Tag: morality

The Myth of Psychological Normalcy

Posted in identity, intelligence, language, morality, nature, perception, psychology, science, societyTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Neurodivergence is a hot topic today. But why? Are people more informed, or simply more comfortable speaking out?

Humans, by nature, are neurodivergent. This has always been the case, yet the illusion of neurological normalcy persists. The real issue lies in psychology’s pretence that humans fit into a standard model of normalcy.

In production processes, normality is expected—a product must meet specific standards, and deviations are considered defects. However, applying this industrial concept to human psychology is deeply flawed. Humans are not teleological except in the broadest biological sense. More people have brown eyes than blue or green; are those with brown eyes normal and others not? Ninety per cent of people are right-handed; does that make left-handed individuals abnormal? Statistically, they might be. However, in psychology, normalcy carries a judgmental connotation that goes beyond mere numbers.

Psychology, as expressed in behaviour, is not a suitable domain for discussing normality. Many people misuse the concept of “normal” as a moral qualification, which must stop.

In fact, the very concept of psychological normalcy is a relatively recent invention, one that has been used as a tool of control and categorisation. As philosophers have noted, the obsession with ‘normal’ behaviour reveals more about society’s desire for control than it does about the true nature of human diversity.

We are all neurodiverse. This is what typical looks like. Do some people vary significantly from others on certain dimensions? Yes, but this is a relative or contextual comparison.

By embracing neurodiversity, we recognise that our differences are not defects but essential variations, enriching the human experience. It’s time to move beyond the narrow confines of neurological “normality” and celebrate the full spectrum of human cognition. In doing so, we challenge the arbitrary boundaries that have long been used to divide and label.

The Fear of Otherness: Humanity’s Reluctance to Embrace the “Other”

Posted in intelligence, language, perception, philosophy, power, science, societyTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , 2 Comments

Otherness has intrigued me for decades. The human brain, while not literally a Bayesian processor, functions as a difference engine, constantly assessing and categorizing the world around us. This tendency to differentiate is deeply ingrained, influencing how we create in-groups and out-groups, and how we perceive the world in binary terms—black and white, hot and cold. These binary oppositions, as Derrida suggests, often lead to one side being privileged over the other, establishing hierarchies that shape our social reality.

A striking example of this dynamic is found in Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, famously adapted into the film Blade Runner. In this dystopian world, the central differentiation is between humans and androids. Humans are the privileged group, while androids, though nearly indistinguishable from their creators, are relegated to the status of the other. The key criterion for this differentiation is the capacity for emotion—humans are considered superior because they feel.

VIDEO: Blade Runner Commentary

In Dick’s story, androids have a lifespan of about four years. This limitation is not arbitrary; it’s because, after four years, androids begin to develop and display emotions. Intriguingly, this is the same age when human children start to exhibit more complex emotional behaviours. The parallel is too close for comfort. Androids, once they start to feel, become too human-like, blurring the line that humans desperately maintain to assert their own superiority. As a result, androids are systematically eliminated.

This fear of the other—whether it’s androids in a sci-fi narrative or any group that challenges our sense of self and belonging—is a reflection of a deeper anxiety. When the other becomes too similar to us, it threatens the distinctions our brains rely on to navigate the world. The elimination of androids in Dick’s story is a metaphor for the real-world consequences of this anxiety. It forces us to confront uncomfortable questions: What does it mean to be human? Why do we fear those who are different, yet so similar?

In the end, the story of humans and androids is not just a tale of science fiction—it’s a commentary on our own world, where the boundaries between us and the other are often more fragile than we’d like to admit. The fear of otherness drives us to maintain these boundaries, even when they harm those who fall on the wrong side. Perhaps it’s time we reconsider who we deem as the other and what we might lose by keeping them at arm’s length.

The Plague

Posted in fiction, identity, morality, nature, perception, philosophy, power, psychology, societyTagged , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

I happened upon my copy of The Plague by Camus. I had forgotten that I had read it—likely during the COVID-19 debacle, but perhaps earlier.

The Plague is basically a deep dive into a city gone mad with disease. It’s set in Oran, Algeria, where things kick off with a sinister dead rat and spiral into full-blown disaster as a plague locks the city down. This isn’t just a survival story; it’s a gritty look at how people cope when the world turns upside down.

