Tag: political science

Rational Ignorance

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Using AutoCrit, I continue to share the review progress of my work in progress, Democracy: The Grand Illusion. In this chapter, I survey the topic of rational ignorance.

Synopsis

The text delves into the concepts of rational ignorance and unknown unknowns within the framework of democratic decision-making. It begins by defining rational ignorance as individuals choosing to remain uninformed due to the perceived high cost of acquiring information. The discussion then moves on to explore how this impacts voter behaviour, leading to decisions based on superficial understanding and susceptibility to misinformation. The concept of unknown unknowns is introduced as factors individuals are unaware of, influencing decision-making unpredictably.

The text concludes by emphasising the importance of addressing cognitive challenges through enhancing political literacy, promoting deliberative democracy, ensuring transparency, and leveraging technology. By doing so, it aims to create a more informed electorate and strengthen democratic systems.

Audience

The target audience for this text includes policymakers, educators, citizens interested in political science or governance issues, and those involved in civic engagement. Those not targeted may include casual readers looking for light reading material or individuals with no interest in politics. To make it more relevant, the author could simplify complex terms for lay audiences without compromising depth or provide real-world examples illustrating theoretical concepts.

Structure and Organisation

The text follows a logical order by first introducing key concepts like rational ignorance and unknown unknowns before exploring their implications on democratic decision-making. Each section flows seamlessly into the next without abrupt transitions or disconnection between ideas.

Tone

The tone throughout remains informative yet urgent about addressing cognitive challenges within democracies effectively. There’s a sense of responsibility conveyed towards improving civic engagement among readers.

Clarity

Overall clarity is strong; however, some sections could benefit from simplification for easier comprehension by all readers. For instance:

  • “Unknown Unknowns refer to factors that are completely outside individuals’ awareness…” – This could be rephrased more straightforwardly.
  • Complex sentences discussing cognitive biases might require additional clarification for better understanding.

Commentary

There is an entire section on cognitive biases earlier in the book as well as a note to directing the reader to it.

Argument and Persuasion

Opinions presented focus on mitigating effects of rational ignorance through enhanced education and transparency measures which are logically constructed with support from references such as Downs (1957) & Kahneman (2011). While persuasive elements are well-supported overall; further statistical data or case studies would enhance credibility.

Commentary

I’m not sure I’ll include more in this book, as I cite copious source material, noted below.

Interest and Engagement

While engaging overall due to its relevance in current socio-political contexts; sections detailing strategies like encouraging deliberative democracy may lose reader interest due to dense content presentation without breaks or interactive elements such as case studies or anecdotes involving citizen participation can improve engagement levels significantly

Final Thoughts & Conclusions

The text concludes with a strong and satisfying section that summarizes the concepts of rational ignorance and unknown unknowns, emphasizing their impact on democratic decision-making. It effectively ties together the key points discussed throughout the work and provides a clear call to action for addressing cognitive challenges in governance. The final thoughts and conclusions serve to underscore the importance of mitigating these challenges through improved education, deliberation, transparency, and technological advancements. The text ends conclusively by summarizing key points discussed earlier while offering actionable steps towards strengthening democratic systems amidst cognitive challenges faced today—providing a clear direction forward that ties together various themes explored throughout the narrative effectively.

References and Supporting Materials

Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row.

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Caplan, B. (2007). The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton University Press.

Tetlock, P. E. (2005). Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? Princeton University Press.

Sunstein, C. R. (2006). Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. D. (1998). The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? Cambridge University Press.

Akerlof, G. A., & Shiller, R. J. (2015). Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception. Princeton University Press.

Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). News That Matters: Television and American Opinion. University of Chicago Press.

Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. Oxford University Press.

Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. H. (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Penguin Books.

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Best Ever

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I’m not sure I need to ask why people over-value things familiar to them. Is there such a thing and a Pangloss Syndrome: We all live in the best of all possible worlds? For most people, it seems, their nation is the best nation, the best county, province, or state, the best city, town, or village. Perhaps I’m over reaching, but we do tend to value these things as remarkably better than average, and isn’t it nice that we weren’t born somewhere else?

