The Trouble with Facts

5–8 minutes

One Motor Vehicle

What we call facts are not discoveries of an unfiltered world. They are the end-products of mediation.

Let’s walk through an example.

Image: Autosmash example. An observer arrives with experience – from genetic predisposition to childhood trauma to winning the lottery. Whatever it might be. Of course, they have many cognitive deficits, biases and filters. Then, there’s the immediate problem of attention. When did they notice the event? Did they turn to look after hearing the noise, or were they meditating on the tree in that moment?

Apparently, a motor vehicle has collided with a tree. Trees are immobile objects, so we can safely rule out the tree colliding with the car.*

So what, exactly, are the facts?

Audio: NotebookLM summary podcast of this topic.

Ontology (the boring bit)

Ontologically, something happened.

A car struck a tree.
Metal deformed.
Momentum stopped.

Reality did not hesitate. It did not consult witnesses. It did not await interpretation.

This is the part Modernity likes to gesture at reverently before immediately leaving it behind.

Image: Requisite NotebookLM infographic on this content.

The Witness

Even the driver does not enjoy privileged access to “what really happened”.

They get:

  • proprioceptive shock
  • adrenaline distortion
  • attentional narrowing
  • selective memory
  • post hoc rationalisation
  • possibly a concussion

Which is already several layers deep before language even arrives to finish the job.

We can generalise the structure:

Ontology: events occur. States of affairs obtain. Something happens whether or not we notice.

Epistemology: observation is always filtered through instruments, concepts, language, habits, and incentives.

Modern sleight of hand: collapse the second into the first and call the result the facts.

People love the phrase “hard facts”, as if hardness transfers from objects to propositions by osmosis. It doesn’t. The tree is solid. The fact is not.

Facts are artefacts. They are assembled from observation, inference, convention, and agreement. They function. They do not reveal essence.

Filtration

An event occurred. A car struck a tree.

Then an observer arrives. But observers never arrive empty-handed.

They arrive with history: genetics, upbringing, trauma, habits, expectations, incentives. They arrive already filtered.

Daniel Kahneman, Olivier Sibony, and Cass Sunstein spend an entire book explaining just how unreliable this process is. See Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment if you want the empirical receipts.

  • Even before bias enters, attention does.
  • When did the observer notice the crash?
  • At the sound? At the sight? After the fact?
  • Were they already looking, or did the noise interrupt something else entirely?

Reality happens once. Facts happen many times, differently, depending on who needs them and why.

Here Comes the Law

This is where the legal system enters, not because truth has been found, but because closure is required.

Courts do not discover facts. They designate versions of events that are good enough to carry consequences. They halt the cascade of interpretations by institutional force and call the result justice.

At every epistemic level, what we assert are interpretations of fact, never access to ontological essence.

Intent, negligence, recklessness. These are not observations. They are attributions. They are stopping rules that allow systems to function despite uncertainty.

The law does not ask what really happened.
It asks which story is actionable.

Two Motor Vehicles

Now add a second moving object.

Another car enters the frame, and with it an entire moral universe.

Suddenly, the event is no longer merely physical. It becomes relational. Agency proliferates. Narratives metastasise.

Who was speeding?
Who had the right of way?
Who saw whom first?
Who should have anticipated whom?

Intent and motive rush in to fill the explanatory vacuum, despite remaining just as unobservable as before.

Nothing about the ontology improved.
Everything about the storytelling did.

Where the tree refused intention, the second vehicle invites it. We begin inferring states of mind from trajectories, attributing beliefs from brake lights, extracting motives from milliseconds of motion.

But none of this is observed.

What we observe are:

  • vehicle positions after the fact,
  • damage patterns,
  • skid marks,
  • witness statements already filtered through shock and expectation.

From these traces, we construct mental interiors.

The driver “intended” to turn.
The other driver “failed” to anticipate.
Someone was “reckless”.
Someone else was merely “unlucky”.

These are not facts. They are interpretive assignments, layered atop already mediated observations, selected because they allow responsibility to be distributed in socially recognisable ways.

This is why explanation now fractures.

One cascade of whys produces a story about distraction or poor judgment.
Another produces a story about road design or visibility.
Another about timing, traffic flow, or urban planning.

Each narrative is plausible.
Each is evidence-constrained.
None is ontologically privileged.

Yet one will be chosen.

Not because it is truer, but because it is actionable.

The presence of a second vehicle does not clarify causation. It merely increases the number of places we are willing to stop asking questions.

Modernity mistakes this proliferation of narrative for epistemic progress. In reality, it is moral bookkeeping.

The crash still occurred.
Metal still deformed.
Momentum still stopped.

What changed was not access to truth, but the urgency to assign fault.

With one vehicle and a tree, facts already fail to arrive unmediated.
With two vehicles, mediation becomes the point.

And still, we insist on calling the result the facts.

Many Vehicles, Cameras, and Experts

At this point, Modernity regains confidence.

Add more vehicles.
Add traffic cameras.
Add dashcams, CCTV, bodycams.
Add accident reconstruction experts, engineers, psychologists, statisticians.

Surely now we are approaching the facts.

But nothing fundamental has changed. We have not escaped mediation. We have merely scaled it up and professionalised it.

