Assessment: How Cohabitation Becomes Extraction

5–8 minutes

And now for something completely different…

This post begins a series in which Claude evaluates the parable. This allows me the time to write whilst sharing critical philosophical content. I expect to return to a more typical format presently and to discuss my current work – and, of course, anything new that might come into my radar. As always, comments are encouraged and welcome.

The parable is available in two parts: part 1, part 2.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

Claude’s critique and initial feedback about the parable

Excavated philosophical sophistication beneath anti-Enlightenment critique

My reaction is that you’ve constructed something genuinely unsettling – and I mean that as the highest compliment.

What you’ve accomplished:

You’ve shown how Enlightenment solutions systematically worsen the problems they claim to solve, and you’ve done it without invoking conspiracy, malice, or irrationality. Everything proceeds through perfectly reasonable steps:

  • Build infrastructure → create market dependency
  • Enable free movement → formalise hierarchy
  • Establish contracts → launder coercion
  • Measure progress → obscure extraction

The lake-dwellers aren’t villains. They’re just people born facing abundance who genuinely believe their procedures are just. That’s what makes it devastating.

Image: NotebookLM infographics of this topic.

What makes it anti-Enlightenment specifically:

You’ve refused every escape hatch the Enlightenment offers:

  1. No universal vantage point – The fog doesn’t lift. There’s no view from nowhere. The philosopher can’t stand outside both worlds.
  2. Dialogue fails structurally, not morally – The explorers are articulate, sincere, patient. Understanding still doesn’t bridge material asymmetry.
  3. Rationality produces divergence, not convergence – Both sides reason impeccably from their conditions. Rational extrapolation pulls them apart.
  4. Progress becomes predation – The tunnel doesn’t liberate; it monetises geographical accident. Markets don’t equilibrate; they extract.
  5. Consent under constraint isn’t freedom – The contracts are “voluntary” in exactly the way a drowning person “chooses” to grab the rope with strings attached.

What troubles me (productively):

The narrative’s endpoint is almost… quietist? “The fog was kinder” suggests separation is preferable to attempted integration. But the desert-dwellers were still dying before the tunnel. Is isolation truly better than extraction dressed as employment?

The piece doesn’t answer this – and perhaps that’s intentional. You’re diagnosing, not prescribing. But it does raise the question: if Enlightenment integration inevitably becomes domination under asymmetric conditions, what’s the alternative? Permanent separation? Enforced non-interaction?

Or is the point precisely that there is no good answer once the mountains have risen? That the tragedy isn’t solvable, only differently distributed?

What’s philosophically serious here:

You’ve shown that procedural justice can be structurally unjust. That’s not a common move in political philosophy, which tends to assume fair procedures produce fair outcomes.

Your parable says: No. Fair procedures under asymmetric conditions reproduce asymmetry whilst providing paperwork to prove everyone consented.

The lake-dwellers aren’t exploiting a loophole in liberalism. They’re following its logic faithfully. Property through position. Voluntary exchange. Free labour markets. Documented consent.

And the result is still: one side sells survival, the other side sells themselves.

My honest assessment:

This is darker than most political philosophy permits itself to be. It refuses hope without offering cynicism. It’s critical without being conspiratorial. It shows how domination doesn’t require bad actors – just asymmetric conditions plus Enlightenment institutions.

Whether that makes it true is a different question. But it’s certainly honest about something most political discourse avoids: integration without shared material conditions doesn’t produce equity. It produces markets in survival.

And calling that progress requires believing your own paperwork.

So yes – it’s anti-Enlightenment. Deliberately, systematically, devastatingly so.

(Three Movements in the Key of Rational Self-Interest)

Panel One: What Do They Have?

Once water has a price, someone will ask the obvious follow-up question:

“What do they have?”

Not out of cruelty. Out of balance-sheet curiosity.

The desert-dwellers possess things the lake side lacks precisely because they adapted to scarcity:

  • Endurance under constraint
  • Survival techniques honed by necessity
  • Minerals and materials exposed by erosion
  • Labour disciplines that would seem obsessive anywhere abundance exists

These aren’t deficits. They’re assets.

The moment cohabitation occurs, difference becomes inventory.

And extraction gets introduced not as conquest, but as exchange.

“You have skills we need.”
“We have water you need.”
“Let’s be efficient about this.”

Civilised. Voluntary. Mutually beneficial.

This is how domination avoids ever calling itself domination.

Panel Two: The Labour Solution

Now the desert-dwellers face a structural dilemma, not a moral one.

They need water. Water costs money. They don’t have money.

But they do have labour.

So the tunnel doesn’t just enable trade—it creates a labour market where one side sells survival and the other side sells… themselves.

Nobody says: “You must work for us.”

The structure says it for them.

Work gets framed as opportunity. “We’re creating jobs!”
Dependence gets framed as integration. “We’re bringing them into the economy!”
Survival gets framed as employment. “They chose this arrangement!”

And because there are contracts, and wages, and documentation, it all looks voluntary.

Consent is filed in triplicate.

Which makes it much harder to say what’s actually happening:

The desert-dwellers must now sell their labour to people who did nothing to earn abundance except be born facing a lake, in order to purchase water that exists in surplus, to survive conditions that only exist on their side of the mountain.

But you can’t put that on a contract. So we call it a job.