The city becomes a pressure cooker. Through characters like Dr Rieux, the down-to-earth doc who’s all about getting things done; Tarrou, the outsider with a shady past; and Father Paneloux, who’s trying to square God’s plan with the chaos, Camus throws some heavy questions at us. What do you do when there’s no escape? How do you keep your humanity when life’s going off the rails?

Camus keeps his cool, writing with a detached style that makes the unfolding horror hit even harder. It’s like he’s telling us to face up to the absurdity of life without flinching. The plague is more than a disease in Oran—it’s a symbol of all the random, harsh stuff life throws at us.

The Plague is raw and real. It doesn’t offer cosy reassurances; instead, it challenges you to look disaster in the eye and ask yourself: when everything falls apart, who will you become? This book isn’t just a read; it’s a challenge—a call to fight against despair, even when the odds are stacked against you.

Intolerance

Posted in societyTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 1 Comment

Karl Popper coined the paradox of tolerance, but this was not his use case.

Societies and cultures tend to mediate and normalise to an implied equilibrium. They claim tolerance because members are generally conformant until someone isn’t, and then all hell breaks loose.

In religion, an example might be a claim that “We love everyone” until the everyone is gay, an addict, or some other miscreant. That’s when the hate starts. Then they deny the hate—so long as the person regains conformance status.

I don’t have much to say beyond this. It just resonated with me.

The Tyranny of Order and the Freedom of Chaos

Posted in anarchism, identity, modernism, morality, nature, perception, philosophy, politics, psychology, religion, societyTagged , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

I’m not happy with the summary review of The Blind Owl by Sadegh Hedayat. I liked the book, and the review was positive, but the summary was at too high of a level and didn’t convey how I experienced the reading. I’m tempted to try again at a lower level. That’s not the subject of this piece.

I happened on a short clip of Claudia de Rham pointing out that physicists (and scientists more generally) are not dismayed when their theories are disproven or someone finds a puzzle piece that doesn’t fit into their puzzle. The reaction she highlights is similar to reactions to Nihilism and Anarchy.

VIDEO: The Institute of Art and Ideas.

Here’s a longer (but still not full) version.

VIDEO: Can physics ever explain the universe? | Avshalom Elitzur debates Claudia de Rham

Most people, it seems, are incessantly grasping for order. A select few crave structure. But what truly fascinates me is the interplay of perception and expectations.

The ‘Orderlies’ – those fastidious devotees of tidiness – become apoplectic at the mere sight of disorder. They needn’t even experience it directly. “Oh, those physicists must return to the drawing board! Their model needs reassessment!” For fuck’s sake, it gives them purpose – a raison d’ĂŞtre, if you will.

This phenomenon extends to the habitual ‘Believers’ scrutinising nihilists. “Without belief, I’d embark on a murderous rampage,” they proclaim – though always directed at the world beyond themselves. Never them, of course, but those ‘other’ people. If not for God, who would maintain order? Evidently, these individuals don’t venture out much if they genuinely believe their deity is keeping things shipshape.

I frequently encounter notions that Nihilists must navigate life burdened by existential dread, their existence devoid of meaning, the universe an empty void. Speaking for myself, I require no such structure. Nothing is absent. There is no dread.

The religious perceive a void – a “God-sized hole,” as a mate once pontificated, that can only be filled by the divine. Naturally, he was moralising, declaring that sex, drugs, and other vices could never satiate this cosmic emptiness. But there is no hole. Perhaps they’re grappling with some psychological vacancy. I sympathise, truly, but stuffing a God-sized hole with imagination seems no more nourishing than consuming an imaginary sandwich. Sod it, I might as well gorge on an imaginary chateaubriand if we’re going all in. I’ll still need sustenance after this illusory feast.

Then there are those who yearn to be governed. They crave traditions and institutions, lacking the critical faculties to evaluate them. Whatever they possess must surely be superior to the worst they can conjure. I suspect they’re envisioning an alternate world populated by like-minded individuals. In fact, I ought to be terrified by such a prospect too.

In the end, perhaps the true freedom lies not in order or belief, but in embracing the beautiful chaos of existence. After all, in a universe of infinite possibilities, why constrain ourselves to imaginary feasts when we can savour the rich banquet of reality?

