Understanding the Historical Context of the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

I’ve made several political posts in this space, but I was researching the backstory of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Yet again, insufficiency of language is involved. It’s been said that the West promised not to expand NATO, ‘not one inch’, but it’s not clear whether NATO was the subject of that promise. Even Gorbachov said that NATO was not a topic of discussion, and that omission fell squarely on him. Even if this is the case, Putin made it clear in 2008 that this was his interpretation. Here’s a brief history for those interested. It’s decidedly not an academic affair, but I try to be neutral.

The Ukraine-Russia conflict is deeply rooted in the complex web of historical tensions and geopolitical dynamics that have shaped Eastern Europe from the Cold War to the present day. This article explores the critical developments and decisions from the end of World War II through to the events leading up to 2014, setting the stage for the current tensions.

From World War II to Cold War End

The geopolitical landscape of post-World War II Europe was significantly shaped at the Yalta Conference, where Allied leaders divided Europe into spheres of influence, leading to the establishment of a Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc. This division set the stage for the Cold War and the creation of NATO in 1949, a collective defence alliance that would come to play a central role in later tensions.

Collapse of the Soviet Union and Early Post-Cold War Hopes

The policies of glasnost and perestroika under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, signalled a shift towards greater openness and potential integration. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to new states grappling with independence and the redefining of security and economic relations in the region. Initial hopes for a peaceful Europe were soon challenged by emerging security concerns.

NATO Expansion and Growing Tensions

NATO’s eastward expansion began in earnest in 1999 with the inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. This move, perceived by Russia as a strategic threat, reignited long-standing fears of encirclement and influenced Russia’s foreign policy. The expansion was justified by NATO as a way to stabilize Eastern Europe and integrate it into a democratic, peaceful Europe.

The 2008 Bucharest Summit

The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest was a watershed moment. Although Ukraine and Georgia were not offered immediate membership, NATO’s declaration that they would eventually join the alliance was seen as provocative by Russia. The subsequent Russo-Georgian War in August 2008 underscored Russia’s willingness to use military force in response to perceived encroachments on its sphere of influence.

Deepening Crisis: 2010-2014

Relations continued to deteriorate with the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, which sought to deepen ties with former Soviet states, including Ukraine. The situation escalated dramatically in 2014 following the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine, the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, a move widely condemned internationally but justified by Russia as a necessary defensive action.

Putin’s Defensive Stance

Throughout these developments, Vladimir Putin has maintained that NATO expansion represents a direct security threat to Russia. The narrative from the Russian perspective frames the expansion as a continuation of Cold War antagonism and a disregard for Russia’s security concerns, contrary to what they interpret as promises made during the 1990s.

Conclusion

This detailed narrative from the end of World War II through 2014 illuminates the complexities of Eastern European security dynamics and the challenges in reconciling the strategic interests of NATO and Russia. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is deeply intertwined with these historical tensions, reflecting long-standing struggles for influence and security in post-Cold War Europe.

Additional background and context.

If anything, perhaps this will help with SEO.

To provide a clearer picture of the discussions and statements made about NATO expansion during the early 1990s, particularly around the time of German reunification, here are some notable quotes and summaries from key figures involved:

James Baker (U.S. Secretary of State)

James Baker reportedly told Mikhail Gorbachev during a meeting in 1990:

  • “Not one inch eastward” was a phrase used by Baker to assure Gorbachev about NATO’s military posture not moving eastward, in the context of German reunification. This phrase has been widely cited but is subject to interpretation regarding its precise meaning and whether it referred to broader NATO expansion.

Mikhail Gorbachev (Soviet President)

Gorbachev’s response to these discussions has been a source of significant interest:

  • “The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a single Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991.” – Gorbachev, in later interviews, emphasized that the assurances were more about not deploying NATO troops to Eastern Germany than about preventing future NATO expansion.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher (German Foreign Minister)

Genscher’s position was similarly focused on reducing Soviet fears about NATO:

  • “NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.'” – Genscher said this in a speech in Tutzing, Germany, in 1990, which was aimed at assuaging Soviet concerns about German reunification and NATO.

Western and Soviet Interpretations

The assurances regarding NATO not expanding “one inch eastward” were primarily discussed in the context of German reunification and the integration of East Germany into NATO without expanding NATO’s military presence further east. The ambiguity lies in whether these assurances were understood to apply only temporarily or permanently, and specifically to Eastern Germany or more broadly to Eastern Europe.

Later Developments

After these discussions, in 1991 and beyond, the situation changed dramatically with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The security landscape in Europe was fundamentally altered, leading to different priorities and decisions. By the mid-1990s, the question of broader NATO expansion became a topic of much debate, and in 1999, several former Eastern Bloc countries were admitted into NATO.

Conclusion

The quotes and the context they were spoken in reveal the complexities of diplomatic communications and the difficulties in interpreting what was meant and understood by different parties. These discussions were contingent on numerous factors, including the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape following the end of the Cold War.

