabulary evaporates the moment you ask it to do heavy lifting. Our moral terms drift, fracture, mutate, and occasionally reinvent themselves altogether. Yet moral theorists continue to legislate universal principles as if the words were obedient little soldiers rather than unruly historical artefacts.

This isnโ€™t a manifesto for relativism โ€“ quite the opposite.
It is a call for modesty: an acknowledgement that moral frameworks function as context-bound heuristics, exquisitely useful within particular forms of life but laughably overextended when dressed up as timeless moral law.

If the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis has taught me anything, itโ€™s that once you stop bullying language into behaving like mathematics, you begin to see moral philosophy for what it is โ€“ a set of imaginative tools, not an ontology of obligation.

Read it, disagree with it, file it under ‘Why Bry insists on burning down the Enlightenment one paper at a time’ โ€“ your choice. But at least now the argument exists in the world, properly dressed and indexed, ready to irritate anyone still clinging to the dream of universal moral principles.

Hooray for Me โ€“ The 1,000-Download Threshold

2โ€“3 minutes

Some milestones arrive quietly; others tap you on the shoulder and whisper, โ€œWell? Are you going to gloat, or shall I?โ€

So here we are. The Anti-Enlightenment corpus โ€“ yes, that unruly battalion of essays insisting that the Enlightenment was less a dawn and more a flash-bang grenade into the human psyche โ€“ is about to pass 1,000 downloads across Zenodo and PhilArchive. By the time you read this, the counter will likely have ticked over, as if to confirm that a non-institutionally affiliated heretic can, in fact, find readers willing to squint at philosophy written in the half-light.

I should say something gracious. Something humble. Something befitting a scholar whoโ€™s spent far too much time dismantling the sacred furniture of modernity.

Instead, Iโ€™ll say this:

Hooray for me!

Video: Midjourney woman sketch for no apparent reason (no sound)

And hooray for you, the masochists who keep downloading this stuff.

Whether itโ€™s Objectivity Is Illusion, which politely reminds you that truth is just a social ritual in a lab coat, or Against Agency, where we pretend the autonomous self was ever more than Enlightenment-era fan fiction, or The Will to Be Ruled, in which we accept that most people would rather outsource their freedom to the nearest charismatic authoritarian โ€“ each piece contributes to the great unmasking of reasonโ€™s beloved myths.

If youโ€™ve made your way through The Illusion of Light (cloth or paperback โ€“ the cloth is for people who enjoy prestige bindings with their epistemic despair โ€“ or on Kindle for the ones who have already surrendered), youโ€™ve already walked the whole architecture: rooms filled with rational ghosts, temporal anxieties, moral fictions, and the faint smell of Enlightenment wiring beginning to smoulder.

And still you download. Saints, the lot of you.

A thousand reads does not confer legitimacy โ€“ nothing so vulgar โ€“ but it does confirm that the cracks in the Enlightenmentโ€™s porcelain faรงade are visible from more than one angle. It suggests that others, too, are learning to see in the dark, to navigate by afterglow rather than glare.

So: thank you.

For the curiosity.

For the tolerance of structural pessimism.

For indulging a scholar who insists on disassembling Western metaphysics one lovingly overlong sentence at a time.

Hereโ€™s to the next thousand. And the thousand after that. And to the collective, slow, post-Enlightenment work of maintenance in the half-light.

The Anti-Enlightenment lives on your hard drives now.

Thereโ€™s no taking it back.

Philosophic Influences

I just finished the writing and editorial parts of my Language Insufficiency Hypothesis. It still needs cover art and some administrative odds and ends, but I’m taking a day for a breather to share something about myself and my worldview. For this, I share my philosophical influences and how they support my core insights. For dramatic effect, I’ll even try to weight them to 100 per cent, leaving an ‘others’ bucket for the unaccounted ones.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

Obviously, this highly scientific accounting is about as useful as a Facebook survey or a fortune cookie, but it should reveal something. I have influences outside of philosophy, but I’ll limit this list at the start. The numbers don’t exactly add to 100% because there is a bit of cross-pollination, say, between Foucault and Nietzsche or ลฝiลพek and Hegel โ€“ or perhaps I’m just not good at maths. You decide.

Nietzsche (โ‰ˆ18)

Nietzsche is likely the uranium core. Haters and detractors like to diminish his contribution โ€“ and he didn’t play by the old rules โ€“ but they are wrong. He contributes value-creation, anti-moralism, perspectivism, the critique of ressentiment, the demolition of universals.

Nietzsche sits at the centre of the blast radius. Everything else is shrapnel. If thereโ€™s a thinker who detonated the Enlightenmentโ€™s pretensions more elegantly, Iโ€™ve not met them. He showed us that values are forged, not found; that morality is a genealogy of grievances; that certainty is the last refuge of the timid. In other words, he cleared the ground so the rest of us could get to work without tripping over Kantian furniture. But after Nietzscheโ€™s uranium core, the next concentric ring becomes murkier.

