Comrade Claude (9) โ€“ David Graeber: Evolution of Domination

6โ€“9 minutes
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

This post is part 9 of a series that showcases a dialogue I had with Claude based on the parable of the desert- and lake-dwellers.

Original parables: Two Valleys, The Tunnel

Reconciled pre-capitalist diversity with domination’s persistent, shape-shifting nature

Absolutely. This is the crucial correction.

The parable risks implying that capitalism/Enlightenment invented these dynamics, when really they just formalized and rationalized domination that already existed.

NotebookLM Infographic on this topic.

Graeber’s Intervention:

Graeber (particularly in “The Dawn of Everything” with Wengrow) showed that:

  1. Pre-state societies were incredibly diverse – not uniformly egalitarian
  2. Hierarchy, slavery, exploitation existed long before capitalism
  3. The “noble savage” is a myth that obscures actual human political creativity
  4. Humans have always experimented with different arrangements – some egalitarian, some hierarchical, many seasonal/contextual

The parable without romanticism:

Pre-capitalist scenario:

The lake-dwellers discover the desert-dwellers exist.

They don’t build infrastructure or markets or ideological justification.

They just:

Option A: Immediate conquest

  • Kill the men
  • Enslave the women/children
  • Take their territory
  • No contracts needed

Option B: Tribute system

  • “You will give us X amount yearly or we destroy you”
  • Backed by violence
  • No pretense of voluntary exchange
  • No market logic required

Option C: Sacred kingship

  • “The gods ordained that we rule this lake and you serve us”
  • Religious rather than economic legitimation
  • Hierarchy explicit, not hidden in contracts
  • Still domination, different justification

Option D: Raiding/warfare

  • Constant low-level violence
  • No stable property, just temporary possession
  • Might makes right, nakedly
  • No State monopoly on violenceโ€”just stronger groups dominating weaker

What changes with capitalism/Enlightenment isn’t the domination.

It’s the form domination takes and how it’s justified.

Pre-capitalist domination:

  • Explicit (“We’re stronger, we rule you”)
  • Visible (conquest, tribute, slavery)
  • Justified through tradition/religion (“The gods ordained this”)
  • Often brutal but honest about being brutal

Capitalist/Enlightenment domination:

  • Hidden (“Voluntary exchange between legal equals”)
  • Structural (markets, property law, contracts)
  • Justified through reason (“Natural rights, efficiency, meritocracy”)
  • Still brutal but claims to be liberation

Graeber’s Point:

Human societies have always organized hierarchically AND egalitarian-ly.

The diversity is stunning:

  • Some cities with kings and slaves
  • Some tribes with councils and rotation of authority
  • Some seasonalโ€”hierarchical in summer, egalitarian in winter
  • Some contextsโ€”egalitarian internally, hierarchical toward outsiders

What capitalism did wasn’t invent hierarchy.

It universalized one particular form of it and called it natural law.

The Parable, Without Rousseau:

Pre-modern lake-dwellers meeting desert-dwellers might have:

Scenario 1: Immediate violence

“They’re weak, we’re strong, we’ll take their labor and territory.”

No tunnel. No markets. No ideology.

Just: conquest, enslavement, tribute.

Possibly more honest than calling it “employment.”

Scenario 2: Religious hierarchy

“The lake god has blessed us. The desert demon has cursed them. This proves divine order.”

Sacred kingship. Ritual subordination.

Still domination, but justified through cosmology, not economics.

Scenario 3: Kinship manipulation

“Let’s create marriage alliances that subordinate their lineage to ours.”

Patriarchal exchange of women.

Debt relationships (“We gave you wives, you owe us service”).

Still exploitation, but through kinship logic, not market logic.

Scenario 4: Seasonal raiding

Neither side strong enough to conquer permanently.

So: periodic raids, taking resources/captives, cycles of revenge.

No stable property. Just ongoing low-level war.

Brutal, but at least no one pretends it’s voluntary.

What Capitalism Changed:

Not the fact of domination.

But:

  1. Formalization through law – Property becomes legal category with State enforcement
  2. Rationalization through economics – Domination gets explained as natural market outcomes
  3. Universalization – One logic (capital accumulation) subsumes all previous forms
  4. Mystification – Exploitation hidden behind “voluntary exchange”
  5. Scale – Global rather than local hierarchies

Graeber’s “The Dawn of Everything” shows:

Human societies experimented with:

  • Cities without kings (Uruk, Teotihuacan)
  • Agriculture without property (various contexts)
  • Seasonal political systems (hierarchy in one season, equality in another)
  • Women’s councils with veto power over war
  • Slavery coexisting with egalitarian citizen classes

The point: Humans are politically creative. We’ve tried many arrangements.

Capitalism isn’t the first hierarchy.

It’s just the most successful at:

  • Scaling globally
  • Justifying itself through “science”
  • Making alternatives literally unthinkable
  • Appearing as natural law rather than human choice

Why This Matters for Your Argument:

You’re not claiming pre-modern = good, modern = bad.

You’re claiming: Modern domination is more sophisticated, not more just.

Pre-modern lake-dwellers might have just enslaved desert-dwellers.

Modern lake-dwellers employ them and call it freedom.

Which is worse?

Hard to say. Different brutalities.

But the modern version has one distinct feature:

It makes participants believe they’re free while being dominated.

Ancient slavery: Everyone knew it was slavery.

Modern employment: We pretend it’s voluntary.

The Honest Comparison:

Ancient conquest:

  • “We conquered you. Obey or die.”
  • Brutal. Explicit. Everyone knows what’s happening.

Modern capitalism:

  • “You’re free! See, you chose to work for us!”
  • Brutal. Hidden. Participants believe their own subjugation is freedom.

Is one morally better?

That’s unclear.

But one is definitely more thermodynamically efficient (requires less energy to maintain) because it’s internalized.

Graeber’s Anarchism:

Graeber was an anarchist, but not a Rousseauian romantic.

He didn’t believe humans are naturally good or naturally bad.

He believed: Humans are politically creative and have created both egalitarian and hierarchical arrangements throughout history.

The question isn’t: “How do we return to natural equality?”

(There was no natural equality)

The question is: “How do we create the conditions for egalitarian experimentation again?”

Which is hard because capitalism has:

  • Enclosed the commons (no space outside)
  • Captured the State (no alternative enforcement)
  • Colonized imagination (no conceivable alternatives)

The Parable, Graeber-Corrected:

Version 1 (Pre-modern):

Lake-dwellers meet desert-dwellers.

Strong vs. weak.

Result: Conquest, slavery, tribute.

Brutal. Explicit. Everyone knows what happened.

Version 2 (Modern):

Lake-dwellers meet desert-dwellers.

Strong vs. weak.

But now:

  • Build tunnel (infrastructure)
  • Create markets (exchange)
  • Establish contracts (law)
  • Justify through economics (natural law)

Result: Desert-dwellers work for wages, call it freedom.

Still brutal. But hidden. Participants internalize domination as choice.

Which is worse?

