Language Insufficiency Hypothesis: Presumption and Horizon

I discuss Chapter 4 ofย ‘A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis’ in this video clip.

Video: Presumption and Horizon

In short, I discuss where language fails in law, politics, science, and digital culture, where we think language conveys more than it does.

Thinking Without Words (and Other Heresies)

2โ€“3 minutes

Evelina Fedorenko has been committing a quiet but persistent act of vandalism against one of modernityโ€™s favourite assumptions: that thought and language are basically the same thing, or at least inseparable housemates who share a fridge and argue about milk. Theyโ€™re not.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this content.

Her fMRI work shows something both banal and scandalous. Linguistic processing and high-level reasoning live in different neural neighbourhoods. When you switch language on, the ‘language network’ lights up. When you do hard thinking without words, it doesnโ€™t. The brain, it turns out, is not secretly narrating your life in subtitles.

This matters because an entire philosophical industry has been built on the idea that language is thought. Or worse: that thought depends on language for its very existence. That if you canโ€™t say it, you canโ€™t think it. A comforting story, especially for people whose entire self-worth is tied up in saying things.

Now watch two chess players in deep play. No talking. No inner monologue helpfully whispering, ‘Ah yes, now I shall execute a queenside fork’. Just pattern recognition, spatial anticipation, constraint satisfaction, and forward simulation. If language turns up at all, it does so later, like a press officer arriving after the battle to explain what really happened.

Video: Dina Belenkaya plays chess.

Language here is not the engine. Itโ€™s the after-action report. The temptation is always to reverse the order. We notice that people can describe their reasoning, and we infer that the description must have caused the reasoning. This is the same mistake we make everywhere else: confusing narration with mechanism, explanation with origin, story with structure.

Fedorenkoโ€™s findings donโ€™t tell us that language is useless. They tell us something more irritating: language is a post hoc technology. A powerful one, yes. Essential for coordination, teaching, justification, and institutional life. But not the thing doing the actual work when the work is being done. Thought happens. Language tidies up afterwards.

Which leaves us with an awkward conclusion modern philosophy has spent centuries trying to avoid. The mind is not a well-ordered library of propositions. Itโ€™s a workshop. Messy, embodied, improvisational. Language is the clipboard, not the hands. And the clipboard, however beautifully formatted, never lifted a chess piece in its life.

As for me, I’ve long noticed that when I play a game like Sudoku, I notice the number missing from the pattern before any counting or naming occurs. The ‘it must be a 3’ only happens after I make the move.

Language Insufficiency Hypothesis: The Gradient

In a 4-minute video, I discuss The Gradient, Chapter 3 of my latest book, A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis.

Video: The Gradient

It’s a short video/chapter. Nothing much to add. In retrospect, I should have summarised chapters 3 and 4 together.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this chapter.

Language Insufficiency Hypothesis: Structural Limits of Language

1โ€“2 minutes

I share a summary of Chapter 2 of A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis.

Video: Language Insufficiency Hypothesis: Structural Limits of Language

Not much to add. The video is under 8 minutes long โ€“ or just read the book. The podcast provides a different perspective.

Let me know what you think โ€“ there or here.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of Chapter 2.

I also discussed Chapter 1: The Genealogy of Language Failure if you missed it.

Language Insufficiency Hypothesis: The Genealogy of Language Failure

1โ€“2 minutes

I published A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis this month, and this is one of a series of videos summarising the content. In this segment, Iโ€™m discussing Chapter 1: A Genealogy of Insufficiency

In this video, I touch on Plato to Barthes and Foucault. Derrida gets no love, and I mention bounded rationality, but not Simon. I discuss Steven Pinker’s dissent in more detail in a later chapter.

Below, I’ve included some artefacts from the book.

Image: Chapter 1: Page 1
Image: Genealogy of Insufficiency: A Historical Trajectory
Image: Table of Contents

A Language Insufficiency Announcement

1โ€“2 minutes

A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis is now available, and I am commencing a series of video content to support it.

Video: Language Insufficiency Hypothesis – Part 1 – The Basic Concepts (Duration: 6:44)

In this primer, I introduce the Language Effectivenessโ€“Complexity Gradient and the nomenclature of the hypothesis: Invariants, Contestables, Fluids, and Ineffables.

In the next segment, I’ll discuss the Effectiveness and Presumed Effectiveness Horizons.

If you would like to support my work, consider purchasing one of my books. Leaving ratings and reviews helps more than you know to appease the algorithm gods.

The book is available at Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and traditional booksellers.

ISBN (Hard Cover): 978-0-9710869-0-6
ISBN (Paperback): 978-0-9710869-4-4

US Library of Congress ID: LCCN: 2025927066

Legibility Meets Humanity for Xmas

3โ€“4 minutes

I’m no fan of holidays. I neither enjoy nor celebrate Christmas. Iโ€™m acutely aware of its commercial excesses and its religious inheritance, two institutions I find, at best, tiresome and, at worst, actively corrosive. Whether thatโ€™s abhorrence or simple loathing is a distinction Iโ€™ll leave to braver souls.

Still, calendars exist whether one consents to them or not, and this piece happens to land today. If Christmas is your thing, by all means, have at it. Sincerely. Rituals matter to people, even when their metaphysics donโ€™t survive inspection.

What follows is not a defence of the season, nor a seasonal moral. Itโ€™s a small human moment that happens to involve Santa, which is to say a costume, a script, and a public performance. What interests me is not the symbolism, but what happens when the performance yields just enough to allow someone else to be seen on their own terms. If nothing else, that feels like a tolerable use of the day.