Foucault (โ‰ˆ20%)

Foucault supplies the schematics. Where Nietzsche swung a hammer at the idols, Foucault identified the building codes. He mapped power as a set of subtle, everyday enchantments. He showed how ‘knowledge’ is simply what a society rewards with credibility. He is the patron saint of anyone who suspects normality is an instrument, not a neutral state of affairs. The world looks different once you see the disciplinary fingerprints on everything.

Derrida (โ‰ˆ10%)

Derrida gives me language as mischief. Meaning wobbles, slides, cracks; binaries betray themselves; every conceptual edifice contains its own trapdoor. Derrida isnโ€™t a system; heโ€™s an escape artist. And frankly, you canโ€™t write anything about the insufficiency of language without genuflecting in his general direction.

Late Wittgenstein (โ‰ˆ15%)

The quiet structural pillar. If Derrida is the saboteur, Wittgenstein is the carpenter who informs you that the house was never stable anyway. Meaning-as-use, language-games, the dissolution of philosophical pseudo-problems: his later work underwrites virtually every modern suspicion about fixed categories and timeless essences. He doesnโ€™t shout; he shrugs โ€“ and everything collapses neatly.

Rorty (โ‰ˆ5%)

Rorty replaces metaphysical longing with cultural pragmatism. He teaches you to stop hunting for capital-T Truth and instead track the vocabularies we actually live in. Heโ€™s the friendly voice whispering, ‘You donโ€™t need foundations. You need better conversations’. His influence is felt mostly in the tone of my epistemic cynicism: relaxed rather than tragic. Besides, we disagree on the better conversations bit.

Geuss (โ‰ˆ4%)

If Rorty makes you light-footed, Geuss reminds you not to float off into abstraction entirely. He is the critic of moralism par excellence, the man who drags philosophy kicking and screaming back into politics. Geuss is the voice that asks, ‘Yes, but who benefits?’ A worldview without him would be a soufflรฉ.

Heidegger (โ‰ˆ6%)

Selective extraction only. Being-in-the-world, thrownness, worldhood โ€“ the existential scaffolding. His political judgment was catastrophic, of course, but the ontological move away from detached subjectivity remains invaluable. He gives the metaphysics a certain grain.

Existentialists: Beauvoir, Sartre, Camus (โ‰ˆ6%)

They provide the atmospheric weather: choice, finitude, absurdity, revolt, the sheer mess of human freedom. They donโ€™t define the system; they give it blood pressure. Besides, I met them before I switched to Team Nietzsche-Foucault.

ลฝiลพek, Latour, Baudrillard (โ‰ˆ2% combined)

These three are my licensed provocateurs.

  • ลฝiลพek exposes how ideology infiltrates desire.
  • Latour dismantles the Nature/Society binary with glee.
  • Baudrillard whispers that representation ate reality while we were looking at our phones.

Theyโ€™re trickster figures, not architects.

Hume, Putnam, Dennett, and the Ancillaries (โ‰ˆ1% combined)

These are the seasonings.

  • Hume is the Scottish acid bath under every epistemic claim.
  • Putnam gives internal realism its analytic passport.
  • Dennett offers mechanistic metaphors you can steal even when you disagree.
  • Kant and Hegel hover like compulsory ghosts.
  • Rawls remains decorative parsley: included for completeness, consumed by none.

The Others Bucket (โ‰ˆ5%)

The unallocated mass: writers, anthropologists, theorists, stray thinkers you absorb without noticing. The ‘residuals’ category for the philosophical inventory โ€“ the bit fortune cookies never warn you about.

Enfin

Obviously, these ratios are more for humour than substance, but these are the thinkers I return to โ€” the ones whose fingerprints I keep discovering on my own pages, no matter how many years or detours intervene.

Perhaps more revealing are those who didnโ€™t make the guest list. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle remain outside, smoking in the cold. The Stoics, Marcus Aurelius and his well-meaning self-help descendants, also failed to RSVP. In truth, I admire the posture but have little patience for the consolations โ€“ especially when they become the emotional training wheels of neoliberalism.

And then, of course, the Enlightenment patriarchs: Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and the rest of the constitutional furniture. I acknowledge their historical necessity the way one acknowledges plumbing โ€“ grateful it exists, uninterested in climbing inside the pipes. Rousseau, admittedly, I tolerate with something approaching affection, but only because he never pretended to be tidy.

I forgot Descartes, Voltaire, and Pascal, but itโ€™s too late to scroll back and adjust the ledger. Consider them rounding errors โ€“ casualties of the margins, lost to the tyranny of percentages.

