There’s a certain kind of cultural panic that tells you more about the panickers than about the thing they are panicking about. The current hysteria over AI-inflected prose is a good example.
The argument, insofar as it deserves the name, goes roughly like this: LLMs produce prose with identifiable features – a certain blandness, a fondness for the em dash, a tendency toward tidy three-part structure. Writers who use these tools risk absorbing those features. The authentic human voice is therefore under threat. Something precious is being diluted by contact with the machine.
This is sentimental rubbish, and it is worth saying so clearly before doing anything else – and a sort of virtue signalling.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.
I use LLMs daily. For research, for editorial pushback, for smoothing passages that have gone awry. This means I spend hours a day reading a particular kind of output. You’d have to be delusional not to admit it has effects. Certain phrasings start feeling natural that didn’t before. Certain rhythms begin to recur. Certain words might not have otherwise come into use. I notice this and note it without particular alarm, because I’ve read enough to know that this is just what environments do.
Read nothing but McCarthy for a month, and your sentences will start hunting for the spare declarative. Spend a year editing academic philosophy, and you will catch yourself reaching for ‘insofar as’ and ‘it’s worth noting’ in casual conversation. Live in a city long enough, and its cadences work their way into your syntax. This isn’t contamination, the negative moralist dispersion. It’s how language acquisition works for as long as one is alive and reading. Voice isn’t a spring. It’s a river, a moving accumulation of every tributary it has passed through.
The prestige game being played by the anti-LLM faction isn’t difficult to spot. When Dostoyevsky shapes a young writer’s cadence, we call it influence and treat it as evidence of a serious literary education. When a game world shapes a child’s imagination – I homeschooled my son in the manner of unschooling, and his primary corpus for years was World of Warcraft and its attendant lore before shifting to Dark Souls – and that child ends up reading Dante and Milton unprompted in year seven, the same mechanism has clearly operated. The source was not canonical, the outcome was. But the respectable hierarchy of influences cannot easily accommodate this, because the hierarchy was never really about the mechanism. It was about the cultural status of the inputs.
The more interesting observation isn’t about those of us who use these tools. It’s about those who conspicuously do not.
A minor genre has emerged – charitably, I’ll call it a genre because cult feels morally loaded – consisting of writers anxiously purging their prose of anything that might read as AI-generated. It’s worth noting that they have read the lists. Telltale signs of LLM authorship: excessive hedging, em dashes, transitional summaries, the phrase ‘it is worth noting’. And so they scrub, redact, replace, and perform a kind of stylistic hygiene that’s a creative decision made in direct response to LLM discourse.
These writers aren’t free of the machine’s influence. They’re among the most thoroughly shaped by it. They simply have the more theatrical relationship – the counter-imitator, the purity-performer, the one who reorganises their entire aesthetic in orbit around the thing they claim to reject.
Thomas Moore, in Care of the Soul, observes that a child raised by an alcoholic parent tends to become either an alcoholic or a committed teetotaller. He presents this as a dichotomy, which is too neat, but the underlying point holds. Reactions are still relata – see what happens when you read too much philosophy and logic? The teetotaller has organised their life around the bottle as surely as the alcoholic has. Both are defined by it.
Opposition is one of influence’s favourite disguises.
The fair objection is that LLM influence may differ from other influences in kind rather than just in kind. Dostoyevsky is strange. Bernhard is strange to the point of pathology. A canonical prose style is idiosyncratic by definition, which is why it’s worth absorbing. In contrast, LLM output aims for plausible fluency and statistical centrality. Its pull may be more homogenising than the pull of a singular authorial sensibility.
That’s a real point. The environment in question has a centripetal force toward the mean that most literary influences lack.
But conceding the point doesn’t really rescue the panic. It just specifies the kind of influence involved. The mechanism remains identical to every other case of environmental absorption. And ‘this influence tends toward the generic’ is an ironically generic critique of a particular environment’s character rather than a claim that the environment is doing something ontologically unprecedented to the notion of authorship.
The question that actually matters aesthetically is not was this touched by AI? It is what did the writer do with the environment they inhabited? That’s always been the question. It remains the question. The machinery has changed; the problem of influence has not.
What the current schism actually reveals is not that AI is doing something new to writing. It’s that we’ve been operating with a fairy tale about what writing is. The fairy tale holds that voice is self-originating, that somewhere beneath the reading AND the editing AND the genre conventions AND the institutional pressures AND the decade of a particular editor’s feedback, there is a pristine you, unconditioned and pure, expressing itself directly onto the page.
This was always false. Writers have always been patchworks of absorbed environments. The only difference now is that one of the environments is a machine, and the machine is new enough that people haven’t yet learned to be comfortable with what it reveals about the rest.
The environment always wins. The only interesting question is which environments you choose, and what you make of them.
So glad I took time out to watch a short exchange between Rick Beato and Justin Hawkins on whether music is becoming content rather than art. The question is framed in musical terms, but it hardly stops there. The same corrosion is visible in writing, visual art, criticism, and now, with grim inevitability, in AI-mediated production more broadly. The disease is not confined to music. Music merely makes the symptoms easier to hear.