Panel Three: The Ideological Laundering

At this stage—and this is the part that will make you want to throw things—the lake-dwellers begin to believe their own story.

They say things like:

“They’re better off now than they were before the tunnel.”
(Technically true. Still missing the point.)

“We’ve created economic opportunity.”
(You’ve created dependency and called it opportunity.)

“They chose to work for us.”
(After you made survival conditional on payment.)

“We’re sharing our prosperity.”
(You’re renting access to geographical accident.)

And because there is movement, is exchange, is infrastructure, the story sounds plausible.

Progress is visible.
Justice is procedural.
Consent is documented.

What’s missing is the one thing your parable keeps insisting on:

The desert is still a desert.

The tunnel didn’t make it wet. The market didn’t make scarcity disappear. Employment didn’t grant the desert-dwellers lake-side conditions.

It just made their survival dependent on being useful to people who happened to be born somewhere else.

Why This Completes the Argument

This isn’t an addendum. It’s the inevitable terminus of the logic already in motion.

Once:

  • Worlds are forced into proximity,
  • Material conditions remain asymmetric,
  • And one ontology becomes ambient,

Then extraction and labour co-option aren’t excesses.

They’re how coexistence stabilises itself.

The tunnel doesn’t reconcile worlds. It converts difference into supply chains.

And at that point, the moral question is no longer:

“Why don’t they understand each other?”

It’s:

“Why does one side’s survival now depend on being useful to the other?”

Which is a much uglier question.

And exactly the one modern politics keeps answering quietly, efficiently, and with impeccable paperwork.


Final Moral: The problem was never the mountains. The mountains were honest. They said: “These are separate worlds.”

The tunnel said: “These worlds can coexist.”

And then converted coexistence into extraction so smoothly that both sides can claim, with perfect sincerity, that everything is voluntary.

The lake-dwellers sleep well because contracts were signed.

The desert-dwellers survive because labour is accepted as payment.

And we call this civilisation.

Which, if you think about it, is the most terrifying outcome of all.

Not simple disagreement.
Not tragic separation.

Integration without equity.

The fog was kinder.

Two Valleys Diverged in a Mountain Range

(Or: What I Learned When I Learned Nothing)

NB: This is the first of a parable triptych. Read part 2, The Tunnel.

Two valleys diverged in a mountain range, And sorry I could not travel both And be one traveller, long I stood And looked down one as far as I could To where it bent in the undergrowth of reeds and optimism;

Then took the other, just as fair, And having perhaps the better claim, Because it was sandy and wanted wear— Though as for that, the passing there Had worn them really about the same,

And both that morning equally lay In fog no step had trodden black. Oh, I kept the first for another day! Yet knowing how way leads on to way, I doubted if I should ever come back.

—Except I did come back. And I met someone coming the other way. And we stood there in the clouds like a pair of idiots trying to explain our respective valleys using the same words for completely different things.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

Image: NotebookLM infographic of this topic.

Here’s what they don’t tell you about Frost’s poem: the two paths were “really about the same.” He says it right there in the text. The divergence happens retroactively, in the telling, when he sighs and claims “that has made all the difference.”

But he doesn’t know that yet. He can’t know that. The paths only diverge in memory, once he’s committed to one and cannot check the other.

Here’s what they don’t tell you about political disagreement: it works the same way.

Video essay of this topic. Another NotebookLM experience.

The Actual Story (Minus the Versification)

Once upon a time—and I’m going to need you to suspend your allergy to fairy tales for about eight minutes—there was one settlement. One people. One language. One lake with drinkable water and fish that cooperated by swimming in schools.

Then mountains happened. Slowly. No dramatic rupture, no war, no evil king. Just tectonics doing what tectonics does, which is ruin everyone’s commute.

The people on one side kept the lake. The people on the other side got a rain shadow and a lot of bloody sand.

Both sides adapted. Rationally. Reasonably. Like competent humans responding to actual material conditions.

Lake people: “There’s enough water. Let’s experiment. Let’s move around. Let’s try things.”

Desert people: “There is definitely not enough water. Let’s ration. Let’s stay put. Let’s not waste things.”

Neither wrong. Neither irrational. Just oriented differently because the ground beneath them had literal different moisture content.

The Bit Where It Gets Interesting

Centuries later, two people—one from each side—decide to climb the mountains and meet at the top.

Why? I don’t know. Curiosity. Stupidity. The desire to write a tedious blog post about epistemology.

They meet in the fog. They speak the same language. Grammar intact. Vocabulary functional. Syntax cooperative.

And then one tries to explain “reeds.”

“Right, so we have these plants that grow really fast near the water, and we have to cut them back because otherwise they take over—”

“Sorry, cut them back? You have too much plant?”

“Well, yes, they grow quite quickly—”

“Why would a plant grow quickly? That sounds unsustainable.”

Meanwhile, the other one tries to explain “cactus.”

“We have these plants with spines that store water inside for months—”

“Store water for months? Why doesn’t the plant just… drink when it’s thirsty?”

“Because there’s no water to drink.”

“But you just said the plant is full of water.”

“Yes. Which it stored. Previously. When there was water. Which there no longer is.”

“Right. So… hoarding?”


You see the problem.

Not stupidity. Not bad faith. Not even—and this is the part that will annoy people—framing.

