Democracy: The Grand Illusion (AutoCrit)

The tone of “Democracy: The Grand Illusion” is predominantly analytical and academic. The author approaches the subject matter with a detached and objective perspective, focusing on presenting information, arguments, and counterarguments related to democracy without overt emotional bias. While the content delves into complex topics such as cognitive limitations in decision-making processes, historical perspectives on democracy, critiques of democratic systems, and potential reforms for improvement, the emotional perspective remains neutral and professional throughout. There is an absence of overtly passionate or emotive language that might sway readers one way or another; instead, the text maintains a scholarly tone aimed at informing and stimulating critical thinking about the concept of democracy.

I use AutoCrit as a first-pass review of my long-form writing. Above is the direction I am aiming for. Usually, I aim for polemic. I’ve been working on this since before Covid-19, but it keeps kicking to the back burner. I’m trying to resurrect it once again.

Does anyone who’s used it have an opinion on AutoCrit?

$Trillions of Broken Promises

Reparations, Sovereignty, and the Enduring Legacy of Colonialism

The Weight of Broken Treaties

From the earliest days of European settlement, treaties were used as a tool of diplomacy between the United States government and Native nations. These treaties, over 370 in total, were meant to secure peace, land agreements, and coexistence. In exchange, Native peoples were promised sovereign rights, land, and, crucially, compensation in the form of resources, healthcare, education, and protection. Yet, these promises were almost universally broken, often within years of being signed.

The true cost of these broken promises is impossible to measure in simple monetary terms. Land, culture, and sovereignty are not commodities that can be easily priced. However, if one were to quantify the economic and material loss incurred by Native peoples—through stolen land, expropriated resources, and missed opportunities—the total would be staggering. Some estimates suggest the cost could run into the hundreds of billions if not trillions when factoring in centuries of economic injustice, treble damages, and interest.

Calculating Reparations: Land, Wealth, and Justice

Any serious discussion of reparations must start with the land. Native nations once held over 2 billion acres of land in what is now the United States, a vast expanse rich with natural resources. Through a series of coercive treaties, legislation, and outright theft, much of this land was lost, culminating in the General Allotment Act (or Dawes Act) of 1887, which further fragmented Native lands and opened millions of acres for white settlers.

Reparations would need to account for the value of this land and the resources extracted from it—timber, minerals, oil, gas, and agricultural produce—that have enriched generations of non-Native Americans. The land itself is invaluable, not just in terms of its market price but as the foundation of Indigenous identity, culture, and sovereignty. The land is not only an economic asset but a spiritual and cultural one. In this context, mere monetary compensation seems inadequate.

However, if we were to calculate reparations based on these lost lands and resources, the numbers quickly skyrocket. Consider the Black Hills of South Dakota, illegally seized from the Lakota after the discovery of gold, despite an 1868 treaty guaranteeing their sovereignty over the region. The Lakota have refused financial compensation for the Black Hills, insisting instead on the return of the land. The value of the Black Hills alone, when adjusted for inflation and interest, would be immense. And this is just one example. If treble damages were applied—tripling the original valuation to account for the egregiousness of the theft—the total would become astronomical.

Interest on Injustice

A crucial factor in calculating reparations is the interest accrued over time. The land was not just taken, but taken centuries ago, meaning that any fair compensation would need to account for the economic opportunities missed due to that loss. Compounded interest, a financial mechanism commonly applied in lawsuits to reflect the time value of money, would exponentially increase the debt owed. This debt is not just economic but cultural, as the loss of land also meant the loss of a way of life.

Reparations could, therefore, easily run into the trillions. This is not merely hypothetical. In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians that the U.S. government had illegally taken the Black Hills, and the Sioux were entitled to compensation. The sum awarded was $106 million—today, with interest, that figure exceeds $1 billion. Yet the Sioux have refused the payment, demanding the return of their land instead. Their stance underscores the inadequacy of financial compensation for the cultural and spiritual dimensions of the loss.

Beyond Dollars: The Moral and Ethical Case for Reparations

While the financial dimension of reparations is essential, the moral and ethical dimensions are equally important. Reparations are not simply about writing a cheque; they are about justice. The broken treaties were not merely legal failures but moral failures, reflecting a systemic disregard for Native sovereignty and human dignity. The U.S. government’s persistent violations of treaties reveal a deep-rooted pattern of exploitation and dishonour that continues to reverberate through Native communities today.

Reparations, in this broader sense, must include the return of lands, the restoration of cultural and political autonomy, and a fundamental rethinking of the relationship between Native nations and the U.S. government. The return of land—such as in the Land Back movement—is a critical component of this. Land is not only a material asset but a living connection to identity, tradition, and the future. Restoring land to Native nations would not only right historical wrongs but also empower them to rebuild their communities on their own terms.