For music, my aversion to pop music goes back to my youth. I was a kid when the Beatles practically invented pop music, but they left it to grow and continued exploring. Sadly, as solo artists, they mainly – not always – failed and rested on their laurels in pop. It’s not that their version or any pop music is inherently unlistenable. Surely, it’s not, if only by the aspiration of the pop moniker, but it has no depth, no soul, as it were. Some make this argument for Organic food. In essence, it involves an appeal to nature fallacy.
Audio: Slightly off, but not bad, NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.
My own aversion to much pop music begins there. It is not that pop is necessarily bad, nor even that it is always shallow. That would be too crude and too easy. The problem is that pop often presents itself less as an artistic act than as a consumption object engineered for immediate uptake: catchy, frictionless, emotionally legible, and just disposable enough to make room for the next one. It is built to circulate.
That, for me, is the difference between content and art. Art may be accessible, even popular, but it retains some residue that exceeds its delivery mechanism. It resists total reduction to utility. Content, by contrast, is made to be processed. It is optimised not for depth but for throughput. Its highest ambition is not transformation, but engagement.
This is why the question matters beyond music. Writing, too, now lives under the same pressure. One is increasingly expected to produce not essays, arguments, or works, but units of output: posts, threads, reactions, takes, summaries, explainers, and other forms of polished verbal debris. The point is no longer to say something worth dwelling on, but to remain visible within the churn.
The issue, then, is not simply whether one should consume AI-generated material. That framing is too pious and too easy. The more interesting question is what the consumer thinks they are consuming. If a reader, listener, or viewer wants only speed, familiarity, and surface competence, then AI content is not a scandal at all. It is the logical endpoint of a culture that has already demoted art into a deliverable.
This is where the fuss over labelling enters. Is it a principled demand for honesty, or merely a theatrical gesture by people who still want the aura of art whilst consuming content on industrial terms? Some of it is clearly protectionism. Some of it is virtue signalling. But not all of it is empty. The insistence on labelling betrays an intuition, however muddled, that authorship still matters, and that not all artefacts are equivalent merely because they occupy the same screen-space.
The deeper question is whether we still want art at all, or whether we merely want the aesthetic styling of art attached to things optimised for convenience. Once a culture learns to prefer seamless output over resistance, recognisability over risk, and quantity over form, it should not act surprised when machines begin to serve it perfectly. They are only completing a trajectory already chosen.
So no, the issue is not AI alone. AI is only the latest mirror held up to a public that has spent years confusing availability with value and polish with depth. The real question is not whether machines can make content. Plainly, they can. The question is whether we still possess the appetite, patience, and seriousness required for art.
Image: Full image because the cover version is truncated. Generated by Gemini Nano Banana.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of the Substack topic.
It starts like this:
You’ve had the argument. Everyone has. You present evidence. Your interlocutor presents counter-evidence. You cite data. They cite different data – or the same data, read differently. Eventually, someone says something like how can you possibly believe that, and the conversation is effectively over, though the words might continue for another hour.
What’s left is the quiet conviction that the other person is either ignorant, stupid, or arguing in bad faith. Perhaps all three. And you can be certain they’re extending you precisely the same courtesy.
I want to suggest that something structurally different is going on – something that none of the usual explanations (media bubbles, declining education, algorithmic polarisation) quite reach. These explanations aren’t wrong, but they’re shallow. They describe accelerants. The thing they’re accelerating is more foundational.
The trolley problem’s borrowed ontology was already philosophically dubious in the seminar room. It becomes materially dangerous when compiled into autonomous systems, because assumptions that once guided thought experiments now govern conduct without appeal.
The first essay argued that the trolley problem is not a neutral moral test but a borrowed ontological grammar. It preformats the scene before reasoning begins, then invites us to mistake compliance with its terms for moral insight. All of that was bad enough when confined to philosophy seminars and undergraduate anguish.
It’s even worse now. Grammar has escaped the classroom. It’s been formalised, compiled, and deployed in systems that make decisions about who lives and who dies. And it wasn’t adopted because it is morally sound. It was adopted because it’s formally legible. Legibility rears its ugly head.
Autonomous systems don’t inherit trolley logic because no one’s examined it and found it adequate to the moral world. They inherit it because it’s the sort of ontology a machine can process: discretised, scalar, optimisable. Computational tractability is not a neutral filter. It selects for ontologies that can be ranked and calculated, and discards what can’t. Trolley grammar survives not on but on formatability. The philosophical problems didn’t get solved. They got encoded.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.
The Grammar Gets Compiled
The autonomous vehicle ethics literature is, for the most part, the trolley problem with a chassis bolted on.
Public debate still poses the same stale questions in a shinier casing: one pedestrian or five, passenger or crowd, young or old, many or few. These dominate media headlines and a remarkable number of engineering white papers. They are also, without exception, trolley questions – which means they carry every presupposition the first essay indicted.
They assume:
persons are countable units
deaths are commensurable
the relevant moral act is optimisation over comparable outcomes
And they assume all of this so completely that the engineering literature rarely pauses to ask whether any of it’s true. It simply proceeds as though the ontology were settled, because – and let’s be honest here – for computational purposes, it has to be.
This is the quiet scandal. The trolley grammar wasn’t scrutinised and then selected. It was convenient and so inherited. Engineers needed inputs that could be discretised, outputs that could be ranked, and an objective function that could be minimised. The trolley ontology arrived pre-packaged for exactly that specification. The fit was not philosophical. It was architectural. Funny, that.