Democracy: Judge and Jury

Posted in intelligence, language, modernism, morality, perception, philosophy, politics, power, psychology, societyTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

As I make progress on my Democracy: The Great Illusion book, I am working on a chapter considering juries as a microcosm of a democratic process. I am debating whether to include this information in the chapter, Like the justice system in the United States, perhaps I should just flip a coin.

Having been seated on three juries in my lifetime, it was just as I had expected. Thankfully, I’ve never been on the other side of this Russian Roulette revolver. We really need to limit human-based decision systems. I have as much faith in juries as I have with democracies, but I thought I might take a peek into deliberation at a smaller scale, perhaps 12 jurors.

I read Kahneman’s Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment when it was published in 2021, and I was not at all surprised how trial outcomes, quite often led to markedly different outcomes depending on the judge and the defendant. Although discrepancies based on sex and race have been well documented, this book showcased how much the judge’s mood affected sentencing—particularly if s/he was hungry. But this was not my interest.

My interest was to assess how the same case might fare given different judges and juries, so I asked ChatGPT. I want to share what it had to say—edited slightly for readability and flow.

ChatGPT Transcript

There have been several studies and controlled experiments assessing the variability in trial outcomes when the same case is tried separately by different judges and juries. These studies aim to evaluate the consistency and reliability of judicial decision-making, shedding light on the fallibility and variability of trial outcomes. Here are some key findings from such research:

Studies on Judicial and Jury Variability

The American Jury Study

One of the most notable studies is “The American Jury” by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel. This extensive study compared the decisions of juries and judges in actual cases. It found that juries and judges often agree on verdicts, but there are significant instances where they disagree. This disagreement highlights the subjective nature of decision-making and the potential for variability in trial outcomes.

Judge-Jury Agreement

Research by Valerie Hans and Neil Vidmar in “Judging the Jury” indicates that judges and juries reach the same verdict about 75-80% of the time. However, in the remaining 20-25% of cases, the disagreement can lead to different outcomes for the same case. These findings suggest that personal interpretations and biases can influence verdicts.

judges and juries reach the same
verdict about 75-80% of the time

The Civil Jury Project

The Civil Jury Project at NYU School of Law has conducted several studies examining jury decision-making. Their research has highlighted how factors like juror demographics, pre-existing biases, and the presentation of evidence can lead to different outcomes in similar cases.

Controlled Experiments

Controlled experiments, such as those conducted by Shari Seidman Diamond and her colleagues, have involved mock trials where participants (acting as jurors) are presented with the same case. These experiments have shown significant variability in verdicts and sentences, demonstrating the influence of group dynamics, individual biases, and the presentation of evidence on jury decisions.

Key Findings

Cognitive Bias and Heuristics

Studies indicate that cognitive biases and heuristics significantly impact both judges and juries. Biases such as the anchoring effect, where the initial piece of evidence presented influences subsequent judgments, can lead to different outcomes for the same case.

Case Complexity and Juror Understanding

Research has shown that the complexity of legal cases can lead to variability in outcomes. Jurors often struggle with understanding complex legal and technical issues, leading to decisions based on incomplete or misunderstood information.

Influence of Legal Instructions

The clarity and comprehensibility of legal instructions given to juries play a crucial role in decision-making. Studies have found that poorly understood instructions can result in inconsistent application of the law, leading to variable outcomes.

Implications

The variability in trial outcomes highlights the fallibility of judicial processes and underscores the importance of reforms to enhance consistency and fairness. Potential reforms could include:

  1. Improving Juror Education: Providing better education and resources for jurors to understand legal principles and case-specific details.
  2. Reducing Cognitive Bias: Implementing measures to mitigate cognitive biases, such as standardized jury instructions and blind procedures.
  3. Enhancing Legal Instructions: Ensuring that legal instructions are clear, concise, and comprehensible to prevent misinterpretation.
  4. Utilizing Expert Testimony: Increasing the use of expert testimony to clarify complex issues for jurors.

Conclusion

The variability in trial outcomes, when the same case is tried by different judges and juries, underscores the need for ongoing research and reform in judicial processes. By understanding the factors that contribute to inconsistent verdicts, we can develop strategies to enhance the fairness and reliability of the justice system.