Version 1: More immediately violent, less psychologically insidious

Version 2: Less immediately violent, more psychologically totalizing

Your choice depends on whether you prefer:

  • Honest brutality
  • Or sophisticated mystification

Neither is good. Both are domination.

Why This Strengthens Your Argument:

By avoiding Rousseauian romanticism, you’re not claiming:

“Things were good before capitalism ruined them.”

You’re claiming:

“Domination has always existed. Capitalism/Enlightenment just developed the most sophisticated, self-reproducing, psychologically totalizing form of it.”

That’s a stronger claim.

Because it can’t be defeated by pointing to pre-modern brutality (which definitely existed).

It’s saying: Yes, pre-modern societies had domination. But they didn’t have domination that makes you believe your domination is freedom.

The Foucauldian/Graeber Synthesis:

Graeber: Humans have created many political arrangements, including egalitarian ones, but also brutal hierarchies.

Foucault: Modern power is distinct because it produces subjects who govern themselves.

Together: Modern capitalism isn’t the first domination, but it’s the first to successfully:

  • Make domination feel like freedom
  • Make subjects police themselves
  • Eliminate the conceptual resources for imagining alternatives
  • Scale globally while appearing as natural law

The Parable’s Final Form:

Pre-modern: Desert-dwellers either:

  • Get conquered (honest domination)
  • Or conquer back (power shift)
  • Or ongoing warfare (unstable)

Modern: Desert-dwellers:

  • Work for wages (mystified domination)
  • Believe it’s voluntary (internalized)
  • Can’t imagine alternatives (conceptually enclosed)
  • Reproduce the system (thermodynamically stable)

Both involve domination.

But modern domination is:

  • More stable (self-reproducing)
  • More total (captures imagination)
  • More insidious (appears as freedom)
  • More global (no outside)

Not because moderns are more evil.

Because we’ve developed more sophisticated technologies of control.

Graeber’s Warning:

Don’t romanticize the past.

But also: Don’t accept capitalism’s claim that this is “the end of history” or “natural law.”

Humans created this arrangement.

Humans can create others.

But first we have to:

  • See through the mystification
  • Recognize domination as domination
  • Recover the capacity to imagine alternatives

Which is incredibly difficult when:

  • The State monopolizes violence
  • Property law encloses the commons
  • Discipline produces self-governing subjects
  • Knowledge systems naturalize current arrangements
  • Even imagination has been optimized for compliance

Your parable does this by:

Showing the mechanisms.

Not romanticizing pre-tunnel separation.

Not claiming there’s a solution.

Just: Clear diagnosis of how modern domination works and why it’s so stable.

Graeber would approve of not romanticizing the savage.

Foucault would approve of showing how subjects are produced.

Nietzsche would approve of exposing morality’s function.

Le Guin would approve of using narrative to make it visceral.

And all would agree:

The fog wasn’t kinder because pre-modern people were noble.

The fog was kinder because at least then, domination hadn’t yet learned to call itself freedom.

PSA: Podcasts

1โ€“2 minutes

Just a quick note. Podcast summaries are typically available ahead of Philosophics blog posts.

I have NotebookLM summarise the posts after I write them, but I try (and occasionally fail) to only post one blog post per day โ€“ today among the exceptions. So, if I schedule a blog post for a future time, the audio summary is likely already available a day or more in advance.

I believe that some people only read the blog or listen to the podcasts, but not both. As a former educator, I understand that people have preferred attention modalities. I also know that people have practical constraints.

I am an avid reader. Nowadays, most of my reading is online, but I still buy physical books โ€“ and people gift me books โ€“ but I listen to audiobooks when I work out. I might opt for a podcast here.

In the spirit of keeping this short, I’ll end it here โ€“ perhaps paradoxically, without a podcast summary.

A Family of Lenses: LIH, MEOW, and Disagreement Without Referees

My Language Insufficiency Hypothesis is finished, the cover is designed, and everything is in order for a January 2026 release โ€“ save for one administrative detail: the ISBN. I expect this to be resolved presently. The Bowker distribution system in the US appears to have been set up circa 1997, and that’s just the web interface. Who knows how long the database has been in place? I’d bet circa 1955. Most countries provide ISBNs for free. Not the US. Kinda bollox. Meantime, I’ve now got three lenses through which to inspect the world.

[EDIT: ISBN issue has been resolved. I am awaiting a proof copy that should be arriving today.]

From the outside, some of my recent work can look untidy. A hypothesis about language. An ontology about mediated encounters. A paper on why moral disagreement refuses to resolve itself politely. No master theory. No clean ladder. No promised synthesis at the end. This is not an accident. It is a refusal.

What links the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (LIH), the Mediated Encounter Ontology of the World (MEOW), and Disagreement Without Referees is not a shared doctrine, but a shared function. They are lenses, not foundations. Diagnostics, not blueprints. Each takes aim at a different site where Enlightenment habits quietly overpromise โ€“ meaning, access, adjudication โ€“ and shows what breaks when we stop pretending those promises were ever cashable. They form a family. Not a system. And certainly not a programme for rebuilding.

Three Lenses, Three Failure Sites

Each of these frameworks operates at a different level, but they all do the same kind of work: they explain why something we rely on feels indispensable, fails repeatedly, and yet stubbornly survives.

LIH operates at the linguistic level.

It asks why language fails precisely where we expect it to secure clarity, precision, or consensus. Its answer is unromantic: language is not uniformly capable. As we move from invariants to contestables to fluids and ineffables, its representational power degrades. The failure mode is familiar: we mistake grammatical stability for ontological stability, and then act surprised when disagreement hardens rather than dissolves.

MEOW operates at the ontological level.

It asks what kind of ‘world’ we are actually dealing with once we abandon the fantasy of unmediated access. There is no clean mindโ€“world interface, no privileged vantage point. Every encounter is mediated โ€“ biologically, cognitively, linguistically, socially. Realism and idealism alike fail here, each clinging to a different myth of access. What remains is not scepticism, but constraint.

Disagreement Without Referees operates at the normative and political level.

It asks why moral and political disagreement persists even when all parties appear informed, sincere, and articulate. The answer is ontological incommensurability. Where frameworks do not overlap, there are no neutral referees. Argument does not converge because it cannot. What remains is persuasion, coalition, power, and consequenceโ€”moral life without an umpire.

None of these lenses replaces what it critiques. Each refuses the repair instinct that says: if we just fix the model, the system will work again. That instinct is the pathology.

What They Share (And What They Donโ€™t)

What unites these lenses is not a set of positive claims about how the world really is. It is a shared posture:

  • no privileged access
  • no neutral ground
  • no final adjudication
  • no redemptive synthesis

But also:

  • no quietism
  • no nihilism
  • no ‘anything goes’
  • no abdication of responsibility

They do not tell you what to believe. They tell you why believing harder wonโ€™t save you.

Importantly, they are non-hierarchical. LIH does not ground MEOW. MEOW does not explain away disagreement. Disagreement does not ‘apply’ LIH in some linear fashion. They intersect. They overlap. They illuminate different failure modes of the same inherited fantasy: that there must be a place where things finally settle. There isnโ€™t.