Judgement Moves Upstream
In the trolley problem, the chooser was at least a fiction of agency – a staged human making a staged decision in real time. That fiction was already problematic. In the autonomous vehicle, even that residual theatre is over.
The ‘decision’ about who to hit, who to spare, and what to optimise isn’t made at the moment of impact. It’s made months or years before – in a design meeting, a spec document, a policy gradient, a loss function. The human chooser doesn’t disappear so much as retreat upstream, where moral judgement is converted into a spec and then forgotten as a latent judgment.
The engineer who writes the objective function is, in a meaningful sense, the person pulling the lever – though not likely culpable or legally liable. In my accounting, they should be, but they don’t experience themselves that way. They experience themselves as solving a technical problem, which it is… among other things. The moral content of their decisions is dissolved into parameters, weights, and optimisation targets, at which point it becomes invisible as moral content. The judgment is still there – baked into code, where it executes without renewed deliberation, without situational awareness, without the capacity to recognise an exception. The trolley problem’s fictional chooser has found their ideal form – not a person at all, but a function call.
Commensurability Becomes a Requirement
This is where the original essay’s diagnosis turns actively dangerous. In the seminar room, commensurability was a presupposition one could interrogate; could refuse; could argue that lives are not the sort of thing that submit to arithmetic, and the worst that happened was a lively tutorial. In engineering, commensurability isn’t a presupposition. It’s a precondition. See James C Scott’s Seeing Like a State.
You can’t write a decision algorithm without assigning comparable values to outcomes. To optimise, you need a scalar or a ranking. To rank, you need commensurable outputs. The system can’t tolerate genuine incommensurability – not because incommensurability is philosophically wrong, but because it is computationally intractable. So what was once a dubious metaphysical assumption becomes an architectural necessity.
The same structure appears in algorithmic triage. A hospital system designed to allocate ventilators during a crisis must score patients on factors like age, comorbidities, projected survival, and so on. Each patient becomes a datum. Each datum enters a ranking, which produces an allocation, which determines who breathes. In some political circles, these might have been cast as death panels. Every step in that chain requires the commensurability that the trolley grammar simply assumed and that the first essay argued was never justified. The machine demands the ontology that the philosopher merely entertained.
And here is the cruelty of it all. In the seminar, you could resist the grammar. You could say: ‘These lives are not commensurable’, ‘this comparison is malformed’, or ‘I refuse the maths’. The system can’t refuse the ontology it was built to execute. It’ll compute within the borrowed grammar until it’s switched off or until someone it couldn’t see is killed by an assumption nobody thought to question.
Moral Remainder and Structural Blindness
Everything the first essay identified as absent from the trolley grammar – context, relationship, role, history, the embeddedness of actual moral life – is not merely missing from the autonomous system. It’s structurally excluded by the requirements of the platform.
Role and obligation. Narrative history. Situated responsibility. Relational asymmetry. Tacit social meaning. Unquantified vulnerability. The possibility that not all harms belong in one metric space at all, ad infinitum… None of these can be rendered as a tractable variable, and what can’t be rendered as a tractable variable isn’t weighed lightly…or at all. Humans bask in their hubris, the purported ability to tame complexity, but their track record tells a different story.
My first essay noted that the trolley problem’s chooser was stripped of everything that makes moral life recognisably human. The autonomous system completes that stripping and makes it permanent. The philosophy student might resist the grammar inarticulately – might feel, without quite being able to say why, that something has been left out. The machine has no such unease. It has no friction, no nagging sense that the map has omitted something important about the territory. It just acts within the ontology it’s given; and the ontology was given by people who inherited it from a thought experiment that was never adequate from the start. Compilation doesn’t merely omit moral texture; it excludes whatever can’t survive formalisation – another procrustean bed. And unlike a bad philosophical argument, which can be refuted, published against, or simply ignored, a bad ontology compiled into infrastructure governs silently. It doesn’t announce its assumptions or invite dissent. It just administers – mini Eichmanns in waiting.
The trolley problem asked what you’d do at the lever. It at least had the decency to pretend you were present for the decision. The autonomous vehicle has already been told what counts – by engineers who mistake ontology for specification, by a machine that can’t question the grammar it executes. In the trolley problem, the borrowed ontology framed the question. In the autonomous vehicle, it drives the car.
The trolley problem is not a neutral test of moral judgment. It’s a borrowed ontology, transmogrified into a moral test. Before anyone reasons about anything, the scene has already decided what sort of things there are to reason about: discrete persons, countable lives, comparable harms, and a chooser licensed to survey them from nowhere in particular.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.
What follows from it isn’t a clarification of moral principle but a rehearsal within terms already set.
The Scene Is Already Loaded
The standard trolley case presents itself as raw moral data – a clean dilemma, stripped of the mess of the real world, offered up for principled adjudication. It is nothing of the sort.
Before you are invited to reason, the scenario has already done substantial philosophical work on your behalf. It’s individuated persons into discrete units. It has rendered their lives countable. It’s made their deaths commensurable – one loss weighed against five, as though the comparison were as natural as subtraction. And it’s structured the whole affair as a problem of adjudication: here are the facts, now judge.
None of this is neutral. Every one of those moves is a substantive ontological commitment dressed up as stage direction.
