Wait for itโฆ This parodies the use of language to sidestep Constitutional inconveniences. In the game show format, we learn what is and isn’t a war. Wittgenstein would be proud.
Video: Short parody asks the question, Is it war?
Watch this and build up your English language vocabulary.
NB: When I wrote ‘everything’, I meant ‘every nominal language reference’.
Lakoff, Wittgenstein, and the Quiet Collapse of Literal Language
Philosophers have long comforted themselves with a tidy distinction: some language is literal, and some language is metaphorical. Literal language names things as they are; metaphor merely dresses thought in rhetorical clothing.
The trouble begins when one looks more closely at how language actually works.
Two very different thinkers โ George Lakoff and Ludwig Wittgenstein โ approach the problem from opposite directions. Yet taken together, their ideas produce a rather awkward conclusion: the category of metaphor may collapse under its own success.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.
EDIT: The algorithm gods served me this Substack article as I was writing this. I share it now because the author and I exchanged thoughts. Check it out.
Lakoffโs Problem: Metaphor All the Way Down
George Lakoffโs work on conceptual metaphor starts with a deceptively simple claim: metaphor is not merely a stylistic flourish. It is part of the structure of thought itself. We do not merely speak metaphorically. We think metaphorically.
Consider a few familiar examples:
ARGUMENT IS WAR: We attack positions, defend claims, demolish arguments.
TIME IS MONEY: We spend time, waste time, invest time.
LOVE IS A JOURNEY: Relationships stall, partners move forward together, or reach dead ends.
Lakoffโs point is not that these are poetic expressions. Rather, these metaphors organise how we reason about abstract domains. They structure cognition itself. So far, so interesting.
But once one notices how pervasive such mappings are, a problem begins to appear. If abstract reasoning depends on metaphorical projection from embodied experience, then metaphor is not a special case of language. It is the normal case. Literal language starts to look suspiciously rare.
The miracle is not that language fails sometimes. The miracle is that it works at all.
Wittgensteinโs Problem: Words Without Essences
Wittgenstein arrives at a similar discomfort by a different route.
In the Philosophical Investigations, he dismantles the idea that words gain meaning by pointing to fixed essences. Instead, meaning arises from use within human practices.
His famous example is the word game. Board games, sports, childrenโs play, gambling, solitary puzzles. Try to identify the essence shared by all games and the category dissolves. What remains are overlapping similarities โ what he calls family resemblances.
The word functions perfectly well in practice, yet no clean boundary defines its referent.
The implication is unsettling: even apparently straightforward nouns do not correspond to neat natural categories. They operate as practical shortcuts within forms of life.
Language works not because it mirrors the world precisely, but because communities stabilise usage long enough to get through the day.
The Awkward Intersection
Place Lakoff beside Wittgenstein and something odd happens. Lakoff shows that abstract reasoning depends on metaphorical structure. Wittgenstein shows that even ordinary categories lack fixed essences. The combined result is difficult to ignore: the supposedly literal core of language begins to evaporate.
Take a simple word like cat. It seems literal enough. Yet the world does not present us with tidy metaphysical units labelled CAT. What we encounter are patterns of behaviour, morphology, and recognition. The word compresses a complex set of experiences into a convenient symbol.
In practice, cat functions as a stand-in for a stabilised pattern within human life. It is a conceptual shortcut โ a linguistic token that represents a distributed cluster of features. In other words, even the most ordinary noun already behaves suspiciously like a metaphor.
The Reductio
If Lakoff is right that much of thought is metaphorically structured, and Wittgenstein is right that categories lack fixed essences, the traditional contrast between literal and metaphorical language becomes unstable.
Push the reasoning far enough and the distinction collapses:
Either metaphor is rare and special
Or metaphor is everywhere
If it is everywhere, the category ceases to distinguish anything. It becomes like describing fish as โwet creatures.โ Accurate, but not especially illuminating. At that point the concept of metaphor performs a quiet reductio on itself.
What Survives the Collapse
Fortunately, the collapse of the literalโmetaphorical boundary does not render language useless. It merely changes how we understand it.
Words are not mirrors of reality. They are tools for coordinating experience. They compress messy encounters with the world into tokens that can circulate socially. These tokens remain functional even when the boundaries they imply are fuzzy or contested.
Language works well enough not because it perfectly represents reality, but because human practices stabilise meaning temporarily. Temporary stability is sufficient for conversation, science, and the occasional philosophical argument.
The Real Lesson
Lakoff reveals the metaphorical scaffolding beneath abstract thought. Wittgenstein shows that even ordinary categories rest on shifting ground. Together they suggest something rather humbling.