I’m not sure if this affinity runs stronger in different political mindsets, Liberals versus Conservatives or such. Anecdotally, I could see Conservatives hanging on the memory of the good old days, if only it weren’t for X, Y, or Z, this would truly be a great [insert geolocational reference]. Liberals, instead, hang on to the prospect of tweaking a nice foundation and progressively shaping it.

Our village is better than the adjacent ones—except for the ones out of financial reach, but those are populated with those wealthier people, and who could tolerate them; our team is the best team—better luck next year; our schools are the best schools—they try harder.

Behavioural economics demonstrates that people value things they own— endowment effect: even if they didn’t choose the item; even if they had valued it less just moments before they took possession of it. This might likely be explained as an product of evolution, but it feels to have gotten out of hand.

Why it’s so difficult to unify modern politics

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“The organization we call modern republicanism is based on multiple values and principles that conflict. We can identify at least five basic values of most modern republican political theories:

  1. popular self-governance by the political community
  2. individual liberties from government and social interference
  3. equality
  4. communal or national preservation, and
  5. economic and material modernization

“All of these matter; none can be ignored. But these values conflict. If you consistently emphasise or choose one over the other or pull on that thread, you move toward an exclusive political view of one kind or another.

“For example, if you emphasise self-governance over all other values and are willing to trade the others for more of it, you become a civic republican or a populist or a participatory democrat.

“If it’s individual liberties and rights, you value above everything else, a Libertarian, a neo-liberal, or a Natural Rights theorist.

“If it’s social equality, you become a progressive or social democrat or even a socialist.

“If it’s material progress above all, then you are probably an ethical utilitarian, believing the politic’s aim is to enhance general happiness.

“If it’s preservation of the forms of community life, then you’re a conservative.”

This is excerpted from the first chapter an excellent Great Courses lecture series by Lawrence Cahoon, The Modern Political Tradition: Hobbes to Habermas. (This PDF course guide provides a summary view.) It’s an interesting dimensionalisation of the problem with trying to reconcile politics into some unified theory, as it becomes necessary to optimise across these dimensions, some of which are polar opposites to other goals in a zero-sum relationship.

This series is available on Amazon as well as at Audible at good prices.

Geuss Who?

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A mate in an online forum turned me onto Raymond Geuss, who’s got just the perspective I’ve been looking for. I’ve felt that the concepts of rights and justice are weak on etymological grounds, but Geuss’ critique is even more fundamental. In his Philosophy and Real Politics, Geuss undercuts the positions of both Nozick and Rawls. I’ve never been a fan of Nozick, but I do consider (have considered) myself to be a bit of a Rawlsian.

Nozick is a key figure underneath Libertarianism, as this movement is very centred on rights. Opting for rights as his starting place as his preface to Anarchy, State, and Utopia:

“Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).” — Robert Nozick

As Geuss points out, Nozick ‘allows that bald statement to lie flapping and gasping for breath like a large, moribund fish on the deck of a trawler, with no further analysis or discussion, and proceeds to draw consequences from it’. In other words, Nozick leads with an unsubstantiated claim that ‘individuals have rights’, and then ‘advances’ his position tautologically.

As for Rawls, justice is his centrepiece. In his A Theory of Justice, the opening line is “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought”. He merely starts from this emotional place and advances his theory based on this basis of justice, yet nowhere does he explain of defend why this should be the foundation. As with Nozick, Rawls simply conjures this out of thin air.

“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.” — John Rawls

On top of this, Geuss comments on the shaky etymologic foundation of both justice and rights. Harkening back to the Latin origin of justice,

As Geuss writes, ‘To begin with the question of the concept of “justice,” it is striking how unclear this concept is in ordinary language and to what extent conceptions of justice differ from one context to another and in different human societies at different times. Thus at the beginning of one of the standard treatises of Roman law, the codification made for the emperor Justinian — one of the most influential texts in European history — we find that the very first sentence gives us a definition of “justice”: “iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens.” That is, justice is “the constant and unflagging will to give each person what is due to him.”