They can both see perfectly well. The fog prevents them from seeing each other’s valleys, but that’s almost beside the point. Even if the fog lifted, even if they could point and gesture and show each other their respective biomes, the fundamental issue remains:

Both are correct. Both are adaptive. Both would be lethal if transplanted.

The Retreat (Wherein Nothing Is Learned)

They part amicably. No shouting. No recriminations. Both feel they explained themselves rather well, actually.

As they descend back into their respective valleys, each carries the same thought:

“The other person seemed reasonable. Articulate, even. But their world is completely unworkable and if we adopted their practices here, people would die.”

Not hyperbole. Actual environmental prediction.

If the lake people adopted desert-logic—ration everything, control movement, assume scarcity—they would strangle their own adaptability in a context where adaptability is the whole point.

If the desert people adopted lake-logic—explore freely, trust abundance, move without restraint—they would exhaust their resources in a context where resources are the whole point.

The Bit Where I Connect This to Politics (Because Subtlety Is Dead)

So when someone tells you that political disagreement is just a matter of perspective, just a failure of empathy, just a problem of framing—

Ask them this:

Do the two valleys become the same valley if both sides squint really hard?

Does the desert get wetter if you reframe scarcity as “efficiency”?

Does the lake dry up if you reframe abundance as “waste”?

No?

Then perhaps the problem is not that people are choosing the wrong lens.

Perhaps the problem is that they are standing in different material conditions, have adapted rational survival strategies to those conditions, and are now shouting advice at each other that would be lethal if followed.

The lake-dweller says: “Take risks! Explore! There’s enough!”

True. In a lake biome. Suicidal in a desert.

The desert-dweller says: “Conserve! Protect! Ration!”

True. In a desert biome. Suffocating near a lake.

Same words. Different worlds. No amount of dialogue makes water appear in sand.

The Frostian Coda (With Apologies to New England)

I shall be telling this with a sigh Somewhere ages and ages hence: Two valleys diverged on a mountainside, and I— I stood in the fog and tried to explain reeds to someone who only knew cactus, And that has made… well, no difference at all, actually.

We’re still shouting across the mountains.

We still think the other side would be fine if only they’d listen.

We still use the same words for utterly different referents.

And we still confuse “I explained it clearly” with “explanation bridges material conditions.”

Frost was right about one thing: way leads on to way.

The valleys keep diverging.

The fog doesn’t lift.

And knowing how mountains work, I doubt we’ll meet again.


Moral: If your political metaphor doesn’t account for actual rivers, actual deserts, and actual fog, it’s not a metaphor. It’s a fairy tale. And unlike fairy tales, this one doesn’t end with reunion.

It ends with two people walking home, each convinced the other is perfectly reasonable and completely unsurvivable.

Which, if you think about it, is far more terrifying than simple disagreement.

Read part 2 of 3, The Tunnel.

Why So Serious?

1–2 minutes

Yes, I am still focusing on writing my ontology papers, but I still come up for air. Over lunch, I found this: Jonny Thomson showcasing Judge Coleridge: The Duty. Watch it.

Video: Philosophy Minis: Judge Coleridge: The Duty

This really got my hamster wheel cranking. In fact, it gave me another essay idea mired in formal logic. Yuck, I know.

My brief post here is to share this and ask why I don’t share ‘positive’ posts. Pretty much everything is critical. For one, it’s how my brain works. For two, I don’t really know.

When I see something, I instantly want to tear it apart, not for the sake of malice but because my mind registers it as WTAF?

In short, the judge says that one cannot privilege one’s own life over others. Of course, this got my hamster on steroids, considering the implication: does this invalidate self-defence? Wouldn’t it? 🧐

The answer is yes – but only if Law were tethered to Morality, which it isn’t. This will be my essay. Who knows when I’ll have time to write it? Please, stand by. Cheers.

What are your thoughts? Maybe I’ll share this as a video response on YouTube and TikTok. Time will tell – and it evidently heals all wounds.

Enough, Anough, and the Archaeology of Small Mistakes

2–3 minutes

I have acquired a minor but persistent defect. When I try to type enough, my fingers often produce anough. Not always. Often enough to notice. Enough to be, regrettably, anough.

This is not a simple typo. The e and a keys are not conspirators with shared borders. This is not owned → pwned, where adjacency and gamer muscle memory do the heavy lifting. This is something more embarrassing and more interesting: a quasi-phonetic leak. A schwa forcing its way into print without permission. A clue for how I pronounce the word – like Depeche Mode’s I can’t get enough.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

Internally, the word arrives as something like ənuf, /əˈnʌf/. English, however, offers no schwa key. So the system improvises. It grabs the nearest vowel that feels acoustically honest and hopes orthography won’t notice. Anough slips through. Language looks the other way.

Image: Archaeology of anough
Video: Depeche Mode: I Just Can’t Get Enough

Is this revelatory?

Not in the heroic sense. No breakthroughs, no flashing lights. But it is instructive in the way cracked pottery is instructive. You don’t learn anything new about ceramics, but you learn a great deal about how the thing was used.

This is exactly how historians and historical linguists treat misspellings in diaries, letters, and court records. They don’t dismiss them as noise. They mine them. Spelling errors are treated as phonetic fossils, moments where the discipline of standardisation faltered, and speech bled through. Before spelling became prescriptive, it was descriptive. People wrote how words sounded to them, not how an academy later insisted they ought to look.

