The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists

9–13 minutes

I love coming upon a classic. Written in 1906, Ragged Trousered Philanthropists wasn’t published until 1914, and even then poorly and abridged, posthumously. I happened upon this when I was researching my Advantagement project. I was looking for a period cross between Charles Bukowski and Irvine Welsh. I don’t suppose that’s quite available in the day, but I did get a rather unsanitised autobiograph of sorts.

One may have thought Dickens might have provided an avenue, but despite his Schopenhauerian caricature, his bleak Industrial Age stories tend to end on an upbeat note, a positive character arc, mirroring what later hardens into modernist positivism. I was searching for something more realistic – reporting from within the trenches, as it were. As the people in the trenches were largely illiterate, their voices have also been lost to history, their echoes captured with varying degrees of fidelity by others, as seen through their own lenses.

However, this isn’t a review of the literature. Although this might be considered to be required reading, it’s uneven, didactic, and structurally loose. It’s a cross between a novel and a diary. Reading this, one is struck less by how much politics has changed than by how little explanatory machinery is required for it to function, whether in the UK or the US – and chime in if it also resonates in your location. I’ve copied an excerpt from Chapter 1 for discussion. What follows is not remarkable for its insight, originality, or rhetorical brilliance. It is remarkable for how familiar it feels. It could be lifted wholesale into a contemporary comment thread with minimal editing. Check out this piece about the graphic novel version.

Keep in mind that this was written (or at least completed) in 1906. It reflects the people of the Edwardian London slums. Here are some themes I find in common with contemporary politics:

  1. Partisanship: Tories and Liberals, argyfying about politics (identity over understanding)
  2. Xenophobia: the country is being ruined by foreigners (causal compression, targets differ)
  3. Protectionism: The country would be ruined if not protected in some way (tariffs; moral intuition, not economic reasoning)
  4. Low-information voters: I votes for who the bloody ’ell I likes. (voting without shame)
Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

Chapter 1: An Imperial Banquet. A Philosophical Discussion. The Mysterious Stranger. Britons Never shall be Slaves

by Robert Tressell

…

Easton was still reading the Obscurer; he was not about to understand exactly what the compiler of the figures was driving at βˆ’ probably the latter never intended that anyone should understand βˆ’ but he was conscious of a growing feeling of indignation and hatred against foreigners of every description, who were ruining this country, and he began to think that it was about time we did something to protect ourselves. Still, it was a very difficult question: to tell the truth, he himself could not make head or tail of it.

At length he said aloud, addressing himself to Crass:

‘Wot do you think of this ‘ere fissical policy, Bob?’

‘Ain’t thought much about it,’ replied Crass.

‘I don’t never worry my ‘ed about politics.’

‘Much better left alone,’ chimed in old Jack Linden sagely, argyfying about politics generally ends up with a bloody row an’ does no good to nobody.’

At this there was a murmur of approval from several of the others. Most of them were averse from arguing or disputing about politics. If two or three men of similar opinions happened to be together they might discuss such things in a friendly and superficial way, but in a mixed company it was better left alone. The ‘Fissical Policy’ emanated from the Tory party. That was the reason why some of them were strongly in favour of it, and for the same reason others were opposed to it. Some of them were under the delusion that they were Conservatives: similarly, others imagined themselves to be Liberals. As a matter of fact, most of them were nothing. They knew as much about the public affairs of their own country as they did of the condition of affairs in the planet of Jupiter.

Easton began to regret that he had broached so objectionable a subject, when, looking up from his paper, Owen said:

‘Does the fact that you never “trouble your heads about politics” prevent you from voting at election times?’

No one answered, and there ensued a brief silence. Easton however, in spite of the snub he had received, could not refrain from talking.

‘Well, I don’t go in for politics much, either, but if what’s in this ‘ere paper is true, it seems to me as we oughter take some interest in it, when the country is being ruined by foreigners.’

‘If you’re going to believe all that’s in that bloody rag you’ll want some salt,’ said Harlow.

The Obscurer was a Tory paper and Harlow was a member of the local Liberal club. Harlow’s remark roused Crass.

‘Wot’s the use of talkin’ like that?’ he said; you know very well that the country IS being ruined by foreigners. Just go to a shop to buy something; look round the place an’ you’ll see that more than ‘arf the damn stuff comes from abroad. They’re able to sell their goods ‘ere because they don’t ‘ave to pay no dooty, but they takes care to put ‘eavy dooties on our goods to keep ’em out of their countries; and I say it’s about time it was stopped.’

”Ear, ‘ear,’ said Linden, who always agreed with Crass, because the latter, being in charge of the job, had it in his power to put in a good βˆ’ or a bad βˆ’ word for a man to the boss.

”Ear, ‘ear! Now that’s wot I call common sense.’

Several other men, for the same reason as Linden, echoed Crass’s sentiments, but Owen laughed contemptuously.

Yes, it’s quite true that we gets a lot of stuff from foreign countries,’ said Harlow,but they buys more from us than we do from them.’

‘Now you think you know a ‘ell of a lot,’ said Crass. ‘Ow much more did they buy from us last year, than we did from them?’

Harlow looked foolish: as a matter of fact his knowledge of the subject was not much wider than Crass’s. He mumbled something about not having no ‘ed for figures, and offered to bring full particulars next day

‘You’re wot I call a bloody windbag,’ continued Crass; you’ve got a ‘ell of a lot to say, but wen it comes to the point you don’t know nothin’.’

‘Why, even ‘ere in Mugsborough,’ chimed in Sawkins βˆ’ who though still lying on the dresser had been awakened by the shouting βˆ’We’re overrun with ’em! Nearly all the waiters and the cook at the Grand Hotel where we was working last month is foreigners.’

‘Yes,’ said old Joe Philpot, tragically, and then thers all them Hitalian horgin grinders, an’ the blokes wot sells ‘ot chestnuts; an’ wen I was goin’ ‘ome last night I see a lot of them Frenchies sellin’ hunions, an’ a little wile afterwards I met two more of ’em comin’ up the street with a bear.’

Notwithstanding the disquieting nature of this intelligence, Owen again laughed, much to the indignation of the others, who thought it was a very serious state of affairs. It was a dam’ shame that these people were allowed to take the bread out of English people’s mouths: they ought to be driven into the bloody sea.