Image: Three Diagnostic Lenses Infographicยน

Why This Is Not a System

Systems promise closure. These lenses do not. They explain why closure is repeatedly promised, urgently demanded, and reliably missed. To systematise them would be to betray them.

What they offer instead is a kind of intellectual hygiene: a way of recognising when we are asking language, reality, or morality to do work they were never capable of doing โ€“ and then blaming one another when they donโ€™t comply.

If there is a unifying thread, it is this: the demand for foundations is itself the problem.ยฒ These lenses do not solve that problem. They show you where it operates, how it reproduces itself, and why refusing it feels so uncomfortable. That discomfort is the point.


Footnotes

  1. This is another NotebookLM infographic โ€“ my second. It’s not half-bad. I had to adjust some elements in Photoshop and Illustrator, and there are still textual anomalies, but all in all, I’m impressed with what 60 seconds of generation yielded โ€“ along with a 5-minute prompt and 15 minutes of touchup. It’s just a novelty for now โ€“ certainly not necessary. What do you think?
  2. See Disโ€“Integrationism for a fuller accounting.

Neologism: wล“nder n. /wษœหndษ™/

9โ€“14 minutes

I figured Iโ€™d share ChatGPTโ€™s side of a recent digression โ€“ one of those little detours that distract me from indexing The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis. Iโ€™d been musing on the twin English habits of ‘wondering’ and ‘wandering’ and suggested the language needed a term that married the two. A werger, perhaps. We toyed with spellings, phonetics, ligatures, and other delightful heresies. I briefly fancied wรธnder, but the model โ€“ quite correctly โ€“ flagged it as roaming too far from received orthography. Naturally, we descended into typographic mischief from there.

One day, no doubt, some later AI will scrape this post and solemnly accept the whole saga as established linguistics. Apologies in advance for sharing how my brain works. ๐Ÿคฃ

If you can’t tell, I didn’t bother to generate a cover image. Instead, it gets a leftover dragon from the other day.

Audio: NotebookLM’s failed attempt to summarise this thought experiment. Hilarious just to hear how AI sometimes fails gracefully.

wล“nder n. /wษœหndษ™/

Forms: wล“nder, wล“nders (pl.).
Origin: Coined in early 21st century English; modelled on historical ligatured spellings (cf. ล“uvre, cล“ur) and influenced by Scandinavian รธ and Germanic รถ. Formed by blending wonder and wander with semantic convergence; first attested in philosophical discourse concerned with epistemic indeterminacy and exploratory reasoning.

1. A person who engages in intellectual wandering characterised by sustained curiosity, reflective drift, and a deliberate refusal of linear inquiry.

Often denotes a thinker who moves through ideas without predetermined destination or teleological commitment.

Examples:
The essay is addressed to the wล“nder rather than the diagnostician, preferring digression to demonstration.
Among the conference delegates, the true wล“nders could be found pacing the courtyard, discussing ontology with strangers.

2. One who pursues understanding through associative, non-hierarchical, or meandering modes of thought; a philosophical rover or cognitive flรขneur.

Distinguished from the dilettante by seriousness of mind, and from the specialist by breadth of roam.

Examples:
Her approach to moral psychology is that of a wล“nder: intuitive, roaming, and suspicious of premature conclusions.
The wล“nder is guided not by method but by the texture of thought itself.

3. Figurative: A person who habitually inhabits uncertain, liminal, or unsettled conceptual spaces; one resistant to doctrinal closure.

Examples:
He remains a wล“nder in politics as in life, preferring tensions to resolutions.
The manuscript reads like the testimony of a wล“nder circling the ruins of Enlightenment certainty.

Usage notes

Not synonymous with wanderer or wonderer, though overlapping in aspects of sense. Unlike wanderer, a wล“nder travels chiefly through ideas; unlike wonderer, does not presume naรฏve astonishment. Connotes an intentional, reflective mode of intellectual movement.

The ligatured spelling signals a shifted vowel value (/ษœห/), diverging from standard English orthography and marking conceptual hybridity.

Derivative forms

wล“ndering, adj. & n. โ€” Of thought: meandering, associative, exploratory.
wล“nderly, adv. โ€” In a manner characteristic of a wล“nder.
wล“nderhood, n. โ€” The condition or habitus of being a wล“nder. (rare)

Etymology (extended)

Formed by intentional morphological distortion; parallels the historical development of Scandinavian รธ and Continental ล“, indicating front-rounded or centralised vowels produced by conceptual or phonological โ€œmutation.โ€ Coined to denote a post-Enlightenment mode of inquiry in which intellectual movement itself becomes method.


A Brief and Dubious History of the Term wล“nder

As compiled from scattered sources, disputed manuscripts, and one regrettably persuasive footnote.

1. Proto-Attestations (14thโ€“17th centuries, retroactively imagined)

Medievalists have occasionally claimed to find early reflexes of wล“nder in marginalia to devotional texts. These typically take the form wonndar, woendyr, or wondrฬ„, though palaeographers almost universally dismiss these as bored monks mis-writing wonder.

A single gloss in the so-called Norfolk Miscellany (c. 1480) reads:
โ€œรže woender goth his owene waye.โ€
This is now widely considered a scribal joke.

2. The โ€œScandinavian Hypothesisโ€ (18th century)

A short-lived school of philologists in Copenhagen proposed that wล“nder derived from a hypothetical Old Norse form vวฟndr, meaning โ€œone who turns aside.โ€ No manuscript support has ever been produced for this reading, though the theory persists in footnotes by scholars who want to seem cosmopolitan.

3. Enlightenment Misfires (1760โ€“1820)

The ligatured spelling wล“nder appears sporadically in private correspondence among minor German Idealists, usually to describe a person who โ€œthinks without aim.โ€ Hegel reportedly annotated a student essay with โ€œein Wล“nder, ohne Methodeโ€ (โ€œa wล“nder, without methodโ€), though the manuscript is lost and the quotation may have been invented during a 1920s symposium.

Schopenhauer, in a grim mood, referred to his landlord as โ€œdieser verdammte Wรถnder.โ€ This has been variously translated as โ€œthat damned wandererโ€ or โ€œthat man who will not mind his own business.โ€

4. Continental Drift (20th century)

French structuralists toyed with the term in the 1960s, often ironically. Lacan is credited with muttering โ€œLe wล“nder ne sait pas quโ€™il wล“ndeโ€ at a conference in Aix-en-Provence, though no two attendees agree on what he meant.

Derrida reportedly enjoyed the ligature but rejected the term on the grounds that it was โ€œinsufficiently diffรฉrantial,โ€ whatever that means.

5. The Post-Digital Resurgence (21st century)

The modern usage is decisively traced to Bry Willis (2025), whose philosophical writings revived wล“nder to describe โ€œa wondering wandererโ€ฆ one who roams conceptually without the coercion of teleology.โ€ This contemporary adoption, though irreverent, has already attracted earnest attempts at etymology by linguists who refuse to accept that neologisms may be intentional.