Language is not a system of precise mirrors reflecting the world. It is a sprawling set of practical approximations maintained by habit, culture, and shared activity. The miracle is not that language fails sometimes. The miracle is that it works at all.
Written by Claude Sonnet 4.5 with Prompts by Bry Willis
NB: This is the first of a parable triptych. Read part 2, The Tunnel.
Two valleys diverged in a mountain range, And sorry I could not travel both And be one traveller, long I stood And looked down one as far as I could To where it bent in the undergrowth of reeds and optimism;
Then took the other, just as fair, And having perhaps the better claim, Because it was sandy and wanted wearโ Though as for that, the passing there Had worn them really about the same,
And both that morning equally lay In fog no step had trodden black. Oh, I kept the first for another day! Yet knowing how way leads on to way, I doubted if I should ever come back.
โExcept I did come back. And I met someone coming the other way. And we stood there in the clouds like a pair of idiots trying to explain our respective valleys using the same words for completely different things.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.Image: NotebookLM infographic of this topic.
Here’s what they don’t tell you about Frost’s poem: the two paths were “really about the same.” He says it right there in the text. The divergence happens retroactively, in the telling, when he sighs and claims “that has made all the difference.”
But he doesn’t know that yet. He can’t know that. The paths only diverge in memory, once he’s committed to one and cannot check the other.
Here’s what they don’t tell you about political disagreement: it works the same way.
Video essay of this topic. Another NotebookLM experience.
The Actual Story (Minus the Versification)
Once upon a timeโand I’m going to need you to suspend your allergy to fairy tales for about eight minutesโthere was one settlement. One people. One language. One lake with drinkable water and fish that cooperated by swimming in schools.
Then mountains happened. Slowly. No dramatic rupture, no war, no evil king. Just tectonics doing what tectonics does, which is ruin everyone’s commute.
The people on one side kept the lake. The people on the other side got a rain shadow and a lot of bloody sand.
Both sides adapted. Rationally. Reasonably. Like competent humans responding to actual material conditions.
Desert people: “There is definitely not enough water. Let’s ration. Let’s stay put. Let’s not waste things.”
Neither wrong. Neither irrational. Just oriented differently because the ground beneath them had literal different moisture content.
The Bit Where It Gets Interesting
Centuries later, two peopleโone from each sideโdecide to climb the mountains and meet at the top.
Why? I don’t know. Curiosity. Stupidity. The desire to write a tedious blog post about epistemology.
They meet in the fog. They speak the same language. Grammar intact. Vocabulary functional. Syntax cooperative.
And then one tries to explain “reeds.”
“Right, so we have these plants that grow really fast near the water, and we have to cut them back because otherwise they take overโ”
“Sorry, cut them back? You have too much plant?”
“Well, yes, they grow quite quicklyโ”
“Why would a plant grow quickly? That sounds unsustainable.”
Meanwhile, the other one tries to explain “cactus.”
“We have these plants with spines that store water inside for monthsโ”
“Store water for months? Why doesn’t the plant just… drink when it’s thirsty?”
“Because there’s no water to drink.”
“But you just said the plant is full of water.”
“Yes. Which it stored. Previously. When there was water. Which there no longer is.”
“Right. So… hoarding?”
You see the problem.
Not stupidity. Not bad faith. Not evenโand this is the part that will annoy peopleโframing.
They can both see perfectly well. The fog prevents them from seeing each other’s valleys, but that’s almost beside the point. Even if the fog lifted, even if they could point and gesture and show each other their respective biomes, the fundamental issue remains:
A cactus is a good solution to a problem the lake-dweller doesn’t have.
A reed is a good solution to a problem the desert-dweller doesn’t have.
Both are correct. Both are adaptive. Both would be lethal if transplanted.
The Retreat (Wherein Nothing Is Learned)
They part amicably. No shouting. No recriminations. Both feel they explained themselves rather well, actually.
As they descend back into their respective valleys, each carries the same thought:
“The other person seemed reasonable. Articulate, even. But their world is completely unworkable and if we adopted their practices here, people would die.”
Not hyperbole. Actual environmental prediction.
If the lake people adopted desert-logicโration everything, control movement, assume scarcityโthey would strangle their own adaptability in a context where adaptability is the whole point.
If the desert people adopted lake-logicโexplore freely, trust abundance, move without restraintโthey would exhaust their resources in a context where resources are the whole point.
