Category: language

Metamodernism: A Postmodern Critique

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The genesis of the Modernity Worldview Survey was Metamodernism. Is this still a thing? In recent years, metamodernism has emerged as a supposed successor to postmodernism, claiming to transcend the seemingly irreconcilable tensions between modernist sincerity and postmodern irony. Yet, upon closer examination, this framework reveals itself not as a genuine paradigm shift but rather as a modernist invention that fails to escape the very critiques it attempts to address.

Video: Introduction to Modernity Worldview Survey concepts

The Modernist Roots of Metamodernism

Despite its claims of oscillation between poles, metamodernism betrays its modernist underpinnings through its implicit teleology and notion of progress. The very framing of “meta” as beyond or transcending suggests a linear progression that is fundamentally at odds with the postmodern rejection of grand narratives. Metamodernism positions itself as forward-moving whilst attempting to recapture elements of premodernity, revealing an anxiety about being perceived as regressive or naive.

Podcast: Audio version of this content

This desire to have it both ways—to acknowledge the constructed nature of meaning whilst still pursuing transcendent meaning—doesn’t represent a resolution so much as a psychological coping mechanism. The cognitive dissonance created by attempting to simultaneously hold contradictory positions is assuaged through a clever rhetorical move: claiming that oscillation itself is the point.

A Rebranding Exercise

What metamodernism presents as novel is ultimately a recombination of elements from premodern, modern, and postmodern frameworks without resolving their fundamental contradictions. Rather than being mutually exclusive from these earlier paradigms, it cherry-picks aspects of each whilst maintaining the basic ontological framework of modernism.

The notion that one can meaningfully “oscillate” between accepting objective and subjective realities is particularly problematic. Either reality has objective features, or it doesn’t—pretending otherwise doesn’t create a new philosophical paradigm but rather a convenient means of avoiding the implications of either position.

Postmodern Irony in Motion

Perhaps the most intriguing interpretation of metamodernism is not as a sincere attempt to move beyond postmodernism but as postmodernism performing its own critique. Viewed through this lens, metamodernism becomes postmodern irony in motion—a knowing wink at the impossibility of escaping construction whilst performatively engaging with the desire to do so.

The irony deepens when we consider that “postmodernism” itself is essentially an externally imposed label rather than a self-identification. Most thinkers characterised as postmodernists reject the label, which functions primarily as a modernist attempt to categorise and contain ideas that fundamentally challenge its frameworks.

Art vs. Philosophy

Where metamodernism succeeds is as a descriptive label for certain artistic and cultural productions that deliberately play in the space between irony and sincerity. Works like David Foster Wallace’s “Infinite Jest,” the television series “BoJack Horseman,” and Wes Anderson’s films effectively combine postmodern techniques with sincere emotional engagement.

However, what works as an artistic sensibility fails as a comprehensive philosophical framework or moral compass. The oscillation that enriches art becomes paralysing when applied to ethics or ontology. A moral framework requires some stable reference points; constantly shifting between believing in objective moral truths and viewing morality as entirely constructed provides no reliable guide for actual decision-making.

Insider vs. Outsider Perspectives

Like religious frameworks that balance literal and metaphorical interpretations, metamodernism may function as a lived experience for those who embrace it, even if it doesn’t hold up to external philosophical scrutiny. The cognitive manoeuvres that appear as tricks or inconsistencies to outsiders often feel like natural, intuitive ways of navigating complexity to those within the system.

This insider/outsider divide recalls Thomas Nagel’s famous “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (PDF) thought experiment—there may be experiential aspects of inhabiting a metamodern worldview that aren’t fully comprehensible from the outside. Yet this doesn’t invalidate external critique; inconsistencies and contradictions still matter philosophically.

Conclusion: Beyond Labels

Perhaps the most postmodern insight is recognising that we cannot escape having an ideology—even a position of having no ideology is itself an ideology. What distinguishes various approaches isn’t whether they have ideologies but how explicitly they acknowledge them, how consistently they apply them, and how willing they are to subject them to revision.