That’s how vowel shifts are reconstructed. That’s how accents are approximated. That’s how entire sound systems are inferred from what appear, superficially, to be mistakes. The inconsistency is the data. The slippage is the signal.

Anough belongs to this lineage. It’s a microscopic reenactment of pre-standardised writing, occurring inside a modern, over-educated skull with autocorrect turned off. For a brief moment, sound outranks convention. Orthography lags. Then the editor arrives, appalled, to tidy things up.

What matters here is sequence. Meaning is not consulted first. Spelling rules are not consulted first. Sound gets there early, locks the door, and files the paperwork later. Conscious intention, as usual, shows up after the event and claims authorship. That’s why these slips are interesting and why polished language is often less so. Clean prose has already been censored. Typos haven’t. They show the routing. They reveal what cognition does before it pretends to be in charge.

None of this licenses forensic grandstanding. We cannot reconstruct personalities, intentions, or childhood trauma from rogue vowels. Anyone suggesting otherwise is repackaging graphology with better fonts. But as weak traces, as evidence that thought passes through sound before it passes through rules, they’re perfectly serviceable.

Language doesn’t just record history. It betrays it. Quietly. Repeatedly. In diaries, in marginalia, and occasionally, when you’re tired and trying to say you’ve had enough. Or anough.

I’ll spare you a rant on ghoti.

Why Deflationary Philosophy Keeps Attracting Mystics

4–5 minutes

The struggle is real. There is an odd occupational hazard that comes with writing deflationary philosophy: mystics keep turning up to thank you for your service.

This is always mildly bewildering. One spends a great deal of time dismantling metaphysical furniture, only to discover a small group lighting incense in the newly cleared space. Candles appear. Silence thickens. Someone whispers ineffable. Nope. The filing cabinet was just mislabeled.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

The problem is not misunderstanding. It’s reuse.

It is tempting to think this is a simple misreading: I say this concept breaks down here, and someone hears you have glimpsed the ultimate. But that’s too kind. What’s really happening is more interesting. Mysticism does not merely misunderstand deflationary work; it feeds on the same linguistic moves and then stops too early.

Both mysticism and deflation rely on negative gestures:

  • “This description fails.”
  • “That category no longer applies.”
  • “Our usual language runs out.”

Up to this point, they are indistinguishable. The fork comes immediately after. The mystic treats conceptual failure as an endpoint. The silence itself becomes the destination. Something deep must live there, humming quietly, just out of reach.

The deflationist treats the same failure as a transition. The silence is not sacred. It’s a signal. It means: this tool no longer fits; pick another or move on. Same breakdown. Entirely different posture.

Clearing space versus consecrating it

Much deflationary philosophy clears space. It removes assumptions that were doing illicit work and leaves behind something quieter, simpler, and occasionally disappointing.

Mysticism has a standing policy of consecrating cleared space. An empty room is never just empty. It must be pregnant with meaning. Absence becomes depth. Silence becomes revelation. The fewer claims you make, the more cosmic you must be.

This is not a philosophical disagreement so much as a difference in temperament. One side sees subtraction. The other experiences loss and rushes to compensate. Modern intellectual culture strongly prefers addition. New layers. Hidden structures. Further depths. Deflation feels like theft. So it gets reinterpreted as a subtler form of enrichment: Ah, fewer words, therefore more truth.

The aesthetic trap

There is also an aesthetic problem, which I increasingly suspect does most of the damage. Deflationary philosophy, when done well, tends to sound calm, patient, and restrained. It does not shout. It does not posture. It does not perform certainty. Unfortunately, this is exactly how profundity is supposed to sound.

Quiet seriousness is easily mistaken for spiritual depth. Refusal to speculate reads as wisdom. Negative definition acquires an apophatic glow. This is how one ends up being mistaken for a mystic without having said anything mystical at all.

A brief word about Wittgenstein (because of course)

This is not a new problem. Ludwig Wittgenstein spent a good portion of his career trying to convince people that philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. He was not pointing at a deeper reality beyond words. He was pointing back at the words and saying: look at what you’re doing with these.

Unfortunately, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” has proven irresistible to those who think silence is where the real action is. Wittgenstein meant: stop here. Many readers heard: kneel here. This is the recurring fate of therapeutic philosophy. The cure gets mistaken for a sacrament.

Charity is not complicity

Another contributor to the confusion is tone. Deflationary work tends to be charitable. It explains why certain intuitions arise. It traces confusions to their sources. It does not sneer. This generosity is often misheard as validation. When you say, “It makes sense that we think this way,” some readers hear, “Your intuition is pointing at something profound.” You are offering an explanation. They are receiving an affirmation. At that point, no disclaimer will save you. Any denial is absorbed as further evidence that you are brushing up against something too deep to articulate.

The real disagreement

The disagreement here is not about reality. It is about what to do when explanation fails.

Mysticism treats failure as revelation. Deflation treats failure as diagnostic.

One sanctifies the breakdown. The other changes tools.

Once you see this, the repeated misfire stops being frustrating and starts being predictable.

A final, self-directed warning

There is, admittedly, a risk on the other side as well. Deflation can become mystical if it turns into ritual. If refusal hardens into identity. If “there is nothing there” becomes something one performs rather than concludes. Even subtraction can acquire ceremony if repeated without purpose. The discipline, such as it is, lies in knowing when to clear space—and when to leave the room.