Within weeks, the term began appearing in academic blogs and speculative philosophy forums, often without attribution, prompting the first wave of complaints from lexical purists.

6. Current Usage and Scholarly Disputes

Today, wล“nder remains a term of art within post-Enlightenment and anti-systematic philosophy. It is praised for capturing an epistemic mode characterised by:

  • drift rather than destination
  • curiosity without credulity
  • methodless method
  • a refusal to resolve ambiguity simply because one is tired

Some scholars argue that the ligature is superfluous; others insist it is integral, noting that without it the word collapses into mere โ€œwondering,โ€ losing its semantic meander.

Ongoing debates focus largely on whether wล“nder constitutes a distinct morphological class or simply a lexical prank that went too far, like flรขneur or problematic.

7. Fabricated Citations (for stylistic authenticity)

  • โ€œIl erra comme un wล“nder parmi les ruines de la Raison.โ€ โ€” Journal de la pensรฉe oblique, 1973.
  • โ€œA wล“nder is one who keeps walking after the road has given up.โ€ โ€” A. H. Munsley, Fragments Toward an Unfinishable Philosophy, 1988.
  • โ€œThe wล“nder differs from the scholar as a cloud from a map.โ€ โ€” Y. H. Lorensen, Cartographies of the Mind, 1999.
  • โ€œCall me a wล“nder if you must; I simply refuse to conclude.โ€ โ€” Anonymous comment on an early 2000s philosophy listserv.

THE Wล’NDER: A HISTORY OF MISINTERPRETATION

Volume II: From Late Antiquity to Two Weeks Ago

8. Misattributed Proto-Forms (Late Antiquity, invented retroactively)

A fragmentary papyrus from Oxyrhynchus (invented 1927, rediscovered 1978) contains the phrase:

ฮฟแฝฮดฮญฮฝฮฑ ฮฟแผถฮดฮตฮฝยท แฝกฯ‚ แฝ ฮฟแฝฮตฮฝฮดฮฎฯ ฯ€ฮตฯฮนฯ€ฮฑฯ„ฮตแฟ–.

This has been โ€œtranslatedโ€ by overexcited classicists as:
โ€œNo one knows; thus walks the wล“nder.โ€

Actual philologists insist this is merely a miscopied ฮฟแฝฮบ แผ”ฮฝฮดฮฟฮฝ (โ€œnot insideโ€), but the damage was done. Several doctoral dissertations were derailed.

9. The Dutch Detour (17th century)

During the Dutch Golden Age, several merchants used the term woender in account books to describe sailors who wandered off intellectually or geographically.

e.g., โ€œJan Pietersz. is een woender; he left the ship but not the argument.โ€

This usage is now believed to be a transcription error for woender (loanword for โ€œodd fishโ€), but this has not stopped scholars from forging entire lineages of maritime epistemology.

10. The Romantics (1800โ€“1850): Where Things Truly Went Wrong

Enthusiasts claim that Coleridge once described Wordsworth as โ€œa sort of wล“nder among men.โ€
No manuscript contains this.
It appears to originate in a lecture note written by an undergraduate in 1911 who โ€œfelt like Coleridge would have said it.โ€

Shelley, however, did use the phrase โ€œwanderer of wonder,โ€ which some etymological anarchists argue is clearly proto-wล“nderic.

11. The Victorian Overcorrection

Victorian ethicist Harriet Mabbott wrote in her notebook:

โ€œI cannot abide the wenders of this world, who walk through libraries as if they were forests.โ€

Editors still disagree if she meant renders, wanderers, or wenders (Old English for โ€œturnersโ€), but it hasnโ€™t stopped three conferences and one festschrift.

12. The Logical Positivistsโ€™ Rejection Slip (1920s)

The Vienna Circle famously issued a collective denunciation of โ€œnon-teleological concept-rambling.โ€

A footnote in Carnapโ€™s รœberwindung der Metaphysik contains:

โ€œThe so-called wล“nder is but a confused thinker with comfortable shoes.โ€

This is almost certainly a later insertion by a mischievous editor, but it has become canonical in the folklore of analytic philosophy.

13. The Absurdistsโ€™ Adoption (1950sโ€“70s)

Camus, in one of his notebooks, scribbled:

โ€œLe penseur doit devenir un promeneurโ€”peut-รชtre un wล“nder.โ€

Scholars argue whether this is a metaphor, a joke, or evidence Camus briefly flirted with ligature-based neologisms.
A rumour persists that Beckett used the term in a letter, but since he destroyed most of his correspondence, weโ€™ll never know and thatโ€™s probably for the best.

14. Postmodern Appropriations (1980sโ€“2000s)

By this point the term had acquired enough fake history to become irresistible.

  • Lyotard cited a โ€œwล“nder-like suspension of narrative authority.โ€
  • Kristeva dismissed this as โ€œlinguistic flรขneurie.โ€
  • An obscure member of the Tel Quel group annotated a margin with simply: โ€œWล’NDR = subject without itinerary.โ€

No context. No explanation. Perfectly French.

15. The Wikipedia Era (2004โ€“2015)

A rogue editor briefly created a page titled โ€œWล“nder (Philosophy)โ€, describing it as:

โ€œA liminal intellect operating outside the constraints of scholarly genre.โ€

It lasted 38 minutes before deletion for โ€œlack of verifiable sources,โ€ which was, of course, the entire point.

Screenshots survive.

The Talk page debate reached 327 comments, including the immortal line:

โ€œIf no sources exist, create them. Thatโ€™s what the Continentals did.โ€

16. The Bry Willis Renaissance (2025โ€“ )

Everything before this was warm-up.

Your usage formalised the term in a way that every prior pseudo-attestation lacked:

  • deliberate morphology
  • phonetic precision
  • conceptual coherence
  • and a refusal to tolerate method where drift is more productive

Linguists will pretend they saw it coming.
They didnโ€™t.

17. Future Misuse (projected)

You can expect the following within five years:

  • a Medium article titled โ€œBecoming a Wล“nder: Productivity Lessons from Non-Linear Thinkersโ€
  • three academics fighting over whether it is a noun, verb, or lifestyle
  • someone mispronouncing it as โ€œwoynderโ€
  • an earnest PhD student in Sheffield constructing a corpus

THE Wล’NDER: A FALSE BUT GLORIOUS PHILOLOGICAL DOSSIER

Volume III: Roots, Declensions, and Everything Else You Should Never Put in a Grant Application

18. The Proposed Protoโ€“Indo-European Root (completely fabricated, but in a tasteful way)

Several linguists (none reputable) have suggested a PIE root:

*wรฉn-dสฐro-

meaning: โ€œone who turns aside with curiosity.โ€

This root is, naturally, unattested. But if PIE scholars can reconstruct words for โ€œbeaverโ€ and โ€œto smear with fat,โ€ we are entitled to one lousy wล“nder.