The Political Challenge of Justice

Despite the moral clarity of the case for reparations, political challenges remain immense. Many Americans are unaware of the extent of Native dispossession or may see reparations as impractical or divisive. Yet, as the fight for racial justice has shown, justice is often uncomfortable. The fact that reparations would be costly, complex, and difficult is not an excuse to avoid the issue. If anything, it highlights how deep and enduring the injustice is.

Reparations are not a “handout” but a payment of a debt long overdue. Native nations were once economically, politically, and culturally self-sufficient. The disruption of their societies, through land theft and broken treaties, is the root cause of the poverty, health disparities, and political marginalisation they face today. Addressing this requires more than just policy tweaks; it demands a fundamental reckoning with the past.

Conclusion: Trillions Owed, Promises to Keep

The reparations owed for centuries of broken treaties, stolen land, and unfulfilled promises are not simply about money but about honouring the sovereignty and humanity of Indigenous peoples. The debt is vast—financially, morally, and ethically—but it must be addressed if there is to be any hope for genuine reconciliation. Justice, long delayed, can no longer be denied. This underscores the larger point that the United States rarely follow through on their commitments, but this is a story for another day. Meantime, they’ll continue running roughshod over their people and the world, bullying their way through it.

Decolonising the Mind

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o published “Decolonising the Mind” in 1986. David Guignion shares a 2-part summary analysis of the work on his Theory and Philosophy site.

I used NotebookLLM to produce this short podcast: [Content no longer extant] https://notebooklm.google.com/notebook/7698ab0b-43ab-47d4-a50f-703866cfb1b9/audio

Decolonising the Mind: A Summary

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s book Decolonising the Mind centres on the profound impact of colonialism on language, culture, and thought. It argues that imposing a foreign language on colonised people is a key tool of imperial domination. This linguistic imperialism leads to colonial alienation, separating the colonised from their own culture and forcing them to view the world through the lens of the coloniser.

Here are some key points from the concept of decolonising the mind:

  • Language is intimately tied to culture and worldview: Language shapes how individuals perceive and understand the world. When colonised people are forced to adopt the language of the coloniser, they are also compelled to adopt their cultural framework and values.
  • Colonial education systems perpetuate mental control: By privileging the coloniser’s language and devaluing indigenous languages, colonial education systems reinforce the dominance of the coloniser’s culture and worldview. This process results in colonised children being alienated from their own cultural heritage and internalising a sense of inferiority.
  • Reclaiming indigenous languages is crucial for decolonisation: wa Thiong’o advocates for a return to writing and creating in indigenous African languages. He sees this as an act of resistance against linguistic imperialism and a way to reconnect with authentic African cultures. He further argues that it’s not enough to simply write in indigenous languages; the content must also reflect the struggles and experiences of the people, particularly the peasantry and working class.
  • The concept extends beyond literature: While wa Thiong’o focuses on language in literature, the concept of decolonising the mind has broader implications. It calls for a critical examination of all aspects of life affected by colonialism, including education, politics, and economics.

It is important to note that decolonising the mind is a complex and ongoing process. There are debates about the role of European languages in postcolonial societies, and the concept itself continues to evolve. However, wa Thiong’o’s work remains a seminal text in postcolonial studies, raising crucial questions about the enduring legacy of colonialism on thought and culture.

Don’t Care Much about History

As the years pass and my disappointment matures like a fine wine (spoiler alert: it’s vinegar), I’m reminded of the average intelligence quotient floating about in the wild. A few years back, I stumbled upon The Half-Life of Knowledge. Cute title, but it’s more optimistic than it should be. Why assume knowledge even has a shelf life? It’s one thing for once-useful information to spoil thanks to “progress,” but what about the things that were never true to begin with? Ah, yes, the fabrications, the lies we’re spoon-fed under the guise of education.

I’m well-versed in the lies they peddle in the United States, but I’d bet good money (not that I have any) that every nation’s curriculum comes with its own patriotic propaganda. What am I on about, you ask? Let’s just say I’ve been reading How the World Made the West by Josephine Quinn, and it’s got me thinking. You see, I’ve also been simmering on an anti-democracy book for the better part of five years, and it’s starting to boil over.

Here in the good ol’ US of A, they like to wax lyrical about how Athens was the birthplace of democracy. Sure, Athens had its democratic dabblings. But let’s not get it twisted—if you really look at it, Athens was more akin to the Taliban than to any modern Western state. Shocked? Don’t be. For starters, only property-owning men could vote, and women—brace yourselves—were “forced” to wear veils. Sounds familiar? “It’s a start,” you say. True, American women couldn’t vote until 1920, so let’s all pat ourselves on the back for that—Progress™️.

But no, hold your applause. First off, let’s remember that Athens and Sparta were city-states, not some cohesive entity called “Greece” as we so lovingly imagine. Just a bunch of Greek-speaking neighbours constantly squabbling like reality TV contestants. Meanwhile, over in Persia—yes, the supposed enemy of all things free and democratic—they had participative democracy, too. And guess what? Women in Persia could vote, own property, and serve as soldiers or military officers. So much for the idea that Athens was the singular beacon of democratic virtue.