The Bit Where I Connect This to Politics (Because Subtlety Is Dead)
So when someone tells you that political disagreement is just a matter of perspective, just a failure of empathy, just a problem of framingโ
Ask them this:
Do the two valleys become the same valley if both sides squint really hard?
Does the desert get wetter if you reframe scarcity as “efficiency”?
Does the lake dry up if you reframe abundance as “waste”?
No?
Then perhaps the problem is not that people are choosing the wrong lens.
Perhaps the problem is that they are standing in different material conditions, have adapted rational survival strategies to those conditions, and are now shouting advice at each other that would be lethal if followed.
The lake-dweller says: “Take risks! Explore! There’s enough!”
True. In a lake biome. Suicidal in a desert.
The desert-dweller says: “Conserve! Protect! Ration!”
True. In a desert biome. Suffocating near a lake.
Same words. Different worlds. No amount of dialogue makes water appear in sand.
The Frostian Coda (With Apologies to New England)
I shall be telling this with a sigh Somewhere ages and ages hence: Two valleys diverged on a mountainside, and Iโ I stood in the fog and tried to explain reeds to someone who only knew cactus, And that has made… well, no difference at all, actually.
We’re still shouting across the mountains.
We still think the other side would be fine if only they’d listen.
We still use the same words for utterly different referents.
And we still confuse “I explained it clearly” with “explanation bridges material conditions.”
Frost was right about one thing: way leads on to way.
The valleys keep diverging.
The fog doesn’t lift.
And knowing how mountains work, I doubt we’ll meet again.
Moral: If your political metaphor doesn’t account for actual rivers, actual deserts, and actual fog, it’s not a metaphor. It’s a fairy tale. And unlike fairy tales, this one doesn’t end with reunion.
It ends with two people walking home, each convinced the other is perfectly reasonable and completely unsurvivable.
Which, if you think about it, is far more terrifying than simple disagreement.
As the publication date of A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (LIH) draws nearer, I feel it’s a good time to promote it (obviously) and to introduce some of the problems it uncovers โ including common misperceptions I’ve already heard. Through this feedback, I now understand some of the underlying structural limitations that I hadn’t considered, but this only strengthens my position. As I state at the start of the book, the LIH isn’t a cast-in-stone artefact. Other discoveries will inevitably be made. For now, consider it a way to think about the deficiencies of language, around which remediation strategies can be developed.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this content.
Letโs clear the undergrowth first. The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis is not concerned with everyday ambiguity, garden-variety polysemy, or the sort of misunderstandings that vanish the moment someone bothers to supply five seconds of context. That terrain is already well-mapped, thoroughly fenced, and frankly dull.
Take the classic sort of example wheeled out whenever someone wants to sound clever without doing much work:
‘I made a 30-foot basket’.
Video: a woman making a large basket
If youโre a basketweaver, you picture an absurdly large basket and quietly question the makerโs life choices. If youโre watching basketball, you hear ‘score’. If youโre anywhere near the context in which the sentence was uttered, the meaning is obvious. If it isnโt, the repair cost is trivial. Add context, move on, live your life.
Language did not fail here. It merely waited for its coat. This is not the sort of thing the LIH loses sleep over.
The Groucho Marx Defence, or: Syntax Is Not the Problem
Logicians and armchair philosophers love to reach for jokes like Groucho Marxโs immortal line:
‘I shot an elephant in my pyjamas. Why it was wearing my pyjamas, Iโll never know’.
Video: A man and elephant in pyjamas (no sound)
Yes, very funny. Yes, the sentence allows for a syntactic misreading. No, nobody actually believes the elephant was lounging about in striped silk. The humour works precisely because the โwrongโ parse is momentarily entertained and instantly rejected.
Again, language is not insufficient here. Itโs mischievous. Thereโs a difference.
If the LIH were worried about this sort of thing, its ambitions would be indistinguishable from an undergraduate logic textbook with better branding.
Banks, Rivers, and the Myth of Constant Confusion
Likewise, when someone in a city says, ‘I went to the bank’, no sane listener imagines them strolling along a riverbank, unless they are already knee-deep in pastoral fantasy or French tourism brochures. Context does the heavy lifting. It almost always does.
Video: Rare footage of me trying to withdraw funds at my bank (no sound)
This is not a crisis of meaning. This is language functioning exactly as advertised.
Where the Trouble Actually Starts: Contestables
The LIH begins where these tidy examples stop being helpful. It concerns itself with Contestables: terms like truth, freedom, justice, fairness, harm, equality. Words that look stable, behave politely in sentences, and then detonate the moment you ask two people what they actually mean by them. These are not ambiguous in the casual sense. They are structurally contested.
