The Architecture of Encounter

A Mediated Encounter Ontology

Bry Willis

Philosophics Press ◐ 2026

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without prior written permission of the author, except for brief quotations used in reviews, criticism, or scholarly discussion.

First Edition

ISBN (Hardback): 978-1-972025-02-4
ISBN (Paperback): 978-1-972025-03-1

© 2026 Bry Willis

ORCiD: 0009-0005-0016-5694

Published by *Philosophics Press*,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Printed in the country of distribution
< philosophics.blog >

Library of Congress Control Number (LCCN): 2026906470

Subjects:

Ontology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of language
Knowledge, theory of

LCC: BD111

Index

A

affordance, 30, 37, 39–40, 44–45, 47, 64, 69, 79–89, 140, 144, 150, 154, 171–173, 175, 180, 184–185, 187, 193–195, 198, 200
  encounter-constituted gradients, 81, 88, 150, 180
  salience-weighted affordance structure, 82–83, 89, 195
agency without substance, 44, 194
AI-mind discourse, 40, 151, 154, 159, 164, 180–182
apophatic mind, 40, 153, 155, 157, 159, 161, 163
apophatic tradition, 156, 159
aspectual designation, 5, 12, 193
autopoiesis, 37, 89

B

bandwidth problem, 70, 94, 109–110, 114, 120, 123, 182–183
Bergson, Henri, 18, 103, 199
Bhaskar, Roy, 24, 199
binding problem, 85–86, 204
Brandom, Robert, 54, 62, 199–200

C

Chalmers, David, 162, 200
Clark, Andy, 84, 89, 200
cognitivism / non-cognitivism, 168–176
coherence grammar, 54–55, 58–63, 150, 180, 194
collective stabilisation, 74, 76
compression, 11, 18, 41–44, 47–49, 56, 62–63, 68–71, 74–75, 97–98, 103, 106–107, 111, 114, 125, 132, 144, 180, 183, 185–186, 194–196
  lossy compression, 114
  epistemic loss, 68, 71–72, 75, 195
constraint, 2, 4–7, 9–12, 16–24, 26–30, 36–41, 44–45, 47–49, 54–63, 68–76, 80–87, 89–90, 94–99, 105, 107–114, 120–131, 133–135, 140–151, 154, 160, 168–170, 172–173, 175–176, 180–187, 192–198
  as patterned invariance, 6, 29, 141
  constraint-pattern, 5–6, 17, 19–20, 23–24, 26–27, 29, 37, 39, 44, 55–56, 59–63, 71–73, 75–76, 81–84, 86–87, 90, 95, 97–99, 105, 107–108, 110, 114, 123, 125–129, 131, 134, 141–145, 147–151, 173, 175, 183, 193–198
  constraint transmission, 12, 29, 61–63, 193
  constraint-cluster, 23, 39, 55, 113, 124, 133
constructivism, 18–20, 26–27, 140–141, 146, 151, 197
convergence realism, 140–141, 145, 148–149, 151, 154, 170–171, 185, 198
convergent stability, 23, 73, 144–145, 147–148, 151, 195, 197
cross-modal integration, 85

cross-perspectival convergence, 139, 141

D

declarative ontology, 121
deflationary accounts, 12, 27–28
Dennett, Daniel, 45, 48–49, 161, 200
double-entry ledger, 157
durative grammar, 102

E

ecological psychology, 80, 88, 184
effectiveness gradient, 47, 72, 75, 97, 106, 108, 110, 112, 114, 123–124, 129–130, 135, 144, 175, 183, 196
eliminativism, 48–49
enactivism, 68, 84, 184, 202
encoding, 22, 42, 46, 48–49, 58, 72, 75–76, 83, 87, 89, 96, 100–101, 103–113, 123–124, 126, 131–133, 135, 148, 150, 160, 170–171, 181, 185, 195
encounter pressure, 54–55, 57–58, 61–63, 68–76, 85, 89, 99, 140, 150, 154
encounter-event, 3–12, 16, 21, 27–28, 36–37, 42, 44, 60, 63, 81, 95, 104, 122, 127, 146, 169–171, 185, 187, 192–193, 195, 197
  individuation of, 8
  as structured relational occurrence, 4, 11, 22, 192
encounter-organisation, 5, 8, 16, 20–21, 26, 28, 40, 46–47, 82, 85, 88–89, 122, 124–125, 145–146, 157–158, 162–164, 168, 172, 181, 183
epistemic confidence, 75, 148
epistemic selection, 69
explanatory gap, 162–163, 202

F

false convergence, 108–109, 120, 123, 125, 128–129, 132, 171, 196
filtering does not imply fabrication, 19, 26, 29, 149, 151, 193
fluency tax, 113, 115, 181
free-energy principle, 201
Frege-Geach problem, 170