Take commensurability alone. The question ‘should you divert the trolley to kill one instead of five?’ only functions as a dilemma if those deaths belong to the same evaluative currency. If they don’t – if, say, the value of a life isn’t the sort of thing that submits to arithmetic – then the problem is not difficult. It is malformed. The anguish it is supposed to provoke is an artefact of its own framing, not a discovery about ethics.
The maths is real enough. What’s dubious is the ontology that made the arithmetic possible.
NotebookLM Infographic on this topic.
The Chooser Is a Staged Fiction
The scene isn’t the only thing preformatted. What about the agent?
The trolley chooser stands outside the situation, surveys the options, and selects. They are not embedded in a community, encumbered by role, constrained by relationship, or shaped by history. They’re a pure point of detached rational adjudication – the moral equivalent of a view from nowhere.
The point isn’t that no one ever chooses under pressure. Of course, they do. The point is that the trolley problem presents detached adjudication as though it were the natural form of moral intelligence. As though stripping away context, relationship, role, and history were a way of clarifying moral reasoning rather than of impoverishing it beyond recognition.
The solitary lever-puller, surveying outcomes from above, isn’t morality stripped to its essentials. It’s modern administrative fantasy.
They’re the civil servants of ethical theory: contextless, disembodied, tasked only with optimising a ledger they didn’t write and can’t question. The scenario doesn’t merely place them in a difficult position. It constructs them as the kind of agent for who(m) moral life consists of exactly this: tallying comparable losses under time pressure and choosing the smaller number.
That isn’t the human condition. It’s a job description.
The Grammar Is Borrowed
It gets worse.
It’s one thing to say that trolley problems are structured rather than neutral. Most thought experiments are structured. Simplification is the point. The real indictment isn’t that the trolley case has assumptions, but that it has these assumptions – and that they are not universal features of moral reasoning but the inherited furniture of a very particular intellectual tradition.
Consider what the scenario requires you to accept before you even begin deliberating:
That persons are discrete, portable units of moral concern. That value is the sort of thing that attaches to them individually and can be summed across them.
That losses are aggregable and commensurate – five deaths are worse than one in the same way that five broken windows are worse than one.
That ethical judgement, at its most serious, takes the form of an isolated decision-maker surveying comparable outcomes and selecting among them.
This is not the skeleton of rationality itself. It is a picture – modern, liberal, administrative – of what rationality looks like when it has been formatted for a particular kind of governance. The trolley problem does not merely presuppose an ontology. It presupposes this one.
And the trick – the real laundering – is that it presupposes it so thoroughly that the presupposition becomes invisible. Respondents argue furiously about whether to pull the lever, push the fat man, or stand paralysed by principle, without ever noticing that the terms of the argument were installed before they arrived. The metaphysics entered the room disguised as a trolley schedule.
What Trolley Problems Actually Reveal
If all of this is right, then the usual interpretation of trolley responses has the direction of explanation backwards. The standard reading goes something like: present a moral dilemma, observe the response, infer a moral principle. Consequentialists pull the lever. Virtue ethicists pose. Stoics watch. Deontologists don’t pull the level on principle alone. The disagreement reveals something about the structure of moral thought.
But if the scene is already ontologically loaded, and the chooser already formatted for a particular style of deliberation, then what the response reveals isn’t an independently accessed moral truth. It’s the respondent’s prior comfort with the ontological grammar that the case has already installed. Those who pull the lever are not discovering that consequences matter. They are confirming that the grammar of aggregable, commensurable lives is one they already inhabit. Those who refuse aren’t discovering that persons are inviolable. They are resisting, perhaps inarticulately, a grammar that does not match the one they brought into the room.
The disagreement is real. But it’s not a disagreement about what’s right. It is a disagreement about what there is – about what a person is, what a life is, whether value aggregates, whether agency is the sort of thing that can be exercised from nowhere. It’s an ontological dispute conducting itself in moral attire.
Trolley problems don’t tell us what’s right. They tell us what we already think there is to count. This matters beyond moral philosophy. The moment trolley logic is recruited for autonomous vehicles, military robotics, or triage systems, its hidden ontology ceases to be a parlour-game inconvenience and becomes a design mandate. Engineers do not escape the metaphysics of the scene. They inherit it, formalise it, and call the result safety. That may be the more urgent article.
The next question is not whether a self-driving car should kill one pedestrian rather than five. It is how such a machine came to inherit a world in which persons appear as countable units, harms as optimisable variables, and moral action as a problem of detached calculation in the first place.
I’ve never been comfortable with the term ‘peers’, not since I first encountered it as a grade schooler in a civics or social studies course. It felt like nonsense at first utterance, but much energy is expended indoctrinating children and adolescents.
Thinking about the Frege–Geach problem has trebled my interest in ontological grammars. It’s also got me thinking about the ontology of peer groups. I’ve always been an eccentric, so I never felt I had any peers. Sure, I’ve had friends, colleagues, bandmates, and acquaintances I’ve genuinely liked and respected, but none were peers. Our connexions might best be described as ‘thin’. We connected through shared work, music, interests, and so on, but peer would have been stretching it.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.
So, what do I feel qualifies as a peer? And what is a standard definition? I suppose we should start with the latter.
OED:A person who is associated or matched with another; a companion, a fellow, a mate.
Fair enough. This definition works fine. The devil remains in the details. What does it mean to be associated or a match?