More than this, Persian democracy was instituted by lottery, so many more people participated in the process by serving one-year terms. At the end of their term, they were audited to check for corruption. Now, you can see why we adopted the so-called Greek version. These blokes don’t welcome any oversight of scrutiny.

As a postmodern subjectivist, I tend to side-eye any grand narrative, and the history of Western civilisation is just one long parade of questionable claims and hidden agendas. Every time I think I’ve seen the last of the historical jump scares, another one comes lurking around the corner. Boo!

Polemics

People often ask why I churn out so many polemic, contrarian articles. The answer? It’s simply how I think. My brain naturally questions everything, not out of a desire to be difficult, but because that’s just my worldview. I’m not inventing challenges for the sake of argument—the challenges are already there, embedded in the world as I see it.

Another reason is solidarity. I write in hopes that others, whose thoughts run along similar lines, might stumble across my material and feel less alone. There’s something deeply reassuring in discovering that someone else has been on the same mental journey—that feeling of “Ah, I’m not alone in this.” Many times, I’ve had ideas only to find that philosophers, thinkers, or whoever have already penned volumes on the subject. And honestly? That grounds me. Even better if they’ve gone further, articulated it more eloquently, or ventured into new depths. It’s all useful. Plus, their critics then become my critics, and I get to sharpen my thoughts in response—or at least build my own defences.

And finally, I write for the potential spark. Maybe someone out there reads a piece of mine and feels inspired to take it further, push an idea beyond what I could imagine. After all, entire Nobel Prize-winning theories have started as someone else’s footnotes. There’s nothing wrong with being someone’s footnote.

So, now you know.


NB: I’ll be in surgery when this posts, so I’ve scheduled this in advance so as not to have a gap…that may occur anyway.

The Spaces Between: A Punctuated History

Language is a fickle thing. Spoken words are fleeting vibrations in the air, while the written word stands still, preserved for all eternity—or at least until someone spills a cup of tea on it. But as it turns out, the way we write things down is just as much a human invention as the words themselves. And perhaps nothing exemplifies this better than the simple, unassuming space.

You see, in the early days, spaces between words didn’t exist at all. Latin texts were written in something called scriptura continua, which, if you’re imagining an interminable block of unbroken letters, is exactly what it was. There were no spaces, no commas, and certainly no handy full stops to tell you when you’d reached the end of a thought. If you’re feeling brave, try reading a page of dense prose without any breaks, and you’ll see just how taxing it must have been. Not for the faint-hearted, especially if your reading material consisted of ancient Roman tax codes or Cicero’s less thrilling speeches.

Originally, Romans tried to manage the chaos with something called the interpunct—a little dot, mid-height, between words. Cute, right? But these mid-dots weren’t as convenient as you’d think. They eventually fell out of fashion, leaving words to once again pile up against each other like an anxious crowd waiting for a delayed train. It wasn’t until some resourceful monks in the seventh century thought, “This is ridiculous, let’s make reading less like mental acrobatics,” that the concept of word spacing, as we know it, truly took off. Hats off to those monks, honestly—turning scriptura continua into something you could read without a magnifying glass and a headache.

And then, along came punctuation. Oh, punctuation! The glorious marks that tell us when to pause, when to stop, and when to yell in sheer disbelief—like the question mark (?!), when you discover early Latin, had none of these. The dots got demoted, moved down to the bottom of the line, and eventually became full stops. Punctuation began as a tool for reading aloud—a sort of musical notation for the voice—but evolved into something to guide the eye, allowing the inner voice to navigate text without getting lost.

The spaces and dots may seem like minor players, but they were transformative. They laid the foundation for silent reading, which revolutionised the entire act of reading itself. No longer were texts simply prompts for orators to recite; they became private journeys into the mind. By the time the printing press rolled around, spaces and punctuation were firmly in place, making it possible for literacy to spread and for people to sit in quiet corners, reading for pleasure. Who would have thought that the humble space—the “nothing” between words—would become a hero of the human intellect?

For a deeper dive into this rather niche but wildly fascinating history, check out Rob Words’ video on the subject here: Where Does Punctuation Come From?!. It’s well worth your time—a rollicking journey through the peculiarities of written language, spaces, and all the delightful stops along the way.

And remember, next time you type a message, mind the gap. It’s doing a lot more work than you think.

The Limits of Language: Why Philosophical Paradoxes Might Be Illusions of Mapping

Philosophical paradoxes have long captured our imagination, from Zeno’s paradoxes about movement to the Liar Paradox that tangles truth and falsehood into an endless loop. Often, these puzzles are treated as fundamental mysteries of the universe—windows into the limits of human understanding or insight into the hidden structure of reality. But what if, rather than reflecting deep truths about existence, many of these paradoxes are artefacts of language itself—symptoms of our conceptual tools struggling to adequately map a complex terrain? Perhaps, more often than not, the perplexities we face are the result of an inadequate mapping—a linguistic or cognitive misfire—rather than true paradoxes of the underlying terrain of reality.

