Tag: power relations

Power Relations Bollox

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As I put the finishing touches on the third revision of my Language Insufficiency Hypothesis manuscript, I find myself reflecting on the role of Foucault’s concept of Power Relations in shaping the use and interpretation of language in institutional contexts.

A key aspect of my hypothesis is the notion that some abstract conceptual language is intentionally vague. I touched on this idea in my recent article on the ambiguity of the term ‘gift’, but the implications extend far beyond that specific example. The strategic use of linguistic indeterminacy is a pervasive feature of many professional domains, serving to veil and enable subtle power plays.

NotebookLM Audio Podcast Discussion of this content.

The strategic use of linguistic indeterminacy is a pervasive feature of many professional domains

In my manuscript, I examine the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as a prime example of this phenomenon. This term is a favourite hiding spot for legal professionals, appearing in phrases like ‘reasonable doubt’ and ‘reasonable person’.Yet, upon closer inspection, the apparent clarity and objectivity of this language dissolves into a morass of ambiguity and subjectivity. The invocation of reasonableness often serves as a rhetorical sleight of hand, masking the exercise of institutional power behind a veneer of impartiality.

While I don’t wish to venture too far into Nietzschean cynicism, there is a sense in which the legal system operates like a casino. The house always seeks to maintain its edge, and it will employ whatever means necessary to preserve its authority and legitimacy. In the case of reasonableness, this often involves a strategic manipulation of linguistic indeterminacy.

interpretation of key legal concepts is always subject to the shifting imperatives of institutional power

The court reserves for itself the power to decide what counts as reasonable on a case-by-case basis. Definitions that prove expedient in one context may be swiftly discarded in another. While skilled advocates may seek to manipulate this ambiguity to their advantage, the ultimate authority to fix meaning rests with the judge – or, in some instances, with a higher court on appeal. The result is a system in which the interpretation of key legal concepts is always subject to the shifting imperatives of institutional power.

This example highlights the broader significance of the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis. By attending to the ways in which abstract and contested terms can be strategically deployed to serve institutional ends, we can develop a more critical and reflexive understanding of the role of language in shaping social reality. In the process, we may begin to glimpse the complex interplay of power and meaning that underlies many of our most important professional and political discourses.

Language Insufficiency, Rev 3

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I’m edging ever closer to finishing my book on the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis. It’s now in its third pass—a mostly subtractive process of streamlining, consolidating, and hacking away at redundancies. The front matter, of course, demands just as much attention, starting with the Preface.

The opening anecdote—a true yet apocryphal gem—dates back to 2018, which is evidence of just how long I’ve been chewing on this idea. It involves a divorce court judge, a dose of linguistic ambiguity, and my ongoing scepticism about the utility of language in complex, interpretative domains.

At the time, my ex-wife’s lawyer was petitioning the court to restrict me from spending any money outside our marriage. This included a demand for recompense for any funds already spent. I was asked, point-blank: Had I given another woman a gift?

Seeking clarity, I asked the judge to define gift. The response was less than amused—a glare, a sneer, but no definition. Left to my own devices, I answered no, relying on my personal definition: something given with no expectation of return or favour. My reasoning, then as now, stemmed from a deep mistrust of altruism.

The court, however, didn’t share my philosophical detours. The injunction came down: I was not to spend any money outside the marital arrangement. Straightforward? Hardly. At the time, I was also in a rock band and often brought meals for the group. Was buying Chipotle for the band now prohibited?

The judge’s response dripped with disdain. Of course, that wasn’t the intent, they said, but the language of the injunction was deliberately broad—ambiguous enough to cover whatever they deemed inappropriate. The phrase don’t spend money on romantic interests would have sufficed, but clarity seemed to be a liability. Instead, the court opted for what I call the Justice Stewart Doctrine of Legal Ambiguity: I know it when I see it.

Unsurprisingly, the marriage ended. My ex-wife and I, however, remain close; our separation in 2018 was final, but our friendship persists. Discussing my book recently, I mentioned this story, and she told me something new: her lawyer had confided that the judge disliked me, finding me smug.

This little revelation cemented something I’d already suspected: power relations, in the Foucauldian sense, pervade even our most banal disputes. It’s why Foucault makes a cameo in the book alongside Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Saussure, Derrida, Borges, and even Gödel.

This anecdote is just one straw on the poor camel’s back of my linguistic grievances, a life filled with moments where language’s insufficiency has revealed itself. And yet, I found few others voicing my position. Hence, a book.

I aim to self-publish in early 2025—get it off my chest and into the world. Maybe then I can stop wittering on about it. Or, more likely, I won’t.