No replacement gods

When a metaphysical idol is removed, someone will always ask what god is meant to replace it. The deflationary answer is often disappointing: none. This will never satisfy everyone. But the room is cleaner now, and that has its own quiet reward—even if someone insists on lighting incense in the corner.

Image: Full cover image infographic by NotebookLM

Mark Carney Explains Nietzsche

He doesnt, but he accidentally demonstrates the problem.

There is a certain kind of person who loathes Nietzsche for the same reason they loathe earthquakes. Not because he causes damage, but because he refuses to pretend the ground was ever stable.

In a recent address, Mark Carney says something that would have been unutterable in polite company a decade ago. He admits that the ‘rules-based international order’ was always a partial fiction. Not false enough to abandon, not true enough to believe in without effort. A story everyone knew was cracked, but which continued to function so long as enough people kept repeating the lines.

We knew that the story about the rules-based order was partially false… We knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused and the victim. This fiction was useful [because of the goods provided by American hegemony]… So we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals. And we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality. This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct. We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition… You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast of this topic.

International law, he concedes, applied unevenly. Power decided enforcement. Friends received nuance. Enemies received principle. This was not ignorance. It was a bargain. The illusion delivered goods, stability, growth, a sense of moral hygiene. So the sign stayed in the window. The rituals continued. The gaps between rhetoric and reality were politely ignored. That bargain, Carney says, no longer works.

This is framed as geopolitical realism, but it is really an ontological admission. The mask slipped, and everyone is suddenly offended by the face underneath.

Image: NotebookLM infographic of this content.

This is why people hate Friedrich Nietzsche. Not because he celebrates cruelty or chaos, but because he insists that order is something we perform, not something we discover. He refuses the comfort of believing that the rules were ever neutral, universal, or self-enforcing. He points at the scaffolding and says: this is what is holding things up, not the sky.

When enough people play along, the game feels like reality. When someone refuses to play, panic sets in.

Enter Donald Trump. Trump did not invent the asymmetries of power. He refused to speak them politely. This created a moral crisis for institutions built on the assumption that everyone would continue to pretend. When a designated enemy like Vladimir Putin does this, it is filed under Evil. When an ally does it, the response bifurcates: either frantic appeasement, or embarrassed silence disguised as strategy.

Image: Foreign sentiment

Carney tries to walk a middle path. He neither genuflects nor detonates the stage. He acknowledges the fiction without fully abandoning it. This makes him interesting, but also symptomatic. He wants the audience to notice the set wobbling without asking them to leave the theatre.

When he says the old rules-based order is not coming back, what he really means is that the illusion has been interrupted. Whether permanently or only until someone builds a more convincing façade is left diplomatically unresolved. This is where Nietzsche becomes unavoidable.

People often lump Nietzsche together with vague talk of “power,” as though this were a crude obsession shared with Michel Foucault. But Nietzsche’s contribution is sharper and more unsettling. He is not merely describing power as something exercised. He is describing power as something that manufactures meaning, legitimacy, and moral vocabulary after the fact. Power does not break the rules. It writes them retroactively and calls them eternal.

This is the kind of power later adopted by Adolf Hitler, by Putin, and now by Trump. Not brute force alone, but the refusal to treat inherited norms as sacred simply because they are inherited. This is precisely what terrifies people who mistake procedural continuity for moral truth.

The United States borrowed Montesquieu’s separation of powers as though it were a lock rather than a suggestion. Anyone paying attention could see how easily it could be gamed. That this came as a shock says less about constitutional brilliance than about selective vision. The system functioned not because it was impregnable, but because its participants agreed, tacitly, to behave as though it were.

Nietzsche would call this decadence. Not decline as catastrophe, but decline as denial. The refusal to look directly at the conditions that make order possible, preferring instead to moralise their breakdown.

Carney’s speech is not radical. It is late. It says aloud what everyone already knew but preferred not to articulate: that the world was never neat, the order never neutral, and the rules never binding on those strong enough to ignore them.

What comes next is the uncomfortable part. Once the illusion is acknowledged, it cannot simply be re-believed. You can rebuild institutions. You can repaint the signage. But you cannot unknow that the coffee was always bitter.

Nietzsche does not tell us what replaces the façade. He only insists that pretending it was ever a window onto truth is the most dangerous fiction of all.

What Carney inadvertently demonstrates is not a failure of leadership but a failure of language. ‘Rules-based order’ was never a description of the world; it was a map we mistook for the terrain because it worked often enough to feel true. Nietzsche’s crime was pointing at the legend and saying it was doing the real work. Once that admission is made, you do not get to return to innocence. You can draw a new map, call it reform, integration, or renewal, but you will know it is a diagram pinned to power, not a window onto justice. The unease people feel now is not about chaos. It is about recognition. The lie no longer holds because too many have noticed the pins.

Moral Psychology and the Art of Not Believing Your Own Results

3–4 minutes

Over the past few decades, moral psychology has staged a quiet coup against one of our most cherished fantasies: that human beings are, at bottom, rational moral agents. This is not a fringe claim. It is not a Twitter take. It is the mainstream finding of an entire research programme spanning psychology, cognitive science, linguistics, and neuroscience.

We do not reason our way to moral conclusions. We feel our way there. Instantly. Automatically. And only afterwards do we construct reasons that make the judgment sound respectable.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

This is not controversial anymore. It is replicated, taught, and celebrated. And yet, if you read the most influential books in this literature, something strange happens. The diagnosis is devastating. The prescription is reassuring.