Cameras do not record reality. They record:

  • a frame,
  • from a position,
  • at a sampling rate,
  • with compression,
  • under lighting conditions,
  • interpreted later by someone with a mandate.

Video feels decisive because it is vivid, not because it is ontologically transparent. It freezes perspective and mistakes that freeze for truth. Slow motion, zoom, annotation. Each step adds clarity and distance at the same time.

Experts do not access essence either. They perform disciplined abduction.

From angles, debris fields, timing estimates, and damage profiles, they infer plausible sequences. They do not recover the event. They model it. Their authority lies not in proximity to reality, but in institutional trust and methodological constraint.

More data does not collapse interpretation.
It multiplies it.

With enough footage, we don’t get the story. We get competing reconstructions, each internally coherent, each technically defensible, each aligned to a different question:

  • Who is legally liable?
  • Who is financially responsible?
  • Who violated policy?
  • Who can be blamed without destabilising the system?

At some point, someone declares the evidence “clear”.

What they mean is: we have enough material to stop arguing.

This is the final Modern illusion: that accumulation converges on essence. In reality, accumulation converges on closure.

The event remains what it always was: inaccessible except through traces.
The facts become thicker, more confident, more footnoted.
Their metaphysical status does not improve.

Reality happened once. It left debris. We organised the debris into narratives that could survive institutions.

Cameras didn’t reveal the truth. Experts didn’t extract it. They helped us agree on which interpretation would count.

And agreement, however necessary, has never been the same thing as access to what is.

* I was once driving in a storm, and a telephone pole fell about a metre in front of my vehicle. My car drove over the pole, and although I was able to drive the remainder of the way home, my suspension and undercarriage were worse for the wear and tear.

The Rhetoric of Realism: When Language Pretends to Know

Let us begin with the heresy: Truth is a rhetorical artefact. Not a revelation. Not a metaphysical essence glimmering behind the veil. Just language — persuasive, repeatable, institutionally ratified language. In other words: branding.

Audio: NotebookLM podcast on this topic.

This is not merely a postmodern tantrum thrown at the altar of Enlightenment rationalism. It is a sober, if impolite, reminder that nearly everything we call “knowledge” is stitched together with narrative glue and semantic spit. Psychology. Neuroscience. Ethics. Economics. Each presents itself as a science — or worse, a moral imperative — but their foundations are built atop a linguistic faultline. They are, at best, elegant approximations; at worst, dogma in drag.

Let’s take psychology. Here is a field that diagnoses your soul via consensus. A committee of credentialed clerics sits down and declares a cluster of behaviours to be a disorder, assigns it a code, and hands you a script. It is then canonised in the DSM, the Diagnostic Scripture Manual. Doubt its legitimacy and you are either naïve or ill — which is to say, you’ve just confirmed the diagnosis. It’s a theological trap dressed in the language of care.

Or neuroscience — the church of the glowing blob. An fMRI shows a region “lighting up” and we are meant to believe we’ve located the seat of love, the anchor of morality, or the birthplace of free will. Never mind that we’re interpreting blood-oxygen fluctuations in composite images smoothed by statistical witchcraft. It looks scientific, therefore it must be real. The map is not the territory, but in neuroscience, it’s often a mood board.

And then there is language itself, the medium through which all these illusions are transmitted. It is the stage, the scenery, and the unreliable narrator. My Language Insufficiency Hypothesis proposes that language is not simply a flawed tool — it is fundamentally unfit for the task it pretends to perform. It was forged in the furnace of survival, not truth. We are asking a fork to play the violin.

This insufficiency is not an error to be corrected by better definitions or clever metaphors. It is the architecture of the system. To speak is to abstract. To abstract is to exclude. To exclude is to falsify. Every time we speak of a thing, we lose the thing itself. Language functions best not as a window to the real but as a veil — translucent, patterned, and perpetually in the way.

So what, then, are our Truths™? They are narratives that have won. Stories that survived the epistemic hunger games. They are rendered authoritative not by accuracy, but by resonance — psychological, cultural, institutional. A “truth” is what is widely accepted, not because it is right, but because it is rhetorically unassailable — for now.

This is the dirty secret of epistemology: coherence masquerades as correspondence. If enough concepts link arms convincingly, we grant them status. Not because they touch reality, but because they echo each other convincingly in our linguistic theatre.

Libet’s experiment, Foucault’s genealogies, McGilchrist’s hemispheric metaphors — each peels back the curtain in its own way. Libet shows that agency might be a post-hoc illusion. Foucault reveals that disciplines don’t describe the subject; they produce it. McGilchrist laments that the Emissary now rules the Master, and the world is flatter for it.

But all of them — and all of us — are trapped in the same game: the tyranny of the signifier. We speak not to uncover truth, but to make truth-sounding noises. And the tragedy is, we often convince ourselves.

So no, we cannot escape the prison of language. But we can acknowledge its bars. And maybe, just maybe, we can rattle them loudly enough that others hear the clank.

Until then, we continue — philosophers, scientists, diagnosticians, rhetoricians — playing epistemology like a parlour game with rigged dice, congratulating each other on how well the rules make sense.

And why wouldn’t they? We wrote them.