The propensity to assign blame is deeply intertwined with human moral frameworks, often reflecting our need to ascribe responsibility and maintain social order. Blame allows us to identify transgressions, enforce norms, and establish accountability within our communities. But when it comes to non-human animals, the concept of blame becomes more complex.
Do Non-Human Animals Have a Sense of Blame?
Non-human animals certainly exhibit behaviours that suggest some rudimentary understanding of social rules and consequences. For example, studies on primates show that they can experience forms of moral emotions like guilt or shame. A chimpanzee might avoid eye contact or show submissive behaviour after breaking a social norm, such as stealing food from a dominant individual. Similarly, domestic dogs have been observed to display so-called “guilty” behaviours—such as avoiding eye contact or cowering—when they sense that their human is displeased. However, it’s debated whether this truly indicates guilt or simply a reaction to their owner’s emotional state.
However, the concept of blame as humans understand it—an attribution of moral responsibility that involves complex cognitive processes like intention-reading and understanding of moral rules—appears to be uniquely human. Non-human animals can recognise when another individual’s behaviour deviates from the norm and might react accordingly, but they don’t seem to hold others accountable in the same moral or punitive sense that humans do.
Blame and Morality in Humans vs. Non-Human Animals
In human societies, blame is often accompanied by a desire for reparation or punishment, as well as a cognitive understanding of intentions and causality. We don’t just react to actions; we interpret motives and hold individuals accountable based on our perception of their intentions. This is where non-human animals typically differ. Their responses to perceived wrongdoing are more likely driven by immediate social consequences—like changes in dominance status or access to resources—rather than a sense of moral outrage or an abstract concept of justice.
For example, if a wolf in a pack disobeys a social rule, it might be punished by the alpha, but this is more about reinforcing social hierarchy and cohesion than about assigning moral blame. Similarly, if a cat lashes out at another cat after being disturbed, it’s responding to an immediate violation of its personal space, not holding the other cat morally accountable.
Evolutionary Perspective
From an evolutionary standpoint, blame and moral emotions likely evolved in humans to facilitate cooperation and social cohesion in increasingly complex societies. As our ancestors formed larger and more intricate social groups, the ability to understand others’ intentions, enforce social norms, and hold individuals accountable would have been crucial for maintaining group stability and cooperative behaviours.
Non-human animals, even those that live in complex social structures, do not face the same cognitive demands as humans when it comes to maintaining large-scale social cohesion. Their social rules and enforcement mechanisms are typically less nuanced and more directly linked to survival and reproductive success.
Conclusion
While non-human animals demonstrate behaviours that hint at a basic understanding of social rules and can respond to transgressions, the uniquely human capacity for assigning blame—and the moral frameworks that arise from it—appears to be a product of our advanced cognitive abilities and complex social structures. Blame, in humans, is not just about responding to actions but involves a deeper understanding of intentions, responsibility, and justice—concepts that are foundational to our moral systems but beyond the reach of non-human cognition as we currently understand it.
I started writing a book on blame, agency, and retributive justice a few years back. Perhaps I should revisit it along with the dozen other books in progress.
Philosophics 