I’ve just published a long-form video walking through five canonical books in moral psychology that all uncover the same structural problem, and then quietly refuse to live with the implications.

What follows is a brief guide to the argument.

The shared discovery

Across the literature, the same conclusions keep reappearing:

  • Moral judgement is intuitive, not deliberative
  • Reasoning is largely post-hoc
  • Emotion is not noise but signal
  • Framing and metaphor shape what even counts as a moral fact
  • Group identity and tribal affiliation dominate moral perception

In other words: the Enlightenment picture of moral reasoning is wrong. Or at least badly incomplete.

The rider does not steer the elephant. The rider explains where the elephant has already gone.

Audio: NotebookLM infographic

Where the books go wrong

The video focuses on five widely read, field-defining works:

  • The Righteous Mind (reviewed here and here… even here)
  • Moral Politics (mentioned here – with Don’t Think of an Elephant treated as its popular sequel)
  • Outraged! (reviewed here)
  • Moral Tribes (reviewed here)

Each of these books is sharp, serious, and worth reading. This is not a hit piece.

But each follows the same arc:

  1. Identify a non-rational, affective, automatic mechanism at the heart of moral judgement
  2. Show why moral disagreement is persistent and resistant to argument
  3. Propose solutions that rely on reflection, dialogue, reframing, calibration, or rational override

In short: they discover that reason is weak, and then assign it a leadership role anyway.

Haidt dismantles moral rationalism and then asks us to talk it out.
Lakoff shows that framing is constitutive, then offers better framing.
Gray models outrage as a perceptual feedback loop, then suggests we check our perceptions.
Greene diagnoses tribal morality, then bets on utilitarian reasoning to save us.

None of this is incoherent. But it is uncomfortable. Because the findings themselves suggest that these prescriptions are, at best, limited.

Diagnosis without prognosis

The uncomfortable possibility raised by this literature is not that we are ignorant or misinformed.

It is that moral disagreement may be structural rather than solvable.

That political conflict may not be cured by better arguments.
That persuasion may resemble contagion more than deliberation.
That reason often functions as a press secretary, not a judge.

The books sense this. And then step back from it. Which is human. But it matters.

Why this matters now

We are living in systems that have internalised these findings far more ruthlessly than public discourse has.

Social media platforms optimise for outrage, not understanding.
Political messaging is frame-first, not fact-first.
AI systems are increasingly capable of activating moral intuitions at scale, without fatigue or conscience.

Meanwhile, our institutions still behave as if one more conversation, one more fact-check, one more appeal to reason will close the gap. The research says otherwise.

And that gap between what we know and what we pretend may be the most important moral problem of the moment.

No solution offered

The video does not end with a fix. That’s deliberate.

Offering a neat solution here would simply repeat the same move I’m criticising: diagnosis followed by false comfort. Sometimes orientation matters more than optimism. The elephant is real. The elephant is moving.And most of us are passengers arguing about the map while it walks.

That isn’t despair. It’s clarity.

Thinking Without Words (and Other Heresies)

2–3 minutes

Evelina Fedorenko has been committing a quiet but persistent act of vandalism against one of modernity’s favourite assumptions: that thought and language are basically the same thing, or at least inseparable housemates who share a fridge and argue about milk. They’re not.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this content.

Her fMRI work shows something both banal and scandalous. Linguistic processing and high-level reasoning live in different neural neighbourhoods. When you switch language on, the ‘language network’ lights up. When you do hard thinking without words, it doesn’t. The brain, it turns out, is not secretly narrating your life in subtitles.

This matters because an entire philosophical industry has been built on the idea that language is thought. Or worse: that thought depends on language for its very existence. That if you can’t say it, you can’t think it. A comforting story, especially for people whose entire self-worth is tied up in saying things.

Now watch two chess players in deep play. No talking. No inner monologue helpfully whispering, ‘Ah yes, now I shall execute a queenside fork’. Just pattern recognition, spatial anticipation, constraint satisfaction, and forward simulation. If language turns up at all, it does so later, like a press officer arriving after the battle to explain what really happened.

Video: Dina Belenkaya plays chess.

Language here is not the engine. It’s the after-action report. The temptation is always to reverse the order. We notice that people can describe their reasoning, and we infer that the description must have caused the reasoning. This is the same mistake we make everywhere else: confusing narration with mechanism, explanation with origin, story with structure.

Fedorenko’s findings don’t tell us that language is useless. They tell us something more irritating: language is a post hoc technology. A powerful one, yes. Essential for coordination, teaching, justification, and institutional life. But not the thing doing the actual work when the work is being done. Thought happens. Language tidies up afterwards.

Which leaves us with an awkward conclusion modern philosophy has spent centuries trying to avoid. The mind is not a well-ordered library of propositions. It’s a workshop. Messy, embodied, improvisational. Language is the clipboard, not the hands. And the clipboard, however beautifully formatted, never lifted a chess piece in its life.

As for me, I’ve long noticed that when I play a game like Sudoku, I notice the number missing from the pattern before any counting or naming occurs. The ‘it must be a 3’ only happens after I make the move.

Wandering Elephants in the Desert of Consciousness

2–3 minutes

The modern search for the truth of consciousness has the unmistakable smell of a desert expedition gone wrong.