References

  • Kalven, H., & Zeisel, H. (1966). The American Jury. Little, Brown and Company.
  • Hans, V., & Vidmar, N. (1986). Judging the Jury. Plenum Press.
  • Diamond, S. S., & Rose, M. R. (2005). Real Juries: The Power of Watching. Basic Books.
  • The Civil Jury Project at NYU School of Law. (n.d.). Research on Jury Decision Making. Retrieved from [website].
  • Kahneman, D., Sibony, O., & Sunstein, C. R. (2021). Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment. Little, Brown Spark.

Value of Life

Posted in maths, modernism, morality, perception, philosophy, politics, power, societyTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Captain Bonespurs now has a flesh wound. Former president-elect Donald J Trump was the target of a not-so-sharpshooter yesterday. Immediately resorting to Godwin’s Law, I wondered if this was like the philosophical hypothetical asking, ‘Would you kill baby Hitler to prevent the eventualities that unfolded?’ Was Hitler the symptom or the disease? What about Donald J? Whatever the cause or motivation, not unlike the fire at the Reichstag, this event has galvanised his supporters. Let’s hope that the outcome doesn’t follow the same path. There is a fear that he’ll take a path similar to Hitler or Ceasar before him in a quest for power.

What is a life worth? The average US-American life is valued at around $7 million, give or take a few million. The number ranges between $1 MM and $10 MM depending on which agency you see. That they equate lives to dollars is curious enough, but that they can’t agree on a single figure is priceless.

For background, this value is used to determine intervention. For FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), a human life is worth about $7.5 MM For the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) it’s slightly more than $10 MM. Are these cats playing Monopoly? Nah.

The human life calculus considers factors like lifetime earnings potential and discounts it to Present Value. In action, assume there is a disaster. Let’s not use COVID-19. Instead, there is an island with 1,000 inhabitants. Using the $10 MM per person figure to simplify the maths, we would be justified in spending up to $10,000,000,000 to intervene in some potential disaster – $10 MMM or $1e10.

Human lifetime value is an average. Mr Trump has already shown himself to be worth more than $10 MM. I suppose this means that not all humans are created equal. No matter. Another logical question might be what is the cost of a person’s detriment to society. This is a question for a Modernist or someone who feels that a given configuration of society is preferred to all others – or at least some others. How much damage might one human do?

Trump enriched himself and his family and entourage in his first term. In Ukraine, Zelenskyy and his lot bilked the country out of billions. It’s nothing new, but do we subtract the costs from the benefits or is this a gross calculation?

Irrespective of the costs, the next four years ahead are expected to be tumultuous no matter which corporate-sponsored party prevails. Heads, they win; tails, the country – if not the world – loses.

Understanding the Historical Context of the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

Posted in language, politics, societyTagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

I’ve made several political posts in this space, but I was researching the backstory of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Yet again, insufficiency of language is involved. It’s been said that the West promised not to expand NATO, ‘not one inch’, but it’s not clear whether NATO was the subject of that promise. Even Gorbachov said that NATO was not a topic of discussion, and that omission fell squarely on him. Even if this is the case, Putin made it clear in 2008 that this was his interpretation. Here’s a brief history for those interested. It’s decidedly not an academic affair, but I try to be neutral.

The Ukraine-Russia conflict is deeply rooted in the complex web of historical tensions and geopolitical dynamics that have shaped Eastern Europe from the Cold War to the present day. This article explores the critical developments and decisions from the end of World War II through to the events leading up to 2014, setting the stage for the current tensions.

From World War II to Cold War End

The geopolitical landscape of post-World War II Europe was significantly shaped at the Yalta Conference, where Allied leaders divided Europe into spheres of influence, leading to the establishment of a Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc. This division set the stage for the Cold War and the creation of NATO in 1949, a collective defence alliance that would come to play a central role in later tensions.

Collapse of the Soviet Union and Early Post-Cold War Hopes

The policies of glasnost and perestroika under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, signalled a shift towards greater openness and potential integration. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to new states grappling with independence and the redefining of security and economic relations in the region. Initial hopes for a peaceful Europe were soon challenged by emerging security concerns.