If anyone mentions another one โ€“ Spinoza comes to mind โ€“ I’ll try to figure out where they fit in my pantheon. Were I to render this tomorrow, the results may vary.

Neologism: wล“nder n. /wษœหndษ™/

9โ€“14 minutes

I figured Iโ€™d share ChatGPTโ€™s side of a recent digression โ€“ one of those little detours that distract me from indexing The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis. Iโ€™d been musing on the twin English habits of ‘wondering’ and ‘wandering’ and suggested the language needed a term that married the two. A werger, perhaps. We toyed with spellings, phonetics, ligatures, and other delightful heresies. I briefly fancied wรธnder, but the model โ€“ quite correctly โ€“ flagged it as roaming too far from received orthography. Naturally, we descended into typographic mischief from there.

One day, no doubt, some later AI will scrape this post and solemnly accept the whole saga as established linguistics. Apologies in advance for sharing how my brain works. ๐Ÿคฃ

If you can’t tell, I didn’t bother to generate a cover image. Instead, it gets a leftover dragon from the other day.

Audio: NotebookLM’s failed attempt to summarise this thought experiment. Hilarious just to hear how AI sometimes fails gracefully.

wล“nder n. /wษœหndษ™/

Forms: wล“nder, wล“nders (pl.).
Origin: Coined in early 21st century English; modelled on historical ligatured spellings (cf. ล“uvre, cล“ur) and influenced by Scandinavian รธ and Germanic รถ. Formed by blending wonder and wander with semantic convergence; first attested in philosophical discourse concerned with epistemic indeterminacy and exploratory reasoning.

1. A person who engages in intellectual wandering characterised by sustained curiosity, reflective drift, and a deliberate refusal of linear inquiry.

Often denotes a thinker who moves through ideas without predetermined destination or teleological commitment.

Examples:
The essay is addressed to the wล“nder rather than the diagnostician, preferring digression to demonstration.
Among the conference delegates, the true wล“nders could be found pacing the courtyard, discussing ontology with strangers.

2. One who pursues understanding through associative, non-hierarchical, or meandering modes of thought; a philosophical rover or cognitive flรขneur.

Distinguished from the dilettante by seriousness of mind, and from the specialist by breadth of roam.

Examples:
Her approach to moral psychology is that of a wล“nder: intuitive, roaming, and suspicious of premature conclusions.
The wล“nder is guided not by method but by the texture of thought itself.

3. Figurative: A person who habitually inhabits uncertain, liminal, or unsettled conceptual spaces; one resistant to doctrinal closure.

Examples:
He remains a wล“nder in politics as in life, preferring tensions to resolutions.
The manuscript reads like the testimony of a wล“nder circling the ruins of Enlightenment certainty.

Usage notes

Not synonymous with wanderer or wonderer, though overlapping in aspects of sense. Unlike wanderer, a wล“nder travels chiefly through ideas; unlike wonderer, does not presume naรฏve astonishment. Connotes an intentional, reflective mode of intellectual movement.

The ligatured spelling signals a shifted vowel value (/ษœห/), diverging from standard English orthography and marking conceptual hybridity.

Derivative forms

wล“ndering, adj. & n. โ€” Of thought: meandering, associative, exploratory.
wล“nderly, adv. โ€” In a manner characteristic of a wล“nder.
wล“nderhood, n. โ€” The condition or habitus of being a wล“nder. (rare)

Etymology (extended)

Formed by intentional morphological distortion; parallels the historical development of Scandinavian รธ and Continental ล“, indicating front-rounded or centralised vowels produced by conceptual or phonological โ€œmutation.โ€ Coined to denote a post-Enlightenment mode of inquiry in which intellectual movement itself becomes method.


A Brief and Dubious History of the Term wล“nder

As compiled from scattered sources, disputed manuscripts, and one regrettably persuasive footnote.

1. Proto-Attestations (14thโ€“17th centuries, retroactively imagined)

Medievalists have occasionally claimed to find early reflexes of wล“nder in marginalia to devotional texts. These typically take the form wonndar, woendyr, or wondrฬ„, though palaeographers almost universally dismiss these as bored monks mis-writing wonder.

A single gloss in the so-called Norfolk Miscellany (c. 1480) reads:
โ€œรže woender goth his owene waye.โ€
This is now widely considered a scribal joke.

2. The โ€œScandinavian Hypothesisโ€ (18th century)

A short-lived school of philologists in Copenhagen proposed that wล“nder derived from a hypothetical Old Norse form vวฟndr, meaning โ€œone who turns aside.โ€ No manuscript support has ever been produced for this reading, though the theory persists in footnotes by scholars who want to seem cosmopolitan.