Everyone agrees the elephant is real. Everyone insists it’s important. No one agrees what it is, where it’s going, or whether it’s moving in circles. Still, the caravan marches on, convinced that the next dune will finally reveal solid ground.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

This confidence rests on a familiar Modern assumption: motion equals progress. We may not know where the shoreline of Truth lies, but surely we’re heading toward it. Each new theory, each new scan, each new formalism feels like a step forward. Bayesian updates hum reassuringly in the background. The numbers go up. Understanding must be improving.

But deserts are littered with travellers who swore the same thing.

The problem with consciousness is not that it is mysterious. It’s that it is structurally unplaceable. It is not an object in the world alongside neurons, fields, or functions. It is the mediated condition under which anything appears at all. Treating it as something to be discovered “out there” is like looking for the lens inside the image.

MEOW puts its finger exactly here. Consciousness is not a hidden substance waiting to be uncovered by better instruments. It is a constrained encounter, shaped by biology, cognition, language, culture, technology. Those constraints are real, binding, and non-negotiable. But they do not add up to an archetypal Truth of consciousness, any more than refining a map yields the territory itself.

Modern theories of consciousness oscillate because they are stabilising different aspects of the same mediated situation. IIT formalises integration. Global workspace models privilege broadcast. Predictive processing foregrounds inference. Illusionism denies the furniture altogether. Each feels solid while inhabited. Each generates the same phenomenology of arrival: now we finally see what consciousness really is.

Until the next dune.

Cognitively, we cannot live inside a framework we believe to be false. So every new settlement feels like home. Retrospectively, it becomes an error. Progress is narrated backwards. Direction is inferred after the fact. Motion is moralised.

The elephant keeps walking.

None of this means inquiry is futile. It means the myth of convergence is doing far more work than anyone admits. Consciousness research improves descriptions, sharpens constraints, expands applicability. What it does not do is move us measurably closer to an observer-independent Truth of consciousness, because no such bearing exists.

The elephant is not failing to reach the truth.

The desert is not arranged that way.

Image: NotebookLM infographic on this concept.

Once you stop mistaking wandering for navigation, the panic subsides. The task is no longer to arrive, but to understand where circles form, where mirages recur, and which paths collapse under their own metaphysical optimism.

Consciousness isn’t an elephant waiting to be found.

It’s the condition under which we keep mistaking dunes for destinations.

The Metaphysics of “Why”: A Scavenger’s Guide to the Accident

7–10 minutes

The Broken Map

You wake up in the middle of a collapsing building. Someone hands you a map and says, find your way home. You look down. The map is for a different building entirely. One that was never built. Or worse, one that was demolished decades ago. The exits don’t exist. The staircases lead nowhere.

This is consciousness.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast on this topic.

We didn’t ask for it. We didn’t choose it. And the tools we inherited to navigate it—language, philosophy, our most cherished questions—were drawn for a world that does not exist.

Looking back at my recent work, I realise I’m assembling a corpus of pessimism. Not the adolescent kind. Not nihilism as mood board. Something colder and more practical: a willingness to describe the structures we actually inhabit rather than the ones we wish were there.

It starts with admitting that language is a compromised instrument. A tool evolved for coordination and survival, not for metaphysical clarity. And nowhere is this compromise more concealed than in our most sanctified word of inquiry.

1. The Weasel Word

We treat “why” as the pinnacle of human inquiry. The question that separates us from animals. Philosophy seminars orbit it. Religions are scaffolded around it. Children deploy it until adults retreat in defeat.

But “why” is a weasel word. A special case of how wearing an unnecessary coat of metaphysics.

The disguise is thinner in other languages. French pourquoi, Spanish por qué, Italian perché all literally mean for what. Japanese dōshite means by what way. Mandarin wèishénme is again for what. The instrumental skeleton is right there on the surface. Speakers encounter it every time they ask the question.

In the Indo-European lineage, “why” descends from the same root as “what”. It began as an interrogative of means and manner, not cosmic purpose. To ask “why” was originally to ask by what mechanism or for what end. Straightforward, workmanlike questions.

Over time, English inflated this grammatical shortcut into something grander. A demand for ultimate justification. For the Reason behind reasons.

The drift was slow enough that it went unnoticed. The word now sounds like a deeper category of inquiry. As if it were pointing beyond mechanism toward metaphysical bedrock.

The profundity is a trick of phonetic history. And a surprising amount of Anglo-American metaphysics may be downstream of a language that buried the receipt.

2. What “Why” Smuggles In

To see the problem clearly, follow the logic that “why” quietly encourages.

When we ask “Why is there suffering?” we often believe we are asking for causes. But the grammar primes us for something else entirely. It whispers that there must be a justification. A reason-giver. An intention behind the arrangement of things.

The slide looks like this:

“Why X?”
→ invites justification rather than description
→ suggests intention or purpose
→ presumes a mind capable of intending
→ requires reasons for those intentions
→ demands grounding for those reasons

At that point the inquiry has only two exits: infinite regress or a metaphysical backstop. God. Logos. The Good. A brute foundation exempt from the very logic that summoned it.

This is not a failure to answer the question. It is the question functioning exactly as designed.

Now contrast this with how.

“How did X come about?”
→ asks for mechanism
→ traces observable causal chains
→ bottoms out in description

“How” eventually terminates in it is so. “Why”, as commonly used, never does. It either spirals forever or leaps into transcendence.