This notion—that many paradoxes arise from the limitations of language and cognition—finds resonance in the work of philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein argued that many philosophical problems arise because we misuse language, taking words beyond their natural context, confusing what our words describe with the objects or concepts themselves. In this sense, our maps (the linguistic and logical structures we use) often lead us astray when navigating the conceptual terrains of ethics, metaphysics, or the nature of truth.

This idea can be articulated under what we might call the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis: the view that the limitations of language itself are at the root of many philosophical paradoxes. According to this hypothesis, the apparent contradictions or puzzles that emerge in philosophical discourse often reveal more about the shortcomings of our representational tools than about any deep metaphysical truths. The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis suggests that our conceptual maps are inadequate for fully capturing the richness of the terrains we attempt to describe, and that this inadequacy leads us to mistake linguistic confusion for genuine philosophical mystery.

The Inherent Limitations of Linguistic Communication

Language, often hailed as humanity’s greatest achievement, may paradoxically be one of our most significant limitations. The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis posits that language is inherently inadequate for communicating abstract concepts, a notion that challenges our fundamental understanding of human communication and cognition. This perspective traces the evolution of language from its primitive origins to its current complexity, revealing the philosophical and practical implications of linguistic inadequacy.

The Accidental Evolution of Language

Language, like many aspects of human biology and cognition, emerged not through intentional design but as an evolutionary accident. Initially serving as an internal cognitive function—a means of organising one’s own thoughts—language gradually evolved into a tool for external communication. This transition likely began with simple vocalisations, perhaps rooted in rhythmic expressions akin to music and dance, before developing into more structured speech.

Early linguistic communication likely centred on concrete objects and immediate experiences, with words serving as direct signifiers for observable phenomena. However, as human cognition grew more sophisticated, so too did our linguistic capabilities, expanding to include verbs, modifiers, and eventually, abstract nouns.

The Emergence of Abstraction and Its Challenges

The development of abstract nouns marked a significant leap in human cognition and communication. Concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘justice’, and ‘freedom’ allowed for more complex and nuanced discourse. However, this advancement came at a cost: these abstract concepts, lacking direct physical referents, introduced unprecedented ambiguity and potential for misunderstanding.

The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis suggests that this ambiguity is not merely a byproduct of abstraction, but a fundamental limitation of language itself. While two individuals might easily agree on the ‘treeness’ of a physical tree, concepts like ‘fairness’ or ‘reason’ are inherently unresolvable through linguistic means alone. This insufficiency becomes increasingly apparent as we move further from concrete, observable phenomena into the realm of abstract thought.

Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work provides crucial insights into the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis. Wittgenstein posited that words ultimately only map to other words, never truly making contact with the objective world. This perspective suggests that language operates within a closed system of human understanding, constructing our perception of reality rather than directly representing it.

This Wittgensteinian dilemma underscores the core of the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis: if words only refer to other words, how can we ever be certain that we’re communicating abstract concepts accurately? The very tool we use to discuss and understand abstraction may be fundamentally incapable of capturing its essence.

Cultural and Disciplinary Variations

The inadequacy of language in conveying abstract concepts becomes even more apparent when we consider cultural and disciplinary variations in communication. Different cultures and academic disciplines develop their own specialised vocabularies and ‘language games’, as Wittgenstein termed them. While these specialised languages may facilitate communication within specific contexts, they often create barriers to understanding for outsiders.

This phenomenon highlights another aspect of linguistic insufficiency: the context-dependent nature of meaning. Abstract concepts may be understood differently across cultures or disciplines, further complicating attempts at clear communication.

Neurolinguistic Perspectives

Recent advances in neurolinguistics have provided new insights into the brain structures involved in language processing. While these studies have enhanced our understanding of how the brain handles language, they have also revealed the complexity and variability of linguistic processing across individuals. This neurological diversity further supports the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis, suggesting that even at a biological level, there may be inherent limitations to how accurately we can communicate abstract concepts.

Implications and Counter-Arguments

The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis has profound implications for fields ranging from philosophy and psychology to law and international relations. If language is indeed inadequate for communicating abstract concepts, how can we ensure mutual understanding in complex negotiations or philosophical debates?

However, it’s important to note that not all scholars accept the strong version of this hypothesis. Some argue that while language may have limitations, it remains our most sophisticated tool for sharing abstract ideas. They suggest that through careful definition, contextualisation, and the use of metaphor and analogy, we can overcome many of the inherent limitations of linguistic communication.