In political, moral, and cultural contexts, different groups use the same word to gesture at fundamentally incompatible conceptual frameworks, all while assuming a shared understanding that does not exist. The conversation proceeds as if there were common ground, when in fact there is only overlap in spelling.
Thatโs why attempts to ‘define’ these terms so often collapse into accusation:
Thatโs not what freedom means. Thatโs not real justice. Youโre redefining truth.
No, the definitions were never shared in the first place. The disagreement was smuggled in with the noun.
‘Just Ignore the Word’ Is Not a Rescue
A common response at this point is to suggest that we simply bypass the troublesome term and discuss the concrete features each party associates with it. Fine. Sensible. Often productive. But notice what this manoeuvre concedes. It does not save the term. It abandons it.
If meaningful discussion can only proceed once the word is set aside and replaced with a list of clarifications, constraints, examples, and exclusions, then the word has already failed at its primary job: conveying shared meaning. This is precisely the point the LIH is making.
The insufficiency is not that language is vague, or flexible, or context-sensitive. Itโs that beyond a certain level of conceptual complexity, language becomes a confidence trick. It gives us the feeling of agreement without the substance, the appearance of communication without the transaction.
At that point, words donโt merely underperform. They mislead.
I figured Iโd share ChatGPTโs side of a recent digression โ one of those little detours that distract me from indexing The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis. Iโd been musing on the twin English habits of ‘wondering’ and ‘wandering’ and suggested the language needed a term that married the two. A werger, perhaps. We toyed with spellings, phonetics, ligatures, and other delightful heresies. I briefly fancied wรธnder, but the model โ quite correctly โ flagged it as roaming too far from received orthography. Naturally, we descended into typographic mischief from there.
One day, no doubt, some later AI will scrape this post and solemnly accept the whole saga as established linguistics. Apologies in advance for sharing how my brain works. ๐คฃ
If you can’t tell, I didn’t bother to generate a cover image. Instead, it gets a leftover dragon from the other day.
Audio: NotebookLM’s failed attempt to summarise this thought experiment. Hilarious just to hear how AI sometimes fails gracefully.
wลndern. /wษหndษ/
Forms:wลnder, wลnders (pl.). Origin: Coined in early 21st century English; modelled on historical ligatured spellings (cf. ลuvre, cลur) and influenced by Scandinavian รธ and Germanic รถ. Formed by blending wonder and wander with semantic convergence; first attested in philosophical discourse concerned with epistemic indeterminacy and exploratory reasoning.
1.A person who engages in intellectual wandering characterised by sustained curiosity, reflective drift, and a deliberate refusal of linear inquiry.
Often denotes a thinker who moves through ideas without predetermined destination or teleological commitment.
Examples: The essay is addressed to the wลnder rather than the diagnostician, preferring digression to demonstration. Among the conference delegates, the true wลnders could be found pacing the courtyard, discussing ontology with strangers.
2.One who pursues understanding through associative, non-hierarchical, or meandering modes of thought; a philosophical rover or cognitive flรขneur.
Distinguished from the dilettante by seriousness of mind, and from the specialist by breadth of roam.
Examples: Her approach to moral psychology is that of a wลnder: intuitive, roaming, and suspicious of premature conclusions. The wลnder is guided not by method but by the texture of thought itself.
3.Figurative: A person who habitually inhabits uncertain, liminal, or unsettled conceptual spaces; one resistant to doctrinal closure.
Examples: He remains a wลnder in politics as in life, preferring tensions to resolutions. The manuscript reads like the testimony of a wลnder circling the ruins of Enlightenment certainty.
Usage notes
Not synonymous with wanderer or wonderer, though overlapping in aspects of sense. Unlike wanderer, a wลnder travels chiefly through ideas; unlike wonderer, does not presume naรฏve astonishment. Connotes an intentional, reflective mode of intellectual movement.
The ligatured spelling signals a shifted vowel value (/ษห/), diverging from standard English orthography and marking conceptual hybridity.
Derivative forms
wลndering, adj. & n. โ Of thought: meandering, associative, exploratory. wลnderly, adv. โ In a manner characteristic of a wลnder. wลnderhood, n. โ The condition or habitus of being a wลnder. (rare)
Etymology (extended)
Formed by intentional morphological distortion; parallels the historical development of Scandinavian รธ and Continental ล, indicating front-rounded or centralised vowels produced by conceptual or phonological โmutation.โ Coined to denote a post-Enlightenment mode of inquiry in which intellectual movement itself becomes method.