Metamodernism, for all its aspirations to transcend earlier frameworks, ultimately reveals more about our contemporary psychological condition than it offers as a coherent philosophical position. It captures our desire to maintain meaning in a world where we’ve recognised its contingency—a desire that may be fundamentally human, even if philosophically untenable.

Rather than seeking yet another “-ism” to resolve our existential and philosophical tensions, perhaps we might more honestly confront the limitations and partialities of all our frameworks, recognising that the search for a perfect synthesis may itself be a modernist fantasy.

Sentient Humour of ChatGPT

Posted in consciousness, intelligence, language, maths, perception, philosophy, psychology, technologyTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

This will be hilarious to approximately no one. I meant to ask ChatGPT 03-mini-high to generate a dummy record. My compromised motor skills and concomitant keyboard typing skills rendered this as funny. Except for the redacted bits in bold, this is the code it rendered. Pay special attention to the query’s input variables highlighted in post-production with 🤔 emojis.

Let’s add a bit to write a funny record per the schema.

import mysql.connector
import logging
import uuid

# Configure logging
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

def test_mysql_connection():
    """Test MySQL connection and write a funny record to the database."""
    logger.info("Testing MySQL connection...")
    
    try:
        logger.info("Connecting to MySQL...")
        connection = mysql.connector.connect(
            host='127.0.0.1',
            user='[user]',
            password='[password]',
            database='[database]',
            port=3306
        )

        if connection.is_connected():
            db_info = connection.get_server_info()
            logger.info(f"Connected to MySQL Server version {db_info}")

            cursor = connection.cursor()
            cursor.execute("SELECT DATABASE();")
            record = cursor.fetchone()
            logger.info(f"Connected to database: {record[0]}")

            # Insert a funny record into survey_results
            funny_survey_data = {
                "session_id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
                "q1_response": 1,
                "q2_response": 2,
                "q3_response": 3,
                "q4_response": 4,
                "q5_response": 5,
                "q6_response": 6,
                "n1": 42, 🤔
                "n2": 69, 🤔
                "n3": 420, 🤔
                "plot_x": 3.14, 🤔
                "plot_y": 2.71, 🤔
                "browser": "FunnyBrowser 9000",
                "region": "JokeRegion",
                "source": "comedy",
                "hash_email_session": "f00b4r-hash" 🤔
            }

            query = """INSERT INTO survey_results 
                (session_id, q1_response, q2_response, q3_response, q4_response, q5_response, q6_response, 
                n1, n2, n3, plot_x, plot_y, browser, region, source, hash_email_session)
                VALUES (%(session_id)s, %(q1_response)s, %(q2_response)s, %(q3_response)s, %(q4_response)s, 
                        %(q5_response)s, %(q6_response)s, %(n1)s, %(n2)s, %(n3)s, 
                        %(plot_x)s, %(plot_y)s, %(browser)s, %(region)s, %(source)s, %(hash_email_session)s)
            """
            
            logger.info("Inserting funny survey record...")
            cursor.execute(query, funny_survey_data)
            connection.commit()
            logger.info(f"Funny survey record inserted with ID: {cursor.lastrowid}")

    except mysql.connector.Error as e:
        logger.error(f"Error during MySQL operation: {e}")

    finally:
        if 'cursor' in locals() and cursor:
            cursor.close()
        if 'connection' in locals() and connection.is_connected():
            connection.close()
            logger.info("MySQL connection closed.")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    test_mysql_connection()

Last Word on Nexus

Posted in language, modernism, perception, philosophy, politics, psychologyTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Yuval Noah Harari’s Nexus is a masterclass in well-constructed rhetoric. A gifted storyteller, Harari wields his prose with the finesse of a seasoned polemicist, but his penchant for reductionism undermines the very complexity he claims to dissect. As a historian, he undoubtedly grasps the intricate web of historical causality, yet he distils it into convenient dichotomies, cherry-picking points to prop up his preferred narrative. He doesn’t just oversimplify history—he commits the cardinal sin of overfitting the past to predict the future, as though the arc of history bends neatly to his will.