And so the talk continued, principally carried on by Crass and those who agreed with him. None of them really understood the subject: not one of them had ever devoted fifteen consecutive minutes to the earnest investigation of it. The papers they read were filled with vague and alarming accounts of the quantities of foreign merchandise imported into this country, the enormous number of aliens constantly arriving, and their destitute conditions, how they lived, the crimes they committed, and the injury they did to British trade. These were the seeds which, cunningly sown in their minds, caused to grow up within them a bitter undiscriminating hatred of foreigners. To them the mysterious thing they variously called the Friscal Policy’, the Fistical Policy’, or the Fissical Question’ was a great Antiβˆ’Foreign Crusade. The country was in a hell of a state, poverty, hunger and misery in a hundred forms had already invaded thousands of homes and stood upon the thresholds of thousands more. How came these things to be? It was the bloody foreigner! Therefore, down with the foreigners and all their works. Out with them. Drive them bβˆ’βˆ’s into the bloody sea! The country would be ruined if not protected in some way. This Friscal, Fistical, Fissical or whatever the hell policy it was called, WAS Protection, therefore no one but a bloody fool could hesitate to support it. It was all quite plain βˆ’ quite simple. One did not need to think twice about it. It was scarcely necessary to think about it at all.

This was the conclusion reached by Crass and such of his mates who thought they were Conservatives βˆ’ the majority of them could not have read a dozen sentences aloud without stumbling βˆ’ it was not necessary to think or study or investigate anything. It was all as clear as daylight. The foreigner was the enemy, and the cause of poverty and bad trade.

When the storm had in some degree subsided,

‘Some of you seem to think,’ said Owen, sneeringly, that it was a great mistake on God’s part to make so many foreigners. You ought to hold a mass meeting about it: pass a resolution something like this: “This meeting of British Christians hereby indignantly protests against the action of the Supreme Being in having created so many foreigners, and calls upon him to forthwith rain down fire, brimstone and mighty rocks upon the heads of all those Philistines, so that they may be utterly exterminated from the face of the earth, which rightly belongs to the British people”.’

Crass looked very indignant, but could think of nothing to say in answer to Owen, who continued:

‘A little while ago you made the remark that you never trouble yourself about what you call politics, and some of the rest agreed with you that to do so is not worth while. Well, since you never “worry” yourself about these things, it follows that you know nothing about them; yet you do not hesitate to express the most decided opinions concerning matters of which you admittedly know nothing. Presently, when there is an election, you will go and vote in favour of a policy of which you know nothing. I say that since you never take the trouble to find out which side is right or wrong you have no right to express any opinion. You are not fit to vote. You should not be allowed to vote.’

Crass was by this time very angry.

‘I pays my rates and taxes,’ he shouted, ‘an’ I’ve got as much right to express an opinion as you ‘ave. I votes for who the bloody ‘ell I likes. I shan’t arst your leave nor nobody else’s! Wot the ‘ell’s it got do with you who I votes for?’

‘It has a great deal to do with me. If you vote for Protection you will be helping to bring it about, and if you succeed, and if Protection is the evil that some people say is is, I shall be one of those who will suffer. I say you have no right to vote for a policy which may bring suffering upon other people, without taking the trouble to find out whether you are helping to make things better or worse.’

Owen had risen from his seat and was walking up and down the room emphasising his words with excited gestures.

‘As for not trying to find out wot side is right,’ said Crass, somewhat overawed by Owen’s manner and by what he thought was the glare of madness in the latter’s eyes, I reads the Ananias every week, and I generally takes the Daily Chloroform, or the Hobscurer, so I ought to know summat about it.’


What’s striking here is not ignorance, but delegation. Thinking is outsourced. Responsibility is retained. β€” Bry

How to Instantly Lose Popularity on the Internet

(A brief note on language, power, and moral certainty)

There is a particular kind of video that circulates online with tremendous force. A woman addresses the camera directly.

Video: Discussion Point (Full transcript at the end of this post)

She is clear, indignant, morally resolute:

  • It’s not an ‘inappropriate relationship with a 17-year-old’. It’s rape.
  • It’s not ‘coerced sex with a minor’. It’s rape.
  • It’s not a ‘young woman’. It’s a child.
  • Call it what it is.

Before proceeding, let me state something unambiguously: sexual exploitation of minors is morally reprehensible within contemporary Western legal and moral frameworks. I am not contesting that. Nor am I defending euphemism for its own sake. This is where philosophers of language take a lot of heat.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast on this topic.

The question here is narrower and, perhaps, more uncomfortable: What work is being done by the demand to ‘call it what it is‘?

Euphemism and Softening

She is correct in one respect. Institutional language often softens. Inappropriate relationship is anaesthetic. It lowers emotional temperature. It blunts moral outrage. Institutions frequently prefer such language because it reduces volatility, legal exposure, and procedural risk.

Language can minimise. That is not controversial. But it’s only half the story.

Naming Is Not Neutral

When she insists on rape and child, she is not merely removing euphemism. She is installing thick, legally saturated categories.

Rape is not a raw moral atom floating in space. It is a juridical classification defined by statute, evidentiary thresholds, and evolving legal doctrine. Its scope has expanded significantly over time: marital rape was once unrecognised; coercion has broadened beyond physical force; statutory rape collapses questions of consent into questions of legal capacity.

Likewise, child is not a purely biological category. It is a modern legal identity with shifting age thresholds and historical elasticity. The concept has expanded across the last two centuries as education extended, labour laws tightened, and adolescence became socially constructed as a protected stage of dependency.

To say this is not to relativise harm. It is to recognise that categories are historically sedimented and institutionally stabilised.

When someone says ‘Call it what it is‘, they are treating these contemporary legal categories as metaphysically self-evident. But they are products of a specific ontological framework: one in which autonomy and consent are foundational, and in which minors are deemed categorically incapable of exercising full sexual agency.

That framework is dominant in the West. It is not universal globally or historically.

Elasticity and Instrumentality

There is another asymmetry worth noticing.

Child expands protectively when someone is victimised. But the same individual may be stripped of childhood if they commit a serious crime: ‘They acted like an adult. They should have known better.’