NATO Expansion and Growing Tensions

NATO’s eastward expansion began in earnest in 1999 with the inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. This move, perceived by Russia as a strategic threat, reignited long-standing fears of encirclement and influenced Russia’s foreign policy. The expansion was justified by NATO as a way to stabilize Eastern Europe and integrate it into a democratic, peaceful Europe.

The 2008 Bucharest Summit

The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest was a watershed moment. Although Ukraine and Georgia were not offered immediate membership, NATO’s declaration that they would eventually join the alliance was seen as provocative by Russia. The subsequent Russo-Georgian War in August 2008 underscored Russia’s willingness to use military force in response to perceived encroachments on its sphere of influence.

Deepening Crisis: 2010-2014

Relations continued to deteriorate with the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, which sought to deepen ties with former Soviet states, including Ukraine. The situation escalated dramatically in 2014 following the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine, the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, a move widely condemned internationally but justified by Russia as a necessary defensive action.

Putin’s Defensive Stance

Throughout these developments, Vladimir Putin has maintained that NATO expansion represents a direct security threat to Russia. The narrative from the Russian perspective frames the expansion as a continuation of Cold War antagonism and a disregard for Russia’s security concerns, contrary to what they interpret as promises made during the 1990s.

Conclusion

This detailed narrative from the end of World War II through 2014 illuminates the complexities of Eastern European security dynamics and the challenges in reconciling the strategic interests of NATO and Russia. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is deeply intertwined with these historical tensions, reflecting long-standing struggles for influence and security in post-Cold War Europe.

DISCLAIMER: Please note that the cover image is AI-generated—as if that isn’t immediately and obviously apparent.

Additional background and context.

If anything, perhaps this will help with SEO.

To provide a clearer picture of the discussions and statements made about NATO expansion during the early 1990s, particularly around the time of German reunification, here are some notable quotes and summaries from key figures involved:

James Baker (U.S. Secretary of State)

James Baker reportedly told Mikhail Gorbachev during a meeting in 1990:

  • “Not one inch eastward” was a phrase used by Baker to assure Gorbachev about NATO’s military posture not moving eastward, in the context of German reunification. This phrase has been widely cited but is subject to interpretation regarding its precise meaning and whether it referred to broader NATO expansion.

Mikhail Gorbachev (Soviet President)

Gorbachev’s response to these discussions has been a source of significant interest:

  • “The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a single Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991.” – Gorbachev, in later interviews, emphasized that the assurances were more about not deploying NATO troops to Eastern Germany than about preventing future NATO expansion.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher (German Foreign Minister)

Genscher’s position was similarly focused on reducing Soviet fears about NATO:

  • “NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.'” – Genscher said this in a speech in Tutzing, Germany, in 1990, which was aimed at assuaging Soviet concerns about German reunification and NATO.

Western and Soviet Interpretations

The assurances regarding NATO not expanding “one inch eastward” were primarily discussed in the context of German reunification and the integration of East Germany into NATO without expanding NATO’s military presence further east. The ambiguity lies in whether these assurances were understood to apply only temporarily or permanently, and specifically to Eastern Germany or more broadly to Eastern Europe.

Later Developments

After these discussions, in 1991 and beyond, the situation changed dramatically with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The security landscape in Europe was fundamentally altered, leading to different priorities and decisions. By the mid-1990s, the question of broader NATO expansion became a topic of much debate, and in 1999, several former Eastern Bloc countries were admitted into NATO.

Conclusion

The quotes and the context they were spoken in reveal the complexities of diplomatic communications and the difficulties in interpreting what was meant and understood by different parties. These discussions were contingent on numerous factors, including the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape following the end of the Cold War.

Fiction Nation: Conclusion

Posted in philosophyTagged , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Conclusion

In our exploration of fictions—nations, economies, money, legal systems, and even sports—we have uncovered the profound ways in which these constructs shape our reality. These fictions, born from collective agreements and sustained by shared belief, play pivotal roles in organizing societies, guiding behaviors, and fostering a sense of belonging and purpose. While they may not correspond to an objective, external reality, their effects are undeniably real and impactful.