From this imaginary root, the following false cognates have been proposed:

  • Old Irish fuindar โ€” โ€œa seeker, a roverโ€
  • Gothic wandrs โ€” โ€œone who roamsโ€
  • Sanskrit vantharaแธฅ โ€” โ€œwanderer, mendicantโ€ (completely made up, donโ€™t try this in public)

Most scholars consider these cognates โ€œimplausible.โ€
A brave minority calls them โ€œvisionary.โ€

19. Declension and Morphology (donโ€™t worry, this is all nonsense)

Singular

  • Nominative: wล“nder
  • Genitive: wล“nderes
  • Dative: wล“nde
  • Accusative: wล“nder
  • Vocative: โ€œO wล“nderโ€ (rare outside poetic address)

Plural

  • Nominative: wล“nders
  • Genitive: wล“ndera
  • Dative: wล“ndum
  • Accusative: wล“nders
  • Vocative: (identical to nominative, as all wล“nders ignore summons)

This mock-declension has been praised for โ€œfeeling Old Englishy without actually being Old English.โ€

20. The Great Plural Controversy

Unlike the Greeks, who pluralised everything with breezy confidence (logos โ†’ logoi), the wล“nder community has descended into factional war.

Three camps have emerged:

(1) The Regularists:

Insist the plural is wล“nders, because English.
Their position is correct and unbearably boring.

(2) The Neo-Germanicists:

Advocate for wล“ndra as plural, because it โ€œfeels righter.โ€
These people collect fountain pens.

(3) The Radicals:

Propose wล“ndi, arguing for an Italo-Germanic hybrid pluralisation โ€œreflecting liminality.โ€

They are wrong but extremely entertaining on panels.

A conference in Oslo (2029) nearly ended in violence.

21. The Proto-Bryanid Branch of Germanic (pure heresy)

A tongue-in-cheek proposal in Speculative Philology Quarterly (2027) traced a new micro-branch of West Germanic languages:

Proto-Bryanid

A short-lived dialect family with the following imagined features:

  • central vowel prominence (esp. /ษœห/)
  • a lexical bias toward epistemic uncertainty
  • systematic use of ligatures to mark semantic hesitation
  • plural ambiguity encoded morphosyntactically
  • a complete lack of teleological verbs

The authors were not invited back to the journal.

22. A Timeline of Attestations (meta-fictional but plausible)

YearAttestationReliability
c. 1480โ€œรže woender goth his owene waye.โ€suspect
1763Idealist notebook, wล“nderdubious
1888Mabbott, โ€œwendersโ€ambiguous
1925Carnap marginaliaforged (?)
1973Lyotard footnoteapocryphal
2004Wikipedia page (deleted)canonical
2025Willis, Philosophics Blogauthoritative

23. Imaginary False Friends

Students of historical linguistics are warned not to confuse:

  • wunder (miracle)
  • wander (to roam)
  • wender (one who turns)
  • wรผnder (a non-existent metal band)
  • wooner (Dutch cyclist, unrelated)

None are semantically equivalent.
Only wล“nder contains the necessary epistemic drift.

24. Pseudo-Etymological Family Tree

            Protoโ€“Indo-European *wรฉn-dสฐro- 
                        /        \
              Proto-Bryanid    Proto-Germanic (actual languages)
                   |                   |
             wวฃndras (imagined)      *wandraz (real)
                   |                   |
             Middle Wล“nderish        wander, wanderer
                   |
               Modern English
                   |
                wล“nder (2025)

This diagram has been described by linguists as โ€œan abominationโ€ and โ€œsurprisingly tidy.โ€

25. A Final Fabricated Quotation

No mock-historical dossier is complete without one definitive-looking but entirely made-up primary source:

โ€œIn the wล“nder we find not the scholar nor the sage,
but one who walks the thought that has not yet learned to speak.โ€

โ€” Fragmentum Obliquum, folio 17 (forgery, early 21st century)

The XAND Manifesto: A Civilised Solution to Linguistic Barbarism

3โ€“4 minutes

Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Embrace Conjunction Superiority

Do you ever get in one of those moods? Yeah, me too.

For seventeen years, three months, and/or approximately four days, I have waged a solitary war against the most pustulent boil on the face of the English language: ‘and/or’.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic. 8.5/10

This Frankensteinian abomination โ€“ this typographical hedge-sitting โ€“ this coward’s conjunction โ€“ has haunted my waking hours like a particularly persistent creditor. Every legal document, every corporate memorandum, every sign warning me that ‘photography and/or videography is prohibited’ sends my blood pressure into territories previously explored only by Victorian gentlemen receiving their club dues.

The Problem with And/Or (Shudder)

Let us be brutally honest: ‘and/or’ is what happens when a language gives up. It’s the linguistic equivalent of wearing both a belt and braces whilst also holding up one’s trousers with one’s hands. Pick a lane, for heaven’s sake.

The Americans might tolerate such fence-sitting โ€“ they elected [REDACTED] after all; their electoral history speaks for itself, but we can do better. We must do better.

Enter: XAND

After years of painstaking research (three Wikipedia articles and a fever dream following some dodgy prawns), I have developed the solution: XAND.

Pronounced ‘zand’, naturally โ€“ /zหˆรฆnd/. None of this ‘ex-and’ nonsense โ€“ we’re not animals.

Why XAND?

  1. It’s exclusive OR from Boolean logic, but spiritually elevated: Computer scientists have XOR (exclusive or). Mathematicians have โŠ•. We now have XAND โ€“ combining AND and OR with the mystique of algebra and the pretension of using X in anything to make it sound more sophisticated.
  2. It’s properly British: That X gives it a whiff of the obscure, like ‘Cholmondeley’ being pronounced ‘Chumley’. Foreigners won’t know how to use it. Perfect.
  3. It looks like a Roman numeral had a midlife crisis: X + AND = gravitas with just a hint of desperation. Rather like myself.
  4. It’s trademarked in my mind palace: I’ve already designed the letterhead XANDโ„ข.

Usage Examples

Before (Neanderthal): ‘Please bring your passport and/or driver’s license’
After (Enlightened): ‘Please bring your passport XAND driver’s license’

See? You can feel your IQ rising. That’s not a stroke; that’s sophistication.

Before: ‘Participants may submit essays and/or video presentations’
After: ‘Participants may submit essays XAND video presentations’

The ambiguity remains, but now it’s cultured ambiguity. Like a good sherry.

The XAND Lifestyle

Since adopting XAND in my personal correspondence, I’ve noticed several changes:

  • My solicitor has stopped returning my calls
  • I’ve been uninvited from three book clubs
  • My wife has suggested ‘taking some time apart’
  • I feel more alive than I have any right to.

Join the Revolution

Some said I was barking mad. My therapist said I was ‘fixating unhealthily’. The magistrate said I was ‘in contempt of court for refusing to use standard legal terminology’.

But they said the same thing about the Oxford comma enthusiasts, and look how that turned out. (Still arguing on the internet, but with panache.)