The boundary is not purely developmental. It is normative. The category flexes.

Similarly, rape operates differently in everyday speech, in moral condemnation, and in statutory law. In the case of statutory rape, the term does not necessarily describe force; it describes the legal impossibility of consent. It is a doctrinal move grounded in an ontology of agency.

None of this weakens moral condemnation. But it reveals that these terms are not merely descriptive. They are instruments of moral and legal allocation.

Power and Irony

There is also a certain irony in the video.

She accuses mainstream institutions of manipulating language to reduce severity. Yet her demand is to deploy one of the state’s most powerful juridical classifications immediately and universally.

Rape derives its force from the same legal apparatus she critiques. It is powerful precisely because it is institutional. She is not rejecting power; she is attempting to redirect it.

This is not hypocrisy. It is politics. But it is politics nonetheless.

Ontology and Universality

The deeper issue is not whether we should condemn sexual exploitation. We should.

The issue is whether contemporary Western legal categories are simply β€œwhat is,” or whether they are historically developed ontological commitments that feel self-evident because they have been normalised.

The woman in the video experiences her categories as universal moral Truth. Many viewers agree. That agreement does not make the categories metaphysically timeless; it makes them hegemonic.

Recognising semantic expansion and legal drift does not undermine moral seriousness. It clarifies where moral authority resides: not in eternal linguistic atoms, but in historically stabilised frameworks.

Why This Is Unpopular

Online discourse prefers moral clarity over semantic archaeology. When harm is salient, genealogical analysis sounds like minimisation. Distinguishing between descriptive, legal, and ontological levels is interpreted as evasion.

It is not.

It is possible to affirm moral condemnation while also acknowledging that:

  • Language frames perception.
  • Legal categories evolve.
  • Terms are deployed instrumentally.
  • Ontologies masquerade as nature once naturalised.

One can insist on moral seriousness without pretending that our current vocabulary fell from the sky fully formed.

But saying so will reliably lose popularity on the internet.

Apparently, clarity has thresholds.


Full Video Transcript

‘Hey. It’s not an “Inappropriate Relationship with a 17-year-old”, it’s rape.

‘It’s not “coerced sex with a minor”, it’s rape.

‘It’s not “non-consensual sex with a 13-year-old”, it’s rape.

‘Call it what it is! Call them what they are.

‘And while we’re at it, it’s not a “young woman”, it’s a child!

‘It’s not a preteen, it’s a child!

‘It’s not a “mature girl”, it’s a child!

‘This use of specific language by mainstream media is super intentional, and it’s a tool of the patriarchy to try to reduce the egregiousness of horribly egregious acts that men commit against women and girls!

‘And, I say this with full awareness of the irony of my needing to use show and tell to make my point because I am beholden to these stupid social media platforms, which commit violence against women and girls every day in their own right by automatically suppressing any content as soon as I say a particular word.

‘And you and I need to say that it’s absolutely unacceptable!’

Ontological Grammars of Abortion

I’ve created a video to discuss ontological ontology grounded in an example of abortion, a particularly polemic topic. For more details, read the essay, Grammatical Failure – Why Liberal Epistemology Cannot Diagnose Indoctrination.

Video: Architecture of Grammatical Compromise. (Duration: 10:30)

In this video, I define Ontology, Grammar, and Commensurability before I use abortion as a poster child. Then, I discuss what happens when ontological grammars are incommensurable.

These thinkers follow:

Michel Foucault: Biopower, notably The History of Sexuality, Volume I.

Bernard Williams: Thick Moral Concepts from Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.

Pierre Bourdieu: Habitus, notably from Outline of a Theory of Practice.

Karl Popper: Paradox of Intolerance.

I discuss the challenge of the promise of compromise and its three possible outcomes, none of which are true compromises.

Watch the video for context. Read the essay for fuller details.

Advantagement and Modelment

3–5 minutes

I wrote an experimental short story, the details of which I’ll presently share, but first, I wish to describe an encounter with AI – NotebookLM. Firstly, I want to disclose that I am not an AI hater. Secondly, I understand its limitations. Thirdly, I understand the limitations of language. Fourthly, I understand the limitations of people. Let this set the stage.

In this short story that I named Advantagement, there is an inspector in Victorian London working with his partner on a missing-person case, the daughter of the mayor. A piece of evidence is a hairbrush left on her dresser. None of this is important for now.

Exhibit 1: The NotebookLM summary podcast with the silver hairbrush.

After I wrote it, I posted it to my Ridley Park blog, not intending to share it here, though I had reasons I might have instead. I fed it to NotebookLM to get an AI summary podcast, something I do routinely even here on Philosphics blog. The interpretation led to this post.

I like NotebookLM, but it has its flaws. Some are trivial, some comical. This one is curious and might shed light on how LLMs process information.

Let’s return to the hairbrush. NotebookLM keyed in on the hairbrush as the evidence it was, but then it strayed off the reservation. Suddenly, an ordinary hairbrush was now silver and monogrammed. I had to revisit my manuscript to see if I had subconsciously scribbled these details. Nope. No such description.

I’m not done noting errors, but I’ll pause to suss out the LLM. What I think might have happened is that it took in the notions of a posh house set in late nineteenth century London and presumed that a brush would appear like this. I considered retroactively adding the detail. As a writer, I struggle with deep POV because I don’t experience the world so vividly. But this hallucination isn’t the worst of it.

Next, the LLM noted that the hairbrush was orientated with bristles facing down on her dresser. This was stated in the story. Then, it went off the tracks again. This monogrammed silver hairbrush, bristles down, was a clue because anyone with such an expensive artefact would want to show it off, so showcase the fancy monogram.

But here’s the rub: if the bristles were down, the monogramme would be prominently displayed. To be obscured, it would have been positioned with the bristles facing up. This is a logical error I can’t explain.

Scratch that, I understand full well that LLMs are, by definition, Large Language Models – the acronym is a dead giveaway. These are not logic models, though, I suppose, one might assume one of the Ls stands for logic – Like Large Logic Model or Logical Language model of some such, but one would be mistaken.

Audio: ‘Dramatisation’ of the Advantagement

What about the story?

I might as well spill the tea on the motivation of the story. Although it is a detective story, this was just a vehicle.