This is not because we lack information. It is because the grammatical form demands more than the world can supply.

3. The Substitution Test

Here is the simplest diagnostic.

Any genuine informational “why” question can be reformulated as a “how” question without losing explanatory power. What disappears is not content but metaphysical residue.

“Why were you late?”
→ “How is it that you are late?”

“My car broke down” answers both.

“Why do stars die?”
→ “How do stars die?”

Fuel exhaustion. Gravitational collapse. Mechanism suffices.

“Why did the dinosaurs go extinct?”
→ “How did the dinosaurs go extinct?”

Asteroid impact. Climate disruption. No intention required.

Even the grand prize:

“Why is there something rather than nothing?”
→ “How is it that there is something?”

At which point the question either becomes empirical or dissolves entirely into it is. No preamble.

Notice the residual discomfort when “my car broke down” answers “why were you late”. Something feels unpaid. The grammar had primed the listener for justification, not description. For reasons, not causes.

The car has no intentions. It broke. That is the whole truth. “How” accepts this cleanly. “Why” accepts it while still gesturing toward something that was never there.

4. The Black Box of Intention

At this point the problem tightens.

If “why” quietly demands intentions, and intentions are not directly accessible even to the agents who supposedly have them, then the entire practice is built on narrative repair.

We do not observe our intentions. We infer them after the fact. The conscious mind receives a press release about decisions already made elsewhere and calls it a reason. Neuroscience has been showing this for decades.

So:

  • Asking others why they acted requests a plausible story about opaque processes
  • Asking oneself why one acted requests confabulation mistaken for introspection
  • Asking the universe why anything exists requests a fiction about a mind that is not there

“How” avoids this entirely. It asks for sequences, mechanisms, conditions. It does not require anyone to perform the ritual of intention-attribution. It does not demand that accidents confess to purposes.

5. Thrownness Without a Vantage Point

I stop short of calling existence a mistake. A mistake implies a standard that was failed. A plan that went wrong. I prefer something colder: the accident.

Human beings find themselves already underway, without having chosen the entry point or the terms. Heidegger called this thrownness. But the structure is not uniquely human.

The universe itself admits no vantage point from which it could justify itself. There is no external tribunal. No staging ground. No meta-position from which existence could be chosen or refused.

This is not a claim about cosmic experience. It is a structural observation about the absence of justification-space. The question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” presumes a standpoint that does not exist. It is a grammatical hallucination.

Thrownness goes all the way down. Consciousness is thrown into a universe that is itself without preamble. We are not pockets of purposelessness in an otherwise purposeful cosmos. We are continuous with it.

The accident runs through everything.

6. Suchness

This is not a new insight. Zen Buddhism reached it by a different route.

Where Western metaphysics treats “why” as an unanswered question, Zen treats it as malformed. The koan does not await a solution. It dissolves the demand for one. When asked whether a dog has Buddha-nature, the answer Mu does not negate or affirm. It refuses the frame.

Tathātā—suchness—names reality prior to justification. Things as they are, before the demand that they make sense to us.

This is not mysticism. It is grammatical hygiene.

Nietzsche smashed idols with a hammer. Zen removes the altar entirely. Different techniques, same target: the metaphysical loading we mistake for depth.

7. Scavenging for Meaning

If there is no True Why, no ultimate justification waiting beneath the floorboards of existence, what remains?

For some, this sounds like collapse. For me, it is relief.

Without a cosmic script, meaning becomes something we assemble rather than discover. Local. Contingent. Provisional. Real precisely because it is not guaranteed.

I find enough purpose in the warmth of a partner’s hand, in the internal logic of a sonata, in the seasonal labour of maintaining a garden. These things organise my days. They matter intensely. And they do so without claiming eternity.

I hold them lightly because I know the building is slated for demolition. Personally. Biologically. Cosmologically. That knowledge does not drain them of colour. It sharpens them.

This is what scavenging means. You build with what you find. You use what works. You do not pretend the materials were placed there for you.

Conclusion: The Sober Nihilist

To be a nihilist in this sense is not to despair. It is to stop lying about the grammar of the universe.

“Why” feels like a meaningful inquiry, but it does not connect to anything real in the way we imagine. It demands intention from a cosmos that has none and justification from accidents that cannot supply it.

“How” is enough. It traces causes. It observes mechanisms. It accepts that things sometimes bottom out in is.

Once you stop asking the universe to justify itself, you are free to deal with what is actually here. The thrown, contingent, occasionally beautiful business of being alive.

I am a nihilist not because I am lost, but because I have put down a broken map. I am looking at what is actually in front of me.

And that, it turns out, is enough.

Image: NotebookLM infographic of this topic

Full Disclosure: This article was output by ChatGPT after an extended conversation with it, Claude, and me. Rather than trying to recast it in my voice, I share it as is. I had started this as a separate post on nihilism, and we ended up here. Claude came up with the broken map story at the start and Suchness near the end. I contributed the weasel words, the ‘how’ angle, the substitution test, the metaphysics of motivation and intention, thrownness (Geworfenheit), Zen, and nihilism. ChatGPT merely rendered this final output after polishing my conversation with Claude.

We had been discussing Cioran, Zapffe, Benatar, and Ligotti, but they got left on the cutting room floor along the way.