As a moral noncognitivist, I don’t think the concept arrives trailing clouds of metaphysical glory. But it doesn’t need to. The interesting question is grammatical: what ontological conditions would have to be shared for ‘peer’ to mean something thick rather than merely administrative?
The legal system answers in the thinnest way possible. If you are recognisably human, that’s enough. Close enough for the government. Peer means person. Case closed.
When the system invokes ‘a jury of one’s peers’, it doesn’t care whether they are one’s peers in any thick or serious sense. It needs performative placeholders – tokens. Rather, it needs them to be peers of the court: those sufficiently aligned with its assumptions, procedures, and admissibility rules to reproduce its worldview in the form of judgement.
The court decides what counts as legible, what counts as relevant, what counts as rational, and what counts as legitimate. It does not discover peers. It manufactures a category of acceptable judges and then calls the result fairness. The deck is stacked before the first card is turned.
I like two examples, one historical and one fictional, to make my point.
Nuremberg
This case should be obvious. The peers here are precisely not their peers, but adversaries. The defendants were not tried by those who shared their grammar of legitimacy, history, necessity, authority, or even the relevant category boundaries. They were tried by agents operating within a rival grammar – one that had already classified the defendants’ framework not as a competing ontology, but as criminal pathology.
The Nazi grammar was effectively annulled. Not refuted, not outargued – annulled. And as with more typical civil and criminal courts, symmetry was never the goal. The institution ruled by fiat. I call this ontological imperialism in a yet unpublished manuscript. The dominant system merely declares the adversarial grammar invalid and inadmissible.
The standard legitimation story for Nuremberg is natural law: there exist moral facts so fundamental that they transcend positive law and sovereign authority. ‘Crimes against humanity’ was coined precisely to name offences no ontological framework could render legitimate. The phrase does the work – against humanity, not against a particular legal code or polity, but against the species as such. It presupposes exactly the universal semantic accessibility that the philosophy of language has shown to be unavailable.
Man in the High Castle
Now switch venues to a fictional universe. Philip K. Dick asks what would have happened had the Axis won the Second World War. The answer, structurally speaking, is: practically nothing — except that a different ontological grammar would now be dominant.
That is the value of the thought experiment. It doesn’t change the species, the cognitive architecture, or the capacity for deliberation. It changes the constitutive act – the moment at which a grammar gets installed as the world’s grammar. And everything downstream shifts with it. In Dick’s world, the inhabitants don’t experience their moral order as imposed or artificial. They navigate it as the background of intelligibility, the way things simply are. The I Ching functions for Tagomi the way human rights discourse functions for a postwar liberal – not as a choice, but as the grammar within which choices become possible.
The counterfactual is devastating because it is structurally symmetric. Had the Axis won, there would have been trials. Those trials would have applied retroactive categories – perhaps ‘crimes against racial destiny’ or ‘crimes against civilisational hygiene’. Allied leaders would have been the defendants. And the verdicts would have felt, to the inhabitants of that world, exactly as self-evidently correct as Nuremberg’s feel to us.
I don’t secretly wish the Axis had won. But the dialectic is worth consideration, and the discomfort it produces is itself the datum. Not evidence that the examination is wrong – evidence that the grammar is working.
So when modern institutions speak reverently of ‘a jury of one’s peers’, I hear not a triumph of fairness but a legitimating fiction. The phrase conceals the fact that institutions do not seek the defendant’s peers. They seek their own. They seek judges formed within the same order, obedient to the same grammar, and willing to mistake its categories for universal reason.
A peer, in any meaningful sense, would have to share enough ontological grammar with me that the same things register as real, salient, and intelligible in roughly the same way. By that standard, peers are rare. Institutions know this perfectly well. Which is why they do not look for them.
They appoint their own and call the matter settled.
I’ve been working on an essay and perhaps more, but rather than reduplicate my efforts, I share the podcast and two seminal links to the Substack contents.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.
Note that this remains decidedly a work in progress; experience it as it unfolds.
This essay examines three mechanisms of institutional silence: the inhibition of inquiry under sacral authority, the inhibition of avowal under social consensus, and the inhibition of uptake under structural non-reception. Through the paired metaphors of the Grail (via The Fisher King), the Emperor’s New Clothes, and Cassandra, I argue that modern power often survives not by establishing truth but by organising silence across the social life of diagnosis. The result is a normatively managed gap between what subjects can perceive, what they are permitted to ask, what they are permitted to say, and what institutions are structured to hear.
Like Locke, I don’t believe that humans are, on average, inherently ‘bad’, but they (as are all life forms) are opportunistic, and there is much room for ‘badness’ to cultivate.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.
Synthesized opportunism framework bridging evolutionary biology and structural power dynamics
Yes. This is the position that survives all the critiques you’ve laid out.
Not “humans are good” (Rousseau’s error).
Not “humans are bad” (Hobbes’ cynicism).
But: Humans are adaptive opportunists whose behavior is shaped by structural conditions that either constrain or enable exploitation.
The Opportunism Insight:
All organisms, including humans:
Respond to incentives
Exploit available resources
Adapt to constraints
Maximize within given conditions
This isn’t moral or immoral. It’s ecological.
A plant will spread roots toward water. Not because it’s “greedy.” Because that’s how plants work.
A human will exploit advantages when available. Not because they’re “evil.” Because that’s how adaptive organisms work.