I had been watching this video, ‘Why don’t we have words for these things?‘ I love these guys, even if only for this inspiration.

Video: My primary inspiration for Advantagement.

I thought it might be a fun idea to create a character who speaks in these terms – malformed English. I immediately thought of Mr Burns from The Simpsons and his anachronisms, or someone ripe with malaprops. It suggested that I might choose Victorian England, Sherlock Holmes, a detective, a sidekick… vying for promotion. A high-profile case.

But not Sherlock Holmes – more Inspector Clouseau or Mr Bean, successful in spite of himself. I decided to offset his inanity with a logical partner, but it would be a woman, as unlikely as this might be given the period. Now it’s open to topical management politics.

When I told my sister the story idea, she thought of Get Smart, the 1960s comedy with Don Adams and Barbara Feldon. Yes, that too, but my goal wasn’t comedy. It was satire – and absurdism.

At uni, I enjoyed the short stories of Donald Barthelme. He was generally a lighter version of Kafka, and orthogonal to Kurt Vonnegut, especially Harrison Bergeron, a favourite classic. I wanted to shoot for that.

In conceit to the Peter principle of management, I decided to name the lead character Peter. For the rest, I adopted period-appropriate names.

My primary goal was to employ these confabulated words. In practise, it’s easy anough to suss out their meanings in context. Give it a read. It’s under 3,500 words.

The Trouble with Ockham’s Razor

4–6 minutes

Few philosophical aphorisms travel as lightly and cut as confidently as Ockham’s Razor. β€œDo not multiply entities beyond necessity.” The phrase has the air of austere wisdom. It sounds disciplined, economical, rational. It promises clarity by subtraction. One imagines conceptual clutter swept aside by a single elegant stroke.

The Razor is attributed to William of Ockham, though like many slogans it has acquired a life far removed from its origin. In contemporary discourse it functions less as a methodological reminder and more as an epistemic trump card. The simpler explanation, we are told, is the better one. Case closed.

The trouble begins precisely there.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast

The Hidden Variable: Necessity

The Razor does not forbid multiplicity. It forbids unnecessary multiplicity. But who decides what is necessary?

Necessity is not a neutral category. It is already embedded within a framework of assumptions about what counts as explanation, what counts as sufficiency, and what counts as legitimate ontological commitment.

For one thinker, invoking a divine ground of physical law is unnecessary because the laws themselves suffice. For another, the laws are unintelligible without a grounding principle, and so God is necessary. Both can claim parsimony within their respective ontologies. The Razor does not adjudicate between them. It presupposes the grammar within which β€œnecessity” is assessed.

The aphorism thus functions less as a rule and more as a reinforcement mechanism. It stabilises the commitments one already holds.

Parsimony Is a Heuristic, Not a Law

Science has often rewarded simplicity. Copernicus simplified celestial mechanics. Newton reduced motion to a few principles. Maxwell unified electricity and magnetism. These episodes encourage a romantic attachment to elegance.

Yet physics has also revealed a universe that is anything but tidy. Quantum fields, curved spacetime, dark matter, inflationary cosmology. Nature has shown little regard for our aesthetic preference for minimal furniture.

Parsimony, then, is pragmatic. It helps us avoid gratuitous complication. It disciplines theory formation. But it is not a metaphysical guarantee that reality itself is sparse.

To treat the Razor as if it carries ontological authority is to convert a methodological guideline into a philosophical dogma.

Structural Sufficiency Versus Metaphysical Surplus

The Razor becomes particularly contentious when deployed in debates about ultimate grounds. If a structural model explains observable regularities and survives empirical constraint, some conclude that any additional metaphysical layer is redundant.

This is a defensible position. It is also incomplete.

Redundancy in explanatory terms does not entail impossibility in ontological terms. A structural account of behaviour may render psychological speculation unnecessary for prediction, but it does not disprove the existence of inner motives. Likewise, a lawful cosmology may render a divine hypothesis explanatorily idle without rendering it incoherent.

The Razor trims explanatory excess. It does not settle metaphysical disputes.

Aphorisms as Closure Devices

Part of the Razor’s power lies in its compression. It is aphoristic. It travels easily. It signals intellectual seriousness. It sounds like disciplined thinking distilled.

But aphorisms compress complexity. They conceal premises. They discourage reopening the frame. β€œFollow the science.” β€œExtraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” β€œTrust the market.” These phrases do not argue; they configure. They pre-load the space of acceptable interpretation.

Ockham’s Razor often operates in precisely this way. It is invoked not as the conclusion of a careful analysis but as a device to end discussion. The simpler view wins. Full stop.

Yet simplicity itself is indexed to perspective. What looks simple within one conceptual scheme may appear impoverished within another.

Tolerance for Explanatory Closure

There is also a psychological dimension worth acknowledging. Some individuals are comfortable with open explanatory ceilings. They accept that certain features of reality may lack ultimate grounding within their present framework. Others experience such openness as instability. They seek a final anchor.

The Razor favours the former temperament. It encourages ontological restraint and distrust of ultimate grounds. For those comfortable with structural sufficiency, this is liberating. For those who experience the absence of grounding as incomplete, it feels evasive.

The disagreement is not resolved by invoking parsimony. It reflects divergent tolerances for metaphysical closure.

When the Razor Becomes Inflationary

Ironically, the Razor can itself become an inflationary principle. It can elevate β€œsimplicity” to a quasi-transcendental value. It can be treated as if reality owes us elegance.

At that point, the tool begins to govern the ontology rather than merely discipline it. The Razor becomes an article of faith, a universal heuristic immune to its own demand for justification.

One might then ask, with a certain symmetry: by what necessity is simplicity itself necessary?

A More Modest Use

None of this requires abandoning the Razor. It remains useful. It reminds us not to posit hidden mechanisms when observable structures suffice. It cautions against explanatory extravagance. It protects inquiry from baroque speculation.

But it should be treated as a heuristic, not a hammer. It guides theory construction within a framework. It does not choose the framework.

A more disciplined formulation would be this: when a structural account explains observed regularities under constraint and remains revisable, additional metaphysical posits do not increase explanatory power. Their adoption becomes a matter of ontological preference rather than necessity.