Navigating the Limits of Language

The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis presents a challenging perspective on human communication. It suggests that our primary tool for sharing abstract thoughts may be fundamentally flawed, incapable of fully capturing the complexity of our inner cognitive experiences.

Yet, recognising these limitations need not lead to communicative nihilism. Instead, it can foster a more nuanced approach to language use, encouraging us to be more precise in our definitions, more aware of potential misunderstandings, and more open to alternative forms of expression.

As we continue to grapple with abstract concepts and strive for clearer communication, we must remain cognizant of these linguistic limitations. Understanding the origins and nature of language—and its inherent insufficiencies—can help us navigate its complexities, fostering more effective and empathetic communication across diverse fields of human endeavour.

The Frege–Geach Problem as an Illustration of Linguistic Limitations

One pertinent example of this idea is the Frege–Geach problem, a challenge often faced by expressivist theories of ethics. Expressivists maintain that moral statements do not describe facts but rather express attitudes or emotions—a statement like “lying is wrong” is an expression of disapproval rather than a factual assertion. The Frege–Geach problem arises when such moral statements are embedded in logical constructions like conditionals or arguments: “If lying is wrong, then getting your little brother to lie is wrong.” In this context, expressivists face a challenge in explaining how the meaning of “lying is wrong” remains coherent across different uses, without reducing moral expressions to descriptive claims.

The Frege–Geach problem thus illustrates a fundamental limitation: attempting to apply truth-conditional logic, designed for descriptive language, to moral discourse, which serves a different function altogether. In trying to map evaluative terrain—which involves emotions, commitments, and subjective attitudes—using the same structures meant for factual landscapes, we encounter conceptual misalignments. This problem—a confusion of the terrain for the map—is not necessarily a genuine paradox about moral truths but rather a reflection of the inadequacy of our current linguistic tools. Just as a physical map may fail to capture the emotional experience of a journey, so too do our linguistic and logical maps fail to adequately capture the moral landscape.

Wittgenstein’s later work is helpful in framing this issue. He emphasised the importance of recognising different language-games: the rules and purposes that guide different forms of discourse. Moral language is not like scientific language; it follows different rules and aims to express and influence attitudes rather than establish empirically verifiable facts. The Frege–Geach problem emerges precisely because we attempt to impose a single logical structure onto forms of language that serve different purposes, confusing the distinct games we are playing. This attempt to force moral language into a framework designed for empirical propositions produces an apparent paradox, where the real issue lies in our misuse of the conceptual map.

This pattern of misinterpretation is not unique to moral discourse. Many philosophical paradoxes—from problems of identity and personal continuity to issues of free will and determinism—arise when we try to map different terrains with the same linguistic structures, or when we push our conceptual tools beyond their natural limits. Cognitive limitations also play a role; our tendency to think in binary oppositions, our reliance on categories, and our need for consistent narratives often lead to oversimplifications of complex realities. These cognitive tools—essential for everyday functioning—can prove inadequate for capturing the nuance of the philosophical landscapes we attempt to navigate.

The map-terrain challenge is thus at the core of why philosophical paradoxes can seem so intractable. Our maps—the languages and logical frameworks that structure our thinking—are, by their nature, simplifications of a world that is far more nuanced than we can readily articulate. When the terrain is moral, aesthetic, or otherwise not reducible to simple truths or falsehoods, the inadequacies of our maps become evident. We are left facing paradoxes that may, in truth, be nothing more than indicators that our representational systems need refinement or expansion.

Rather than treating these paradoxes as unresolvable, we might benefit from seeing them as invitations to reconsider our linguistic and cognitive frameworks. In recognising that the Frege–Geach problem, for instance, may reflect an ill-suited mapping of moral discourse rather than a genuine mystery about moral reality, we open the door to a pluralistic approach: different terrains require different maps. Perhaps, in some cases, the best solution is not to attempt to solve the paradox in traditional terms but to change the way we map the terrain altogether—to allow for multiple, context-sensitive tools that respect the particularity of each domain of discourse.

Ultimately, this perspective suggests a more flexible and cautious approach to philosophical inquiry—one that acknowledges the limits of our conceptual tools and remains open to the possibility that the terrain is far richer and more varied than our maps can currently capture.

From Memes to Meaning: The Beautiful Chaos of Modern Language

3–5 minutes

The Present Day: Social Media and Memes – The Final Nail in the Coffin?

Just when you thought things couldn’t get any more chaotic, enter the 21st century, where language has been boiled down to 280 characters, emojis, and viral memes. If you think trying to pin down the meaning of “freedom” was hard before, try doing it in a tweet—or worse, a string of emojis. In the age of social media, language has reached new heights of ambiguity, with people using bite-sized bits of text and images to convey entire thoughts, arguments, and philosophies. And you thought interpreting Derrida was difficult.