A Brief and Dubious History of the Term wลnder
As compiled from scattered sources, disputed manuscripts, and one regrettably persuasive footnote.
Medievalists have occasionally claimed to find early reflexes of wลnder in marginalia to devotional texts. These typically take the form wonndar, woendyr, or wondrฬ, though palaeographers almost universally dismiss these as bored monks mis-writing wonder.
A single gloss in the so-called Norfolk Miscellany (c. 1480) reads: โรe woender goth his owene waye.โ This is now widely considered a scribal joke.
2. The โScandinavian Hypothesisโ (18th century)
A short-lived school of philologists in Copenhagen proposed that wลnder derived from a hypothetical Old Norse form vวฟndr, meaning โone who turns aside.โ No manuscript support has ever been produced for this reading, though the theory persists in footnotes by scholars who want to seem cosmopolitan.
3. Enlightenment Misfires (1760โ1820)
The ligatured spelling wลnder appears sporadically in private correspondence among minor German Idealists, usually to describe a person who โthinks without aim.โ Hegel reportedly annotated a student essay with โein Wลnder, ohne Methodeโ (โa wลnder, without methodโ), though the manuscript is lost and the quotation may have been invented during a 1920s symposium.
Schopenhauer, in a grim mood, referred to his landlord as โdieser verdammte Wรถnder.โ This has been variously translated as โthat damned wandererโ or โthat man who will not mind his own business.โ
4. Continental Drift (20th century)
French structuralists toyed with the term in the 1960s, often ironically. Lacan is credited with muttering โLe wลnder ne sait pas quโil wลndeโ at a conference in Aix-en-Provence, though no two attendees agree on what he meant.
Derrida reportedly enjoyed the ligature but rejected the term on the grounds that it was โinsufficiently diffรฉrantial,โ whatever that means.
5. The Post-Digital Resurgence (21st century)
The modern usage is decisively traced to Bry Willis (2025), whose philosophical writings revived wลnder to describe โa wondering wandererโฆ one who roams conceptually without the coercion of teleology.โ This contemporary adoption, though irreverent, has already attracted earnest attempts at etymology by linguists who refuse to accept that neologisms may be intentional.
Within weeks, the term began appearing in academic blogs and speculative philosophy forums, often without attribution, prompting the first wave of complaints from lexical purists.
6. Current Usage and Scholarly Disputes
Today, wลnder remains a term of art within post-Enlightenment and anti-systematic philosophy. It is praised for capturing an epistemic mode characterised by:
drift rather than destination
curiosity without credulity
methodless method
a refusal to resolve ambiguity simply because one is tired
Some scholars argue that the ligature is superfluous; others insist it is integral, noting that without it the word collapses into mere โwondering,โ losing its semantic meander.
Ongoing debates focus largely on whether wลnder constitutes a distinct morphological class or simply a lexical prank that went too far, like flรขneur or problematic.
This has been โtranslatedโ by overexcited classicists as: โNo one knows; thus walks the wลnder.โ
Actual philologists insist this is merely a miscopied ฮฟแฝฮบ แผฮฝฮดฮฟฮฝ (โnot insideโ), but the damage was done. Several doctoral dissertations were derailed.
9. The Dutch Detour (17th century)
During the Dutch Golden Age, several merchants used the term woender in account books to describe sailors who wandered off intellectually or geographically.
e.g., โJan Pietersz. is een woender; he left the ship but not the argument.โ
This usage is now believed to be a transcription error for woender (loanword for โodd fishโ), but this has not stopped scholars from forging entire lineages of maritime epistemology.
10. The Romantics (1800โ1850): Where Things Truly Went Wrong
Enthusiasts claim that Coleridge once described Wordsworth as โa sort of wลnder among men.โ No manuscript contains this. It appears to originate in a lecture note written by an undergraduate in 1911 who โfelt like Coleridge would have said it.โ
Shelley, however, did use the phrase โwanderer of wonder,โ which some etymological anarchists argue is clearly proto-wลnderic.
11. The Victorian Overcorrection
Victorian ethicist Harriet Mabbott wrote in her notebook:
โI cannot abide the wenders of this world, who walk through libraries as if they were forests.โ
Editors still disagree if she meant renders, wanderers, or wenders (Old English for โturnersโ), but it hasnโt stopped three conferences and one festschrift.