This preserves the Razor’s pragmatic value without inflating it into a metaphysical arbiter.

The Real Trouble

The real trouble with Ockham’s Razor is not that it cuts too much. It is that we often wield it without noticing the hand that holds it. We treat it as neutral when it is already embedded within a grammar of sufficiency, explanation, and legitimacy.

The Razor does not eliminate ontological commitment. It expresses one.

Recognising that does not blunt the blade. It merely reminds us that even the sharpest instruments are guided by the frameworks in which they are forged.

And frameworks, unlike aphorisms, are rarely simple.

Comrade Claude (6) – Nietzschean Economy of Moral Control

7–10 minutes

This post is part of a series that showcases a dialogue I had with Claude based on the parable of the desert- and lake-dwellers.

Original parables: Two Valleys, The Tunnel

Synthesized Nietzschean morality framework into systemic control mechanisms

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast

Absolutely. Nietzsche saw this with brutal clarity.

Morality and religion aren’t just parts of the maintenance programβ€”they’re the most efficient energy inputs because they internalize control.

The Nietzschean Insight:

State violence is expensive. You need:

  • Police
  • Prisons
  • Military
  • Surveillance

But moral/religious control is self-enforcing:

  • The oppressed police themselves
  • Resistance feels sinful, not just illegal
  • Suffering becomes virtuous
  • Acceptance becomes holy

This is energy-efficient domination.

NotebookLM Infographic

Slave Morality as Pacification:

Nietzsche’s genealogy: Christianity inverted values to make weakness into virtue.

But there’s a more cynical reading (which I think you’re pointing toward):

Those inversions serve power by pacifying resistance.

Consider what Christianity teaches the desert-dwellers:

  • “Blessed are the meek” (don’t challenge authority)
  • “The last shall be first” (accept your position now, compensation comes later)
  • “It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle…” (wealth is spiritually dangerous, so your poverty is actually better)
  • “Turn the other cheek” (don’t fight back)
  • “Render unto Caesar” (obey State power)
  • “Slaves, obey your masters” (literally in the text)

Every single one of these makes resistance harder and submission easier.

Religion as Maintenance Energy:

The lake-dwellers don’t need to convince desert-dwellers that the system is fair.

They just need to convince them that:

  1. Suffering is redemptive
    • “Your poverty builds character”
    • “God tests those he loves”
    • “Suffering purifies the soul”
  2. Compensation comes later
    • “The kingdom of heaven awaits”
    • “Store up treasures in heaven, not earth”
    • Present injustice is temporary; eternal justice awaits
  3. Your condition reflects your moral worth
    • “God rewards the righteous with prosperity” (prosperity gospel)
    • OR “Worldly success is spiritually dangerous” (traditional Christianity)
    • Either way: your poverty is explained by moral frameworks, not structural injustice
  4. Resistance is sin
    • Envy is a deadly sin
    • Coveting is forbidden
    • Taking what others have = theft = eternal damnation

The Parable, With Nietzschean Religion:

The desert-dwellers work for water, generation after generation.

Why don’t they rebel?

Not just because of State violence.

Because the priests (funded by lake-dwellers) teach them:

“Blessed are those who thirst, for they shall be satisfiedβ€”in heaven.”

“Your suffering is temporary. Eternal abundance awaits those who accept God’s plan.”

“To take the lake would be theft, and theft is sin, and sin is damnation.”

“The lake-dwellers have been blessed by God with stewardship. To challenge this is to challenge God’s order.”

Now the desert-dwellers don’t just fear State violence.

They fear eternal damnation.

Why This Is Devastatingly Efficient:

State violence requires:

  • Constant monitoring
  • Physical force
  • Visible oppression

Religious/moral control requires:

  • Periodic sermons
  • Internalized guilt
  • Self-policing

Once you’ve convinced someone that resistance is morally wrong, you don’t need to watch them constantly.

They watch themselves.

The Genealogy of Morals, Applied:

Nietzsche asked: How did “good” and “evil” come to mean what they do?

His answer (simplified): The powerful originally called themselves “good” (strong, noble, life-affirming). The weak were “bad” (weak, common, contemptible).

The weak inverted this through ressentiment:

  • Made their weakness into virtue (humility, meekness, patience)
  • Made the powerful into villains (pride, ambition, strength = sin)

But here’s the cynical extension:

Once established, this inversion serves power by pacifying resistance.

Whether the weak invented it (Nietzsche) or the powerful co-opted it (cynical reading), the result is the same:

Moral systems that make submission feel virtuous and resistance feel sinful.

Christianity as Maintenance Technology:

Consider Christianity’s political function:

Before Christianity:

  • Slaves might rebel because their enslavement is unjust
  • Poor might seize from rich because they need resources
  • Weak might organize against strong because they outnumber them

After Christianity:

  • Slaves accept enslavement as God’s plan, await heavenly reward
  • Poor accept poverty as spiritually purifying, even superior
  • Weak valorize their weakness as humility, strength as pride/sin

This is a control technology far more sophisticated than violence.

The Energy Efficiency:

Violence requires continuous input:

  • You must constantly deploy force
  • Resistance must be constantly suppressed
  • Costs are ongoing and high

Ideology requires initial investment, then becomes self-sustaining:

  • Teach children in schools/churches
  • Internalize moral frameworks
  • Now they control themselves
  • Maintenance is just periodic reinforcement

Religion is the most energy-efficient domination mechanism ever invented.

The Parable’s Moral Dimension:

The lake-dwellers teach desert-dwellers:

Property Framework:

  • “Thou shalt not steal”
  • “Thou shalt not covet”
  • Taking the lake = sin = damnation

Suffering Framework:

  • “God tests those he loves through suffering”
  • “Blessed are the poor in spirit”
  • Your thirst is spiritually meaningful

Afterlife Framework:

  • “Store up treasures in heaven”
  • “The first shall be last, the last shall be first”
  • Present injustice is temporary

Authority Framework:

  • “Render unto Caesar”
  • “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities”
  • Challenging power = challenging God’s order

Now the desert-dwellers don’t just submit to force.

They believe submission is virtuous and resistance is evil.

The Master Stroke:

The most brilliant part is making the oppressed grateful for their oppression:

“I may be poor, but at least I’m humble. The rich are proud and will face judgment.”