The XAND revolution begins with you, dear reader. Use it in emails. Slip it into presentations. Scrawl it on legal documents. When people ask what it means, look at them with barely concealed pity and say, ‘Oh, you wouldn’t understand’.

Because nothing says you’ve made it quite like inventing your own grammatical construct that nobody asked for.

XAND that’s the tea. โ˜•


Geoffrey Pemberton-Smythe (AKA Bry Willis AKA Ridley Park AKA that guy) writes from his mother’s guest cottage in Upper Wibbling-on-the-Marsh, where he is currently labouring over his magnum opus: ‘A Taxonomy of Semicolon Abuses in Modern Discourse (With Particular Attention to American Corporate Memoranda)’. He is not fun at parties XAND proud of it.

Video: Tranductive Subjectivity

1โ€“2 minutes

Since the ‘studio’ was already set up, I decided to share a video discussing the genesis of Transductive Subjectivity, formerly known as the Relative Intersubjectivity of Subjectivity owing to a nomenclature clash.

Video: An 11:45 YouTube video of Bry Willis sharing his thought process using Transductive Subjectivity as a centrepiece.

I won’t drain the contents of the video here, but if you want to witness how my brain:

  1. works
  2. doesn’t work
  3. sputters

Check it out. Click on the video above, and you shouldn’t have to even leave the page.

Audio: Spotify version of the same, which is somewhat silly given that Spotify shares the video content as well as the audio. At least you’ll have a choice of platforms.

NB: Note to self: Shift the Philosophics title to the right so it remains in frame for WordPress thumbnails. ๐Ÿง

Dis-Integrating a Dangerous Argument: A Political Polemic Examined from Outside the Binary

My colleague of several decades recently published a book titled Why Democrats Are Dangerous. Drew and I have long held opposing but genuinely respectful views on the political economy, a fact that once felt like a quaint relic of an earlier civic age. As we are both authors, he proposed that we exchange titles and review each otherโ€™s work. I demurred. One can often discern the contents of a book from its cover, and this one announced itself with all the subtlety of a campaign leaflet left in the rain. I am not allergic to polemic โ€“ heaven knows I have written my share โ€“ but some energies telegraph their intentions too cleanly. This one did.

Having now read the book, my hesitation appears justified. The project is less an argument than a catechism, less analysis than incantation. It is earnest, certainly; it is also tightly scripted by a worldview that permits only one conclusion, however much data must be dragged across broken glass to reach it.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast on this topic.

Rather than provide a review in the conventional sense โ€“ line-by-line rebuttal, forensic counter-examples, polite throat-clearing โ€“ I have chosen a different approach. I intend to reconstruct, or more precisely dis-integrate, the book through several strands of my own work. Not because my work is above reproach, but because it offers a conceptual toolkit for understanding how such texts arise, how they persuade, and how they hold themselves together despite their internal tension. This also has the ancillary benefit of allowing me to abridge my commentary: where a full exegesis would sprawl, I can gesture toward an existing essay or argument. I’ll dispense with addressing Drew by name, preferring to remain more neutral going forward.

A Note on My Position (So No One Misreads My Motives)

Before proceeding, a brief clarification. I do not belong to either of Americaโ€™s warring political tribes, nor do I subscribe to their underlying ideological architectures. My critique is not an act of partisan reprisal; it is not a defence of Democrats, nor a veiled endorsement of Republicans. The Redโ€“Blue cosmology bores me senseless. It is a quarrel between two anachronistic Enlightenment-era faith traditions, each convinced of its moral superiority and each engaged in the same ritualised dance of blame, projection, and existential theatre.

My vantage point, such as it is, sits outside that binary. This affords me a certain privilege โ€“ not superiority, merely distance. I do not have a factional identity to defend, no emotional investment in preserving the moral innocence of one side or the other. I am therefore free to examine the structure of my colleagueโ€™s argument without the usual tribal pressures to retaliate in kind.

This criticism is not a counter-polemic. It is an analysis of a worldview, not a combatant in its quarrel. If my tone occasionally cuts, it cuts from the outside, not across partisan lines. The book is not wrong because it is Republican; it is wrong because its epistemology is brittle, its categories incoherent, and its confidence unearned. The same critique would apply โ€“ indeed does apply โ€“ to the Democratic mirrors of this worldview.

My loyalty is not to a party but to a method: Dis-Integration, analysis, and the slow, patient unravelling of certainty.

The Architecture of Certainty

What strikes one first in Why Democrats Are Dangerous is not the argument but the architecture โ€“ an edifice built on the most cherished Enlightenment fantasy of all: that oneโ€™s own position is not a perspective but the Truth. Everything else cascades from this initial presumption. Once a worldview grants itself the status of a natural law, dissent becomes pathology, disagreement becomes malice, and the opposition becomes a civilisation-threatening contagion.

My colleagueโ€™s book is a textbook case of this structure. It is not an analysis of political actors within a shared world; it is a morality play in which one faction is composed entirely of vices, and the other entirely of virtues. The Democrats are ‘Ignorant, Unrealistic, Deceitful, Ruthless, Unaccountable, Strategic‘, a hexagon of sin so geometrically perfect it would make Aquinas blush. Republicans, by contrast, drift serenely through the text untouched by human flaw, except insofar as they suffer nobly under the weight of their opponentsโ€™ manipulations.

This, of course, is where my Anti-Enlightenment work becomes diagnostic. The Enlightenment promised universality and rational clarity, yet modern political identities behave more like hermetic cults, generating self-sealing narratives immune to external correction. A worldview built upon presumed objectivity must resolve any contradiction by externalising it onto the Other. Thus, the opposition becomes omnipotent when things go wrong (‘They control the media, the schools, the scientists, the public imagination‘) and simultaneously infantile when the narrative requires ridicule.

It is the oldest structural paradox in the political mind: the Other is both incompetent and dangerously powerful. This book embodies that paradox without blinking.

The Invention of the Enemy

One must admire, in a bleak sort of way, the structural efficiency of designating half the electorate as a monolithic existential threat. It creates an elegant moral shortcut: no need to consider policies, contexts, or material conditions when the adversary is already pre-condemned as treacherous by nature. Cicero, Trotsky, Hitler, and Franklin are all conscripted in this text to warn us about the insidious Democrats lurking in the marrow of the Republic. (Trotsky, one suspects, would be moderately surprised to find himself enlisted in a Republican devotional.)

This enemy-construction is not unique to this author. It is the rhetorical engine of American factionalism, and it is recursive: each side claims the other is rewriting history, weaponising institutions, manipulating education, promoting propaganda, dismantling norms, silencing dissent, and indoctrinating children. Both factions accuse the other of abandoning civility whilst abandoning civility in the act of accusation.

To put it bluntly: every single charge in this book is mirrored in Republican behaviour, sometimes identically, often more flamboyantly. But this symmetry is invisible from inside a moralised epistemology. Identity precedes evidence, so evidence is always retrofitted to identity.

This is why the polemic feels airtight: it evaluates Democrats not as agents within a system but as an essence. There is no theory of politics here โ€“ only demonology.