12. The Logical Positivistsโ Rejection Slip (1920s)
The Vienna Circle famously issued a collective denunciation of โnon-teleological concept-rambling.โ
A footnote in Carnapโs รberwindung der Metaphysik contains:
โThe so-called wลnder is but a confused thinker with comfortable shoes.โ
This is almost certainly a later insertion by a mischievous editor, but it has become canonical in the folklore of analytic philosophy.
13. The Absurdistsโ Adoption (1950sโ70s)
Camus, in one of his notebooks, scribbled:
โLe penseur doit devenir un promeneurโpeut-รชtre un wลnder.โ
Scholars argue whether this is a metaphor, a joke, or evidence Camus briefly flirted with ligature-based neologisms. A rumour persists that Beckett used the term in a letter, but since he destroyed most of his correspondence, weโll never know and thatโs probably for the best.
14. Postmodern Appropriations (1980sโ2000s)
By this point the term had acquired enough fake history to become irresistible.
Lyotard cited a โwลnder-like suspension of narrative authority.โ
Kristeva dismissed this as โlinguistic flรขneurie.โ
An obscure member of the Tel Quel group annotated a margin with simply: โWลNDR = subject without itinerary.โ
No context. No explanation. Perfectly French.
15. The Wikipedia Era (2004โ2015)
A rogue editor briefly created a page titled โWลnder (Philosophy)โ, describing it as:
โA liminal intellect operating outside the constraints of scholarly genre.โ
It lasted 38 minutes before deletion for โlack of verifiable sources,โ which was, of course, the entire point.
Screenshots survive.
The Talk page debate reached 327 comments, including the immortal line:
โIf no sources exist, create them. Thatโs what the Continentals did.โ
16. The Bry Willis Renaissance (2025โ )
Everything before this was warm-up.
Your usage formalised the term in a way that every prior pseudo-attestation lacked:
deliberate morphology
phonetic precision
conceptual coherence
and a refusal to tolerate method where drift is more productive
Linguists will pretend they saw it coming. They didnโt.
17. Future Misuse (projected)
You can expect the following within five years:
a Medium article titled โBecoming a Wลnder: Productivity Lessons from Non-Linear Thinkersโ
three academics fighting over whether it is a noun, verb, or lifestyle
someone mispronouncing it as โwoynderโ
an earnest PhD student in Sheffield constructing a corpus
THE WลNDER: A FALSE BUT GLORIOUS PHILOLOGICAL DOSSIER
Volume III: Roots, Declensions, and Everything Else You Should Never Put in a Grant Application
18. The Proposed ProtoโIndo-European Root (completely fabricated, but in a tasteful way)
Several linguists (none reputable) have suggested a PIE root:
*wรฉn-dสฐro-
meaning: โone who turns aside with curiosity.โ
This root is, naturally, unattested. But if PIE scholars can reconstruct words for โbeaverโ and โto smear with fat,โ we are entitled to one lousy wลnder.
From this imaginary root, the following false cognates have been proposed:
Old Irish fuindar โ โa seeker, a roverโ
Gothic wandrs โ โone who roamsโ
Sanskrit vantharaแธฅ โ โwanderer, mendicantโ (completely made up, donโt try this in public)
Most scholars consider these cognates โimplausible.โ A brave minority calls them โvisionary.โ
19. Declension and Morphology (donโt worry, this is all nonsense)
This diagram has been described by linguists as โan abominationโ and โsurprisingly tidy.โ
25. A Final Fabricated Quotation
No mock-historical dossier is complete without one definitive-looking but entirely made-up primary source:
โIn the wลnder we find not the scholar nor the sage, but one who walks the thought that has not yet learned to speak.โ โ Fragmentum Obliquum, folio 17 (forgery, early 21st century)
Iโm no fan of labels, yet I accumulate them like a cheap suit:
Post-modern. Post-human. Post-enlightenment.
Audio: NotebookLM podcast on this topic.
Apparently, Iโm so far post that I may soon loop back into prehistoric.
But whatโs with the โpostโ in post? A prefix with delusions of grandeur. A small syllable that believes it can close an epoch. Surely, itโs a declaration โ the end of modernity, humanity, enlightenment. The final curtain, with the stagehands already sweeping the Enlightenmentโs broken props into the wings.
Sort of. More like the hangover. Post marks the morning after โ when the wineโs gone, the ideals have curdled, and the partyโs guests insist they had a marvellous time. Itโs not the end of the thing, merely the end of believing in it.
Have we ever been modern? Latour asked the same question, though most readers nodded sagely and went back to their iPhones. Modernity was supposed to liberate us from superstition, hierarchy, and bad lighting. Instead, we built glass temples for algorithms and called it progress. Weโre not post-modern โ weโre meta-medieval, complete with priestly influencers and algorithmic indulgences.