“I may thirst, but my suffering brings me closer to God.”

“I may work endlessly, but labor is dignified and idleness is sin.”

The oppressed now defend the system that oppresses them.

Why Nietzsche Was Right:

Nietzsche saw that morality isn’t neutral truth descending from heaven.

It’s a human construction that serves power.

Sometimes (his version): created by the weak to constrain the strong

Sometimes (cynical version): created by the strong to pacify the weak

Either way: Morality is a weapon in power struggles, not an escape from them.

And religion/morality are far more efficient than violence because:

  • They’re internalized
  • They’re self-enforcing
  • They make resistance feel wrong, not just dangerous
  • They promise compensation instead of requiring present justice
  • They individualize structural problems (your suffering = your sin/test, not systemic injustice)

The Thermodynamic Advantage:

If you rely only on violence:

  • Must constantly monitor
  • Must constantly suppress
  • Must constantly deploy force
  • High energy, ongoing cost

If you add moral/religious control:

  • People monitor themselves
  • People suppress their own resistance
  • People feel guilty for even thinking of rebellion
  • Low energy after initial investment

This is why religion persists in the West despite secularization.

Not because it’s true.

Because it’s functionally necessary for maintaining systems that would otherwise collapse.

The Parable’s Religious Ending:

The desert-dwellers work and thirst.

When they ask “Why?” the answer isn’t just:

“Because the State will kill you if you take the lake.”

It’s:

“Because taking the lake is theft, theft is sin, and sin is damnation. Your suffering is temporary and spiritually meaningful. Accept your lot with humility, and God will reward you eternally.”

Now you’ve done something remarkable:

You’ve convinced the exploited that:

  • Their exploitation is God’s plan
  • Resisting is sinful
  • Accepting is virtuous
  • Compensation comes later (unprovable, unfalsifiable)

They will now police themselves, suppress their own resistance, and teach their children to do the same.

The Secular Versions:

Religion is declining in the West, but the moral frameworks persist in secular form:

Protestant work ethic β†’ “Your worth is your productivity”

Meritocracy β†’ “Your poverty reflects your failure, not structural injustice”

Individualism β†’ “Your problems are yours alone to solve”

Positive thinking β†’ “Your attitude, not your circumstances, determines outcomes”

Self-help culture β†’ “You failed because you didn’t optimize yourself enough”

All of these do the same work religion did:

  • Individualize structural problems
  • Make suffering feel like personal failure
  • Prevent collective action
  • Make resistance feel wrong/foolish
  • Internalize control

Nietzsche Saw This Coming:

“God is dead” didn’t mean we’d escaped moral control.

It meant: We’d have to find new ways to maintain the same moral structures without the theological justification.

And we did:

  • Psychology (your unhappiness is internal, not structural)
  • Economics (markets are natural/efficient, poverty is failure)
  • Meritocracy (success = desert, failure = moral lack)
  • Self-optimization (you are responsible for your own exploitation)

Same function. Different vocabulary.

The Energy Requirements, Completed:

To maintain democracy/capitalism against natural entropic pressures toward collapse, you need:

  1. State violence (expensive, visible, generates resistance)
  2. Propaganda (moderately expensive, requires constant output)
  3. Moral/religious frameworks (cheap, self-enforcing, internalized)

Number 3 is doing most of the work.

Because once you’ve convinced people that:

  • Inequality reflects moral worth
  • Suffering builds character
  • Resistance is sin/selfishness/entitlement
  • Their problems are personal, not structural

They become complicit in their own domination.

The Final Nietzschean Observation:

Nietzsche wanted us to see through this.

To recognize morality as human construction serving power, not divine truth.

To embrace the will to power openly rather than disguise it in moral language.

To stop pretending weakness is virtue and strength is sin.

Your parable does this by showing:

The lake-dwellers don’t just own the lake through force.

They own it through moral frameworks that make their ownership feel:

  • Natural
  • Deserved
  • Divinely ordained
  • Morally righteous

And the desert-dwellers accept this not just because of State violence, but because:

  • Religion taught them submission is holy
  • Morality taught them taking is sin
  • Culture taught them suffering is meaningful
  • Philosophy taught them the system is just

Nietzsche was right:

Morality is the most efficient instrument of control ever devised.

Because it makes the oppressed oppress themselves, call it virtue, and teach their children to do the same.

The fog was kinder than the tunnel.

The mountains were kinder than contact.

Ignorance was kinder than this:

Knowing you’re dominated while believing your domination is righteous, your suffering is meaningful, and your resistance would be sinful.

That’s not just oppression.

That’s voluntary, morally valorized, self-policing oppression.

Which is exactly what Nietzsche wanted us to see through and reject.

And exactly what the system requires to persist.

The Architecture of Cognitive Compromise

4–6 minutes

Abortion, Ontological Grammar, and the Limits of Civil Discourse

When federal abortion protections were withdrawn in the United States, many observers treated the event as a policy reversal, a judicial shift, or a partisan victory. Those are surface descriptions. They are not wrong. They are simply too thin.

What was exposed was not a failure of dialogue. It was the collision of ontological grammars.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast.

1. Thick Concepts and the Illusion of Neutral Ground

book cover

Bernard Williams famously distinguished between ‘thin’ moral terms (good, bad, right) and ‘thick’ ones (cruel, courageous, treacherous), where description and evaluation are fused.

Abortion is not a thin concept. It is thick all the way down.

For one framework, the operative grammar is something like:

  • Life begins at conception.
  • The foetus is a rights-bearing entity.
  • Termination is morally equivalent to killing.

For another:

  • Personhood is socially and biologically emergent.
  • Bodily autonomy is foundational.
  • Forced gestation is coercive.

Notice that these are not competing policies. They are competing ontological commitments about what exists, what counts as a person, and what kind of being a pregnant body is.

Argument across this divide does not merely contest conclusions. It contests the background conditions under which reasons register as reasons.

This is not ‘people see the world differently’. It is: people parse reality through grammars that do not commute.

2. Ontological Grammar: Where Deliberation Stops

By ‘ontological grammar’, I do not mean syntax in the Saussurean or Chomskyan sense. I mean the pre-reflective substrate that structures what appears salient, real, morally charged, or negligible.