G

Gibson, James J., 79–82, 88, 184, 201
grammatical trap, 159
Grice, H. P., 96–97, 201

H

Habermas, Jürgen, 99, 130, 201
hard problem of consciousness, 2, 100, 114, 162–163, 168, 176, 180, 186
Heidegger, Martin, 40, 73, 82, 100, 201
heuristic container, 161–162, 164
Hume, David, 12, 27, 168, 201

I

idealism, 2–3, 6, 12, 24–25, 83, 100–101, 140, 168, 180, 186, 192
indexical compression, 41, 49, 194
inferentialism, 62, 70
institutional persistence, 125
invariant anchor, 18, 23, 29, 139, 141, 150, 154, 180

K

Kant, Immanuel, 20, 146, 151, 192, 197, 202
Korzybski, Alfred, 67, 153, 167, 202

L

Ladyman, James, 4, 17, 19, 202
Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (LIH), 95, 107–109, 111, 114, 182–183, 196
Latour, Bruno, 121, 202
linguistic relativity, 99, 101, 202

M

Maturana, Humberto, 37, 88, 202
mediation, 3–12, 17–20, 23–24, 26–29, 39, 41, 44, 46–47, 54–55, 57, 69–71, 73–76, 81–83, 85–88, 94–95, 97–99, 105–109, 113–114, 122–123, 125, 129–131, 134, 140–149, 151, 158, 169, 180, 192–193, 195–197
  biological, 5
  cognitive, 5, 122
  linguistic-cultural, 4–5, 26, 88, 192
  as constitutive condition, 5, 11, 192
MEOW (Mediated Encounter Ontology of the World), 2–11, 16–24, 26–30, 36–45, 48, 54–60, 62, 68–70, 72–73, 75, 80–89, 97–101, 104, 107, 114, 120–127, 130, 133–134, 140–148, 151, 154–155, 158, 160–163, 168–170, 172–173, 175, 183, 197–198
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 82, 203
mind-world bifurcation, 24, 80, 100–101, 114, 140, 176, 180
modal differentiation, 35, 37, 39–42, 46–49, 54, 71, 74, 84–87, 89, 144, 150, 182, 184, 187, 193–194

N

Nagel, Thomas, 5, 73, 203
normativity frontier, 133, 168–169, 171, 173–175, 177, 182–183, 187–188, 198
noumenal-phenomenal distinction, 20, 146, 155, 160–161, 163–164

O

object-grammar, 60–61
ontic structural realism (OSR), 4, 19–21, 29
ontological grammar, 24–25, 42, 46–47, 49, 58–60, 63, 68, 75–76, 89, 93–95, 99–105, 108–114, 123–125, 129–130, 132–134, 146, 154–155, 159–161, 164, 169–171, 175–176, 181–182, 187, 195–196
ontology/model distinction, 19
overestimation gap, 108, 113, 125, 130–131

P

panpsychism, 8, 195
Peirce, Charles S., 59, 67, 74–75, 139, 167, 203
perception without representation, 84
perceptual variation, 86
phenomenal presentation, 8, 158, 160–161, 163–164, 183, 195
Pinker, Steven, 97, 203

predictive processing, 84, 89, 184
presentational structure, 7–8, 11–12, 46, 160, 192, 195
process metaphysics, 18, 25, 101
Putnam, Hilary, 3, 54, 60, 73, 98, 145, 155, 203

Q

qualia, 147, 155, 202
Quine, W. V. O., 9, 54, 100, 143, 203

R

realism-idealism dispute, 2–3, 12, 24–25, 101, 168, 180, 186
reification error, 158
relata, 4, 13, 21–24, 30, 100, 104, 114, 180, 192
representation, 3, 54, 62, 68, 72–73, 76, 80, 84–89, 94, 110, 195
Rorty, Richard, 3, 20, 68, 203
Rovelli, Carlo, 28, 184, 188, 204