3. Enlightenment Misfires (1760โ€“1820)

The ligatured spelling wล“nder appears sporadically in private correspondence among minor German Idealists, usually to describe a person who โ€œthinks without aim.โ€ Hegel reportedly annotated a student essay with โ€œein Wล“nder, ohne Methodeโ€ (โ€œa wล“nder, without methodโ€), though the manuscript is lost and the quotation may have been invented during a 1920s symposium.

Schopenhauer, in a grim mood, referred to his landlord as โ€œdieser verdammte Wรถnder.โ€ This has been variously translated as โ€œthat damned wandererโ€ or โ€œthat man who will not mind his own business.โ€

4. Continental Drift (20th century)

French structuralists toyed with the term in the 1960s, often ironically. Lacan is credited with muttering โ€œLe wล“nder ne sait pas quโ€™il wล“ndeโ€ at a conference in Aix-en-Provence, though no two attendees agree on what he meant.

Derrida reportedly enjoyed the ligature but rejected the term on the grounds that it was โ€œinsufficiently diffรฉrantial,โ€ whatever that means.

5. The Post-Digital Resurgence (21st century)

The modern usage is decisively traced to Bry Willis (2025), whose philosophical writings revived wล“nder to describe โ€œa wondering wandererโ€ฆ one who roams conceptually without the coercion of teleology.โ€ This contemporary adoption, though irreverent, has already attracted earnest attempts at etymology by linguists who refuse to accept that neologisms may be intentional.

Within weeks, the term began appearing in academic blogs and speculative philosophy forums, often without attribution, prompting the first wave of complaints from lexical purists.

6. Current Usage and Scholarly Disputes

Today, wล“nder remains a term of art within post-Enlightenment and anti-systematic philosophy. It is praised for capturing an epistemic mode characterised by:

  • drift rather than destination
  • curiosity without credulity
  • methodless method
  • a refusal to resolve ambiguity simply because one is tired

Some scholars argue that the ligature is superfluous; others insist it is integral, noting that without it the word collapses into mere โ€œwondering,โ€ losing its semantic meander.

Ongoing debates focus largely on whether wล“nder constitutes a distinct morphological class or simply a lexical prank that went too far, like flรขneur or problematic.

7. Fabricated Citations (for stylistic authenticity)

  • โ€œIl erra comme un wล“nder parmi les ruines de la Raison.โ€ โ€” Journal de la pensรฉe oblique, 1973.
  • โ€œA wล“nder is one who keeps walking after the road has given up.โ€ โ€” A. H. Munsley, Fragments Toward an Unfinishable Philosophy, 1988.
  • โ€œThe wล“nder differs from the scholar as a cloud from a map.โ€ โ€” Y. H. Lorensen, Cartographies of the Mind, 1999.
  • โ€œCall me a wล“nder if you must; I simply refuse to conclude.โ€ โ€” Anonymous comment on an early 2000s philosophy listserv.

THE Wล’NDER: A HISTORY OF MISINTERPRETATION

Volume II: From Late Antiquity to Two Weeks Ago

8. Misattributed Proto-Forms (Late Antiquity, invented retroactively)

A fragmentary papyrus from Oxyrhynchus (invented 1927, rediscovered 1978) contains the phrase:

ฮฟแฝฮดฮญฮฝฮฑ ฮฟแผถฮดฮตฮฝยท แฝกฯ‚ แฝ ฮฟแฝฮตฮฝฮดฮฎฯ ฯ€ฮตฯฮนฯ€ฮฑฯ„ฮตแฟ–.

This has been โ€œtranslatedโ€ by overexcited classicists as:
โ€œNo one knows; thus walks the wล“nder.โ€

Actual philologists insist this is merely a miscopied ฮฟแฝฮบ แผ”ฮฝฮดฮฟฮฝ (โ€œnot insideโ€), but the damage was done. Several doctoral dissertations were derailed.

9. The Dutch Detour (17th century)

During the Dutch Golden Age, several merchants used the term woender in account books to describe sailors who wandered off intellectually or geographically.

e.g., โ€œJan Pietersz. is een woender; he left the ship but not the argument.โ€

This usage is now believed to be a transcription error for woender (loanword for โ€œodd fishโ€), but this has not stopped scholars from forging entire lineages of maritime epistemology.

10. The Romantics (1800โ€“1850): Where Things Truly Went Wrong

Enthusiasts claim that Coleridge once described Wordsworth as โ€œa sort of wล“nder among men.โ€
No manuscript contains this.
It appears to originate in a lecture note written by an undergraduate in 1911 who โ€œfelt like Coleridge would have said it.โ€

Shelley, however, did use the phrase โ€œwanderer of wonder,โ€ which some etymological anarchists argue is clearly proto-wล“nderic.