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast on this topic.

What Legibility?

When I use the term legibility, itโ€™s usually as a pejorative. Itโ€™s my shorthand for reductionism. For the way human beings are flattened into checkboxes, metrics, market segments, or moral exemplars so they can be processed efficiently by institutions that mistake simplification for understanding.

But legibility isnโ€™t always a vice.

Video: Santa signs with a 3-year-old dear girl

Most of us, I suspect, want to be legible. Just not in the ways we are usually offered. We want to be seen on our own terms, not translated into something more convenient for the viewer. That distinction matters.

In the video above, a deaf child meets Santa. Nothing grand happens. No lesson is announced. No slogan appears in the corner of the screen. Santa simply signs.

The effect is immediate. The childโ€™s posture changes. Her attention sharpens. Thereโ€™s a visible shift from polite endurance to recognition. She realises, in real time, that she does not need to be adapted for this encounter. The encounter has adapted to her. This is legibility done properly.

Not the synthetic legibility of television advertising, where difference is curated, sanitised, and arranged into a reassuring grid of representation. Not the kind that says, we see you, while carefully controlling what is allowed to be seen. That version of legibility is extraction. It takes difference and renders it harmless. Here, the legibility runs the other way.

Santa, already a performative role if ever there was one, doesnโ€™t stop being performative. The costume remains. The ritual remains. But the performance bends. It accommodates. It listens. The artifice doesnโ€™t collapse; it becomes porous.

Iโ€™m wary of words like authenticity. Theyโ€™ve been overused to the point of meaninglessness. But I do think we recognise performatism when we see it. Not in the technical sense of speech acts, but in the everyday sense of personas that ring hollow, gestures that exist for the camera rather than the people involved. This doesnโ€™t feel like that.

Of course, the child could already connect. Deaf people connect constantly. They persevere. They translate. They accommodate a world that rarely meets them halfway. Nothing here ‘grants’ her humanity. What changes is the tightness of the connexion.

The shared language acts as a verbal proxy, a narrowing of distance. You can see the moment it clicks. He speaks her language. Or rather, he speaks a language that already belongs to her, even if calling it ‘hers’ is technically imprecise. Mother tongue is a slippery phrase. Irony does some of the work here.

Legibility, in this case, doesnโ€™t make her smaller. It makes the interaction larger. And that, inconveniently for our systems and slogans, is what most people have been asking for all along.

PhilSurvey: What is the aim of philosophy?

2โ€“3 minutes

I commenced a series where I discuss the responses to the 2020 PhilPapers survey of almost 1,800 professional philosophers. This continues that conversation with questions 2 through 4 โ€“ in reverse order, not that it matters. Each is under 5 minutes; some are under 3.

For the main choices, you are given 4 options regarding the proposal:

  • Accept
  • Lean towards
  • Reject
  • Lean against

Besides the available choices, accepted answers for any of the questions were items, such as:

  • Combinations (specify which.)
    For the combos, you might Accept A and Reject B, so you can capture that here.
  • Alternate view (not entirely useful unless the view has already been catalogued)
  • The question is too unclear to answer
  • There is no fact of the matter (the question is fundamentally bollocks)
  • Agnostic/undecided
  • Other

Q4: The first one asks, ‘What is the aim of philosophy?’ Among the responses were:

  • Truth/Knowledge
  • Understanding
  • Wisdom
  • Happiness
  • Goodness/Justice

Before you watch the video, how might you respond?

Video: What is the aim of philosophy?

Q3: What’s your position on aesthetic value?

  • Objective
  • Subjective
Video: What is aesthetic value?

Q2: What’s your position on abstract objects?

  • Platonism (these objects exist “out there” in or beyond the world)
  • Nominalism (the objects are human constructs)
Video: Where do abstract objects reside?

Q1: What’s your position on ร  priori knowledge?

This video response was an earlier post, so find it there. This is asking if you believe one can have any knowledge apart from experience.

  • Yes
  • No

NB: I’ve recorded ten of these segments already, but they require editing. So I’ll release them as I wrap them up. Not that I’ve completed them, I realise I should have explained what the concepts mean more generally instead of talking around the topics in my preferred response. There are so many philosophy content sites, I feel this general information is already available, or by search, or even via an LLM.

In the other hand, many of these sites โ€“ and I visit and enjoy them โ€“ support very conservative, orthodox views that, as I say, don’t seem to have progressed much beyond 1840 โ€“ Kant and a dash of Hegel, but all founded on Aristotelian ideas, some 2,500 years ago.

Spoiler alert, I think knowledge has advanced and disproved a lot of this. It turns out my brothers in arms don’t necessarily agree. Always the rebel, I suppose.

PhilPapers Survey โ€“ ร€ Priori Knowledge

I commenced a new series that shares my philosophical positions from the PhilPapers 2020 survey.

Video: Intro and question 1 to the survey.

Not a lot to write beyond what the video already says.

My responses are available on my PhilPeople profile. If you really can’t justify watching the 4-minute video clip, read the spoilers below โ€“ but it will go down in your permanent record.

Show spoiler (tl;dr?)
  • 73% of respondents accept or lean toward the claim that ร  priori knowledge exists
  • 18% of respondents reject or lean away from the claim that ร  priori knowledge exists

My Response: ร€ priori knowledge does not exists. No knowledge exists prior to experience.