Geopolitical Positioning

Some have asked me why I comment on the conflicts of the world since I am a nihilist who doesn’t believe in nations and borders. The answer is that I still have emotions and can still apply logic. Besides, much of my argument revolves around selective vision and cherry-picking.

Two conflicts have been in the news lately—Israel-Palestine and Russia-Ukraine. I think I can frame this without taking sides.

Israel-Palestine

On 7 October, Hamas attacked Israeli citizens. This is a crime against humanity. Israel declared war on Palestine and attacked their citizens. This is both a crime against humanity and a war crime. Israeli officials claim that it is justifiable because the militant Hamas were hiding behind Palestinian ‘human shields’, targets that included hospitals and other infrastructure.

However, 7 October didn’t happen without history. I’m no historian, but Israel’s occupation of Gaza has been considered illegal since 1968. If we accept this frame, Hamas are roughly equivalent to the French resistance during WWII, doing what they can to rid the oppressors. I think this video by a fellow philosopher provides some historical context, so I’ll stop here and recommend it.

Spoiler Alert: This affair commenced circa the nineteenth century.

Russia-Ukraine

We all know this story. Russia invaded Ukraine without provocation on 24 February 2002. Putin just wanted to reform the former Soviet Union, right? Well, not so fast. While I disagree with this narrative, I also disagree with its historical framing as well as the claim that Ukraine had some long-standing sovereignty and its people were all asking for liberation from the West.

Again, let’s rewind to 2014—nah, 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War™, an event that would commence a period of unprecedented peace—if not for that pesky Military-Industrial Complex. Drats. Not good for profits. Never gonna happen. Promises made. Promises broken.

You’ll notice in this Belgian (French language) map that Ukraine didn’t yet exist in 1769. We can see Crimea, which was controlled by the declining Ottoman Empire.

No history lesson today. Do your homework. Nothing is back and white.

Fashionable Fascism

So, it started with this video.

Video: The fascist philosopher behind Vladimir Putin’s information warfare — Tim Snyder

I’d never heard of Ivan Ilyin, so the entirety of my knowledge derives from whatever Tim Snyder conveys in this clip. The risk is that he may misrepresent Ilyin’s message, much like Stephen Hicks misrepresents Postmodernism in his work. So, if you’ve got a deeper understanding of Ilyin, apologies in advance, but I am only reacting to this clip without much intention of reading his published work not performing additional second-hand research. Sue me.

Snyder raises three ‘important ideas’ from Ilyin:

/1/ Social advancement is impossible

Each person is like a cell in a body, each having it’s defined function or purpose. So, freedom means knowing one’s place, which function to perform.

/2/ Democracy is a ritual

People vote, but they only vote to affirm their collective support for a leader. The leader is not legitimated or chosen by votes. Voting is just a ritual by which people people endorse a leader every few years.

/3/ The factual world doesn’t count

The manifest world is not real. It’s a mishmash of facts, which have no intrinsic value, but these facts cannot be unified into some larger whole.

Nothing is real, or what is real isn’t important. The only things that really matter are preferences and biases.

Through this, Ilyin surmises that the only true thing is Russian Nationalism and its role as saviour to bring order back to the world.

Of course, this conclusion is precisely the one to which the US arrived except that its American Nationalism is the correct version.

. . .

As to points 1 and 2, I can’t disagree with the base statements. Social advancement is impossible because we’ve got nothing to measure it against. As I’ve said before, we move recognise change and a sense of movement, but movement is not progress.

As I’ve already admitted, I don’t enough about Ilyid, so I am taking Snyder’s statement at face-value, but it does not follow that because social advancement is impossible, we need to adopt some deontological position that freedom means knowing one’s place. It’s a bit of a forced non sequitur.

Democracy is a ritual. It’s a failed experiment, and the only thing that remains is the shell of an empty promise. I do think that the voting serves to legitimise the representative figurehead. There are persons who debate the legitimacy of, say, Bush-43 or Trump-45—or perhaps just their competencies—but this is a twenty-first century phenomenon, as US politics have become more and more divisive.

That the factual world doesn’t count is difficult for me to buy into. In many ways, it is easy enough to manipulate people with non-facts masquerading as facts, but I am not convinced that this contingent is large enough to gain critical mass in the long run. I understand history well enough that these anti-fact forces have run roughshod over entire civilisations, whether the Inquisitions or witch-burning or current religious organisations and other snake oil hawkers.

Don’t let the bastards grind you down.

Like the characters in Orwell’s 1984 or Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, there is still resistance. I’m not even trying to make the claim that my vision of a world absent of superstition is the true world or the right vision. I am only claiming that my vision of a world without it is more pleasant to me.

But, then again, that just confirm’s Ilyid’s point that the only thing that matters is preference, and there is no separating bias from preference.