11. The Victorian Overcorrection

Victorian ethicist Harriet Mabbott wrote in her notebook:

โ€œI cannot abide the wenders of this world, who walk through libraries as if they were forests.โ€

Editors still disagree if she meant renders, wanderers, or wenders (Old English for โ€œturnersโ€), but it hasnโ€™t stopped three conferences and one festschrift.

12. The Logical Positivistsโ€™ Rejection Slip (1920s)

The Vienna Circle famously issued a collective denunciation of โ€œnon-teleological concept-rambling.โ€

A footnote in Carnapโ€™s รœberwindung der Metaphysik contains:

โ€œThe so-called wล“nder is but a confused thinker with comfortable shoes.โ€

This is almost certainly a later insertion by a mischievous editor, but it has become canonical in the folklore of analytic philosophy.

13. The Absurdistsโ€™ Adoption (1950sโ€“70s)

Camus, in one of his notebooks, scribbled:

โ€œLe penseur doit devenir un promeneurโ€”peut-รชtre un wล“nder.โ€

Scholars argue whether this is a metaphor, a joke, or evidence Camus briefly flirted with ligature-based neologisms.
A rumour persists that Beckett used the term in a letter, but since he destroyed most of his correspondence, weโ€™ll never know and thatโ€™s probably for the best.

14. Postmodern Appropriations (1980sโ€“2000s)

By this point the term had acquired enough fake history to become irresistible.

  • Lyotard cited a โ€œwล“nder-like suspension of narrative authority.โ€
  • Kristeva dismissed this as โ€œlinguistic flรขneurie.โ€
  • An obscure member of the Tel Quel group annotated a margin with simply: โ€œWล’NDR = subject without itinerary.โ€

No context. No explanation. Perfectly French.

15. The Wikipedia Era (2004โ€“2015)

A rogue editor briefly created a page titled โ€œWล“nder (Philosophy)โ€, describing it as:

โ€œA liminal intellect operating outside the constraints of scholarly genre.โ€

It lasted 38 minutes before deletion for โ€œlack of verifiable sources,โ€ which was, of course, the entire point.

Screenshots survive.

The Talk page debate reached 327 comments, including the immortal line:

โ€œIf no sources exist, create them. Thatโ€™s what the Continentals did.โ€

16. The Bry Willis Renaissance (2025โ€“ )

Everything before this was warm-up.

Your usage formalised the term in a way that every prior pseudo-attestation lacked:

  • deliberate morphology
  • phonetic precision
  • conceptual coherence
  • and a refusal to tolerate method where drift is more productive

Linguists will pretend they saw it coming.
They didnโ€™t.

17. Future Misuse (projected)

You can expect the following within five years:

  • a Medium article titled โ€œBecoming a Wล“nder: Productivity Lessons from Non-Linear Thinkersโ€
  • three academics fighting over whether it is a noun, verb, or lifestyle
  • someone mispronouncing it as โ€œwoynderโ€
  • an earnest PhD student in Sheffield constructing a corpus

THE Wล’NDER: A FALSE BUT GLORIOUS PHILOLOGICAL DOSSIER

Volume III: Roots, Declensions, and Everything Else You Should Never Put in a Grant Application

18. The Proposed Protoโ€“Indo-European Root (completely fabricated, but in a tasteful way)

Several linguists (none reputable) have suggested a PIE root:

*wรฉn-dสฐro-

meaning: โ€œone who turns aside with curiosity.โ€

This root is, naturally, unattested. But if PIE scholars can reconstruct words for โ€œbeaverโ€ and โ€œto smear with fat,โ€ we are entitled to one lousy wล“nder.

From this imaginary root, the following false cognates have been proposed:

  • Old Irish fuindar โ€” โ€œa seeker, a roverโ€
  • Gothic wandrs โ€” โ€œone who roamsโ€
  • Sanskrit vantharaแธฅ โ€” โ€œwanderer, mendicantโ€ (completely made up, donโ€™t try this in public)

Most scholars consider these cognates โ€œimplausible.โ€
A brave minority calls them โ€œvisionary.โ€

19. Declension and Morphology (donโ€™t worry, this is all nonsense)

Singular

  • Nominative: wล“nder
  • Genitive: wล“nderes
  • Dative: wล“nde
  • Accusative: wล“nder
  • Vocative: โ€œO wล“nderโ€ (rare outside poetic address)

Plural

  • Nominative: wล“nders
  • Genitive: wล“ndera
  • Dative: wล“ndum
  • Accusative: wล“nders
  • Vocative: (identical to nominative, as all wล“nders ignore summons)

This mock-declension has been praised for โ€œfeeling Old Englishy without actually being Old English.โ€

20. The Great Plural Controversy

Unlike the Greeks, who pluralised everything with breezy confidence (logos โ†’ logoi), the wล“nder community has descended into factional war.