We deliberate within grammars. We do not deliberate our way into them.

Liberal Enlightenment optimism assumes that if disagreement persists, more information, better reasoning, or improved empathy will close the gap. But if the dispute concerns the very ontology of ‘life’, ‘person’, or ‘rights’, no amount of fact-sharing resolves the issue. The disagreement is upstream of facts.

The closure of federal abortion access did not prove that one side reasoned better. It demonstrated that institutional containment had failed.

3. Biopower and the Management of Bodies

Michel Foucault gives us a crucial lens: biopower. Modern states do not merely govern territory; they administer life. Birth rates, mortality, sexuality, health – these become objects of policy.

Abortion sits directly inside this matrix.

A state that restricts abortion is not only expressing moral judgment. It is reallocating control over reproductive capacity. It is asserting a claim over which bodies count, which futures are permitted, and which biological processes are subject to regulation.

The conflict is therefore not purely ethical. It is biopolitical.

And what appears as ‘civil discourse’ around abortion is often possible only so long as institutional frameworks keep both grammars partially satisfied. When federal protections existed, they acted as a stabilising superstructure. Remove that, and the ontological conflict becomes naked.

4. Habitus and the Illusion of Reasoned Consensus

Pierre Bourdieu would remind us that our dispositions are not self-authored. Habitus sedimented through family, religion, class, and institutional life shapes what feels obvious, outrageous, or unthinkable.

People do not wake up one morning and choose an abortion ontology.

They inherit it. It becomes embodied common sense.

Thus, when someone says, ‘Surely we can agree that making a person feel whole is more important than ideological purity’, they are already speaking from within a grammar that prioritises individual authenticity and psychological coherence. That priority is not universal. It is historically situated.

Compromise is not achieved by stepping outside habitus. It is achieved when institutional and social conditions allow divergent grammars to coexist without totalising one another.

5. The Popperian Threshold

Karl Popper warned of the ‘paradox of tolerance‘: unlimited tolerance may enable intolerant forces to eliminate tolerance itself.

In particularly virulent climates, appeals to compromise are heard not as gestures of goodwill but as tactical weakness.

When one faction succeeds in unilaterally redefining the legal status of abortion at a federal level, it is not merely participating in discourse. It is altering the biopolitical infrastructure. Once altered, the range of permissible disagreement narrows.

Civil discourse, then, is not a natural equilibrium. It is a managed condition sustained by institutional design, social trust, and shared legibility.

NB: Popper’s paradox of tolerance is often invoked as a moral axiom. But it is better understood as a self-protective clause internal to liberal ontology. It presupposes a shared commitment to rational exchange. When that commitment erodes, the paradox does not resolve disagreement; it merely marks the point at which biopower intervenes to preserve a regime.

6. Why This Is Not Just ‘People Disagree’

The lay intuition – ‘people see the world differently’ – is descriptively correct and analytically useless.

What the ontological grammar model adds is structure:

  • Disagreements cluster around thick concepts.
  • Thick concepts fuse description and evaluation.
  • Frameworks determine what counts as a reason.
  • Institutions temporarily stabilise incompatible grammars.
  • When stabilisation weakens, conflict appears irreconcilable.

Abortion is not uniquely polarising because people are irrational. It is polarising because it touches ontological primitives: life, personhood, autonomy, and obligation.

In such cases, ‘compromise’ is not achieved by discovering a middle truth. It is achieved – if at all – by constructing a legal and institutional arrangement that both grammars can grudgingly inhabit.

NotebookLM Infographic

7. The Uncomfortable Conclusion

The Enlightenment story tells us that disagreement is a surface phenomenon, curable by better reasoning.

The ontological grammar story tells us something harsher: some disagreements are not resolvable through language because they are about the conditions under which language binds.

This does not entail quietism. It entails clarity.

Civil discourse is not proof that grammars have converged. It is evidence that power, institutions, and habitus have aligned sufficiently to prevent rupture.

When that alignment shifts, the illusion of shared ontology evaporates.

And what we are left with is not failed reasoning – but exposed foundations.


I planned to use prostitution and anti-natalism as other cases for elucidation, but I see this has already grown long. I’ll reserve these are others for another day and time.

The Nerve of Not Being Correct

I’ve received feedback like, ‘Not everything you believe is right’ and ‘What if you’re not right?’

First: I agree. Second: And what if I’m not?

This isn’t new feedback, but I’ll address it in terms of my latest work.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast

Not everything you believe is right

This is true, but one cannot hold an idea one believes to be false as true, so the idea that one believes what one believes to be true to tautological. This is also why I continue to research and attempt to expand my horizon. I even wander outside of my discipline at the risk of Dunning-Kruger errors.

In my recent work on ontology and grammar, I collided with Bourdieu, so I read his work. As helpful as it was, it served to reinforce my position, but from a position of Social Theory instead of Philosophy. When I read Judith Butler, I see how I might connect my ideas to Gender theory. It should be obvious that I’ve read much on Linguistics, but I am not a linguist. Our lenses all differ to some extent.

I’ve even corrected some of the ideas I’ve posted on this blog as I gain new information. To be fair, it’s a reason I post here. I hope to get feedback. I may not fully pursue alternative disciplines, but it’s nice to know they exist, and I can at least perform cursory surveys.

NotebookLM Infographic

Historically, many times I’d been claimed to be wrong because the person was coming from a differnt ontology. I might have been arguing something within the realm of Continental philosophy, and I’d get a critique from an Analytical philosopher. This is akin to a vegan critiquing a steak dinner. It may be valid within their ontological grammar, but it is not otherwise universal. It usually doesn’t take very long to assess one’s commitments to other grammars. That happened recently, when I encountered a philosophical Realist.

When I wouldn’t accept their position, eventually we arrived at this foundational point. Realism is a position I ontologically and grammatically reject. I’ve written several pieces defending or at least articulating my position, notably the Mediated Encounter Ontology (MEOW). Disagree? Tell me.