Harari offers binary possibilities, but his worldview is anything but ambivalent. He is a Modernist to his core, a devoted evangelist of Progress™ with a capital P. His unwavering faith in the forward march of human civilisation betrays an almost theological zeal, as if history itself were a teleological engine hurtling toward an inevitable destiny.

More troubling, though, is his tendency to step beyond his lane, veering into the treacherous territory of the Dunning-Kruger effect. He confuses the illusion of control with actual control, mistaking correlation for causation and influence for omnipotence. The result? A grand narrative that seduces with its elegance but crumbles under scrutiny—an edifice of certainty built on the shaky foundations of conjecture.

In the end, Nexus is a fascinating read, not because it reveals an immutable truth about our future, but because it so brilliantly encapsulates the ambitions—and the blind spots—of its author.

Yesterday and Today

Posted in language, philosophy, psychology, realityTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 3 Comments

For no apparent reason, I was pondering lost temporal words, so I paid a quick visit to ChatGPT and wanted to share the wealth. Perhaps we can bring some of these back from the grave.

Audio: Podcast prattle of this content.

Eldernight: Referring to the night before last, this term has long since faded from common usage.

Erewhile: Meaning “a little while ago” or “previously.”

Ereyesterday: Meaning “the day before yesterday” – a direct counterpart to “overmorrow.”

Erstwhile: Similar to “erewhile,” it denotes something that was formerly the case.

Fortnight: Short for “fourteen nights,” this term refers to a two-week period and is still in use in British English.

Nudiustertian: A wonderfully specific Latin-derived term meaning “of or relating to the day before yesterday.”

Overmorrow: This term was used to indicate the day after tomorrow.

Sennight: Derived from “seven nights,” this word was used to mean a week.

Umwhile: Another Scottish term meaning “at times” or “occasionally” in the past.

Whilom: An archaic term meaning “formerly” or “once upon a time.”

Yore: While you touched on similar concepts with “whilom,” this term specifically means “of long ago” or “of time long past.”

Yestereve: This term referred to the evening of the previous day, essentially what we’d call “last night.”

Yestermorrow: An intriguing word that denoted “yesterday morning.”

Yestreen: A Scottish and Northern English word meaning “yesterday evening” or “last night” – similar to “yestereve” but with different regional origins.

These terms, though largely obsolete, offer a glimpse into the linguistic richness of earlier English, providing nuanced ways to express temporal relationships that have since been lost in modern usage.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness

Posted in consciousness, language, nature, perception, philosophy, psychology, science, videoTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 2 Comments

If you are reading this, you are likely familiar with David Chalmers’ idea of the Hard Problem of Consciousness—the thorny, maddeningly unsolvable question of why and how subjective experience arises from physical processes. If you’re not, welcome to the rabbit hole. Here, we’ll plunge deeper by examining the perspective of Stuart Hameroff, who, like a philosophical magician, reframes this conundrum as a chicken-and-egg problem: what came first, life or consciousness? His answer? Consciousness. But wait—there’s a slight snag. Neither “life” nor “consciousness” has a universally agreed-upon definition. Oh, the joy of philosophical discourse.

Video: Professor Stuart Hameroff and others promote the idea that consciousness pre-dates life. A fuller version is available at IAI.
Audio: Podcast on this topic.

For the uninitiated, Hameroff’s stance is heavily flavoured with panpsychism—the idea that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the universe, like space or time. In this worldview, consciousness predates life itself. From this vantage, Hameroff’s proposition seems inevitable, a tidy solution that fits neatly into a panpsychistic framework. But let me stop you right there because I’m not signing up for the panpsychism fan club, and I’m certainly not prepared to let Hameroff’s intellectual sleight of hand go unchallenged.