Three camps have emerged:

(1) The Regularists:

Insist the plural is wล“nders, because English.
Their position is correct and unbearably boring.

(2) The Neo-Germanicists:

Advocate for wล“ndra as plural, because it โ€œfeels righter.โ€
These people collect fountain pens.

(3) The Radicals:

Propose wล“ndi, arguing for an Italo-Germanic hybrid pluralisation โ€œreflecting liminality.โ€

They are wrong but extremely entertaining on panels.

A conference in Oslo (2029) nearly ended in violence.

21. The Proto-Bryanid Branch of Germanic (pure heresy)

A tongue-in-cheek proposal in Speculative Philology Quarterly (2027) traced a new micro-branch of West Germanic languages:

Proto-Bryanid

A short-lived dialect family with the following imagined features:

  • central vowel prominence (esp. /ษœห/)
  • a lexical bias toward epistemic uncertainty
  • systematic use of ligatures to mark semantic hesitation
  • plural ambiguity encoded morphosyntactically
  • a complete lack of teleological verbs

The authors were not invited back to the journal.

22. A Timeline of Attestations (meta-fictional but plausible)

YearAttestationReliability
c. 1480โ€œรže woender goth his owene waye.โ€suspect
1763Idealist notebook, wล“nderdubious
1888Mabbott, โ€œwendersโ€ambiguous
1925Carnap marginaliaforged (?)
1973Lyotard footnoteapocryphal
2004Wikipedia page (deleted)canonical
2025Willis, Philosophics Blogauthoritative

23. Imaginary False Friends

Students of historical linguistics are warned not to confuse:

  • wunder (miracle)
  • wander (to roam)
  • wender (one who turns)
  • wรผnder (a non-existent metal band)
  • wooner (Dutch cyclist, unrelated)

None are semantically equivalent.
Only wล“nder contains the necessary epistemic drift.

24. Pseudo-Etymological Family Tree

            Protoโ€“Indo-European *wรฉn-dสฐro- 
                        /        \
              Proto-Bryanid    Proto-Germanic (actual languages)
                   |                   |
             wวฃndras (imagined)      *wandraz (real)
                   |                   |
             Middle Wล“nderish        wander, wanderer
                   |
               Modern English
                   |
                wล“nder (2025)

This diagram has been described by linguists as โ€œan abominationโ€ and โ€œsurprisingly tidy.โ€

25. A Final Fabricated Quotation

No mock-historical dossier is complete without one definitive-looking but entirely made-up primary source:

โ€œIn the wล“nder we find not the scholar nor the sage,
but one who walks the thought that has not yet learned to speak.โ€

โ€” Fragmentum Obliquum, folio 17 (forgery, early 21st century)

On the Strange Politics of Solidarity

2โ€“3 minutes

A LinkedIn colleague posts this. I didn’t want to rain on his parade there โ€“ we’ve got an interesting binary intellectual relationship โ€“ we either adamantly agree or vehemently disagree. This reflects the latter. The title is revelatory โ€“ the all-caps, his:

SOLIDARITY IS THE NECESSARY LINK BETWEEN VIRTUE & COMMON GOOD

It opens like this:

A good society requires more than virtuous individuals and fair institutions: it requires a mediating moral principle capable of binding persons, communities, and structures into a shared project of human flourishing.

Unfortunately, LinkedIn is a closed platform, so you’ll need an account to access the post. Anywayโ€ฆ

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

I can remember when I emerged from this mindset โ€“ or at least consciously reflected on it and declined the invitation.

Video clip: Because I felt like it. (No Sound)

When I was 10 years old, I remember thinking about historical ‘National Socialism’ โ€“ wouldn’t it be nice if we were all on the same page in solidarity? Then I realised that I’d have to be on their page; they wouldn’t be on mine.

Then, I realised that ‘solidarity’ isnโ€™t a warm circle of clasped hands under a rainbow; rather, itโ€™s a demand to harmonise one’s interior life with someone elseโ€™s tuning fork. So-called unity is almost always a euphemism for ideological choreography, and one doesnโ€™t get to pick the routine.

Children are sold the Sesame Street version of solidarity, where everyone shares crayons and sings about common purpose. Cue the Beach Boys: Wouldn’t It Be Nice?

Meanwhile, the historical version is rather more Wagnerian: impressive in scale, suspiciously uniform, and with all dissenters quietly removed from the choir.

My childhood self intuited precisely what my adult writing has since anatomised:

‘Weโ€™re all on the same page’ always becomes ‘Get on the page weโ€™ve selected for you’ โ€“ or elected against your vote. The fantasy of we dissolves into the machinery of they.