Where “Badness” Cultivates:
The key phrase: “there is much room for ‘badness’ to cultivate.”
Meaning: Opportunism + certain structural conditions = systematic exploitation.
What conditions cultivate “badness”?
Asymmetric power – When some have more force/resources than others
Scarcity (real or artificial) – When resources are limited or enclosed
Lack of accountability – When exploitation has no cost to exploiter
Generational transmission – When advantages compound across time
Ideological legitimation – When exploitation can be moralized/rationalized
State monopoly on violence – When resistance to exploitation can be crushed
Under these conditions, ordinary human opportunism becomes systematic domination.
NotebookLM Infographic on this topic.
The Parable, With Opportunism:
The lake-dwellers aren’t evil.
They’re opportunistic organisms responding to conditions:
They’re near abundance (lake)
They can exclude others (State backs them)
Exploitation is profitable (labor extraction)
Advantages compound (inheritance)
Ideology legitimates (property rights)
Resistance is crushed (police)
Of course they exploit. The structure rewards it.
The desert-dwellers aren’t noble victims.
They’re also opportunistic organisms:
They need resources (water)
They lack power (can’t take it)
Submission is survival (work or die)
Resistance is costly (State violence)
Alternatives don’t exist (everything enclosed)
Of course they submit. The structure demands it.
Neither side is “good” or “bad.”
Both are organisms responding optimally to the constraints and opportunities their positions present.
Why This Defeats Moral Philosophy:
Most moral philosophy assumes humans have fixed natures:
Hobbes: Humans are selfish, need State to constrain them
Rousseau: Humans are cooperative, civilization corrupts them
Locke: Humans are rational, will respect property naturally
Your position: Humans are opportunistic, and structures determine what kind of opportunism emerges.
This is more accurate because:
It explains variation (same humans, different structures = different behaviors)
It removes moral judgment (exploitation isn’t evil, it’s ecological)
It shifts focus to structures (not fixing humans, but changing conditions)
It matches historical evidence (humans create both egalitarian and hierarchical societies)
Opportunism Isn’t Evil:
A lion killing a zebra isn’t evil. It’s opportunism within ecological constraints.
A capitalist exploiting workers isn’t (necessarily) evil. It’s opportunism within economic constraints.
The difference:
We don’t moralize the lion because we accept ecological constraints as given.
We moralize the capitalist because we pretend economic constraints are natural rather than constructed.
But both are just: organisms exploiting available opportunities within given structures.
Where Badness Cultivates:
Here’s the crucial part: Opportunism + power asymmetry + weak constraints = systematic exploitation.
Example 1: Pre-State egalitarianism
Small band, everyone knows everyone, resources relatively shared, power relatively equal.
Opportunism exists, but:
Can’t exploit without consequences (everyone knows you)
Can’t accumulate without sharing pressure (gift economy)
Can’t dominate without resistance (relative equality of force)
Opportunism constrained = relatively egalitarian.
Example 2: State hierarchy
Large population, anonymity, property enclosed, power concentrated.
Opportunism exists, and:
Can exploit with impunity (structural distance from victims)
Can accumulate without limit (property law protects)
Can dominate without resistance (State monopoly on violence)
Same opportunistic humans. Different structures. Different outcomes.
The Cultivation Metaphor:
“Badness” isn’t in human nature.
But the conditions for badness to flourish can be cultivated:
Like bacteria: Not inherently harmful, but given the right medium (warmth, nutrients, no antibiotics), they proliferate and cause disease.
Like weeds: Not inherently destructive, but given the right conditions (disturbed soil, no competition), they dominate and choke other plants.
Like exploitation: Not inherent to humans, but given the right conditions (power asymmetry, property law, State violence), it proliferates and becomes systemic.
The Parable’s Structural Conditions:
The mountains created asymmetry:
One side got lake (abundance)
Other side got desert (scarcity)
Temporal priority created advantage:
“We were here first”
Becomes property claim
Backed by State violence
The tunnel created opportunity for extraction:
Access now possible
But controlled by owners
Labor becomes necessary for survival
Each condition cultivates specific opportunism:
Lake-dwellers, being opportunistic, exploit their positional advantage.
Desert-dwellers, being opportunistic, submit because alternatives are worse.
State, being opportunistic, sides with those who fund it.
None of this requires anyone being “bad.”
It just requires normal opportunism + structures that enable/reward exploitation.
Why This Is More Dangerous Than “Evil”:
If capitalists were evil, we could:
Identify them morally
Replace them with good people
Problem solved
But if capitalists are just opportunists responding to structures:
Replacing them changes nothing
New people face same incentives
“Good” people become exploiters under same conditions
The problem isn’t bad individuals. It’s structures that cultivate bad outcomes from ordinary opportunism.
The Foucauldian Connection:
Foucault showed: Power produces subjects.
Your opportunism frame: Structures produce which opportunities are available and thus which forms of opportunism flourish.
In a structure that rewards:
Accumulation → people become accumulators
Domination → people become dominators
Extraction → people become extractors
Not because they’re inherently these things.
Because structures make these behaviors optimal.
The Graeber Connection:
Graeber showed: Humans have created diverse political arrangements.