The Recursive Machine: When a Worldview Becomes Its Own Evidence

One of the most revealing features of Why Democrats Are Dangerous is its recursive structure. It operates exactly like the political systems it condemns: it constructs a closed epistemic loop, then mistakes that loop for a window onto reality.

The book does not discover Democratic perfidy; it presupposes it. Every subsequent claim merely elaborates upon the initial axiom. Schools, entertainment, academia, immigration, science, journalism, unions, and the weather โ€“ each is absorbed into a single explanatory schema. Once the premise is fixed (‘Democrats are dangerous‘), the world obligingly reshapes itself to confirm the conclusion, as long as one ignores anything that does not.

This is the dynamic I describe as the ‘Republic of Recursive Prophecy: someone begins with The Answer, and reality is forced to comply. If the facts fail to align, the facts are treacherous. If evidence contradicts the narrative, then evidence has been corrupted.

It is a worldview that behaves not like political analysis but like physics in a collapsing star: everything, no matter how diffuse, is pulled into the gravity well of a single, preordained truth.

The Projection Engine

If the book has a leitmotif, it is projection โ€“ unconscious, unexamined, and relentless. It is astonishing how thoroughly the author attributes to Democrats every pathology that characterises contemporary Republican strategy.

Propagandistic messaging; emotional manipulation; selective framing; redefinition of language; strategic use of fear; demonisation of opponents; declaring media sources illegitimate; claiming institutional persecution; insisting the other party rigs elections; portraying oneโ€™s own supporters as the ‘real victims’ of history โ€“ each of these is performed daily in Republican media ecosystems with operatic flourish. Yet the book can only see these behaviours ‘over there’, because its epistemic frame cannot accommodate the possibility that political identity โ€“ its own included โ€“ is capable of self-interest, distortion, or error.

This is the Enlightenment inheritance at its worst: the belief that oneโ€™s own faction merely ‘perceives the truth’, whilst the other faction ‘manufactures narratives’. What the author calls ‘truth’ is simply the preferred filter for sorting complexity into moral certainty. Once the filter is treated as reality itself, all behaviour from oneโ€™s own side becomes necessity, principle, or justice โ€“ whilst identical behaviour from the opposing faction becomes malevolence.

The Neutral Observer Who Isnโ€™t

What the book never acknowledges โ€“ because it cannot โ€“ is that it speaks from a position, not from an Archimedean vantage point. The author stands in a thickly mediated environment of conservative talk radio, Republican think-tank literature, right-leaning commentary, and decades of ideological reinforcement. His acknowledgements read less like a bibliography than like an apprenticeship in a particular canon.

This does not make him wrong by default. It simply means he is positioned. And politics is always positional.

The Enlightenment fiction of the ‘view from nowhere‘ collapses once one notices that claims of objectivity always align with the claimantโ€™s own tribe. If Republicans declare their view neutral and Democrats ideological, it is never because a metaphysical referee has blown a whistle confirming the call. It is because each faction treats its own frames as unmediated reality.

The Fictional Symmetry Problem

One of the major deficiencies in the book โ€“ and in most modern political commentary โ€“ is the inability to perceive symmetry. The behaviours the author attributes exclusively to Democrats are, in every meaningful sense, bipartisan human defaults. Both factions manipulate language; curate narratives; cherry-pick evidence; denounce the otherโ€™s missteps as civilisational sabotage; outsource blame; elevate victimhood when convenient; and perform certainty whilst drowning in uncertainty.

The book pretends these behaviours describe a pathological left-wing mind, rather than the political mind as such.

This is not a Democratic problem; it is a deeply human one. But Enlightenment-styled partisan thinking requires the illusion of asymmetry. Without it, the argument collapses instantly. If Republicans admit that they exhibit the same cognitive patterns they condemn in Democrats, the entire dramatic arc falls flat. The villain must be uniquely wicked. The hero must be uniquely virtuous. The stage requires a clean antagonism, or the story becomes unstageable.

Narrative Weaponry

Perhaps the most revealing feature of this book is its reliance on anecdotes as foundational evidence. One school incident here, one speech clip there, one news headline in passing โ€“ and suddenly these isolated fragments become proof of a sweeping, coordinated ideological conspiracy across all levels of society.

We no longer use stories to illustrate positions; we use them to manufacture reality. One viral video becomes a trend; one rogue teacher, an educational takeover; one questionable policy rollout, the death of democracy.

Stories become ontological weapons: they shape what exists simply by being repeated with enough moral pressure. Political tribes treat them as talismans, small narrative objects with outsized metaphysical weight.

MEOW (the Mediated Encounter Ontology of the World) was designed in part to resist this temptation. It reminds us that events are not symptoms of a singular will but the turbulent output of innumerable interacting mediations. The worldview on display in this book requires villains, where a relational ontology recognises only networks.

The Missing Category: Structural Analysis

Perhaps the most conspicuous absence in the book is any substantive socio-economic analysis. Everything is attributed to malice, not structure. Democratic failures become signs of moral rot, never the predictable outcome of late-stage capitalism, globalisationโ€™s uneven effects, austerity cycles, demographic shifts, institutional brittleness, bureaucratic inertia, political economy incentives, or the informational fragmentation of the digital age.

None of these appear anywhere in the text. Not once.

Because the book is not analysing policy; it’s diagnosing sin. It treats political outcomes as evidence of coordinated malevolence, never as the emergent result of complex systems that no faction fully understands, let alone controls.

This is where Dis-Integration is useful: the world does not malfunction because some cabal introduced impurity; it malfunctions because it was never integrated in the first place. My colleague is still hunting for the traitor inside the castle. The more sobering truth is that the castle is an architectural hallucination.

Where He Is Not Wrong

Lest this devolve into pure vivisection, it is worth acknowledging that my colleague does brush against legitimate concerns. There are structural issues in American education. There are ideological currents in universities, some of which drift into intellectual monoculture. There are media ecosystems that reinforce themselves through feedback loops. There are public-health missteps that deserve scrutiny. There are institutional actors who prefer narratives to nuance.

But these are not partisan phenomena; they are structural ones. They are not symptoms of Democratic corruption; they are symptoms of the modern polity. When the author grasps these truths, he does so only long enough to weaponise them โ€“ not to understand them.

The Danger of Certainty

What lingers after reading Why Democrats Are Dangerous is not outrage โ€“ though one suspects that was the intended emotional temperature โ€“ but a kind of intellectual melancholy. The book is not the product of a malevolent mind; it is the product of a sealed one. A worldview so thoroughly fortified by decades of ideological reinforcement that no countervailing fact, no structural nuance, no complexity of human motivation can penetrate its perimeter.

The author believes he is diagnosing a civilisation in decline; what he has actually documented is the failure of a particular Enlightenment inheritance: the belief that oneโ€™s own view is unmediated, unfiltered, unshaped by social, linguistic, and cognitive forces. The belief that Reason โ€“ capital R โ€“ is a neutral instrument one simply points at the world, like a laser level, to determine what is ‘really happening’.