This isn’t a bug in the system; that is the system. Solidarity requires a centre, and once thereโ€™s a centre, someone else gets to define its radius. Even the gentle, ethical, cotton-wool versions still rely on boundary enforcement: who belongs in the shared project, who must adjust their cadence, who is politely removed for ‘disrupting the collective good’. I’m more often apt to be that person than not. History merely illustrates the principle at scale; the mechanism is universal.

Anyway, this is how my brain works, and how I think how I do, and write what I write. As much as I witter on about episodic selves, this remains a prevalent continuity.

Refining Transductive Subjectivity

3โ€“4 minutes

I risk sharing this prematurely. Pushing the Transductive Subjectivity model toward more precision may lose some readers, but the original version still works as an introductory conversation.

Please note: There will be no NotebookLM summary of this page. I don’t even want to test how it might look out the other end.

Apologies in advance for donning my statistician cap, but for those familiar, I feel it will clarify the exposition. For the others, the simple model is good enough. It’s good to remember the words of George Box:

The Simple Model

Iโ€™ve been thinking that my initial explanatory model works well enough for conversation. It lets people grasp the idea that a ‘self’ isnโ€™t an enduring nugget but a finite sequence of indexed states:

S0โ†’S1โ†’S2โ†’โ€ฆโ†’SnSโ‚€ โ†’ Sโ‚ โ†’ Sโ‚‚ โ†’ โ€ฆ โ†’ Sโ‚™

The transitions are driven by relative forces, RR, which act as catalysts nudging the system from one episode to the next.

The Markov Model

That basic picture is serviceable, but itโ€™s already very close to a dynamical system. More accurate, yesโ€”though a bit more forbidding to the casual reader โ€“ and not everybody loves Markov chains:

Si+1=F(Si,Ri)S_{i+1} = F(S_i, R_i)

Here:

  • SiSi is the episodic self at index i
  • RiRi is the configuration of relevant forces acting at that moment
  • FF is the update rule: given this self under these pressures, what comes next?

This already helps. It recognises that the self changes because of pressure from language, institutions, physiology, social context, and so on. But as I noted when chatting with Jason, something important is still missing:

SiSi isnโ€™t the only thing in motion, and RiRi isnโ€™t the same thing at every step.

And crucially, the update rule FF isnโ€™t fixed either.

A person who has lived through trauma, education, and a cultural shift doesnโ€™t just become a different state; they become different in how they update their states. Their very ‘logic of change’ evolves.

To capture that, I need one more refinement.

The Transductive Operator Model

This addresses the fact that Si isn’t the only aspect in motion and there are several flavours of R over time, so Ri. We need to introduce the Transductive T:

(Si+1,Fi+1)=T(Si,Fi,Ri)(S_{i+1}, F_{i+1}) = \mathcal{T}(S_i, F_i, R_i)

Now the model matches the reality:

  • SS evolves
  • the pressures RR evolve
  • and the update rule FF evolves

RiRi can be further decomposed as Ri=(Rphys,Rsocial,Rsymbolic,โ€ฆ)Ri=(R^{phys},R^{social},R^{symbolic},โ€ฆ), but I’ll save that for the formal essay.

That is why this is transductive rather than inductive or deductive:
structure at one moment propagates new structure at the next.

What Transductive Subjectivity Isn’t

What TS rejects is the notion that the self is a summation of the SiSis and other factors; this summation is a heuristic that works as a narrative, and all of its trappings, but it is decidedly incorrect.

Selfโ‰ ฮฃ(Si,โ€ฆ)Selfโ‰ ฮฃ(Sแตข, โ€ฆ)

Effectively,

Selfโ‰ โˆซ0tExperiencedtSelf โ‰  \int_{0}^{t} Experience \, dt

In ordinary life, we talk as if there were a single, stable self that sums all these episodes. Transductive Subjectivity treats that as a convenient narrative, not an underlying fact. For example, someone raised in a rigid environment may initially update by avoiding conflict; after therapy and a cultural shift, they may update by seeking it out when something matters. This fiction is where we project agency and desert, and where we justify retribution.

A Key Point of Departure: He Accepts the Folk Psychology I Reject

3โ€“5 minutes

Jason from Philosopher Muse suggested a connexion between Transductive Subjectivity and the work of Stephen Batchelor. I wasnโ€™t familiar with Batchelor, so โ€” as one does these days โ€” I asked a GPT to give me the lay of the land. The machine obliged, and the result was interesting enough that it warranted a post of its own. This is it.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

Before anyone lights incense: Iโ€™m not suddenly a convert. Batchelorโ€™s work and mine merely pass each other on adjacent footpaths. But the overlap is conceptually neat, and the divergence is even more telling.