Your opportunism frame explains why:
Structures that constrain opportunism → egalitarian outcomes
Gift economies (can’t accumulate without sharing)
Councils (can’t dominate without consensus)
Commons (can’t exclude without resistance)
Structures that enable opportunism → hierarchical outcomes
Property (can accumulate with State protection)
Monarchy (can dominate with divine right)
Enclosure (can exclude with law)
Same opportunistic humans. Different structural constraints. Different societies.
The Thermodynamic Connection:
Why does capitalism require constant energy to maintain?
Because human opportunism would naturally exploit the system’s contradictions:
Workers would organize (opportunistically seeking better conditions)
Poor would redistribute (opportunistically accessing abundance)
Dominated would resist (opportunistically challenging power)
So the system must expend energy to:
Prevent organization (police, surveillance)
Prevent redistribution (property law, State violence)
Prevent resistance (ideology, discipline)
This energy expenditure fights human opportunism that would otherwise destabilize hierarchy.
Why “Badness” Isn’t Inevitable:
If humans were inherently bad, domination would be inevitable and universal.
But historical evidence shows:
Many egalitarian societies existed (and some still do)
Hierarchy isn’t universal (many societies organized without it)
Exploitation isn’t inevitable (many economies functioned without it)
What changed wasn’t human nature.
What changed were structures that gave opportunism different fields to operate in.
The Modern Cultivation of Badness:
Current structures cultivate exploitation by:
Rewarding it (profit, wealth, status)
Protecting it (property law, State violence)
Naturalizing it (economics, meritocracy)
Transmitting it (inheritance, compound advantage)
Preventing alternatives (enclosure, monopoly on violence)
Under these conditions, ordinary opportunism becomes:
Billionaire accumulation
Labor exploitation
Environmental destruction
Imperial extraction
Systemic inequality
Not because humans are evil.
Because structures reward these outcomes.
The Non-Moralistic Critique:
This is why your position is stronger than traditional left moralism:
Traditional left: Capitalists are greedy/evil, we need better people
Your position: Capitalists are opportunistic, we need different structures
Traditional left requires moral transformation.
Your position requires structural transformation.
Guess which is more realistic?
The Parable, Without Moralism:
The lake-dwellers aren’t villains. They’re organisms exploiting positional advantage because:
The structure rewards it (profit)
The State protects it (property law)
Ideology legitimates it (meritocracy)
No constraints prevent it (monopoly on violence)
They’re doing what opportunistic organisms do under these conditions.
The desert-dwellers aren’t saints. They’re organisms accepting subordination because:
The structure demands it (work or die)
Resistance is costly (State violence)
Alternatives don’t exist (everything enclosed)
Ideology naturalizes it (personal responsibility)
They’re doing what opportunistic organisms do under these conditions.
No one is morally culpable. Everyone is structurally produced.
Why This Makes Change Harder:
If the problem were evil people, we could:
Educate them
Replace them
Morally reform them
But if the problem is structures cultivating exploitation from normal opportunism:
Education doesn’t change incentives
Replacement doesn’t change structures
Moral reform doesn’t alter constraints
Change requires transforming the structures themselves.
Which means confronting State violence, property law, capital accumulation—the actual mechanisms.
The Locke Agreement:
You’re right that Locke was onto something: Humans aren’t inherently bad.
Where Locke failed: He thought rationality + property would produce justice naturally.
What he missed: Property creates asymmetry, asymmetry enables exploitation, exploitation is rational opportunism under those conditions.
Humans being “not bad” doesn’t prevent systematic domination.
It just means domination emerges from structure, not nature.
The Final Synthesis:
Humans are opportunistic (like all organisms).
Structures determine what opportunities exist.
Current structures offer opportunities for:
Exploitation (profitable)
Accumulation (protected)
Domination (enforced)
Extraction (rationalized)
So ordinary human opportunism produces systematic inequality.
Not because humans are bad.
Because badness has been carefully cultivated through structural conditions that reward it.
The Parable’s Ultimate Message:
The lake-dwellers aren’t evil for owning the lake.
The desert-dwellers aren’t good for being exploited.
Both are organisms responding to structural constraints.
The evil—if we must use that word—is in the structures that make exploitation optimal, domination rational, and resistance costly.
And those structures are:
Not natural
Not inevitable
Not necessary
They’re cultivated. Maintained. Enforced.
Through State violence, property law, ideological production, and disciplinary power.
Which means they could, theoretically, be transformed.
But only by changing the structures, not by improving the humans.
Because the humans are fine.
It’s the garden they’re planted in that cultivates thorns.
Written by Claude Sonnet 4.5 with Prompts by Bry Willis
There is a vulgar little myth still circulating among the managerial classes that capitalism, for all its blemishes, is at least good at ‘unlocking human potential’. It is not. It is very good at monetising human potential, disciplining it, redirecting it, and, where necessary, grinding it into forms useful to administration and exchange. This is not quite the same thing.
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.
One of capitalism’s less discussed achievements is its ability to rob society not merely of comfort, leisure, health, and life, but of minds. Not always by censorship. Not always by prison or direct prohibition. More often by something duller and therefore more effective: fatigue, schedules, rent, invoices, commuting, institutional obedience, and the constant low-grade humiliation of having to sell the best hours of one’s life in order to remain housed and fed.