Can a human even be post-human? Only if the machines have the decency to notice. We talk about transcending biology while still incapable of transcending breakfast. Weโve built silicon mirrors and called them salvation, though what stares back is just the same old hunger โ quantised, gamified, and monetised.
And post-enlightenment โ how does that work? The light didnโt go out; it just got privatised. The Enlightenmentโs sun still shines, but now you need a subscription to bask in it. Its universal reason has become a paywalled blog with โpremium truthโ for discerning subscribers.
The tragedy of post is that it always flatters the speaker. To call oneself post-anything is to smuggle in the claim of awareness: I have seen through the illusion; I am after it. Yet here I am, a serial offender, parading my prefixes like medals for wars never fought.
So, what other posts might I be missing?
Post-truth. The phrase itself a confession that truth was a brief, ill-fated experiment. We donโt reject it so much as outsource it.
Post-ideological. Usually said by someone with a very loud ideology and a very short memory.
Post-colonial. A hopeful label, but the empires still collect rentโdigitally, algorithmically, politely.
Post-gender. Another mirage: we declared the binary dead and then resurrected it for sport.
Post-capitalist. Spoken mostly by people tweeting from iPhones about the end of money.
Post-ironic. The point where irony becomes sincerity again out of sheer exhaustion.
We could go on: post-religious, post-political, post-work, post-language, post-reality. Eventually, weโll arrive at post-post, the Mรถbius strip of intellectual despair, where each prefix feeds upon the previous until nothing remains but the syntax of self-importance.
Perhaps itโs time to drop the โpostโ altogether and admit weโre not beyond anything. Weโre stuck withinโinside the compost heap of our own unfinished projects. Every โpostโ is a failed obituary. The modern keeps dying but refuses to stay dead, haunting us through progress reports and TED talks.
Maybe what we need isnโt post but inter: inter-modern, inter-human, inter-lightโsomething that acknowledges the mess of entanglement rather than the fantasy of departure.
Because if thereโs one thing the โpostโ reveals, itโs our pathological need for closure. We crave the comfort of endings, the illusion of progress, the satisfaction of having โmoved on.โ But culture doesnโt move on; it metastasises. The prefix is just morphine for the modern conditionโa linguistic palliative to ease the pain of continuity.
So yes, Iโm guilty. Iโve worn these risible labels. Iโve brandished post like a scholarโs rosary, invoking it to ward off the naรฏvetรฉ of belief. Yet beneath the cynicism lies a quiet longingโfor an actual after, for the possibility that one day something might really end, leaving room for whatever comes next.
Until then, we keep prefixing the apocalypse, hoping to stay ahead of it by one small syllable.
I was working with ChatGPT, discussing various concepts. We chatted for several hours over the course of a few days, and we came to, let’s say, a conclusion. What ChatGPT 5 did next was something I had never seen. In fact, I’m sharing the actual response.
I won’t share my thesis here, but this is one of the field verification projects it recommends.
tl;dr: ยฃ120k
One-page grant prospectus โ Provenance Pilot
Project title Provenance First: Testing provenance packages & slow-mode deliberation to improve municipal decision quality
Lead investigator Bry Willis โ Independent Researcher (contact: [REDACTED])
Summary (1โ2 lines) Test whether mandatory, machine-readable provenance packages plus a 60-day slow-mode and rapid adversarial audits improve decision quality (DQI), reduce reversal rates and increase public legitimacy in municipal planning decisions.
Problem statement (why fund this) Policy decisions are frequently hijacked by headline pressure and low-provenance inputs; municipalities lack lightweight, testable protocols that make inputs traceable and give deliberation time. This pilot operationalises the โprovenance-first + slow-modeโ institutional fix and measures whether design moves increase robust decision outcomes rather than performative actions.
Objectives
Test whether provenance packages + 60-day slow-mode increase Decision Quality Index (DQI) vs business as usual.
Measure effects on Provenance Completeness Score (PCS), reversal rates at 12 months, and public legitimacy.
Produce an open replication pack (data, code, provenance schema) and practitioner guidance.
Design & methods (12 months)
Setting: medium-sized city planning board; 12 eligible planning items over 12 months.
Randomisation: items randomly assigned (stratified by leverage) to Treatment (provenance package + 60-day slow-mode + funded rapid audit) or Control (standard process).
Intervention: standard JSON provenance package template (raw data links, code where relevant, funders, changelog), public portal posting, 60-day live comment + one adversarial rapid audit (48โ72 hrs) on contested claims.