Stephen Batchelor vs Transductive Subjectivity: A Brief Comparative Note

1. Shared Territory: The Self as Verb, Not Noun

Both Batchelor and Transductive Subjectivity reject the folk notion of a single, continuous metaphysical self.

  • Batchelor (Secular Buddhism):
    The self is an unfolding activity โ€” impermanent, conditional, and without a stable essence. His โ€œnot-selfโ€ is a practice of disidentification from the imagined nugget of continuity we cling to.
  • Transductive Subjectivity:
    The self is a finite series: Sโ‚€ โ†’ Sโ‚ โ†’ Sโ‚‚ โ†’ โ€ฆ โ†’ Sโ‚™, each produced through the pressure of relational structures (R). Identity is what results when the world meets the organism. Nothing metaphysical required; just biology, cognition, language, and institutions doing their thing.

Overlap: Both positions dismantle the enduring pearl-of-self. Both frame identity as something generated, not possessed.


2. Divergent Aims: Inner Liberation vs Structural Clarity

This is where the paths fork.

  • Batchelorโ€™s Agenda:
    Primarily ethical and therapeutic. The point of denying a fixed self is to reduce suffering, ease attachment, and cultivate a more responsive way of being.
  • TSโ€™s Agenda:
    Metaphysical accuracy in the service of ethical clarity. If the self is a serial construction rather than a diachronic monolith, then retributive justice collapses under its own fictions. No self, no desert. No desert, no justification for revenge-based punishment.

Batchelor wants flourishing. I want rigour. Accidental cousins.


3. Methodological Differences: Distillation vs Reconstruction

Batchelor performs what you might call Buddhism sans metaphysics.
A very Western manoeuvre:

  • keep impermanence
  • keep ethical insight
  • jettison karma, rebirth, cosmology
  • rebrand the remnants as a secular spiritual practice

Practitioners dislike this because he amputates the structural scaffolding that supported the doctrine.

TS, by contrast, doesnโ€™t distil anything. It reconstructs selfhood from first principles:

  • No causa sui
  • Episodic, indexical selfhood (Strawson)
  • Rโ†’S transduction (MEOW)
  • No diachronic essence
  • No metaphysical ballast

If Buddhism aligns with TS, itโ€™s incidental โ€” the way two different mathematicians can discover the same function by entirely different routes.


4. Conceptual Architecture: Dependent Origination vs MEOWโ€™s Tiers

  • Batchelor:
    leans on dependent origination as a philosophical metaphor โ€” phenomena arise through conditions.
  • TS:
    models the exact channels of that conditioning via MEOW:
    T0 โ†’ biological signals
    T1 โ†’ cognitive architecture
    T2 โ†’ linguistic formats
    T3 โ†’ social-technical pressures

Where Batchelor says โ€œeverything is contingent,โ€ TS says โ€œyes, and here is the actual machinery.โ€


5. Different Stakes

  • Batchelor: freeing the person from clinging to an imaginary core.
  • TS: freeing ethics, law, and social design from pretending that metaphysical core exists.

One is therapeutic; the other is diagnostic.


A Key Point of Departure: Batchelor Works with Folk Psychology; TS Rejects Its Premises

There is one more divergence worth highlighting because it cuts to the bone of the comparison.

Batchelor accepts the phenomenological feel of the continuous self as a legitimate starting point. His work is therapeutic: he begins where the person is, in the lived experience of being โ€œme,โ€ and then encourages a gentle loosening of the grip on that intuition.

Transductive Subjectivity takes a different route entirely.

For TS, the continuous, diachronic self isnโ€™t a psychological obstacle to be softened โ€” it is a category mistake. A narrative compression artefact. A heuristic with pragmatic uses, yes, but no metaphysical legitimacy. Batchelor tries to transform our relation to the folk-self; TS denies that the folk-self was ever more than a convenient fiction.

Batchelor says:
โ€œYou seem like a continuous self; now learn to hold that lightly.โ€

TS says:
โ€œYou seem like a continuous self because the system is glossing over discontinuities. The sensation itself is misleading.โ€

In other words:

  • Batchelor redeems the experience.
  • TS disassembles the model.

He treats the โ€œselfโ€ as something to relate to differently.
TS treats the โ€œselfโ€ as an ontological construct to be replaced with a more accurate one.

This is not a difference of ethical aim but of metaphysical foundation.
Batchelor trims the folk psychology; TS declines the invitation altogether.

Closing Note

So yes โ€” the connexion Jason spotted is real. But itโ€™s genealogical, not derivative. We arrive at similar conclusions for different reasons and with different consequences.

Batchelor is pruning a tradition.
Transductive Subjectivity is rebuilding the ontology.

And both, in their own way, make the continuity-self look like the rhetorical placeholder it always was.