To make his case, Hameroff engages in a curious manoeuvre: he defines both life and consciousness in ways that conveniently serve his argument. Consciousness, for him, is not limited to the complex phenomena of human or even animal experience but is a fundamental property of the universe, embedded in the very fabric of reality. Meanwhile, consciousness eventually orchestrates itself into life—a secondary phenomenon. With these definitions, his argument clicks together like a self-serving jigsaw puzzle. It’s clever, I’ll grant him that. But cleverness isn’t the same as being correct.

This is the philosophical equivalent of marking your own homework. By defining the terms of debate to fit his narrative, Hameroff ensures that his conclusion will satisfy his fellow panpsychists. The faithful will nod along, their priors confirmed. But for those outside this echo chamber, his framework raises more questions than it answers. How does this universal consciousness work? Why should we accept its existence as a given? And—here’s the kicker—doesn’t this just punt the problem one step back? If consciousness is fundamental, what’s the mechanism by which it “pre-exists” life?

Hameroff’s move is bold, certainly. But boldness isn’t enough. Philosophy demands rigour, and redefining terms to suit your argument isn’t rigorous; it’s rhetorical trickery. Sure, it’s provocative. But does it advance our understanding of the Hard Problem, or does it merely reframe it in a way that makes Hameroff’s preferred answer seem inevitable? For my money, it’s the latter.

The real issue is that panpsychism itself is a philosophical Rorschach test. It’s a worldview that can mean just about anything, from the claim that electrons have a rudimentary kind of awareness to the idea that the universe is a giant mind. Hameroff’s take lands somewhere in this spectrum, but like most panpsychist arguments, it’s long on metaphysical speculation and short on empirical grounding. If you already believe that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality, Hameroff’s arguments will feel like a revelation. If you don’t, they’ll feel like smoke and mirrors.

In the end, Hameroff’s chicken-and-egg problem might be better framed as a false dichotomy. Perhaps life and consciousness co-evolved in ways we can’t yet fully understand. Or perhaps consciousness, as we understand it, emerges from the complexity of life, a byproduct rather than a prerequisite. What’s clear is that Hameroff’s solution isn’t as tidy as it seems, nor as universally compelling. It’s a clever sleight of hand, but let’s not mistake cleverness for truth.

Outraged at Evil

Posted in language, morality, nature, perception, philosophy, politics, power, psychology, reality, science, societyTagged , , , , 1 Comment

I’ve recently picked up Kurt Gray’s Outraged!, and it’s got me thinking about metaphysics—more specifically, how the implausibility of metaphysical constructs like “evil” shapes our understanding of harm and morality. Gray’s central thesis—that everyone wants good outcomes for themselves and their society but focuses on different objects of harm—is intriguing, but it hinges on some deeply problematic assumptions.

Take, for instance, his argument that the vitriol between Democrats and Republicans is less about genuine malice and more about divergent harm perceptions. Democrats, he suggests, see harm in systemic inequalities, while Republicans focus on the erosion of traditional values. Both sides, in their own way, think they’re protecting what matters most. But here’s where it gets murky: how do we square this with the fact that these perceived harms often rest on fantastical and unfounded worldviews?

Audio: Podcast speaking on this content

Gray recounts a childhood experience in Sunday school where the question of what happens to unbaptised people was posed. The answer—Hell, of course—was delivered with the enthusiasm of a child parroting doctrine. This made Gray uncomfortable at the time, but as an adult, he reflects that his step-parents’ insistence on baptism wasn’t malicious. They genuinely believed they were saving him from eternal damnation. He argues their actions were driven by love, not malevolence.

On the surface, this seems like a generous interpretation. But dig deeper, and it’s clear how flawed it is. Hell doesn’t exist. Full stop. Actions based on an entirely imaginary premise—even well-intentioned ones—cannot escape scrutiny simply because the perpetrator’s heart was in the right place. Good intentions do not alchemize irrationality into moral virtue.