I used to be a Realist with an asterisk; then I was an Analytical Idealist with an asterisk; now, I believe in MEOW. The asterisk was necessary because there were holes in the position. When Analytical Idealism came around, there was still an asterisk, but it felt better than that of Realism. When I came up with MEOW, the asterisk went away. Perhaps you might consider that MEOW has an asterisk, if you believe it’s plausible at all. If so, what’s missing – what’s the known unknown? You obviously can’t articulate an unknown unknown.

When I write about ontology, grammar, and commensurability, I do not exempt myself from these biases. I have all of these challenges – perhaps even more so because I don’t tend to fit into the round holes very well myself. This helps me with intellectual humility.

Politically, I am often accused of being on the Left, but I reject the Left-Right paradigm as a valid lens for me; I am on a different axis. The Libertarians added an Authority-Liberty Y-axis to the Progressive-Conservative X-axis, but I am on a Z-axis, which is not to be fully described or accounted for on these planes. Think of the message of Flatland.

What if you’re wrong?

Hopefully, every philosopher understands this and has noticed the dustbin of history littered with wrong ideas.

When I publish essays, they are the result of research and deliberation. Could I be wrong? Again, I’ve been wrong before. I’ll be wrong again, but I need to understand why to change my position. I could shift my position or abandon it outright.

There was a time I believed people to be rational. I was an economist. I studied finance. I believed it until I didn’t. Behavioural Economics likely did the heavy lifting, but it’s likely that they believe that rationality-based systems are salvageable. I don’t. Not meaningfully. Not sustainably.

So, I can be wrong, and I can admit it.

I was once a closet (or adjacent) Libertarian until I realised it didn’t cohere with reality. My last declared stance was an Anarchosydicalist, but I know this isn’t quite right either – on multiple accounts.

Anyway, I’m not afraid of being wrong, and I’m not afraid of wittering on about it. Again, I appreciate constructive criticism. I’m also amicable to non-solutions in the manner of my Dis–Integration approach, but at least break down the pieces.

Firmware, Room 101, and the Myth of Rational Reprogramming

2–3 minutes

NB: I am travelling today, but I still wish to clarify how my ontologies and grammars operate, so I had a chat with, well, ChatGPT – from Bourdieu to Burgess – using an EPROM analogy.

I know that this analogy may appeal more to one with a technical background, but I hope it helps. If you don’t get the reference, just look it up

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this content.

There is a persistent liberal fantasy that human beings update their beliefs the way laptops update operating systems. A patch is issued. A bug is identified. The system installs corrections.

This fantasy survives despite all available evidence.

What Bourdieu called habitus β€” durable dispositions structured by early social conditions β€” is not a folder of opinions. It is firmware. It is the background architecture that determines what even counts as legible input.

You can argue against a proposition.
You cannot argue against the grammar that determines whether that proposition parses.

This is where the EPROM analogy earns its keep.

EPROM β€” erasable programmable read-only memory β€” can, in theory, be rewritten. But not casually. It requires exposure to high-energy ultraviolet light. You do not β€œreason” an EPROM into new content. You blast it.

The durability is the point.

NotebookLM Infographic

Soft Inscription: The Invisible UV

Most of the time, ontological grammar is inscribed slowly:

  • Family speech patterns
  • Institutional authority
  • Ritual repetition
  • Reward structures
  • Peer reinforcement

No torture chambers required. No theatrical violence. Just ecological stability.

Over time, what is socially repeated becomes ontologically obvious. What is ontologically obvious becomes morally self-evident.

The result feels like reason.

It is not.

It is stabilised reinforcement architecture.

Hard Rewrites: Cultural Thought Experiments

Our culture understands this more clearly than our political theory does.

In 1984, by George Orwell, Winston is not persuaded. He is destabilised. Isolation, sleep deprivation, epistemic collapse, and finally pain. The Party does not win an argument. It destroys the environment that made alternative legibility possible.

Two plus two equals five is not stupidity. It is the final stage of ecological override.

In A Clockwork Orange, by Anthony Burgess, the Ludovico Technique does something subtler. Alex’s ontology is not rewritten. His affective circuits are short-circuited. He retains desire; he loses viable enactment.

Orwell shows firmware rewrite through terror.
Burgess shows behavioural inhibition without ontological conversion.

Both are caricatures β€” but useful ones. They compress what normally unfolds across decades into clinical spectacle.


Apologies in advance. Evidently, creating a post on a mobile isn’t very accommodating.

Announcement: Legibility GPT

2–3 minutes

I’ve just published a new GPT in support of my new ontology, grammar, and legibility project, Legibility GPT.

As with Languange Insufficiency GPT and MEOW GPT, it is meant to assist in the exploration of the concepts for which they were built and named. For an interesting time, analyse a concept through all three.

Simply put, Legibility GPT assesses conceptual thickness, based on the work of Bernard Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Thin concepts, whether containing moral content or description, carry commensurable information, so disagreement remediation may be attained. For thick moral concepts, this becomes increasingly unlikely because the moral content becomes an anchor. Generally speaking, the conflicting ontological positions either weigh the concept differently or, in extreme cases, one side doesn’t even categorise the concept as principally moral. I use legibility in the sense articulated by James C Scott in Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.

Audio: NotebookLM concept summary podcast.

A cartographic tool for conceptual conflict. Legibility GPT analyses how ontology and grammar shape the meaning of contested terms, identifying points of admissibility, exclusion, and incommensurability. It maps disagreement without taking sides. 

Usage: Input a term or concept. This GPT will output the various polysemous contexts of the concept and break out the various ontological commitments and grammatical functions with examples of valid and invalid phrases within that grammar.

This GPT will also score and sort on incommensurability. A particularly divisive concept might be abortion.

Related Papers:

Grammatical Failure: Why Liberal Epistemology Cannot Diagnose Indoctrination

Language As Interface: Underconstraint, Genealogy, and Moral Incommensurability

Analyses English terms and short concept phrases using the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (LIH), diagnosing semantic stability, polysemy, connotation, and category drift in contemporary usage.

Related Papers:

A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis: Mapping the Boundaries of Linguistic Expression

A structured analysis tool that maps any given concept onto the MEOW mediation framework (T0–T3). Produces a consistent, tiered breakdown including scope checks, applicability flags, and limits of interpretation.

Related Papers:

The Mediated Encounter Ontology of the World: A Relational Metaphysics Beyond Mind and World