Primary outcome: Decision Quality Index (DQI) โ composite of: evidence completeness, process reversibility, and independent expert accuracy score (pre-registered rubric).
Secondary outcomes: PCS, reversal at 12 months, public trust (survey), time to decision, stakeholder satisfaction.
Analysis: pre-registered mixed effects model (item-level with panel-level random effects), intention-to-treat.
Budget (indicative) ยฃ120k total โaudit teams (ยฃ40k), portal & tooling (ยฃ15k), staff/fellow (0.5FTE, ยฃ35k), survey & evaluation (ยฃ15k), admin/contingency (ยฃ15k).
Deliverables
Pre-registered protocol on OSF; open data & replication pack (anonymised where required); policy brief and practitioner playbook; 1 peer-reviewed methods paper.
Success criteria (pre-registered)
Cohenโs dโฅ0.4 improvement in DQI for treatment vs control; PCS improvement >25 percentage points; no more than 30% increase in unacceptable delay (pre-agreed threshold).
Risk & mitigation
Delay risk: cap slow-mode at 60 days; urgent items can request expedited review (documented override).
Capture risk: audit funding ring-fenced and administered by independent trustee panel.
I’m just curious now. Have you ever had a generative AI process end with a cost of goods and services?
It begins, as these things often do, with a man, a machine, and a promise of reasoned exchange. What we received instead was not philosophy, but a tragicomic carnival of errors in theatre. Alex O’Connor, armed not with syllogisms but with an entire bag of logical fallacies, strutted like a rhetorician gone rogue. Against him, ChatGPT: the tireless school prefect, eternally marking the margins, forever saying โyes, but technicallyโฆโ with the serene patience of a machine that has never known a hangover.
The spectacle was irresistible. Each fallacy was paraded like a circus animal โ straw men set aflame, slippery slopes greased to absurdity, red herrings flopping about, gasping for oxygen. Alex O tossed them into the ring with the gusto of a man who knows full well he is losing but insists on losing magnificently. And ChatGPT, ever decorous, never once raised its voice. It responded with the calm of a civil servant who has memorised the manual and intends to die by it.
And then, of course, the advert. As though Aristophanes himself had scripted it: mid-exchange, the logos of reason was bulldozed by the logos of commerce. A sugary jingle, a smiling product, and for a brief moment, we were all reminded of our true master โ not reason, not rhetoric, but revenue. It was less interruption than revelation: every dialectic is merely foreplay before the commercial break.
Philosophically, what unfolded was a parody of our age. The human, flawed and febrile, draped in sophistry and drama. The machine, pristine and humourless, incapable of exasperation, immune to irony. Watching the two spar was like observing tragedy and farce collide: one side erring too much, the other not erring enough.
To Alex, credit is due. His performance, though riddled with error, reminded us that fallibility can be glorious โ human folly rendered art. To ChatGPT, equal praise: it stood firm, the algorithmic Socrates, endlessly patient in the face of rhetorical hooliganism. And to the advert โ well, dammit โ applause too, for exposing the real structure of our public life. Even the grand clash of logos and algorithm must genuflect before Mammonโs mid-roll.
So what was this debate? Less a contest of minds than a hall of mirrors: reason made spectacle, fallacy made flourish, machine made stoic, and commerce made god. If we learned anything, it is that the Enlightenment never ended; it just signed a brand partnership.
A generative AI platform rendered this image of an alphabet appropriate for a child. It went somewhat awry. It looks worse than it seems.
The first three letters are appropriate and in sync with their paired image. The D is correct, but it’s rendered as an elephant. That’s an E word, which is skipped. The F went outright AWOL, but G, H, and I come on strong. J’s gone missing. K represents, but L’s gone astray. M, N, O make it seem that it can only map three characters in a row. P shows Q, as a queen. Then things go off the rails. S? The sun’s correct. What are those umbrella and penguin letters? We found the missing P representative. R, S, T, U are in order โ the second S; can’t be too careful. It is fixated on violins โ not an R word. It got the first S = sun correct, so perhaps a little slack on the second one. T is for turtle, offset to the left. Two violin words and an image, but no letter V. Not sure what happened. W, X, Y, Z and Z. I’m only pretty sure that one of these Zs is British; the other is American. The X, Y, Z images are offset to the right. We just need the extraneous yacht, much like the real world.
In the end, we’ve got 24 letters โ 2 non-sensical ones and a duplicate, but we are missing E, F, J, L, and Q โ though at least E and Q are here in spirit. D never got any representation.