This same flawed logic permeates much of the political and moral discourse Gray explores. Consider anti-abortion activists, many of whom frame their cause in terms of protecting unborn lives. To them, abortion is the ultimate harm. But this stance is often rooted in religious metaphysics: a soul enters the body at conception, life begins immediately, and terminating a pregnancy is tantamount to murder. These claims aren’t grounded in observable reality, yet they drive real-world policies and harm. By focusing on “intent” and dismissing “malice,” Gray risks giving too much credit to a worldview that’s fundamentally untethered from evidence.

Which brings me to the notion of evil. Gray invokes it occasionally, but let’s be clear: evil doesn’t exist. At least, not as anything more than a metaphor. The word “evil” is a narrative shortcut—a way to denote something as “very, very, very, very bad,” as a precocious toddler might put it. It’s a relic of religious and metaphysical thinking, and it’s about as useful as Hell in explaining human behaviour.

Take the archetypal “evildoers” of history and society: Adolf Hitler, Jeffrey Dahmer, or (for some) Donald Trump. Are these people “evil”? No. Hitler was a power-hungry demagogue exploiting fear and economic despair. Dahmer was a deeply disturbed individual shaped by trauma and pathology. Trump is a narcissist thriving in a culture that rewards spectacle over substance. Labelling them as “evil” absolves us of the responsibility to understand them. Worse, it obscures the systemic conditions and societal failures that allowed them to act as they did.

Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem gave us the concept of the “banality of evil,” and it’s a helpful corrective. Arendt’s point wasn’t that Eichmann was secretly a great guy but that his actions weren’t driven by some metaphysical malevolence. He was a cog in the machine, an unremarkable bureaucrat following orders. The atrocities he committed weren’t the result of extraordinary wickedness but of ordinary systems enabling ordinary people to do extraordinarily harmful things.

This insight cuts to the core of the issue. If “evil” is banal—if it’s nothing more than the mundane processes of harm scaled up—then it never really existed to begin with. It’s a construct, a tool of storytelling that obscures far more than it reveals.

So, where does this leave us? For one, we must abandon “evil” as an explanatory framework. It’s analytically lazy and morally dangerous. Instead, let’s focus on precision. Rather than labeling someone “evil,” we can describe their actions: harmful, exploitative, cruel. These words invite inquiry; “evil” slams the door shut.

By rejecting metaphysical constructs like evil, we gain a clearer, more grounded understanding of harm and morality. And perhaps that’s what Outraged! inadvertently teaches us: the real outrage isn’t malice; it’s the stubborn persistence of unexamined beliefs masquerading as moral clarity. If we can let go of those, maybe we can finally move forward.

Reflections on Chapter 6 of Harari’s Nexus

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As I continue reading Chapter 6 of Yuval Noah Harari’s Nexus, I find myself wrestling with the masterful misdirection and rhetorical strategies he employs. A critical reader can discern the writing on the wall, but his choir of loyal readers likely consumes his narrative like red meat, uncritically savouring its surface-level appeal.

Social Media and Misinformation

Harari begins by addressing the role of social media in spreading disinformation and misinformation, particularly singling out Facebook. From there, he pivots to Q-Anon conspiracy theories. While these topics are undeniably relevant, Harari’s framing feels more like an indictment of the masses rather than a nuanced critique of the systemic factors enabling these phenomena.

The Voter Knows Best?

Harari leans heavily on platitudes like “the customer is always right” and “the voters know best.” These truisms may resonate with an indoctrinated audience but fail to hold up under scrutiny. The powers that be—whether governments or corporations—exploit this mentality, much like religious institutions exploit faith. Harari’s concern seems rooted in the fear that AI could outmanoeuvre these same masses, creating competition for global entities like the World Economic Forum (WEF), which, in his view, aims to remain unchallenged.

Taxation, Nexus, and the Future of Nation-States

Harari’s discussion of taxation and the nexus between power and information is intriguing, but it misses a larger point. Nation-states, as I see it, are becoming anachronisms, unable to defend themselves against the rise of technocratic forces. Taxation, once a cornerstone of state power, may soon be irrelevant as the global landscape shifts toward what I call Feudalism 2.0—a hierarchy dominated by transnational actors like the WEF.