S

salience, 30, 36–42, 44, 47, 49, 71, 82–83, 89, 144, 180, 185, 194–195
scale-dependence, 16–17, 23, 29, 36, 39, 113, 140, 145, 147, 180, 193
Scott, James C., 123, 204
Searle, John, 121–122, 134, 155, 196, 204
second-order constraint system, 36, 47, 109, 120–123, 128, 134, 150, 154, 173, 175–176, 181, 196
self-maintenance, 37–41, 44–49, 68, 80–81, 83, 85, 89, 158, 180, 193–194
Sellars, Wilfrid, 20, 70, 204
Shannon, Claude, 96–97, 204
stabilisation, 16–18, 23, 29–30, 36, 39, 41, 47, 54–59, 61–63, 68–76, 80, 84–85, 89, 94–99, 105–110, 112, 114, 124–126, 128–132, 140, 145, 150, 154, 171, 173, 175, 180, 185, 193, 195–198
substance ontology, 9, 16, 21–22, 24–25, 30, 37, 45–49, 59, 94, 100, 102–103, 113–114, 122, 124, 140, 158, 164, 174, 181, 187, 192
substrate-neutrality, 37–38, 40, 49, 89, 155, 182
synchronisation protocol, 36, 46–47, 72, 87, 94, 96–97, 105–106, 110–111, 114, 120, 123, 125, 127, 135, 150, 171–173, 175, 180
synchronisation repair, 126, 128, 133–134

T

temporal organisation, 28–29, 197
Thompson, Evan, 37, 68, 88, 204
Turing, Alan, 155
Turner, Denys, 156

V

van Fraassen, Bas, 146
Varela, Francisco, 37, 68, 88, 202

W

Whitehead, Alfred North, 8, 15, 18
Whorf, Benjamin Lee, 25, 99, 101
Willis, Bry, 2, 107, 170
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 73, 93, 100, 133

About the Author

Bry Willis is an independent philosopher whose work explores the cracks in language, objectivity, and meaning. He writes at the intersection of philosophy of language, meta-philosophy, and social epistemology, often testing how concepts fracture under pressure. His essays – such as *Objectivity Is Illusion: An Operating Model of Social and Moral Reasoning* – trace how consensus masquerades as truth and how rhetoric, power, and perspective shape what we call knowledge. He manages the *Philosophics Blog* and publishes literary speculative non-fiction under the pseudonym Ridley Park.

Other Titles by Bry Willis

Books:

A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis: Mapping the Boundaries of Linguistic Expression
ISBN: 978-0-9710869-4-4

When Language Fails: Ontological Pluralism and the Limits of Moral Resolution
ISBN: 978-0-9710869-4-4

Illusions of Light: Thinking After the Enlightenment
ISBN: 978-0-9710869-7-5

Meditations on Nothing: Notes Before Existence
ISBN: 978-0-9710869-5-1

Meditations on Nothing: A Companion Guide
ISBN: 978-0-9710869-6-8

Essays by Bry Willis

Essays are available as open-access publications through Zenodo.

The Anti-Enlightenment Essays:

Against Agency: The Fiction of the Autonomous Self

Competency, Proxies, and Political Standing: A Conceptual Diagnosis or On the Rhetoric of Democratic Inclusion

Moral Universality and Its Discontents: A Critical Examination of Normative Ethics' Conceptual Foundations

Objectivity Is Illusion: An Operating Model of Social and Moral Reasoning
Rational Ghosts: Why Enlightenment Democracy Was Built to Fail
Temporal Ghosts: The Tyranny of the Present
The Discipline of Dis-Integration: Philosophy Without Redemption
The Fact of the Matter: After Bernard Williams – Truthfulness, Facts, and the Myth of Immediacy
The Great Substitution: From Metaphysics to Metaphysics The Grammar of Impasse – Causal Mislocation
The Grammar of Impasse – Conceptual Exhaustion The Myth of Homo Normalis: Archaeology of the Legible Human

The Will to Be Ruled: Totalitarianism and the Fantasy of Freedom

OTHER ESSAYS:

Disagreement Without Referees: Ontological Incommensurability and the Limits of Moral Adjudication
Grammatical Failure: Why Liberal Epistemology Cannot Diagnose Indoctrination
Illegible Futures: Affective Legibility and the Governance of Optimism
Language As Interface: Underconstraint, Genealogy, and Moral Incommensurability
Quand le langage fonctionne sans trancher : Indétermination structurelle et termes normatifs en contexte pluraliste Seeing Like a System: High Modernism, Legibility, and the Limits of Intelligent Robotics
The Mediated Encounter Ontology of the World: A Relational Metaphysics Beyond Mind and World
The Expiration Date of Object Permanence: Heuristics, Grammar, and Quantum Pseudoproblems
Truth After Deflation: Why Truth Resists Stabilisation
The Rhetoric of Evil: How a Theological Artefact Survived Secular Moral Thought
When Syntax Is Asked to Bear Too Much: The Frege–Geach Problem and the Limits of Linguistic Invariance

Connect

Further work: philosophics.blog
Inquiries: talk@philosophics.blog *or* microglyphics@gmail.com

Philosophics Press

Philosophics Press publishes works that inhabit the fault lines between philosophy, literature, and design. Founded as an imprint of Microglyphics, it exists to sustain thought outside the economies of visibility and prestige – to print, quite literally, what persists when systems fail.