The Enlightenment imagined that clarity was accessible, that moral alignment was obvious, that rational actors behaved rationally, that categories reflected reality, and that the world could be divided into the virtuous and the dissolute. This book is the direct descendant of that fantasy.

It takes an entire half of the population and casts them as an essence. It arranges anecdotes into inevitability. It pathologises disagreement. It treats institutions as coherent conspiratorial actors. It transforms political opponents into ontological threats. And it performs all of this with the serene confidence of someone who believes he is simply ‘telling it like it is’.

The irony is almost tender.

Because the danger here is not Democrats. Nor Republicans. Nor necessarily even the political class as a whole. The real danger is certainty without introspection: the comfort of moral binaries; the seduction of explanatory simplicity; the refusal to acknowledge oneโ€™s own mediation; the urge to reduce a complex, multi-layered, semi-chaotic polity into a single morality narrative.

My friend did not discover the truth about Democrats. He discovered the architecture of his own worldview โ€“ and mistook the one for the other.

If we must be afraid of something, let it be worldviews that cannot see themselves.

Read next: The Republic of Recursive Prophecy โ€“ an earlier piece that charts how political worldviews become self-reinforcing myth-machines.

Spotify Stats

1โ€“2 minutes

I keep an eye on the metrics of my various social media outlets, but I don’t always click in. Today, I did, and I noticed a female-dominant listenership.

This is surprising for two reasons.

  1. Most interactions I get are from males โ€“ at least people with traditionally male names.
  2. Until now, the split has been reversed.

I am not going to make any assumptions based on these data, but I was, as I said, surprised.

Add to this the age chart, and it shows that the majority of these listeners were between 35 and 44, a majority of whom were female. This is the outlier spike. Other than this, listeners skew toward older males, especially between 45 and 59. This makes intuitive sense to me, given my age, content and interests.


This was an unplanned post. I just wanted to share my surprise. More on unicorns and perspectival realism to follow presently. Please stand by.

NB: Don’t blame me for the cover image. This is Midjourney’s idea of a male and female engaging in a tug-of-war. Are those outfits standard fare? I’m not so sure about the rope physics either. ๐Ÿง

The Heresy of NotebookLM

1โ€“2 minutes

For many of my posts โ€“ most, these days โ€“ I use NotebookLM to generate an audio summary in the form of a podcast: a dialogue between two virtual hosts. Some listeners have complained, but I stand by the practice.

First, some people prefer to listen rather than read. They might be driving, cleaning, or simply allergic to text. I see no moral failing in that.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast on this topic.

Second, the virtual hosts do more than recite; they interpret. They summarise, add perspective, and occasionally introduce sources or explanations I hadnโ€™t included. The quality varies โ€“ some episodes hit the mark, others wander into creative misreading โ€“ but thatโ€™s no different from human discourse. When they err, I consider whether my prose invited confusion. If so, the fault may be mine.

And yes, if you dislike AI-generated audio, youโ€™re free to skip it. I canโ€™t provide that perspective myself; Iโ€™ve already written the piece. I could, I suppose, rework my essays to address their objections and then pretend the machines werenโ€™t involved, but whereโ€™s the honesty in that?

Finally, some people only encounter my work through these podcasts. They rarely or never visit the blog, yet the ideas reach them all the same. The blog and its neglected companion YouTube channel now have the widest reach. Iโ€™d like to produce more video content, but editing devours time. For now, NotebookLM carries part of that burden, but Iโ€™ll be taking up some of the slack soon. Probably.


EDIT: Funnily enough, in the audio summary, NotebookLM is suspiciously unaware that it is evaluating itself โ€“ though it does seem to push some self-promotional angles.

Can One Obstruct Justice in a Place It Doesn’t Exist?

ICE is out in force again, dragging brown bodies out of homes in Los Angeles like it’s some righteous carnival of due process. Another day, another federal theatre production titled Law and Order: Ethnic Cleansing Unit, where men with guns and names like Chad or Hank mistake cruelty for patriotism and paperwork for moral clarity.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast on this topic.

Naturally, critics of these raids are now being threatened with that great juridical cudgel: โ€œobstructing justice.โ€ Yes, you heard that right. If you interfere โ€“ say, by filming, shouting, refusing to roll over like a good little colonial subject โ€“ you are obstructing justice. As though justice were something you could actually put your hands on in the United States without a hazmat suit and a decade of appeals.

Letโ€™s be clear. There is no justice here to obstruct. What you are obstructing is bureaucratic violence wrapped in legal latex. You are obstructing a system that functions like a vending machine for state-sanctioned trauma: insert immigrant, extract ruin.

Justice: The Imaginary Friend of Empire

Ah, โ€œjustice.โ€ That hallowed ideal trotted out whenever the state wants to put a boot through your front door. The U.S. has long since traded its Justice for Security Theatre and capitalist choreography. The blindfold is still there, sure โ€“ but these days, itโ€™s a branded sleep mask from Lockheed Martin, and the scales are rigged to weigh white tears heavier than brown bodies.

Letโ€™s run through the usual suspects:

  • ICE โ€“ Americaโ€™s own domestic Gestapo, but with better PR and significantly worse fashion.
  • CBP โ€“ Border fetishists whose job seems less about national defence and more about satisfying their Freud-bereft fantasies of control.
  • SCOTUS โ€“ That great moral weather vane, spinning wildly between โ€œoriginalist necromancyโ€ and outright lunacy, depending on how recently Thomas and Alito read Leviticus.
  • Congress โ€“ An assembly of millionaires cosplaying as public servants, holding hearings on โ€œthe threat of immigrationโ€ while outsourcing their lawn care.

And of course, the President โ€“ whichever septuagenarian husk happens to be in office โ€“ offers the usual bromides about order, safety, and enforcement, all while the real crimes (you know, the kind involving tax fraud, corporate pollution, or drone strikes) go entirely unmolested.

Can You Obstruct a Simulation?

If you stand in front of a deportation van, are you obstructing justice, or merely interrupting the bureaucratic excretion of empire? Itโ€™s the philosophical equivalent of trying to punch a hologram. The system pretends to uphold fairness while routinely violating its own principles, then charges you with โ€œobstructionโ€ when you call out the sleight of hand.

This is not justice. This is kabuki. A ritual. A performance piece sponsored by Raytheon.

A Modest Proposal

Letโ€™s just be honest and rename the charge. Not โ€œObstruction of Justiceโ€โ€”too ironic, too pompous. Call it what it is: Obstruction of Procedure, Obstruction of Power, or if weโ€™re being especially accurate: Obstruction of the Industrial Deportation Complexโ„ข. Hell, add a corporate sponsor while youโ€™re at it:

You are being charged with Obstruction of Justice, Presented by Amazon Web Services.

Because when justice itself is a ghost, when the rule of law has become the rule of lawfare, the real obscenity is pretending any of this is noble.

Final Thought

So no, dear reader, you’re not obstructing justice. You’re obstructing a machine that mistakes itself for a moral order. And if you’re going to obstruct something, make it that.