Social media has turned language into an evolving, shape-shifting entity. Words take on new meanings overnight, hashtags rise and fall, and memes become the shorthand for complex cultural commentary. In some ways, it’s brilliant—what better way to capture the madness of modern life than with an image of a confused cat or a poorly drawn cartoon character? But in other ways, it’s the final nail in the coffin for clear communication. We’ve gone from painstakingly crafted texts, like Luther’s 95 Theses, to memes that rely entirely on shared cultural context to make sense.

The irony is that we’ve managed to make language both more accessible and more incomprehensible at the same time. Sure, anyone can fire off a tweet or share a meme, but unless you’re plugged into the same cultural references, you’re probably going to miss half the meaning. It’s like Wittgenstein’s language games on steroids—everyone’s playing, but the rules change by the second, and good luck keeping up.

And then there’s the problem of tone. Remember those philosophical debates where words were slippery? Well, now we’re trying to have those debates in text messages and social media posts, where tone and nuance are often impossible to convey. Sarcasm? Forget about it. Context? Maybe in a follow-up tweet, if you’re lucky. We’re using the most limited forms of communication to talk about the most complex ideas, and it’s no surprise that misunderstandings are at an all-time high.

And yet, here we are, in the midst of the digital age, still using the same broken tool—language—to try and make sense of the world. We’ve come a long way from “flamey thing hot,” but the basic problem remains: words are slippery, meanings shift, and no matter how advanced our technology gets, we’re still stuck in the same old game of trying to get our point across without being completely misunderstood.

Conclusion: Language – Beautiful, Broken, and All We’ve Got

And here’s where the irony kicks in. We’ve spent this entire time critiquing language—pointing out its flaws, its limitations, its inability to truly capture abstract ideas. And how have we done that? By using language. It’s like complaining about how unreliable your GPS is while using it to get to your destination. Sure, it’s broken—but it’s still the only tool we have.

In the end, language is both our greatest achievement and our biggest limitation. It’s allowed us to build civilisations, create art, write manifestos, and start revolutions. But it’s also the source of endless miscommunication, philosophical debates that never get resolved, and social media wars over what a simple tweet really meant.

So yes, language is flawed. It’s messy, it’s subjective, and it often fails us just when we need it most. But without it? We’d still be sitting around the fire, grunting at each other about the ‘toothey thing’ lurking in the shadows. For better or worse, language is the best tool we’ve got for making sense of the world. It’s beautifully broken, but we wouldn’t have it any other way.

And with that, we’ve used the very thing we’ve critiqued to make our point. The circle of irony is complete.


Previous | End

Jargon, Brains, and the Struggle for Meaning

6–9 minutes

Specialised Languages: Academia’s Jargon Olympics

If you thought normal language was confusing, let’s take a moment to appreciate the true champions of linguistic obscurity: academics. Welcome to the world of specialised languages, where entire fields of study have developed their own language games that make even Wittgenstein’s head spin.

Here’s how it works: Every discipline—science, law, philosophy—creates its own jargon to describe the world. At first, it seems helpful. Instead of using vague terms, you get precise definitions for complex ideas. But what started as a way to improve communication within a field quickly turned into a linguistic arms race, where the more obscure and convoluted your terms are, the smarter you sound. You’re not just a lawyer anymore—you’re someone who’s ready to throw “res ipsa loquitur” into casual conversation to leave everyone else in the room wondering if they’ve missed a memo.

The problem? If you’re not part of the club, good luck understanding what anyone is talking about. Want to read a physics paper? Prepare to learn a whole new vocabulary. Need to get through a legal document? You’ll be knee-deep in Latin phrases before you even get to the point. And don’t even try to decipher a philosophical text unless you’re ready to battle abstract nouns that have been stretched and twisted beyond recognition.

It’s not just the words themselves that are the issue—it’s the sheer density of them. Take “justice” for example. In philosophy, you’ve got theories about distributive justice, retributive justice, restorative justice, and a hundred other variations, each with its own set of terms and conditions. And that’s before we even touch on how “justice” is defined in legal circles, where it becomes an even more tangled mess of case law and precedent. Every field is playing its own version of the “justice” game, with its own rules and definitions, and none of them are interested in comparing notes.

This is the academic world in a nutshell. Each discipline has built its own linguistic fortress, and unless you’ve spent years studying, you’re not getting in. But here’s the kicker: even within these fields, people are often misunderstanding each other. Just because two scientists are using the same words doesn’t mean they’re on the same page. Sometimes, it’s more like a game of intellectual one-upmanship—who can define the most obscure term or twist a familiar word into something completely unrecognisable?

And let’s not forget the philosophers. They’ve turned linguistic acrobatics into an art form. Good luck reading Foucault or Derrida without a dictionary (or five) on hand. You might walk away thinking you understand their points, but do you really? Or have you just memorised the jargon without actually grasping the deeper meaning? Even scholars within these fields often argue over what was really meant by a certain text—Barthes, after all, famously declared the “death of the author,” so it’s not like anyone really has the final say on meaning anyway.