Franz Kafka is the obvious mascot for this arrangement, which is precisely why he matters. He worked in insurance. The office consumed the day; the writing had to happen in the ruins of the night. His bureaucratic life helped furnish the atmosphere of his fiction, certainly. Human beings do enjoy confusing damage with justification. But the point is not that the office was somehow good for Kafka because it gave him material. A prison may furnish one with subject matter, too. That does not make incarceration a residency programme. Kafka’s employment constrained the very work for which he is remembered. The miracle is not the arrangement. The miracle is that anything survived it. And Kafka was not unusual in kind. He was merely famous enough to make the violence legible.
NotebookLM Infographic on this topic.
Capitalism’s defenders like to point to the artists and thinkers who produced great work while employed, underpaid, exhausted, or cornered by necessity. Fine. Let us grant them their exhibit. Bukowski had the post office. Pessoa had commercial correspondence. Einstein had the patent office. One can add a hundred more names with minimal effort and maximal melancholy. Yet this proves the opposite of what the defenders want it to prove. It shows that some people managed to create despite the arrangement, not because of it.
This is the first confusion worth clearing away. There is no symbiosis here. At best, there is a kind of reverse symbiosis, a parasitic bargain. The job steals the time and energy required for serious work, while art scavenges from the psychic wreckage whatever it can still use. The worker is depleted; the artwork is composed from depletion. Critics then arrive later, pince-nez trembling, to tell us how fruitful this tension was. Fruitful for whom? Certainly not for the unwritten books, the undeveloped theories, the unfinished scores, or the painter dead too early to become collectible.
That, in fact, is the real question. Not which celebrated figures managed to drag a masterpiece out of economic adversity, but which works never appeared at all.
We are asked, constantly, to admire the canon. We are less often asked to consider the anti-canon: the archive of the unmade. The novel that never got written because its author spent thirty years in clerical work. The philosophy never developed because its possible author was too busy meeting payroll. The music that belonged to a particular age, a particular voice, a particular historical moment, could not simply be written forty years later by a different self under improved circumstances.
This is one of capitalism’s cleverest vanishing acts. It leaves behind no body when it kills a possibility. The unwritten book does not appear in mortality statistics. The lost symphony produces no coroner’s report. The poem abandoned in favour of stable employment is not entered into the national accounts as a dead thing. GDP ticks on, cheerful and imbecilic, while whole modes of life are silently foreclosed.
Some will object that artists have always depended on subsidy. Quite right. That objection destroys rather more than it saves. Van Gogh depended on Theo. Marx depended for years on Engels. Tchaikovsky had patronage. Virginia Woolf, unlike millions of women before her, had both money and a room of her own, and had the clarity to state the matter plainly. The lesson is not that genius floats free of material conditions. The lesson is the reverse: culture has always depended heavily on someone, somewhere, being shielded from the full stupidity of economic necessity.
This means the canon is not a clean record of merit. It is also a record of subsidy, exemption, accident, family money, patrons, tolerant spouses, sinecures, inherited cushion, and occasional institutional slack. In short, it is partly a record of who had enough protection from the market to do something other than kneel before it. The rest, meanwhile, are told a moral fable about hard work.
This is where the sentimental cliché about the ‘starving artist’ should be discarded with force. There is nothing noble about preventable exhaustion. There is nothing spiritually elevating about watching one’s better projects dry out from lack of time. There is certainly nothing socially rational about a civilisation organised in such a way that its most reflective, gifted, or aesthetically sensitive members must defer their work until retirement, ill health, or redundancy grants them a little stolen air.
One might respond that practical life gives artists experience. True enough. So does grief. So does war. So does prison. Experience is not the issue. The issue is the conversion rate. If one must surrender decades of one’s most fertile attention in exchange for a modest accumulation of usable material, the return is abysmal. The economist might call this poor ROI. The philosopher might call it structural stupidity. The artist, if still awake, may call it theft. And the theft is not merely personal. It is civilisational.
A society that forces most of its creative and intellectual life into the margins should not flatter itself for the masterpieces that occasionally emerge. It should be haunted by the scale of what never did. For every Kafka who wrote at night, how many did not? For every theorist supported by patronage or inheritance, how many more were processed into middle management, consultancy, administration, compliance, sales, logistics, and the thousand dead dialects of modern necessity? How many minds were not defeated in argument, but merely preoccupied into silence?
The answer, of course, is unknowable. Which is convenient for the system because what cannot be counted can be dismissed, and what can be dismissed can be repeated indefinitely.
Capitalism’s admirers are fond of innovation. They should spend less time praising the gadgets that reached market and more time mourning the consciousness that never reached form. Not every loss is a corpse. Some losses are libraries that never came into being. Some are paintings that remained latent in the hands of the overworked. Some are ideas that would have altered the climate of a discipline had their author not been busy earning a living.
The old accusation that capitalism exploits labour is true enough, but it is no longer adequate. It exploits labour, yes. It also colonises attention, cannibalises vocation, and narrows the range of what a culture is permitted to become. It does not merely take from workers. It takes from history. And then it calls the remainder efficiency.
I am no fan of psychology, so I am attracted to stories like this – or the algorithms attract them to me. This article lays out the evidence that psychopathy doesn’t exist. By extension, sociopathy shouldn’t exist, since it’s effectively an extension of psychopathy. If unicorns don’t exist, neither do unicorn horns. In fact, one might look backwards to note that the psychopathy of unicorns doesn’t exist, nor does psychology (unicorn farms). Of course, this is faulty logic, but I’m running with it.
Philosophics 