Psychology of Totalitarianism

I finished Mattias Desmet’s The Psychology of Totalitarianism, which I mentioned the other day. Unfortunately, my initial optimism was premature. Everything I enjoyed was front-loaded: the first four chapters set up a promising critique of mechanistic rationality and the collapse of shared meaning. Then the book turned into a long, therapeutic sermon. I should have stopped at Chapter 4 and saved myself the sunk-cost regret.

It isn’t that nothing follows; it’s just that what follows is so thin that the cost-benefit ratio goes negative. Once Desmet moves from diagnosis to prescription, the argument collapses into a psychologist’s worldview: an entire civilisation explained through mass neurosis and healed through better intuition. He builds his case on straw versions of reason, science, and modernity, so his ‘cure’ can look revelatory.

The trouble is familiar. Having dismantled rationalism, Desmet then installs intuition as its replacement – an epistemic monarchy by another name. His appeal to empathy and connection reads less like philosophy and more like professional self-promotion. The therapist can’t stop therapising; he privileges the psychological lens over every other possibility.

The result is a reductionist parascience dressed as social theory. The totalitarian mind, in Desmet’s telling, isn’t political or structural but psychological – a patient waiting for insight. I don’t doubt his sincerity, only his scope. It’s what happens when a discipline mistakes its vocabulary for the world.

Desmet’s project ultimately re-enchants what it claims to critique. He wants rationalism redeemed through feeling, order reborn through connection. Dis-Integrationism stops short of that impulse. It accepts fracture as the permanent condition – no higher synthesis, no therapeutic finale. Where Desmet sees totalitarianism as a collective pathology awaiting treatment, I see it as reason’s own reflection in the mirror: a system trying to cure itself of the only disease it knows, the need to be whole.

One thought on “Psychology of Totalitarianism

  1. The critique of mechanistic rationality can be found in Weber, Merchant, Lefebvre, Nietzsche, Habermas, Adorno, and Horkleimer (I’m reading the latter two right now, and I’m far from disappointed!). Fracture is a permanent condition for Adorno’s negative dialectic: a critical dialectic, without synthesis. Indeed, Adorno and Horkleimer start from the observation that Reason has turned against itself (this echoes your image of the mirror).

    For the constitution/reconstitution of shared meaning, I’ve noted Jean-Luc Nancy, who proposes a semio-democracy, a regime of meaning.

    Regarding intuition, Nietzsche’s is that of the body, of “great reason.” Bergson also privileges intuition as a method for grasping duration. This is where philosophy distinguishes itself from political analysis, or political philosophy.

    Other psychologists manage to avoid wanting to “treat society.” See Reich, Guattari…

    Regarding science, Funtowicz & Ravetz propose a humble epistemology/post-normal science (I did read your post about “post-“, but still). https://homohortus31.wordpress.com/2025/10/04/post-normal-science-acting-in-uncertainty-embracing-humble-epistemology-funtowicz-ravetz/

    Relational philosophy is still too little explored. See Diogenes, Buber, Haraway, Barad…

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