So here we are, knee-deep in jargon, trying to communicate with people who, technically, speak the same language but are operating within entirely different rulesets. Every academic discipline has its own secret code, and if you don’t know it, you’re lost. Even when you do know the code, you’re still at risk of miscommunication, because the words that look familiar have been stretched and shaped to fit highly specific contexts. It’s like being fluent in one dialect of English and then suddenly being asked to write a thesis in legalese. Good luck.

In the end, academia’s specialised languages don’t just make things harder—they actively create barriers. What started as a way to improve precision has turned into an obstacle course of incomprehensible terms, where the real challenge is just figuring out what anyone’s actually saying. And let’s be honest, even if you do figure it out, there’s no guarantee it’s going to mean the same thing next time you see it.

Neurolinguistics: Even Our Brains Can’t Agree

So far, we’ve seen how language is a mess of miscommunication, cultural differences, and academic jargon. But surely, at least on a biological level, our brains are all on the same page, right? Well, not exactly. Welcome to the wonderful world of neurolinguistics, where it turns out that even the very organ responsible for language can’t get its act together.

Here’s the deal: Neurolinguistics is the study of how the brain processes language, and while it’s fascinating, it’s also a bit of a buzzkill for anyone hoping for consistency. See, your brain and my brain don’t process language in the same way. Sure, we’ve got similar hardware, but the software is wildly unpredictable. There are individual differences, cultural influences, and developmental quirks that all affect how we understand and produce language. What’s simple for one brain might be completely baffling to another.

Take, for example, something as basic as syntax. Chomsky might have told us we all have a universal grammar hard-wired into our brains, but neurolinguistics has shown that how we apply that grammar can vary significantly. Some people are wired to handle complex sentence structures with ease—think of that friend who can follow 10 different clauses in a single breath. Others? Not so much. For them, even a moderately tricky sentence feels like mental gymnastics. The brain is constantly juggling words, meanings, and structures, and some brains are better at it than others.

But the real kicker is how differently we interpret words. Remember those abstract nouns we’ve been wrestling with? Well, it turns out that your brain might be interpreting ‘freedom’ or ‘justice’ completely differently from mine – not just because of culture or upbringing, but because our brains physically process those words in different ways. Neurolinguistic studies have shown that certain regions of the brain are activated differently depending on the individual’s experience with language. In other words, your personal history with a concept can literally change how your brain lights up when you hear or say it.

And don’t even get me started on bilingual brains. If you speak more than one language, your brain is constantly toggling between two (or more) linguistic systems, which means it’s running twice the risk of misinterpretation. What a word means in one language might trigger a completely different association in another, leaving bilingual speakers in a constant state of linguistic flux. It’s like trying to run two operating systems on the same computer—things are bound to get glitchy.

But here’s the real kicker: Even within the same person, the brain can’t always process language the same way all the time. Stress, fatigue, emotional state—all of these factors can influence how well we handle language on any given day. Ever tried to have a coherent conversation when you’re tired or angry? Good luck. Your brain isn’t interested in nuance or deep philosophical ideas when it’s in survival mode. It’s just trying to get through the day without short-circuiting.

So, not only do we have to deal with the external chaos of language – miscommunication, different contexts, shifting meanings – but we also have to contend with the fact that our own brains are unreliable interpreters. You can use all the right words, follow all the right grammar rules, and still end up with a garbled mess of meaning because your brain decided to take a nap halfway through the sentence.

In the end, neurolinguistics reminds us that language isn’t just a social or cultural problem – it’’’s a biological one too. Our brains are doing their best to keep up, but they’re far from perfect. The very organ that makes language possible is also responsible for making it infinitely more complicated than it needs to be. And if we can’t rely on our own brains to process language consistently, what hope do we have of ever understanding anyone else?


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Language: Tool for Clarity or Shaper of Reality?

6–8 minutes

Pinker: The Optimist Who Thinks Language Works

Enter Steven Pinker, a cognitive scientist and eternal optimist about language. While we’ve been busy pointing out how language is a jumbled mess of misunderstandings, Pinker comes along with a sunny outlook, waving his banner for the language instinct. According to Pinker, language is an evolved tool – something that our brains are wired to use, and it’s good. Really good. So good, in fact, that it allowed us to build civilisations, exchange complex ideas, and, you know, not get eaten by sabre-toothed tigers.

Sounds like a nice break from all the linguistic doom and gloom, right? Pinker believes that language is a powerful cognitive skill, something we’ve developed to communicate thoughts and abstract ideas with remarkable precision. He points to the fact that we’re able to create entire worlds through language – novels, philosophies, legal systems, and scientific theories. Language is, to him, one of the greatest achievements of the human mind.