Harari poorly frames a Uruguayan taxation dilemma, reducing it to a simplistic trade-off between information and power without addressing the broader implications. This shallow analysis leaves much to be desired.

Determinism and Misdirection

Next, Harari mischaracterises the philosophical concept of determinism, likely to mislead readers who aren’t well-versed in its nuances. He spins a cautionary tale based on this revised definition, which may serve his rhetorical goals but detracts from the intellectual integrity of his argument.

Setting the Stage

Harari ends the chapter with a statement about the importance of time and place in history, using it as a setup to provoke a sense of urgency. While this is a classic rhetorical device, it feels hollow without substantive backing.

Final Reflections

Many Modernists may embrace Harari’s narrative uncritically, but for me, the veneer is thin and riddled with holes. His analysis fails to engage with more profound critiques of power and governance, relying instead on cherry-picked anecdotes and oversimplified arguments. The chapter’s focus on social media, AI, and taxation could have been fertile ground for profound insights, but Harari instead opts for rhetorical flourish over rigorous examination. Still, I’ll press on and see what the next chapter holds.

Stories, Power, and the Utility of Fiction

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Chapter 2 of Nexus

Chapter 2 of Yuval Noah Harari’s Nexus centres on the power of stories and their role in shaping human societies. For Harari, stories are not merely narratives but essential tools that have elevated human-to-human networks into human-to-story networks—a transition he frames as unadulterated Progress™, reflecting his dyed-in-the-wool Modernist perspective.

Audio: Podcast on this content

The Power of Stories

Harari argues that fictional stories underpin the strength of social networks, enabling constructs like nations and economies to thrive. He celebrates these intersubjective frameworks as shared functional experiences that facilitate progress. While Harari’s thesis is compelling, his tone suggests an uncritical embrace of these constructs as inherently good. Branding and propaganda, for example, are presented as valid tools—but only when used by those on the “right side” of history, a position Harari implicitly claims for himself.

Order Above All Else

One of Harari’s key claims is that order trumps truth and justice. He justifies limiting both for the sake of maintaining stability, positioning this as his modus operandi. This prioritisation of order reveals a functionalist worldview where utility outweighs ethical considerations. Harari goes further to define “good” information as that which either discovers truth or creates order, a reductionistic view that leaves little room for dissent or alternative interpretations.

By extension, Harari endorses the concept of the “noble lie”—deception deemed acceptable if it serves these ends. While pragmatism may demand such compromises, Harari’s framing raises concerns about how this justification could be weaponised to silence opposition or reinforce entrenched power structures.

Alignment with Power

Harari’s alignment with institutional power becomes increasingly evident as the chapter progresses. His discussion of intersubjective constructs positions them as the bedrock of human achievement, but he appears unwilling to scrutinise the role of institutions like the World Economic Forum (WEF) in perpetuating inequalities. Harari’s lack of criticism for these entities mirrors historical justifications of despotic regimes by those aligned with their goals. He seems more concerned about AI’s potential to disrupt the plans of such institutions than about its impact on humanity as a whole.

Fiction as a Weapon

Harari concludes with an implicit hope that his narrative might gain consensus to undermine opposition to these power structures. His fondness for fiction—and his belief that “a story is greater than any truth”—positions storytelling as both a tool and a weapon. While this reflects the undeniable power of narratives, it also underscores Harari’s selective morality: stories are good when they align with his perspective and problematic when they don’t.

Final Thoughts

Chapter 2 of Nexus is a study in the utility of stories, but it also reveals Harari’s Modernist biases and alignment with institutional power. His prioritisation of order over truth and justice, coupled with his justification of noble lies, paints a picture of a pragmatist willing to compromise ethics for stability. Whether this perspective deepens or is challenged in later chapters remains to be seen, but for now, Harari’s narrative raises as many concerns as it seeks to address. I don’t mean to be overly cynical, but I can’t help but think that this book lays the groundwork for propagandising his playbook.