“What have the Romans ever done for us?” – Monty Python

Then he goes on to clarify that “what is due to him” is radically different dependant on being a citizen, an alien, a slave, a woman, a minor, and so on. To simplify this, we are stuck in a tautological loop: one is due what one is due, as determined somewhat exogenously.

Rights don’t fare any better, being even more ambiguous, so I don’t feel so bad about pursuing the irrelevance of these virtue concepts on etymological grounds.

Workmanship Ideal or Convenience?

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One of the biggest issues I have with modern, Western political theory is Locke‘s so-called ‘workmanship ideal‘, a concept stemming from the Enlightenment belief that a maker of something should be the rightful owner of something. The Age of Enlightenment (AKA Age of Reason) was supposed to have divorced science from other rationale, whether divine rights (as ascribed to kings) or something else. The problem—the same problem Descartes had in his Discourses—is that God (even if vis-a-vis ‘nature‘) is injected exogenously and irrationally into the works. Philosophers even into the 21st century, if barely, have concluded that this concept breaks down when we attempt to secularise it, but we are subjectively comfortable with the notion. Of course, the more our beliefs lean towards ‘higher powers‘, intelligent design and the such, the more comfortable we are apt to feel.

I was originally inspired to write this when researching Rawls and happening upon Ian Shapiro‘s Yale open course, The Moral Foundations of Politics. James Murphy has this to say in his essay, The Workmanship Ideal : A Theologico-Political Chimera?

What’s in Store for 2017?

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Going into 2017, I am going to focus more attention on Universal Basic Income (UBI) otherwise known as minimum income. Providing everyone with a safety net in the spirit of life, liberty, and happiness. Hopefully, this will take some focus away from or redirect the negativity I am anticipating under the Trump regime, but I make no promises, expressed or implied. I’ll attend to the detractors as well.

I’ve been peripherally aware of the concept of UBI for a couple of years now—Martin Ford’s Rise of the Robots and Erik Brynjolfsson’s The Second Machine Age, among others. Although I don’t envision it as a permanent solution—after all, what is permanent? —but it is a solution that works within the existing (and woefully wanting) economic framework. It does, however, have a way to go relative to the current socio-political constructs.

The solution is not permanent primarily because the current economic system based on markets, supply, demand, income, and production is tenuous, so building on a platform of shifting sand is bound to fail—not because it is a bad idea considering the given system, but because the system itself is faulty. Capitalism is a house of cards, a tenuous MacGyver-ed system held together with spit and bubble gum (and who knows what else). I don’t have a replacement system in mind, and most people are not quite ready to abandon their cherished ragdoll owing to indoctrination, propaganda, and escalating commitment.  Entropy is at play, and the establishment needs to apply more and more external force to keep it together. We can look to history and the French revolution of 1789 as a guide—or perhaps the fall of tsarist Russia. These systems were inherently unstable.

Regarding these societies of serfs, the gutting of the middle class and the expanding inequality along with technological trends seems to have a trajectory along a vector to return us there, and the results can be expected to be as disastrous.

The United States was founded during the so-called Enlightenment with dashes of a Calvinistic work ethic and rugged independence, whatever that means. ‘Enlightenment,’ like ‘modern’, is a flattering term given to self-describe a period, but this description is mostly wishful thinking. I am not opposed to much of the thought that came from the Enlightenment, from Diderot to Locke to Montesquieu—thoughts such as freedom and separation of powers—, hijacked by the likes of Franklin and Jefferson on these shores, but they, too, were built on shaky grounds—the grounds of gods or God, and nature—, so our laws are built upon nothing; this is worse than shifting sand: at least there was sand to shift.

Language tries to obfuscate the divine with the euphemism nature. From so-called ‘natural laws’ we derive property rights, but take away the premise of natural law, and we lose the basis for such an assertion. And don’t get me started on the further foundationless logical leap to intellectual property rights.