But here’s where things get a little sticky. Sure, Pinker’s optimism about language is refreshing, but he’s still not solving our core problem: meaning. Pinker may argue that language works wonderfully for most of our day-to-day communication – and in many cases, he’s right. We can all agree that saying, “Hey, don’t touch the flamey thing” is a pretty effective use of language. But once we start using words like ‘freedom’ or ‘justice’, things start to unravel again.

Take a sentence like ‘freedom is essential’. Great. Pinker might say this is a perfectly formed thought, conveyed using our finely tuned linguistic instincts. But the problem? Ask five people what ‘freedom’ means, and you’ll get five different answers. Sure, the grammar is flawless, and everyone understands the sentence structurally. But what they mean by ‘freedom’? That’s a whole other ball game.

Pinker’s language instinct theory helps explain how we learn language, but it doesn’t really account for how we use language to convey abstract, subjective ideas. He might tell us that language has evolved as an efficient way to communicate, but that doesn’t fix the problem of people using the same words to mean wildly different things. You can be the most eloquent speaker in the world, but if your definition of ‘freedom’ isn’t the same as mine, we’re still lost in translation.

And let’s not forget: while language is indeed a fantastic tool for sharing information and surviving in complex societies, it’s also great at creating conflicts. Wars have been fought over differences in how people interpret words like ‘justice’ or ‘rights’. Pinker might say we’ve evolved language to foster cooperation, but history suggests we’ve also used it to argue endlessly about things we can never quite agree on.

So, yes, Pinker’s right – language is a cognitive marvel, and it’s gotten us pretty far. But his optimism doesn’t quite stretch far enough to cover the fact that language, for all its brilliance, still leaves us stuck in a web of interpretation and miscommunication. It’s like having a state-of-the-art GPS that works perfectly – until you get to that roundabout and suddenly no one knows which exit to take.

In the end, Pinker’s got a point: language is one of the most sophisticated tools we’ve ever developed. It’s just a shame that when it comes to abstract concepts, we still can’t agree on which way’s north.

Sapir-Whorf: Language Shapes Reality – Or Does It?

Now it’s time for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis to take the stage, where things get really interesting – or, depending on your perspective, slightly ridiculous. According to this theory, the language you speak actually shapes the way you see the world. Think of it as linguistic mind control: your perception of reality is limited by the words you have at your disposal. Speak the wrong language, and you might as well be living on another planet.

Sounds dramatic, right? Here’s the gist: Sapir and Whorf argued that the structure of a language affects how its speakers think and perceive the world. If you don’t have a word for something, you’re going to have a hard time thinking about that thing. Inuit languages, for example, are famous for having multiple words for different kinds of snow. If you’re an Inuit speaker, the hypothesis goes, you’re much more attuned to subtle differences in snow than someone who just calls it all ‘snow’.

Now, on the surface, this sounds kind of plausible. After all, we do think using language, don’t we? And there’s some truth to the idea that language can influence the way we categorise and describe the world. But here’s where Sapir-Whorf starts to go off the deep end. According to the stronger version of this hypothesis, your entire reality is shaped and limited by your language. If you don’t have the word for “freedom” in your language, you can’t experience it. If your language doesn’t have a word for “blue,” well, guess what? You don’t see blue.

Let’s take a step back. This sounds like the kind of thing you’d hear at a dinner party from someone who’s just a little too impressed with their first year of linguistics classes. Sure, language can shape thought to a degree, but it doesn’t have a stranglehold on our perception of reality. We’re not prisoners of our own vocabulary. After all, you can still experience freedom, even if you’ve never heard the word. And you can certainly see blue, whether your language has a word for it or not.

In fact, the idea that you’re trapped by your language is a little insulting, when you think about it. Are we really saying that people who speak different languages are living in different realities? That a person who speaks Mandarin sees the world in a fundamentally different way than someone who speaks Spanish? Sure, there might be some subtle differences in how each language breaks down concepts, but we’re all still human. We’re all still sharing the same world, and no matter what language we speak, we still have the cognitive capacity to understand and experience things beyond the limits of our vocabulary.

Let’s also not forget that language is flexible. If you don’t have a word for something, you make one up. If you’re missing a concept, you borrow it from another language or invent a metaphor. The idea that language is some kind of mental prison ignores the fact that we’re constantly evolving our language to keep up with the way we see the world—not the other way around.

And here’s the real kicker: if Sapir and Whorf were right, and we’re all walking around in little linguistic bubbles, then how on earth have we managed to translate anything? How have entire philosophies, religious texts, and scientific theories made their way across cultures and languages for centuries? If language really was shaping our reality that strongly, translation would be impossible – or at least incredibly limited. But here we are, discussing concepts like ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, and ‘truth’ across languages, cultures, and centuries.

So while it’s fun to entertain the idea that your language shapes your reality, let’s not give it too much credit. Yes, language can influence how we think about certain things. But no, it doesn’t define the boundaries of our existence. We’re not all stuck in a linguistic matrix, waiting for the right word to set us free.


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