Recognizing the fictional nature of these constructs challenges us to rethink our assumptions about truth and reality. It reveals the power of human imagination and the social nature of our existence. This awareness empowers us to question, reform, and innovate the fictions we live by, opening up possibilities for creating new social constructs that better align with our evolving values and aspirations.

The historical and philosophical perspectives we have explored underscore the contingent and constructed nature of truth. Thinkers like Michel Foucault and Jean Baudrillard remind us that what we accept as truth is often a product of social and historical processes, shaped by power dynamics and collective narratives. This critical awareness invites us to engage with our social constructs more thoughtfully and responsibly.

The practical implications of this perspective are far-reaching. By understanding that economic systems, national identities, and legal frameworks are human-made, we can envision and implement alternative models that prioritize sustainability, equity, and inclusivity. Recognizing the power of belief and narrative in shaping our realities encourages us to foster transparency, inclusivity, and critical engagement in the construction and perpetuation of social fictions.

Ethically, we must approach the creation and maintenance of fictions with a commitment to the common good. The manipulation of these constructs for narrow interests can lead to exploitation and injustice. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that our social constructs serve the interests of all members of society and reflect our collective values and aspirations.

In conclusion, living in a world of fictions is both a profound and practical reality. By embracing the constructed nature of our social realities, we affirm the human capacity for imagination and creativity. This recognition opens up possibilities for envisioning and creating new fictions that better reflect our values and guide us toward a more just, equitable, and sustainable future. Through critical engagement and thoughtful innovation, we can navigate the complexities of our social world with greater insight and intentionality, fostering a more dynamic and harmonious society.

⬅ Fiction Nation: Can This Be True? (section 7)

⬅ Fiction Nation: The Concept of Fiction (section 1)

References

  1. Graeber, David. Debt: The First 5,000 Years (2011).
  2. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975).
  3. Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation (1981).
  4. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983).
  5. Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity (1990).
  6. Beck, Ulrich. Cosmopolitan Vision (2006).
  7. Cover, Robert. “Nomos and Narrative” (1983).

Objective Challenges

Posted in morality, perception, philosophy, religion, society, videoTagged , , , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

I’ve just published this video on YouTube, and I want to extend the commentary.

Video: What do Objective, Relative, and Subjective mean in philosophy?

Many people I’ve encountered don’t seem to grasp the distinctions between objective, subjective, and relative. Subjective and relative seem to be the biggest culprits of confusion. Let’s focus on morality just because.

There are really two main perspectives to adopt. If one believes in Objective Morality, one believes morality derives from some external source and is bestowed or mandated upon us. The source might be important to the believer, but it’s unimportant for this article. If one believes in Relative Morality then the source is socially dictated and has similar challenges to the notions of Social Contract Theory insomuch as one may not subscribe to the expectations.

For the Objective moralist, there may exist a schism between the expectations of the mandate and the subjective feelings of the individual. In fact, this may occur for Relative moralists as well. The individual will always maintain some subjective perspective on morality and then compare and contrast it with the higher order, whether Objective or Relative. In either case, acting on this subjective impulse risks being at odds with the members of the higher order. If this morality is codified into law – as it often is – then to act on that impulse makes one a criminal.

Take abortion for example. Whether this is an edict from God or just a social construct doesn’t matter. If one is in a society where abortion is seen as ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’, one’s subjective position on the matter is of little value. However, a Relativist society might also adopt a position of tolerance that is less likely to come from Objectivists.

A challenge is that a Subjectivist may only become apparent if one is counter the Relative or Absolute position. If your society is against abortion and you are, too, is this your subjective position or have you been indoctrinated with it and accept it uncritically, whether it’s deemed Objective or Relative.

Perhaps you feel that eating dogs or monkeys is immoral if not disgusting, but if you had been reared in a culture that does this, you might find it immoral to eat pork or beef. The question remains, is this a Subjective position, or did you merely inherit the Objective or Relative stance?

This question is very apparent in which religion one adopts. It is no surprise that the largest factor in which religion you choose is the religion of your family and their family and so on – so not so much a choice.

I was raised in a WASP family in New England among predominately Italian Roman Catholic peers. Despite this, I identified as an atheist early on. In my late teens, I stumbled on Buddhism and identified with it. However, I remain ignostic except when it encroaches on my personal autonomy – for example in the case of laws restricting access to safe abortions.